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This study addresses the contemporary conflict of national identity in Sudan between the adherents 
of „Islamic nationalism‟ and „customary secularism‟. The former urge the adoption of a national 
constitution that derives its civil and criminal laws from Sharia (Islamic law) and Arabic be the 
language of instruction in national institutions of Sudan. The group argues that the intertwined 
model of the Islamic-Arab cultural identity accelerates assimilation of the heterogeneous African 
ethnic and religious diversities in Sudan into a homogeneous national identity defining Sudan as an 
Islamic-Arab state. The latter demand the adoption of secular laws, which must be derived from the 
diverse set of customary laws and equal opportunities for all African languages beside Arabic and 
English. The group claims that the adoption of the Islamic laws and Arabic legalises the treatment 
of the citizens in the country in terms of religion and race and that implies racism and 
discrimination. In this way, the adherents of the Islamic nationalism imposed the Islamic-Arab 
model. In reaction, the Muslims and the non-Muslim secularists resort to violence as an alternative 
model of resistance. In pursuance of war, the Islamists declared Jihad against the secularists in 
Nuba Mountains, South Blue Nile (Ingessana) and adopt the racial war in Darfur. In this region, the 
janjaweed (armed Arab militias) in Darfur fight inclusively the insurgents and the indigenous 
African Muslims in Darfur in equal terms. This form of war has caused a humanitarian disaster in 
this region. The method of the research is qualitative and its main primary source material was 
based on a survey conducted among students of five universities in Sudan. Prepared and organised 
questionnaires in English and Arabic were given to five hundred students. Participant observation, 
interviews and relevant secondary sources were also used. The findings of the study indicate that 
every religion and culture in Sudan provides a set of regulations which promote political ethics of 
cultural and religious diversities as well as equal distribution of power and national wealth. The new 
emerging phenomenon that attempts to project religion as the source of human insecurity and 
injustice embodies some psychological and ideological orientations emanating from human nature 
and not the historical religions of God. It recommends the durable resolutions taking into 
consideration the diverse theoretical models for the formation of a nation-state, where the diversity 
is not discouraged; instead states apply laws which promote religious and ethnic diversities within 
one territorial state. The insistence of the Islamists on the application of the Islamic law and 
marginalisation of the non-Arab groups in Darfur, Eastern Sudan of Beja, Ingessana of South Blue 
Nile and Nuba Mountains threaten the territorial integrity of the state. The secession of South Sudan 
from the current Sudan in the internationally surpvised referendum in January 2011 was a paradigm 
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Sudan remains an unstable state with cycles of ruthless civil wars
1
 that devastate its infrastructure
2
, 
threaten its territorial integrity
3





 The objectives of these wars emanate from religious, economic and 
cultural settings. In the Northern Sudan, the Islamic religion is associated with the Arabic language, 
culture and race, due to its association with the Middle East. On the other hand, the concerns of the 
population of the South consist of economic deprivation of its region, limited participation in power 
sharing and the systematic threats to its Christian, Animist and African cultural identity.
6
  
   This research explores how decision-makers in Sudan address these complex objectives in a 
national constitution for the citizens. Since, 1958 to present day, major political parties in Sudan fail 
several times to reach a consensus to legislate a unified constitutional system. The Islamic political 
parties of Umma with its sect, Ansar, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) with its al-Khatimyyia sect 
and the National Islamic Front (NIF), which has rifted into the National Congress Party (NCP) and 
currently leads by the President Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir and the Popular Congress Party 
(PCP), under the leadership of Hassan Abdullah Turabi all from the North of Sudan urge the 
adoption of Sharia, (Islamic law) to be a source of legislation and Arabic an official language in a 
national constitution
.7
 On the other hand, the political parties of secular Muslims from Nuba 
Mountains and „Christian Animist‟ of the South, especially the Sudan People‟s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) with its military wing, the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) support the 
 
 
1 Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. “The Sudan People‟s liberation Army & the Problem of Factionalism” in Christopher 
Clamham (ed.) (1998). African Guerrillas, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 60-61. Civil violence in Sudan 
started in 1955 and ended in 1972 and resumed in 1983.   
2 Leopold, Mark (2005). Inside West Nile, Violence, History & Representation on an African Frontier, Oxford: James 
Currey p. 23. Heavy tank tracks of the SPLA towards Yei in South Sudan chewed the tarmac road of Arua and the 
Government of Sudan long range artillery shelled the town of Koboko. 
3 The Machakos Protocol signed between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan in 2003, p. 8. Machakos provides 
self determination to the people of Southern Sudan to choose between separation and unity with Sudan.  
4 Prunier, Gerard (2007). Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide, London: Hurst & Company, p. 54. 
5 Meyer, Gabriel (20059). War and Faith in Sudan, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, p. 25. A 
report published by the US Committee for Refugees states that over all the Sudanese war-related death toll for those 
years is more than 2.5 million.  
6 Iyob, Ruth and Khadiagala, Gilbert M (2007). Sudan the Elusive Quest for Peace, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
p. 178.  The Northern Sudan monopolises power, wealth including oil that is mostly produced from the South and 
strives to assimilate the African population of the country into the Islamic Arab image. 
7 Prunier, Gerard op. cit., President Al-Bashir heads the National Congress Party and Turabi heads the Popular 





legislation of religious and ethnic diversities which must be derived from the diverse set of 
customary laws.
8
 (See appendix 3 for more information about the historical background of this 
conflict). „Islamic fundamentalism‟ is an ideology, which claims that a just society must base its 
constitution on Sharia. National laws for such a society are derived from three sources: Holy Quran, 
Hadith refers to all examples of the Prophet Muhammed and the precedents, which the recognised 
Islamic scholars interpret in consensus.
9
 The followers of Animism, however, believe that the social 
structure of society is compatible with powers, which live in natural phenomena, such as animals, 
trees, mountains and rivers. These beings affect people for both good and bad, but believers refrain 
from recognising them as God, and hence, they are not worshiped, but respected.
10
    
   There is no consensus among scholars over what term best describes these beliefs in Sudan. Some 
call them „Animism‟ and others call them traditional or „theistic‟ religions. For instance, Nikkel 
defines the Dinka ethnic group of South Sudan, as followers of “Powers”
11
; An-Na‟im describes 
them as mainly Animists
12
and Johnson rejects all these descriptions defining them as „pejorative‟ 
and asserts that the population in the South adheres to “theistic religions.”
13
  
   With all the platitude and pejorative descriptions to the term Animist, this study adopts it, because 







 and it argues that such diversity of religious beliefs constitutes the essence of identity and 
the institutions created after independence of Sudan from Great Britain on 1 January 1956, have 
neglected to incorporate it into a national constitution of the state. Muslim scholar
17
 T Abdou 
Maliqalim Simone points out that the legislative power in Sudan does not represent the prevailing 
 
 
8Deng, Francis Mading (1995). War of Visions Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, Washington D.C: Brookings 
Institution, p. 21. 
9Brown, Daniel (1996). Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
1-3. 
10 Voll, John Obert and Voll, Sarah Potts (1985). The Sudan, Unity and Diversity in Multicultural State, London: 
Boulder Co., pp. 22-3. 
11 Nikkel, Marc R (2001). Dinka Christianity the Origin and Development of Christianity among the Dinka of Sudan 
with Special Reference to the Song of Dinka Christians, Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, p. 20. 
12 An-Na‟im, Abdullahi Ahmed (ed.) (1993). Proselytization and Communal Self- Determination in Africa, New York: 
Maryknoll, p. 12. 
13 Johnson, Douglas Hamilton (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan‟s Civil Wars, Oxford: James Currey, p. xviii. 
14 Evans-Pritchard, Evans (1940). The Nuer a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a 
Nilotic Peoples, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 46. 
15 Meyer, Gabriel (2005). War and Faith in Sudan, Micchigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Compnay, p.67. 
16 Kebbede, Girma (1999). Sudan‟s Predicament Civil War, Displacement and Ecological Degradation, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, p. p. 4. 
17 Simone, T Abdou Maliqalim (1994). In Whose Image? Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan, Chicago: The 





religious and cultural diversity in national institutions. It aims to transform the whole country 
towards one religious character based on Islam. For instance, in September 1983, the former 
President Ja‟afer Muhammad Nimeiri imposed Sharia that applies hudud, a formal legal code that 
stones to death a married woman proved guilty of adultery, amputates cross limbs of a thief found 
guilty of stealing and whips any person found drinking alcohol. Simone concludes that such a law 
proves „unpopular‟ and intensifies the civil violence in the country between its opponents, the 
Christians and Animists and its advocates, the Muslim fundamentalists.
18
  For Hassan Makki 
Mohammad, a Sudanese “Islamist”
19
scholar, introduction of Sharia in national institutions of Sudan 
is a significant decision. He claims that the Christian missionaries have not given sufficient 
opportunity to Islamic Arab culture in the South to be legislated as a unifying factor for Sudan‟s 
national identity. Mohammad concludes that it is time now to allow Islam to take its course in 
transforming Sudan‟s national identity.
20
  
   Two scholars, however, consider the transformation of Sudan into the Islamic and Arab cultural 
identity as an exclusion of other parameters of peculiar cultures in the country. First, Abdullahi 
Ahmed An‟Naim, a Sudanese Professor of Islamic Law at Emory University School of Law in 
Atlanta
21
argues that the ideological concept of the NIF party, which intends to transform all public 
institutions of Sudan, towards „Islamic fundamentalism‟ is a difficult legislative task to pass without 
counterforce of a serious resistance from the Christians and the Animists of the South. This group 
has derived its modern national identity from the secular Christian West. An‟Naim concludes that 
therefore, it is not easy to address the question of a national constitutional system within the status 
quo of the NIF definition.
22
 Second, Francis Mading Deng, former Professor of Political Science at 
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, USA and currently the United Nations (UN) 
Secretary General Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide argues that the adoption of 
„Islamic fundamentalism‟ in Sudan aggravates the crisis of national identity in the country. The 
SPLM, which is a radical organisation, where the majority of its members are Christians and 
 
 
18 Op. cit., p. 26.  
19 Middle East (Spring 2003). “Sudanese Muslims, Christians Discuss „Co-living and a Culture of Peace‟”, the Middle 
East Council of Churches News Report, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 3. “Dr. Hassan Makki Mohammad, a Sudanese professor 
argues that globalisation of culture; politics and economic impoverishment of the marginalised and helpless community 
have had a disturbing effect on social peace in Sudan”.  
20 Mohammad, Hassan Makki (1989). Sudan: The Christian Design, London: Islamic Foundation, p. 76.  
21 An‟Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed (Summer 2003).  Re-affirming Secularism for Islamic Societies, New. Perspective 
Quarterly, Vol. 7. An‟Naim, a Sudanese Islamic Jurist at Emory University in New York, USA, pp. 1-2.  
22 An‟Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed (ed.) (1999). Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, New York: 





Animists from the South considers it as assimilation and adopts an unwavering position in resisting 
it. Deng concludes that the ideological assimilation of „Arabisation and Islamisation‟ that favours 
the Arab religion and culture over the African, religions and cultures in a national constitution of 
state is the basic issue that causes political crisis between the Arabised Muslims of the North and 
the African Christians and Animists of the South.
23
 
The legislation of „Arabisation and Islamisation‟ with intent to unify ethnic and religious diversities 
in Sudan implies coercion to assimilation of other cultures into Islamism and Arabism. This legal 
approach does not evolve the essential diverse religious and racial identities of Sudan. Instead, it 
represents a racial discrimination to the followers of Christianity, Animism and Muslims from the 
non-Arabs in national institutions of Sudan. Its implementation in public institutions causes 
inexorable rebellion and resistance from the indigenous non-Arab ethnic groups of Darfur, Beja 
along the Red Sea, Nuba in Nuba Mountains and South Sudan. According to de Waal, the NIF party 
endeavours to construct a system that is entirely based on Islam, which is transformed into Arab 
racism. This racial transformation has caused a departure of some Muslim politicians of the non-
Arab origin from the NIF such as Daud Bolad from the Fur of Darfur. Bolad served this party, since 
his student‟s career and developed consciousness of systematic Muslim-Arabs racial practices 
against the non-Arabs‟ Muslims and the non-Muslims in the distribution of power and wealth in the 
state. At last, he rebelled and joined the SPLM, a radical political organisation largely composed of 
Christians and Animists from the South, which rejects Islamisation and Arabisation and from there, 
Bolad promulgated that Islam is not free from the traditional racism of Muslim Arabs in Sudan.
24
  
   The phenomenon of racial discrimination in Islamic religion to the Muslim Africans and non-
Muslim Africans in sharing power and wealth in national institutions in Sudan is the case study for 
this research. The study is composed of six chapters and a conclusion. The empirical foundation of 
the research commences at chapter one, where the analysis based on the theoretical framework 
rejects the claim that the colonial British policy of the „Closed District Ordinance‟ of 1922 is the 
essential cause of the successive civil wars in Sudan. During that time, the colonial power prevented 
Muslim Arabs from entering the South, unless a visitor first obtained a permit from the colonial 
authority. The study argues that the civil violence in Sudan is a conflict of dynamic discrimination 
and racism based on the inter-independent ideological „Arabisation and Islamisation‟ of Sudan‟s 
 
 
23 Deng, Francis Mading (1995). War of Visions Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, Brookings Institution: Washington: 
D C, p. 12. 





national structures. This ideology discriminates against the assimilated non-Arabs to Islam equally 
with the non-Muslims in favour of Muslim Arabs in the distribution of power and national wealth. 
Thus, the victims of discrimination collectively resort to violence as a form of resistance. The 
research adopts the theory of Benedict Anderson of „imagined community‟ as an alternative model 
in explaining the diverse religious and ethnic composition of Sudan. This theory helps the diverse 
religious and ethnic groups of Sudan to imagine themselves in the way they think of themselves. In 
this chapter, the emergence of two conflicting ideological schools of thought among the decision-
makers in Sudan is plausibly discussed. The first school is the Islamic ideological one and its 
adherents are defined as ethnic territorial nationalists and the second is the secularist school and its 
adherents are labeled as ethnic territorial national pluralists. The former asserts un-wavering 
position for the adoption of Sharia and Arabic as fundamental sources of laws for a national 
constitution. The latter places a perpetual resistance against these sources and urges the adoption of 
a secular constitution free from religious canon law and Sharia.  
   Chapter two shows that the present ideological schools were initially established at the first 
setting of Sudan, under the basis of social and political inclusion and exclusion. The current 
pluralists‟ populations in South Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Darfur at the west were excluded from 
building the national institutions of state. Successive powers from the nationalist ideological school 
constructed these regions as economic sources, where slaves were accessed. This phenomenon has 
built mistrust between the centre and the periphery populations and makes it impossible to reach a 
consensus in common economic plan for the state, except for the racial stereotype of the „lost 
brothers‟. The school of ethnic territorial nationalism mainly from the centre of Sudan labels the 
non-Muslims in the South of Sudan as „lost brothers‟, because of their resistance to Islam and they 
remain largely Animists and Christians, until today, and for this reason, the nationalists described 
them as „lost‟ people on the way to heaven.  
   Chapter three provides the historical continuity of racial categories of the construction of Sudan 
into „Islamic Arab North Region‟ and the African „Pagans and Slaves‟ of the South. Power applied 
intertwined Islam and Arab as a model of making ethnic and religious uniformity. Under this 
circumstance, the regions of the African Muslims of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Beja, centre 
far north and east became the „Northern Sudan of Muslim Arab Region‟ to the exclusion of the 
Christian and Animist South. Currently, this unified region is experiencing political fragmentation. 
The non-Arabs‟ Muslim regions rebelled, under the allegation that the nationalists‟ school in 
dominant of power discriminates against them in religion, Islam. It drops Islam as an inclusive 





region is undergoing a series of racial divisions leading to the current deadly and unsettled violence 
in the vast region of Darfur.    
   Nonetheless, the chapter discusses further discrimination as new opinions urge the change of the 
territorial name Sudan to Thudan emerge from the majority of the Nilotic-speaking community 
from the South. The Nilotic students argue that the name Sudan represents discrimination, since its 
origin comes from the Arabic word, „black‟, a perpetual downtrodden slave in the classical 
ideological interpretation of the Muslim Arabs. Others claim that, it promotes an assimilation to the 
model of Arabisation, since the initial „S‟ in „Sudan‟ is a missing sound in their environmental 
linguistic forms.  
   Chapter four deals with the dilemmas of Muslim Arabs in South Sudan between the wealth 
derived from trafficking in the native populations as slaves and the conversion of these Animists to 
the Islamic religion. Alternatively, Muslim Arabs chose to become slavers, rather than, missionaries 
to propagate Islam to convert the non-Muslim natives in the South to Islam. They chose so, because 
conversion would have emancipated the Animists from slavery bondage, because Islam sanctions 
enslavement of a Muslim by another Muslim. Such experiences of the past interactions have only 
created a wrong image of Islam, and hence, the Animists remain aggressive to the Islamic religion, 
until the present time.     
   Chapter five focuses on the attempt of the adherents of ethnic territorial nationalism to impose the 
model of assimilation on these resisting non-Muslims and non-Arabs into Islam through a unified 
national constitution, where its laws are derived from Sharia and Arab language. The group, 
however, has already adopted Christianity and Animism as its religions and radically urges the 
adoption of secular laws. At this juncture, the objective dichotomy between the ideological 
discourses of these schools develops parallel and in turn, the Islamic group in power resorts to 
„anomia‟ assimilation, while its opponents, the secularists urge for the „gradable‟ assimilation. The 
former is referred to a form of an assimilation that totally eradicates cultural, ethnic and religious 
differences and inserts Islamic uniformity through different methods, including legal ones and 
violence against the dissidents. The latter is an assimilation that does not remove fully the existing 
diversity; instead, it makes it possible for the ethnic Muslim Africans, the Animist Africans and the 
Christian Africans to live in the country with the Muslim Arabs and Christians, where each group 
takes a „gradable‟ culture of another. In comparative study of „gradable antonyms‟, the opposite of 
big is not necessarily to be small, it can be medium. In this context, the assimilation of the non-





interaction of non-Muslims with Muslims at the public spaces allow each one to take a part of 
cultural identity from the other.     
   Chapter six discusses the climax of this assimilation between the two schools of thought leading 
to the armed violence and the production of new political ideologies of „New Sudan‟ and tawajha 
al-hathari (orientation project). New Sudan is an ideological ideal that aims to transform Sudan 
towards secularism in opposition to tawajha al-hathari strives to transform Sudan‟s national 
identity into a monolithic Islamic identity. Adherents of both ideologies tried to find alternative 
resolutions to their opposing ideologies and signed the „Comprehensive Peace Agreement‟ (CPA) in 
Naivasha, Kenya in January 2005.  
   The agreement, however, divided the territorial state of Sudan into two parts. The Northern 
jurisdiction applies Sharia in civil and criminal judiciaries and the Southern jurisdiction applies 
secular laws derived from customs in its judiciary system. The agreement also includes an 
internationally supervised referendum for the people of South Sudan to decide between unity with 
the North or separation in January 2011. The CPA also grants „Popular Consultation to the regions 
of the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile known as Ingessana Hill in which the elected 
legislature decides the appropriate system for their regions. The CPA does not address the 
prevailing violence in Darfur region; however, the findings at the conclusion indicate that Islam has 
been adopted for political objective of constructing a majority population in Sudan, which became 
the unified „North Sudan of Arab Muslims‟. This political practice has changed the religion to a 
political ideology, where its adherents pursue violence in the name of religion against their 
opponents, the moderate Muslims, the Christians and the Animists from the marginal areas of the 
Nuba Mountains, the Ingessana Hill and South Sudan. Muslims‟ opposition to the adoption of this 
model are categorised as murtadeen (apostates) and many of them have been killed in the name of 
Jihad. The adoption of Jihad against Muslim opposition has aroused different interpretations among 
the divided Sudanese imams (Islamic clerics). Those who allied with the current government in 
power approved the organised attacks against the opposition in the name of Jihad. On the other 
hand, those who allied with the opposition(s) reject it and remain in opposition to the government at 
the marginal populace.  
   Currently, Jihad which was used as a justification for war in the South, Nuba Mountains and 
Ingessana Hill has been suspended in the violence waging on in Darfur, instead, racism surfaces 
between Arab Muslims, janjaweed fighting against the other non-Arab Muslims in the region. The 
war has escalated and claimed, unknown figure of the death toll. The United Nations (UN) 





groups have lost their lives, since the starting of the violence in February 2003 and more than four 
million have been displaced. Such numbers are difficult to prove, but the fundamental reality is that 
the violence has affected the people at all socio-economic aspects causing humanitarian disaster 
which the United States of America (USA), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 








Lock et al. observe that “every graduate student who is tempted to employ a qualitative design 
should confront one question, „Why do I want to do … study?‟ and then answer it honestly”.
25
 The 
search for an honest answer is a challenge for a researcher. It dictates him or her to clarify the 
purpose of a study. In the view of Maxwell, there are three aims for doing a study: personal, 
practical and research. Personal purpose refers to the issue which leads a researcher to decide to 
research on a specific topic.  It could be a political agenda with intent to change a political situation 
or a need to advance an academic career. Practical purpose refers to the accomplishment of some 
administrative policy-making for an administrative change. Research focuses on understanding 
something by gaining insights on a certain ongoing issue and why it is occurring.
26
  
   The aim of this study is both „personal‟ and „research‟ in general. It is personal, since it is 
intended for gaining an academic degree and it is a „research‟, since it aims to explore and gain 
insights on political and religious crises in national institutions of Sudan. It seeks to understand why 
these crises are happening and what alternative(s) are conceptualised by the people in Sudan that 
could be brought about in order to cease these religious and political conflicts in the country.   
Aim of study and Researcher’s position 
The purpose of this study is thus, to examine the contested issue of national identity for the diverse 
ethnic and religious groups in Sudan in a scientific viewpoint. Researching in a scientific way 
creates also a position for a researcher. It shows his or her identity whether he or she is a 
modernist/positivist, postmodernist or a pragmatist.  Modernists/positivists believe that scientific 
knowledge can unfold the universal truths for the common good of the universal institutions.
27
 On 
the other hand, postmodernists argue that scientific knowledge of modernity, which has been 
largely constructed on the binary oppositions of true and false, mind and body, reason and emotion 
is mostly unstable, since it embodies ideological discourses.
28
 Therefore, there is no guarantee that 
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 Conflict between the modernists and postmodernists compel some scholars to urge the adoption of 
„pragmatism‟ as an alternative resolution theory for it. For instance, Rorty suggests that social 
scientists should drop both modernist and postmodernist theories and adopt pragmatism, which is a 
theory that urges institutions to adhere to “what works”.
30
  
   It is through this scientific conflict of the modernists/positivists, postmodernists and pragmatists, 
where the position of the author becomes visible in the text.  The researcher follows “the positivist 
ideal of objective and disinterested scientist” that adheres to the research question in analysing the 
collected data.
31
 The author believes that impartial analysis of the heterogeneous institutions such as 
of Sudan reveals the hidden truth that positively contributes for the improvement of these 
institutions in a worthy scientific manner.
32
 Working for the „common good‟ spontaneously makes 
this researcher to be classified as a positivist/modernist. It transforms him to become an advocate of 
universal ethical values, which promote the establishment of institutions on the basis of democratic-
multi-party system with an obligation to respect human rights of individuals in Sudan.  In its 
theoretical meaning, human rights originated from individual rights as “gifts” from natural laws.
33
 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has accused Omer Hassan Al-Bashir the 
current President of Sudan of three counts of genocide against the indigenous African Muslim 
ethnic groups in Darfur: “genocide by killing (article 6-a), genocide by causing serious bodily or 
mental harm (article 6-b) and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about the group‟s physical destruction (article 6-c)”.
34
  
   In the opinion of this writer, national institutions in Sudan can function towards political 
perfection for the realisation of common good, if decision-leaders separate religion(s) from national 
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and adopt non-religious laws within the system of democratic pluralism.
35
 
„Representative democracy‟ cannot observe standard of human rights, when it derives its civil and 
criminal laws from religious codes and dogmas. In April 2010, Sudan revived representative 
democracy based on the system of multi-party pluralism; yet, the system mostly relies on the 
religious laws, which do not sufficiently adhere to moral standard of universal human rights 
obligations.
36
 For instance, under Sharia in Sudan, a person who has been confirmed of theft at a 
highway faces amputation of limbs and women found guilty of adultery are stoned to death.
37
 For 
Held, “representative democracy”, which is mostly adopted in modern state(s) is inadequate and so, 
it “requires clarification” of its constitutional laws and the procedures of their application.
38
  
   The modern world has been effectively improving its institutions to better form; however, 
exploitation of religion in politics disrupts the positivists/modernists hope for the development of 
public institutions in a peaceful manner.
39
 Setting it in the mosques, synagogues and churches as an 
issue for individuals and leaving public aim to a scientific engagement creates a hope for the 
prosperous world, but postmodernists‟ scholarships continue to mislead the world. For instance,  
Lemert claims that: “Postmodernism, if it is about anything, is about the prospect that the promises 
of the modern age are no longer believable because there is evidence that for the vast majority of 
people … there is no realistic reason to vest hope in any version of the idea that the world is good 
and getting better. 
40
 Researching on these issues dictates a researcher to choose between qualitative 
and quantitative research methods. 
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Hatch observes that, when an advanced graduate student decides to conduct a scientific research, 
one question comes into his or her mind is that “Should I do qualitative study?”
41
 The reason is that 
such student may claim that quantitative research is statistical and experimental; therefore, its 
strengths are mainly conceptual, while a qualitative research method engages the participants, 




   Under these guidelines, this research adopts a qualitative rather than a quantitative method in 
order to engage the participants. Calhoun argues that, when there is an issue of difference the 
alternative is to involve “poly-phonic discourse, not a monological statement … a discourse in 
which many voices shed light on a problem from different vantage points”. 
43
 Since 1958 to present 
day, the „monological‟ political force in Sudan has failed to reach a consensus on how to manage 
the religiously, ethnically and racially heterogeneous identities in a unified constitution for Sudan as 
a nation-state. Therefore, the author decided to involve students from some Sudanese universities in 
order to elicit such a „poly-phonic discourse‟, instead of the constant „monological‟ discourse of 
political force on the issue of identity in the country. In modern society, students of higher 
institutions of learning are important groups. They are the future leaders of states and capable of 
constructing political and cultural ideologies for their political aims. For instance, students of higher 
institutions of learning in Sudan organised and implemented the popular uprisings which overthrew 
the former military juntas of Ibrahim Abboud in October 1964 and Ja‟afer Muhammad Nimeiri in 
April 1985. Hassan Abdullah Turabi, the founder of the NIF constantly appeals to students to move 
and overthrow the current Government of Sudan (GoS), under the President Omer Hassan Al-
Bashir party the NCP. Turabi says history proves that students in Sudan have a political capacity to 
overthrow dictatorial military regimes.
44
  
   Considering these past successes and contributions of students in participating in politics stimulates 
political and democratic associations in Sudan to enter into campuses of universities and recruit students for 
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their political parties. This paradigm turns the higher institutions in Sudan into massive centres of political 
competition, where the political associations acquire members for their political parties. Nonetheless, the 
author is conscious that students of higher education have their distinctive political organisations, yet some 
of them have no stable political parties, still the aim of the study is to make students generate their views, 
opinions, imaginations and concepts about their identities. The search for their opinions and ideas requires 
research strategy. Hedrick et al. suggest that in order for a researcher to ensure research accuracy and ethics, 
he or she needs to construct clear strategies for collecting information. These strategies include, reviewing 
the relevant literature and conducting data gathering that involves visit(s) to the field of the problem.
45
 This 
research study has adopted these strategies as:  
Survey 
One of the methods in collecting research data is a survey, but it faces its own philosophically, 
technically and politically based criticisms. Politically, Marsh argues that survey method is 
manipulative in two ways. First, the knowledge it produces about institutions gives power to elite in 
control and this situation may lead to an abuse of power. Second, it cannot produce knowledge 
about reality, but only ideological reflections which could be embraced by some interest group.
46
 
Technique based criticism is that survey method is too statistical and that reduces interesting 
questions to totally incomprehensible numbers, while many studies are not necessarily statistical. 
Second, it relies on highly structured questionnaires which are restricted and limited.
47
 
Philosophical critics maintain that a survey research searches on particular people‟s beliefs and 
actions and neglects the context in which these beliefs and actions occur. Therefore, when an issue 
of research is taken out of context, it is easy for a researcher to mis-understand the meaning of 
behaviour.
48
 This research project rejects some critical views against the survey method in two 
ways: First, survey method produces complex perceptions, opinions, ideas, and imaginations of 
people about themselves in certain political, social and cultural surroundings. Their produced 
opinions from these surroundings constitute authentic data for relatively objective analysis. 
According to Fowler, survey is the only method, where a researcher can provide numerous facts 
about people‟s behaviours and attitudes at different situations. A researcher applies it “by asking a 
sample of people about themselves” on specific questions such as on race, religion, age, household 
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structure, education, housing, financial incomes and the way of spending these incomes.
49
 Second, 
survey is an inclusive technical research method. It is not only limited on the construction of 
questionnaires, but goes beyond. In the view of de Vause, a survey is not a particular technique of 
collecting information that is only based on questionnaires, but it involves other appropriate 
techniques and mechanisms such as interviews, observation, and content analysis.
50
   
   These complex research techniques are very significant and valuable, and therefore, they are 
adopted in this research. Fowler defines the questionnaire as a structured technique of data 
collection, whereby its respondents are asked with the same set of question(s) as variable(s). Thus, 
in „descriptive research‟, the fundamental art of designing the questionnaires is connected with the 
research objective(s) or question(s) a researcher wants to answer. It should be composed of 
dependent and independent variables to be measured. Independent variable refers to the cause of 
change and dependent variable refers to the effect. On the other hand, de Vause maintains that apart 
from variables, it is useful for a researcher conducting an „explanatory research‟ to consider the 
background in setting the questionnaires. The background measure refers to the characteristics such 
as sex, race, religion, ethnic group, education, social status, occupation, region and age.
51
 This study 
is both descriptive and explanatory. The former refers to “what is going on” and the latter deals with 
“why it is going on”.
52
  And in order to describe „what is going on‟ about the conflict of national 
identity and „why it is going on‟ in Sudan, it adopts a survey as one of its fundamental strategies. Its 
main primary source material was collected in a survey conducted in the fieldwork in Sudan. 
Questionnaires written in English and Arabic were structured taking into consideration relevant 
background to the study. Age was omitted in the structure, because it is not culturally acceptable to 
ask a person about his or her age in Sudan. Generally, the age of the university students in Sudan is 
between seventeen to twenty five years. Regions and religions in Sudan were the independent 
variables used in the questionnaires with their subsequent dependent variables. The reason for these 
two variables was to allow students from different regions of Sudan with their different religious 
backgrounds express their views towards the main question of study. (See appendix 1)  
   Having structured the questionnaires, the necessity of limiting the participants on the process 
came up. A researcher should seriously take into consideration the question “How many 
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participants does one need to study in order to address the goals that one has set?”
53
 The 
questionnaires were presented to five hundred students of higher education in Sudan. The study 
takes students as an example
54
 of the target population of the study.  This number was divided 
among the Muslims, the Christians and the Animists. Three-hundred and fifty were Muslims and 
one hundred and fifty were Christians and Animists. There were objective reasons for this 
imbalanced division among the adherents of the three religions. First, the population of Muslims in 
Sudan is larger than the population of the Christians and the Animists.
55
 Second, it is said that some 
Christians of the South, Darfur and Nuba Mountains practice compatibly Christianity and Animism, 
and those were adequate reasons to combine them into one group.
56
  
   After this organisation, how to gain access to students in order to deliver the questionnaires 
became the challenging key issue for the researcher. Stouthamer-Loeber and van Kammen maintain 
that it is necessary for a researcher conducting a fieldwork research to ask for the cooperation of the 
related agencies such as hospitals, schools, churches or courts in order to reach the target 
participants for study.
57
 Cooperation with professors and lecturers was initiated in order to reach 
students hence; the questionnaires were distributed to students in the lectures halls. The author was 
allowed to come into class-rooms, during lectures and seminars and to ask the Animist, the 
Christian and the Muslim students to voluntarily fill the questionnaires. Under this method, 
University of Khartoum was given two hundred, University of Juba received one hundred and fifty 
and Omdurman Ahlia University got ninety. Both University of Bahr el-Ghazal and University of 
Upper Nile were given sixty, where each received thirty.  
   There were some fundamental reasons for the choice of the five universities. First, University of 
Khartoum is very popular as the oldest and largest institution of higher education in Sudan. Second, 
Omdurman Ahlia University is an elite institution that sets its curriculum and orientation at the 
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campus on secular values. For this reason, it has been in conflict with the present Government of 
Sudan leading to several clashes between the ideological Islamic students and the ideological 
secular Muslim, Animist and Christian students. In 1996, the students from the Islamic forum 
incinerated offices, libraries and other essential properties of the University. The same scenario was 
repeated in 2004, when some administrative offices were burnt. These systematic events at one 
university compel the author to consider it as the centre of conflicting ideologies of „Islamic 
fundamentalism‟ and secularism and hence, it deserves research attention. Moreover, the author has 
extensive experiences at these three universities. First, he was an undergraduate student at 
Omdurman Ahlia University and graduate student at University of Khartoum and taught at both 
universities from 1997-2000. These connections made it possible for him to establish cooperation 
with teaching staff and students. Hedrick et al. argue that “Even totally open and visible setting 
usually require some degree of authorization for data collection”.
58
 On one occasion, the author 
authorised two students in the lecture hall at the University of Khartoum to collect the responses 
from other students in the hall and deliver them to him in the office at the university campus. 
Colleagues from the staff provided comfortable office spaces for writing, interviewing and 
receiving the responses of the research questionnaires from students.  
   University of Juba was chosen, because it is the oldest university in the South and it embraces 
most students from the „Southern Region‟. The University of Bahr el-Ghazal was chosen for three 
reasons. First, the researcher has been a member of the teaching staff, since, November 1997, when 
its campus was temporary transferred to Khartoum, during the political turmoil of violence from its 
original campus in Wau, South Sudan. Second, Wau is also the home town of the author and that 
has helped him in getting accommodation and interacting with students. Third, it is the centre of the 
largest ethnic group in South Sudan, the Dinka; thus, most of its students come from two Nilotic 
ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Jur Col. University of Upper Nile was chosen, because it has been 
the centre of four Nilotic ethnic groups: the Nuer; the Dinka; the Shilluk and Anyuak. The majority 
of its students come from these Nilotic ethnic groups.  
Plan, analysis and literature 
The implementation of the research process also requires a schedule or a framed time. Stouthamer-
Loeber and van Kammen recommend that a researcher dealing with study that depends on access to 
 
 





participants from specific organisation(s) needs to take an appropriate time for it.
59
 The plan for the 
survey and the collection of data from five universities in Sudan was framed due to the limited time 
at hand. It was comprised of three visits of intensive three-month–fieldwork- periods. The first 
survey was conducted from January through March 2007 and the second starting from January to 
March 2008. During this time, a complete number of four hundred and fifty seven filled 
questionnaires by students were returned to the author. One hundred and eighty one responses were 
from the University of Khartoum, one hundred and thirty nine from the University of Juba, seventy 
seven from Omdurman Ahlia University, thirty from the University of Bahr el-Ghazal and thirty 
from the University of Upper Nile. (See table 1)  
   Having the filled questionnaires, then it was possible to begin the analysis. Scholars pursue 
different methods of analysis for a qualitative research. For instance, LeCampte and Preissele 
pursue „typological‟ analysis. They describe it as a method of “dividing everything observed into 
groups or categories on the basis of some canon for disaggregating the whole phenomenon under 
study”.
60
 Hatch, however, limits it into nine steps. First, identification of data to be analysed; 
second, reading of the data and marking entries related to the research typologies. Third, reading of 
entries by typology and recording the main ideas in entries on a summery sheet; forth, looking for 
the patterns, relationships, themes within the typologies. Fifth, reading data and coding entries 
according to patterns identified and keeping a record of what entries go with which elements of 
patterns; sixth, decide, if these patterns are supported by data. Seventh, looking for the relationships 
among the identified patterns, eighth, writing the patterns as one-sentence generalisations and 
finally, selecting the data excerpts that support generalisation.
61
 There is also an inductive analysis, 
which Potter, defines as a search for patterns of meaning from the collected data, so that general 
statements about phenomena, under research investigation are produced. It commences with the 
examination of particular issues within the data by “looking for patterns across individual 
observations … arguing for those patterns as having the status of general explanatory statements”.
62
 
Third, there is an interpretive analysis, which Hatch defines as a systematic search for meaning and 
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giving meaning to data. It is about making sense of social situations by making explanations for 
what is going on within them. Fundamentally, it is about making inferences, developing insights, 
attaching significance, identifying themes, discovering relationships, developing explanations, 
making interpretations, mounting critiques, generating theories and drawing conclusions.
63
  
   It seems there is no strict difference between typology and interpretive analyses; however, Denzin 
asserts that interpretive analysis helps in identifying “different definitions of the problem” by 
showing how individuals interpret public policies in public institutions, which have been 
established to settle certain problem(s).
64
 This formed the basis for this study to adopt interpretive 
and typology-research methods in analysing the responses of students to the questionnaires. It 
identifies different imaginations and definitions of students to the problem of Sudan‟s national 
identity within the responses and discovers their relationships, attaches relevance, develops 
explanations, contrasts opposing opinions, generates supporting theories to the explanations, 
compares new imaginations with the existing literature, mounts critiques on what does not fall 
within the universal standard of human rights obligations and finally draws general conclusion.  
   During the third visit to Sudan, the author emphasised the right to religion as a constructed right 
derived from individual freedom.
65
 In this visit, September to November 2008, method of interview 
was introduced. For Kvale, a qualitative research interview is a mutual conversation lasting at least 
one hour between two people about a specific theme that a researcher presents to an interviewee. Its 
purpose is to comprehensively understand the views and experiences of an interviewee on a subject 
in question in order to “develop knowledge about one specific” issue.
66
  
   In light of this view, interviews were constructed in accordance to the responses of some students 
to the questionnaires. In essence, they were intended for certain specific respondents in order to 
obtain more knowledge about some particular issues which appeared in their answers to the 
questionnaires. In another word, the reason for the interview was to give further opportunities to 
these students to explain deeper what was not clear in their earlier responses in the questionnaires 
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and so focusing on their past responses. During the interview, the author avoided anything that 
would have influenced an interviewee, but remained impartial.
67
 (See appendix 2). Sixty seven of 
them were individually consulted for private interviews for one hour per each student in specific 
locations. Denzin urges researchers to locate an appropriate interactional space for an interview 
within a limited time.
68
 The cooperation that the researcher received from the teaching staff at the 
five universities made this possible. Each student was interviewed in her or his respective university 
environment. Three students were interviewed individually in the office given to the author at the 
University of Khartoum. Four were individually interviewed in the office at Omdurman Ahlia 
University. Thirty students were individually interviewed in the office at the University of Juba. 
Fifteen were individually interviewed in the office at the University of Bahr el-Ghazal and fifteen in 
the same manner were interviewed in the office at the campus of the University of Upper Nile.  
   After these interviews, came the final review of relevant scientific literature, impartial 
interpretation of the data and all necessary crosschecking of students‟ statements and observations. 
Therefore, the present manuscript is organised in accordance to the responses of students to the 
given questionnaires, participant observation and the interviews, however, it is necessary to 
elaborate what participant observation means in this particular context. It does not refer to the 
traditional „participant observation‟ conducted by ethnographers such as Bronislaw Malinowski, 
Margaret Mead and Radcliffe-Brown who spent most of their time studying their subjects.
69
 Such 
an approach is unnecessary for the present study, but applied to a limited extent, complementing 
data gained from the questionnaires and interviews as the author is already an insider with vast 
knowledge of culture(s), experiences and observed behaviours in Sudan.  Therefore, participant 
observation becomes here a sort of observation which Hatch defines as a process of getting closer to 
the subjects of study in order to add more definitions and descriptions of their activities to the 
already existed experiences about them.
70
 Such experiences and knowledge of the author to cultural 
characteristics helped him to describe and interpret more impartially and unbiased some activities 
which the students performed, during the fieldwork in Sudan. For instance, the author observed that 
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the majority of African Muslim students from Nuba Mountains, Darfur, often walked with the 
African Christian-Animist-students from the South, while it was very rare to witness a Muslim-
Arab student walking with a Christian-Animist from the South. This new association of the African 
Muslims with the African Christians reflects the dynamic change of the political setting of social 
institutions in the country, where religion is not necessarily any longer a model of social 
relationship in spaces, but racial categories of „Africans‟ and „Arabs‟.  
   Among the relevant literature, studies of Ann Mosely Lesch, Francis Mading Deng, Douglas 
Hamilton Johnson, Abdullahi Ahmed An‟Naim, Alex de Waal, Robert O Collins and Abdel-Wahab 
El-Affendi have been very helpful sources. Sociological studies of Robert Miles, Emile Durkheim, 
Max Weber, Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Zygmunt Bauman, Stephen Steinberg, Anthony Smith, 
Michael Omi, Howard Winant, Robert Ezra Park and Eric Hobsbawm have also been useful for the 
study. Nonetheless, writing of conflict issues in current Sudan is not easy, because of political 
harassment, interrogation, detention and murder of those who disseminate knowledge that does not 
match to the policy of the ruling government, the NCP. A Sudanese who attempts to disseminate an 
opinion that deviates from the oriented policy of tawajha alhathari may be killed.
71
 Authorities can 
quickly interpret any critical views as “blasphemy”
72
or “apostasy”, which are both punishable to 
death in the criminal court of Sharia.
73
  
   The incrimination of citizens in expressing their political opinions in Sudan puts the writer into a 
dilemma between omitting and publicising the names of his respondents. Omission of the names of 
the respondents puts the author in a conflict with a large number of students. Generally, every 
student knew the purpose of the questionnaires and the interviews and the majority of them urged 
the researcher to publish their names in the text. On the other hand, listing their names within the 
text might still jeopardise them. A solution to this dilemma was found from two scholars. First, 
Fowler Jr urges researchers to protect research respondents by removing their names from the text 
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and inserting ambiguous names for their identifications.
74
 Second, Hatch argues that ethics obligates 
a researcher in any organisations to consider the impact of research work “on the wider social and 
physical environment”.
75
  Ethical perspective made the author consider the safety of the responded 
students as a priority. For this reason, pseudo names were constructed for them. The names are 
defined in the footnotes and some within the text of the manuscript in terms of religious, ethnic, 
university and regions as requested in the questionnaires. The term anonymous was also used for 
the identification of those who have not revealed their names in the questionnaires. The majority of 
students from the Nilotic peoples of Jur Col, Anyuak, Jieng (Dinka), Naath (Nuer) and Collo 
(Shilluk) identify themselves Christians and Animists and some defined their religious identity as 
„Christian-Animists‟.  
   The systematic use of the religious compatible definition has forced the author to conclude that 
there is a difference between the descriptions, „Christian-Animist‟ and „Christian and Animist‟. The 
former refers to the Nilotic students that practice compatibly Christianity and Animism and the 
latter identifies the believers who adhere to only one of the two religions, either Christianity or 
Animism in Sudan. Furthermore, the capitalised „North‟ stands for the region of the Northern Sudan 
and a student from that region is also identified as a „Northerner‟. This definition actually includes 
the west, far north; the east and the centre of the country. The rest falls under the category of the 
„South‟ and „Southerner‟. Every critical qualitative and quantitative scientific research requires a 
theory which conforms to the main question of a research problem. In many occasions, lack of a 
relevant theoretical framework for a scientific research causes problems of coherence, specially, 
when a researcher transfers the oral data into a body of a text.
76
 Thus, Alexander defines theory as a 
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Distribution of Questionnaires to five Universities 
 
University Sent Questionnaires Responses 
Khartoum University 200 181 
Juba University 150 139 
Ahlia University 90 77 
Bahr el-Ghazal University 30 30 
Upper Nile University 30 30 




Sharaqa Hall University of Khartoum 
 






1   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SUDANESE 
CONFLICTING NATIONALISM 
 
Researching on the topic of identity is extremely controversial, because of its three conflicting 
philosophical conceptions. For the Enlightenment, identity is a human-person fully centred as 
unified individual and sufficiently endowed with reason and conscious action and therefore, the self 
is an identity of a person.
78
   
   In contrast, sociological inter-actionists reject this theory and argue that self-personal identity is 
not entirely sufficient; instead, it is formed in relation to „significant others‟ or interaction between 
self and society. 
79
  For the post-modernists, identity is not permanent; it is constantly formed and 
transformed in relation to the ways a society is represented in cultural institutions. It is not 
biological, but historical; therefore, contradictory identities at different time of history can construct 
a comfortable narrative that unifies their identities into a unified one.
80
 
   Political forces in Sudan have failed to construct a comfortable narrative for the diverse religious 
and ethnic groups in the state. They have, instead, established racial and discriminatory institutions 
making the civil violence in Sudan to be fundamentally a conflict of identity based on the dynamics 
of racism and discrimination within the political, cultural and social institutions of the territory. The 
research rejects the claim of some scholars that the past and the current civil wars in the country are 
products of the colonial „British Policy‟ of the „Closed District Ordinance‟. For instance, Beshir 
Muhammed Said claims that the colonial British Government decided to introduce a legal system 
the „Closed District Ordinance‟ since 1922 and effectively implemented it in 1926. The bill treated 
Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Beja and Darfur separately from the Islamic and Arab North. 
The intention was to build up a series of self-autonomous racial and tribal systems based on the 
indigenous customs, traditions and other local beliefs in exclusion of Islam. Muslim Arabs were 
instructed to first obtain „Special Permits‟ in order to enter those areas. Later Darfur, the Nuba 
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Mountains and some Beja areas were dropped from the policy of the closure with the exception of 
the South. Said concludes that such policy was a firm and direct barrier to the transformation of 
Sudan into an Islamic and Arab culture and that had created hostilities and frequent violence and 
wars between the Northern Muslim Arabs and the African Christian culture in Sudan.
81
  
   In addition, Abdel Wahab El-Affendi also claims that the present violence in Sudan dates back to 
the imperial government of the British Southern Policy. The main objective of that policy was to 
stem the expansion of Islam into the Southern territory. Christian missionaries and British officials 
were politically hostile to the Islamic religion and culture. This policy caused a reaction from the 
Northern Muslims who swiftly reacted to reaffirm the validity of Islam and Arab culture in the 
region. Hence, in 1938, the Graduate Congress, an organisation mainly composed of Muslims and 
Arabs of the North outlined in their memorandum to the British Colonial Administrator, Sir 
Douglas Newbold the importance of Arabic and Islam in the educational system in the South. El-
Affendi concludes that the policy has created a prominent hostility of Muslims from the North to 




   These claims of the two scholars are misleading, since they fail to disclose the genuine cases for 
the closure. First, the closure was an antidote to the trafficking in ethnic groups from the South. 
Historically, Sudan emerged as a state, under abrupt interactions between the indigenous Africans 
and Muslim Arab settlers coming from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula
83
. The first Arab settlers 
entered into Sudan with few females and consequently married mostly the indigenous, non-Muslim 
ethnic Africans. After such exogamous marriage, racism emanated within the institutions between 
the settlers and the indigenous identities. Deng explains, during that time, there were no barriers to 
cross marriages between the settled Arabs and the indigenous peoples of Sudan. The indigenous 
African women in the territory were married to Arab Muslims and their children were identified as 
Arab Muslims in accordance with the patrilineal system of Arab culture. After these exogamous 
marriages, a sense of diversity was built, but later social superiority and inferiority arose between 
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them. Muslim Arabs pursued the practice of trafficking in the Black indigenous Africans of Sudan 
as slaves
84
and that project dominated the social structures for centuries, until today.
85
  
   These racial categories of superiority and inferiority, where the former trafficked in the latter 
could not be impeded without introduction of legal measures preventing it, especially, when slavery 
was illegalised, and yet, it continued to thrive in the institutions of Sudan.  According to Jok, Sudan 
is a country, “where old habit persists”
86
 in its social spheres. For instance, after six decades, when 
England illegalised the slave trade with all its accompanying inequities, Samuel Baker, a British 
explorer visited Khartoum, capital city of Sudan in 1862. Baker was astonished to find that the city 
was economically booming due to the wealth derived from slave trade. Jok concludes that the 
professional slavers from the Muslim Arab area sneaked into the territories of the South and Nuba 
Mountains and kidnapped the indigenous Africans for trafficking them in the North and beyond.
87
 
   This illegal situation gives a satisfaction that the introduction of the „Closed District Ordinance‟ 
was the only alternative left to the British to fetter slavers from entering the South. Its legal 
adoption had mitigated the enslavement and trafficking in the Animist peoples from the South. 
According to Lesch, the British legal bill of the „Closed District Ordinance‟ which limited the entry 
of Muslim Arabs to the South had helped the Black Animist population in the South to remain 
inaccessible by Muslim Arab slavers.
88
  
   Second, even if the South was not closed for the entry of Muslim Arabs from the North, the 
indigenous people of the South would have had continued to resist Islamisation, because the 
relationships between them and Muslim Arabs were in an anomalous state. For example, a cohort of 
Muslim Arabs enriched themselves on the illegal means of theft and loot essential properties from 
them. Those attitudes have played a negative role in converting the Animists to Islam. They have 
created a racial hatred to Arab Muslims leading to the violence of resistance to Islam, until the 
British introduced the bill of the closure.  According to Abel Alier, the indigenous inhabitants of the 
South remained constantly in resistance to foreign cultures, because, many violent events between 
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understanding throughout the time of their interactions. The attitudes of Muslim Arabs of 
plundering property, stealing animals, burning dwellings, trafficking in them as slaves and 
imposition of alien customs and beliefs into their cultural life acerbated their rejection of the Islamic 
faith and such practices motivated some British Administrators to prevent Muslim Arabs from 
entering the Southern territory.
89
 
   This perspective suggests that the historical legal bill of the „Closed District Ordinance‟ has 
genuine objectives from the past and it is seriously misleading for the above two Sudanese scholars 
to claim it as the fundamental reason for today‟s conflict in the territorial Sudan. The present 
conflict in Sudan is a resistance to the model of „Arabisation and Islamisation‟ of public institutions 
in the country. This political tendency does not represent the diversity of Sudan; instead, it 
represents the rejection of others. According to Sir Hilton Poynton, the primary objective of the 
British colonial policy in transfer of power in was summed up in promoting the existing religious 
diversity in building institutions of state.
90
  
   In this regard, the policy of „Arabisation and Islamisation‟ rejects diversity in nation building. 
Deng observes that the successive governments in control of power in Sudan are Muslims and 
identify themselves Arabs. For this reason, they follow the pattern of Islamisation and Arabisation 
of public institutions as a means to establish national identity.
91
 The intertwined Arabisation and 
Islamisation model neglects the empirical composition of Sudan‟s racial and cultural diversity and 
favours cultural identity of Islam and Arab to the exclusion of the cultures and the customs of the 
Animists, the Christians and the unique ritual characteristics of the African Muslims in Sudan. 
Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, a Sudanese scholar
92
 describes Sudan as a very unique country in Africa. 
It embraces contradictory racial identities which represent it as “Arab-Africa”
 93
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   The neglect of power to this diversity of „Arab-Africa‟ and its frequent political attempts to 
transform it into monolithic Islamic-Arab in cultural identity epitomises the paradigm of racism in 
building of institutions for the citizens of Sudan. Miles and Brown observe that a discriminating 
power builds institutions on the principle of exclusion to the opposing distinctive culture in national 
institutions.
95
 The imposed adoption of Islamic and Arabic culture in national institutions represents 
the exclusion of the presence of the African Muslims, the African Christians and the African 
Animist in Sudan. Two scholars observe this phenomenon and present their views. First, An‟Naim 
argues that the legalisation of Sharia above other religions and cultures in the national constitution 
in the Northern Sudan as a main source of legislation as requires in article four (4) of the 
constitution, places the non-Muslims in an inferior status in their country.
96
 Second, Hassan 
observes that in Sudan, there is an African Islam in Darfur which is unique and different from the 
classical Islam of Muslim Arabs at the far north and centre of present Sudan.
97
 
   These scholarly views prompt the author to argue that the adoption of indispensable Islam with 
Arab by power as one criterion in making a constitutional system in Sudan implies favour to the 
Islamic Arab culture and exclusion of other religions, non-Arab races and unique cultures of the 
African Muslims and non-Muslims in the state and that model constitutes the dynamics of racism 
and discrimination. In essence, the present populations of Sudan believe that they are different 
ethnically, culturally and religiously. Despite that belief, they continue to imagine themselves as a 
nation within the territorial state of Sudan. Benedict Anderson defines nation as an imagined 
political community that imagines itself inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined, because 
“the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow country members or 





 This theory is significantly relevant for the explanation of ethnic and cultural diversities 
in Sudan. It helps us to understand and expound that the populations living in the current territory of 
Sudan are of different ethnicities, cultures, religions, traditions and customs, yet they still live in the 
territory, where they imagine themselves as one people sharing the territorial nation state, Sudan. 
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Southhall reiterates that the Dinka ethnic group identifies itself as a distinct group known as 
Munyjieng, Jieng or Munyjiang to mean the people. Again, the ethnic Nuer knows itself as Naath to 
mean the people and the Shilluk, calls itself as Collo, a term refers to the Black people. Southhall 
concludes that all three of these ethnic groups are conscious of other groups residing with them in 
Sudan.
100
 Second, Al-Shahi points out that the people of Sudan recognise two phenomena in their 
identities. Locally they identify themselves with a tribe as distinct in terms of descent, history, 




   The research argues that these different communities of Sudan require a quality of political power 
that prompts their imaginations through a national constitution that conforms to the phenomena of 
their religious, ethnic and cultural diversities. Under this constitution, power can inculcate into their 
imaginations a sense of being equal territorial citizens with their diverse cultures, yet they are a 
territorial nation. Nonetheless, power remains in constant orientation of them, so that each group 
avoids political statements in media, conferences, seminars and all national institutions that may 
build negative prejudice and stereotypes affecting the maintenance of these imaginations. 
According to Lee, Malaysia is a country composed of ethnic Chinese, Indians and indigenous 
Malays. The Malaysian politicians take this diversity as a base for constructing organs of national 
institutions. Traditions and customs of these different ethnic groups are the sources for integration 
of the nation. Extending from 1993-2003, Malaysia had introduced institutional structures which 
gave to each citizen a political and cultural space. The constitution reflects icons of multiculturalism 
and nationalism of these diverse ethnic groups. Leaders and civilians that operate within the social 
and the political circles refrain from releasing statements that may jeopardise this orientation. The 
power of the media is impressive, since its ethic reflects the image of compatibility of diverse 
Malaysians. Lee concludes that such a form of equal representation of different ethnic traditions in 
the national constitution makes a diverse society to believe that it is a nation.
102
   
  Practically, the theory of imagination that adopts an ethnic territorial pluralistic model as in 
Malaysia is an antithetical to the theory of ethnic territorial nationalism in Sudan, which favours the 
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intertwined Islam and Arab culture and rejects the icons of multiculturalism. According to Lesch, 
the successive Muslim Arab nationalists in Sudan maintain that majority religion, Islam and Arabic 
should be the interconnected model defining the country‟s national identity and in practice, they 
have introduced it into legal laws. In reaction, Muslims of the Northern Sudan such as the Fur in 
Darfur, the Beja, the Nuba and the Christians and Animists of the South reject this model. Lesch 
concludes that the population of the South tends to maintain its Christianity and Animism and its 
indigenous languages beside English, while the majority people from Darfur, Nuba Mountains and 




   With respect to the ethnic and religious diversity in Sudan, this research rejects the 
constitutionalised system of Arabisation and Islamisation and alternatively, it considers religion as a 
basic equal right for individual citizens, both the majority and minority. This equal right needs 
protection from the leadership in power of national institutions in Sudan as a government. 
Individual Animists, Christians and Muslims need a constitution that offers free spaces for worship 
within sovereign Sudan. Tuula Sakaranaho notes that the European landscape has been abruptly 
transformed to multi-religious centralism, where there are new non-Christian minorities. This 
phenomenon creates a dilemma for the European Union (EU) leaders between the need to protect 
their sovereign borders from the emerging new cultures, and at the same time to show hospitality to 
the new residing immigrants with their new religions and cultures. Sakaranaho concludes that the 
„Charter of Fundamental Rights‟ that adopts the principles of democracy and human rights in 
dealing with its societies helps the EU leaders face this dilemma, because, it urges with respect to 
diverse cultures, religions and traditions of the territorial residents within the EU sovereignties.
104
  
   Granting equal freedom to different religious minorities and the majority in public social 
structures of a state creates the religious interaction of these groups as free territorial residents. 
Conversion from one religion to another religion is not necessary to be institutionalised specifically 
in a national constitution. Instead, it should be constituted by permitting individual men and women 
of different faiths to interact in public spaces of recreation, such as clubs, markets, schools, parks, 
city squares, bars, gardens and zoos. These social recreation centres are the facilitating instruments 
of free religious conversion. According to An‟Naim, sometimes, religious conversion occurs 
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without being intended, because of human interactions in commercial, social, and cultural 
atmospheres.
105
   
   This researcher argues that when power in a state commences to legally institutionalise religious 
conversion, then that institutionalisation contains an underlying ideological discourse of 
proselytism. It is an institutionalised religious propaganda that may not necessarily promote 
religious dialogue, discussion, cooperation, pluralism, and tolerance. Instead, its adherents embed 
the means of its implementation in political and economic institutions. According to Martin, 
proselytisation has been characterised as a negative term, which may embody coercive means 
disguised in established economic, political, social and diplomatic institutions. Martin concludes 
that the negativity of this term stimulates some Christians to reform their theological missions that 




   The institutionalisation of the means of the religious proselytisation into public institutions of a 
state implies the building of racial institutions in a state. Racism is an abstract universal idea 
without colour or smell. It only becomes visible, when it is applied in national institutions. 
According to Omi and Winant, racial dynamics in a racial state are manifested in education, 
religion, law, economics and science.
107
 The author has observed the genesis of public institutions 
in Sudan that manifest extreme connotations of racism, which is embedded in national institution 
against the population of the Black Africans. For example, in the capital city of Sudan, Khartoum a 
police force can be instructed to move to some specified residence, where the inhabitants are mostly 
Black African Muslims from the Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hills, Darfur and the Christians and 
Animists from the South and evict them. Currently, the inhabitants that reside in ghettos around 
Khartoum were mostly evicted from their original locations of Hechish between Jabra and Suq al-
Shabbi and Dar al- Salam at Wed- Amaar. The present government, under President Al-Bashir 
escalates the eviction of the specific groups. It authorises police organs to evict the defined 
identities frequently and isolate them at desolate locations. There the victims of the eviction begin 
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to create names for their desert areas such as Bentiu, Dar al-Salam, Ras Shathan and Angola and 
many others around the suburb of Khartoum. Simone observes that, the increasing numbers of the 
African cultural characteristics from the Christian and Animist South into the institutions of 
Northern Sudan provokes the Islamic power in Khartoum. And alternatively, it resorts to the 
legislation of provisional laws, which allow the authorities in Provincial Khartoum to bulldoze the 
residential houses of these Black Africans and pack them into vehicles and drive them farther into 
the sandy desert around Khartoum.
108
 For functionalist sociologists, a racial regime that 
discriminates its institutions fixes discrimination in those institutions to deny the target group from 
equal privileges and services. Wodak and Reisigl explain that race is a social construction, which a 
discriminating power in a state applies to legitimate its ideological tool of oppression and 
exploitation of specific social groups and deny them access to material, cultural and material 
resources, such as work, welfare services, housing and political rights.
109
 In practice, institutions of 
state which are built on racial discrimination remain in conflict. The affected group reacts and 
introduces measures of resistance. These measures can be a serious demand for participation in 
power, autonomous or self-rule government or self determination that may lead to complete a 
distinct new territorial sovereignty. According to Miles, a state that uses racial categories in dealing 
with citizens causes a reaction from the affected community. The reactionists use the racial concept 
to construct alternative as a basis for political resistance and fight for more political autonomy, 
wider participation and independence.
110
 
   The consistent habitual practice of power that evicts or relocates specific ethnic groups, because 
of their origin, colour, ethnic and culture manifests a paradigm of racial discrimination to the 
territorial citizens. This practice builds an endless cycle of racial conflicts and violence in the 
national institutions of Sudan. It motivates the African Christians and Animists of the South to 
regret being abruptly annexed to the Islamic Arab North as one territorial people and experience 
systematic discrimination and racism. Malwal argues that Arab Muslims control power and use 
intertwined religion and race to great effect. They seek to establish dominance over the 
heterogeneous religious and racial groups in the country. The Turco-Egyptian regime united these 
diverse groups through “historical accident” and it was through another unexpected historical 
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accident that Great Britain handed the political power to this minority Muslim Arab population 
upon independence. Malwal concludes that the adoption of Arab race and Islamic religion in 
national institutions as a model for unifying its essential diversity revives the remorseful historical 
mistreatment by the Muslim Arabs to the Christian and Animists of the South.
111
 
   The perspective of discrimination prompts this author to present a question: what is the alternative 
resolution that can end perpetual racial domestic conflict in Sudan? The authentic source to provide 
a clear response to this question comes from the Sudanese decision makers. Two prominent and 
influential political figures on the national affairs in Sudan offer parallel ideological responses in 
writing and speech. First, Abel Alier former President of the Southern Sudan Region from 1973 
until early 1982
112
argues that the domestic racial conflict will constantly remain unchanged, unless 
a legislative power enacts a national constitution based on secular democratic pluralism to be 
applied to all levels of national institutions.
113
 Second, Nafi Ali Nafi, the current Presidential 
Assistant of Sudan argues in a political speech that the building of Sudan as an Islamic state, where 
its constitutional laws are derived from Sharia is an imperative objective of any Muslim in the 
country. It is a Will of God and must be dictated with all available means, including stripping power 




   These two conflicting syntheses from the prominent leaders of Sudan give us a comprehensive 
perspective to construct specific names for these competing ideological proponents. First, we call 
the group of the political forces in Sudan that urge the legislature to take Sharia as the sole source 
of national laws and Arabic as an official language of national institutions adherents of ethnic 
territorial nationalism. Second, the opponent group to this model of constitutional approach consists 
of the adherents of ethnic territorial national pluralism. The advocates of the latter ideology press 
for the adoption of pluralistic and secular constitutional system that sustains different religions, 
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cultures, customs and languages of the diverse citizenry within the territorial Sudan. Two are for 
our analysis. First, secularisation of institutions in Sudan refers to privatisation of religion as an 
entity of individual person and the state for the whole citizens. Wilson defines secularisation as “the 
process by which religious institutions, actions, and consciousness lose their social significance” by 
privatising as a subject of individuals set apart from a national constitution.
115
 Second, there is a 
reason for adopting the term „ethnic‟ to both conflicting proponents in search of a national identity. 
In essence, there is no unified definition to the term ethnic. In Greek, Ethnikos is an adjective and 
ethnos is a noun and both were used for the identification of foreign people in the Greek territory.
116
 
In the Medieval era, the term was used as a derivative word from Latin, ethnicus to mean heathen 
referring to a Gentile, a non-Jewish person.
117
 Moreover, the contemporary anthropological studies 
show that the term is used to define people of one culture, custom, religion or language.
118
 This 
perspective substantiates that the term „ethnic‟ fits to both contradictory ideological categories of 
constructing national identity in Sudan, since the latter definition can mean a common culture. 
Therefore, the two schools of thought present opposing and distinctive ideologies, where each 
group has its common culture that unifies its people as one ethnic group. Specifically, it is under 
this context, where the term ethnic is adopted here and at the same time, the term territory 
represents each group, since each of them is identified within the territorial Sudan, but with parallel 
ideological perceptions.  
   Generally, there is no consensus on what constitutes national identity in a nation- state. Modern 
theoretical models which have been used in making national identities in the world have not 
represented uniform approaches. Some consider the political culture of democratic pluralism as a 
basis for building national institutions in opposition to the autocratic, theocratic, aristocratic or the 
military regimes. According to Schraeder, in 2000, one hundred and six Heads of States and 
Premiers from the democratic governments assembled in Warsaw, Poland to discuss the promotion 
of global democracy. The meeting led to the „Warsaw Declaration‟ which urges the global 
institutions to introduce extensive transition to the multiparty democratic pluralism in order to 
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uproot all forms of authoritarian systems.119 Some claim that national constitutions of democracies 
represent equal rights of cultural and religious diversities of majority and minority groups. Yet, 
sometimes the majority promotes its cultural identity in national media.
120
  
   The argument for the representation of both the majority and minority groups in a democratic 
constitution causes a serious political dispute among students of the targeted universities for this 
research in Sudan. Instances of this dispute come from the question in the questionnaires of the 
study which states: “How do you want national identity of these regions to be defined in a national 
constitution of Sudan and why do you think so?” Their responses to this question are divisive as one 
of Muslim Arab student asserts that “… the best constitutional system that suits Sudan is the 
Islamic-Arab democratic pluralism for the reason that it unifies the cultures of our people … in 
order to make us look like one nation in cultural identity”.
121
 In contrast, the Dinka Christian 
Animist student states: “For me, I want a secular democratic constitution, because it allows 
multiculturalism to flourish in our social structures”.
122
  
   The conflicting opinions of the two students represent the essential conflict of national identity in 
Sudan. The adherents of ethnic territorial nationalism interlace democracy with the religious 
ideology of Islamic-Arab culture as a means of deposing diversity and inserting the majority 
cultural identity based on Islam and Arabic culture. On the other hand, the adherents of ethnic 
territorial national pluralism resist the majority intent to eradicate diversity and seek the adoption of 
a secular constitution. In this way, parallel models build up and become the centre of political 
departure in national institutions of the country. El-Affendi argues that there has been no 
democratic multiparty regime in Sudan that succeeded to constitute a national constitution for 
inclusive citizens. Since 1958, the first „Constitution Commission‟ that involved all different 
democratic multi-parties could not reach a consensus in adopting the Islamic nor secular 
constitution. The Muslims majority urged the adoption of an Islamic constitution and the Christians 
and Animists minority demanded the adoption of irreligious laws derived from diverse secular 
sources, until the military government, under Ibrahim Abboud from the Beja ethnic group of the 
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   This phenomenon of constitutional conflict continues in Sudan to our present day. Currently, the 
Interim Constitution of Sudan Article (5) paragraph (1) states: “Nationally enacted legislation 
having effect only in respect of the Northern States of the Sudan shall have its sources of legislation 
Islamic Sharia”. Second, paragraph (2), under the same article states “Nationally enacted legislation 
applicable to Southern Sudan shall have as its sources of legislation … the values and the customs 
of the people, including their traditions and religious beliefs”.
124
 In this regard, two ideologies of 
ethnic territorial national pluralism and ethnic territorial nationalism develop in parallel among 
students. 
1.1 Ethnic territorial nationalism 
The model of ethnic territorial nationalism that transforms Sudan‟s national identity into an Arab-
Islamic state came into effect when the former Military President Nimeiri imposed Sharia on 8 
September 1983.
125
 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban describes Sharia as a form of law that dismantles the 




   The issue of Sharia divides the students; some Muslims reject it and some support it. For example, 
the question is religion important and what is your concept about the world in accordance to your 
religion, does it allow space for other religions(s), if so, please explain? El-Nur Mohammad, a 
Muslim Arab student states: “Islamic religion is important, because, it embodies Sharia, which 
provides justice to all citizens”.
127
 However, H A, a Muslim Arab student states: “Religion is 
sometimes good, but Sharia is not needed. When Nimeiri imposed it, the majority of Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Sudan were astonished and formed the political alliance for the restoration of the 
democratic multiparty system that would rescind it; unfortunately, the Umma party cheated the 
masses”.
128
 According to Kok, after the imposition of Sharia as the law for Sudan, the democratic 
political parties of Umma and Sudanese professionals formed a political alliance, the „National 
Alliance for National Salvation‟ (NANS), and signed a charter in London 1985. And even though 
the SPLM was a guerrilla political opposition at war with Nimeiri, it also signed the charter in a 
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document called „Koka Dam Declaration‟ in Ethiopia in March 1986. The charter invoked the 
abrogation of Sharia and the NANS organised popular uprising and deposed President Nimeiri on 6 
April 1985. After that the „Military Transitional Council, TMC‟, under Major General Abdul 
Rahaman Suwar Al-Dhab formed a transitional government. In April 1986, a democratic multiparty 




   Later under pressure from the political parties of DUP, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and 
the Union of the Sudan African Parties (USAP), Al-Mahdi acquiesced for the suspension of Sharia 
constitutionally, but the radical Islamists of the NIF, seized power militarily. On 29 June 1989, 
Brigadier Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir declared himself as the President of Sudan and „Islamic 
fundamentalism‟ in its extreme form returned to power.  Al-Bashir called his military regime as 
Thura Al-Ingaz Al-Watoni (National Salvation Revolution) with the intent to impose Islamic 
identity and control religious diversity.
130
 Montague observes that, whenever racism fails in its 
endeavours to prove that the source of group differences lies in the biological field, it falls back 
upon justification in terms of divine purposes.
131
  
   Two scholars allege the „Salvation‟ of religious and racial discrimination in national institutions 
of Sudan. First, according to An‟Naim, the NIF of the „Salvation‟ defines Sharia constitutionally as 
a divine law and such definition prohibits all possible attempts of the Sudanese citizens to criticise 
or discuss it, so that they offer alternative legal views which fit them. The NIF alleges that the 
critics of this law are apostates and such accusation is a crime punishable by death, under section 
(126) of Sudan‟s Penal Code of 1991.
132
 Second, Collins argues that the NIF, which has changed its 
name to the NCP, pursues the creation of a „New Sudanese‟ identity that is defined as Islamic and 
Arabic to the exclusion of other religions and languages. For the NCP, to be a Sudanese requires the 
adoption of the twin pillars, Arabic and Islam as an interconnected model of homogenising the 
people of Sudan. The ideology is too rigid and it rejects any negotiation and compromise over these 
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twin models. Those who could not conform to this creed would be excluded for not being Sudanese. 
In order to produce the „New Sudanese‟, the „Islamic fundamentalists‟ introduce a complete 
ideology to indoctrinate, shape and control the population of Sudan from all aspects of life, where 
everything is Islamised and Arabised. Sharia is applied to its extreme by codifying strict Islamic 
traditions and employing them to justify Jihad against the defined citizens as “apostates and 
heathens” in the country.
133
  
   The NCP is a synonymous with the NIF and „Salvation‟ in Sudan. Its political orientation 
analogically, manifests three interrelated ideological characteristics of „Islamic fundamentalism‟ in 
facing its political dissidents. First, it pursues the model of violence in defence of its Islamic 
ideology. And in order to apply that model, it seeks sources of funds and an army, and since 
sometimes, war is fought for some economic advantages to the combatants
134
, the „Salvation‟ 
entices the impoverished population in dire need of basic services to its Islamic military 
recruitment. Thus, some young Muslim men quickly aggregate and register with the Islamic militia, 
Popular Defence Force (PDF), often to gain personal advantage. According to the Sudanese Human 
Rights Organisation (SHRO), the NIF recruited Arab Muslims, under the PDF, which is an oriented 
militia to promote its ideology of defending Islam from those it has labeled as pagans and apostates. 
Each member of the PDF receives a lump sum of 50,000 Sudanese pounds, a gun and a horse in 
order to join the Jihadists. SHRO concludes that the government promised the recruits to any booty 
taken from a group suspected to be loyal to the opposition forces.
135
  
   Furthermore, Petterson says that foreign Muslim activists like Osama Bin Laden contributed 
funds for the application of Jihad. Under Jihad, the NCP accused the Dinka ethnic group at their 
villages of being allies with the SPLM, which resists the transformation of Sudan into an Islamic-
Arab state.
136
 Second, the NCP adopts the systematic killing of its opponents in the name of Jihad, 
where it divides its dissidents into „apostates‟ and „pagans‟. According to Rone, the Government of 
Sudan under the NIF applies two penalties of Sharia against its opposition forces. First, the 
collective and second the individual penalties, the former applies to recalcitrant group or apostates. 
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In this way, the apostates are those Sudanese Muslims in the SPLM and could be brought back, 
under the sway of an imam that promulgates Jihad against them. The latter applies to those 
prescribed as unbelievers, enemies of God and His Messenger, refers to the non-Muslims in the 
SPLA. Rone concludes that Jihad is a method, which the NIF uses to confront such groups citing 
from the Holy Quran 2:193, 8:39: “For whoever has heard the call of the Messenger of God, peace 
be upon him, and has not responded to it, must be fought, until there is no persecution and the 
religion is God‟s entirely”.
137
 
    Jihad in Sudan is a synonym for „ethnic cleansing‟. Preece defines „ethnic cleansing‟ as an 
ideology that intends to eradicate ethnic diversity, so that a certain political territory reflecting one 
ethnic and religious identity is produced.
138
 In a visible sense, Jihad in Sudan is ethnic cleansing to 
both non-Muslims and Muslims who reject the ideological system of „Islamic fundamentalism‟ in 
institutions of Sudan. Scholars and some human rights agencies provide practices of the NCP 
Jihadists. First, according to de Waal, under Jihad, the political oppositions that cooperated with the 
SPLM were characterised as apostates in Sudan. For this, the Holy Book of Quran and the mosques 
in the areas of the oppositions were devastated. For instance, eleven mosques of the Nuba Muslims 
were incinerated and the mosque of Mukla village of Ingessana Hill was bulldozed. de Waal 
concludes that the Holy books of Quran and the mosques in the villages of Gedamayeb and 
Rabbasim of Beja Muslims to the east of Sudan were also destroyed.
139
 Second, Jok observes that, 
when the PDF launched attacks against the villages of the non-Muslim ethnic group, the Dinka in 
Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Abyei in South Sudan, they killed the adult men, captured children, 
women and took them to the Islamic territory of the North.
140
 Third, Iyob and Khadiagala argue that 
the system of the Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan that emerged in 1989 has been utilising and 
manipulating all Islamic religious tenets “to justify the killings of Muslims by Muslims as is 
exemplified by the campaigns of ethnic cleansing in the Nuba Mountains … and of Darfur” and the 
Christian South.
141
 Forth, SHRO reports that the NCP Jihadists on some occasion assaults 
exempted women and children from the killing during its Jihad. Such exemption is an 
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implementation of the Islamic ideological plan of transforming the non-Muslim children and 
women of the Dinka as legal properties to the believers, the Muslims in the „land of peace‟. SHRO 
concludes that the NCP government defines its territory as the „land of peace‟ and the opposite is 
the land of „war‟ in reference to its interpretation of the Islamic precept.
142
  
   Different human rights agencies started to report this kind of government treatment of the children 
and women of the Dinka to the United Nations (UN) and in turn, the UN held a session to deliberate 
over this issue and finally decided to send a panel of UN experts headed by Gaspar Biro to Sudan. 
This delegation was mandated to investigate the circumstances of these allegations. In his report, 
Gasper warned the UN that there was an alarming increase in cases of slavery, servitude, slave 
trade, forced labour in the jurisdiction of Sudan against some specific groups.
143
  
   The empirical development of the ideological „Islamic fundamentalism‟ in politics in the past and 
present in Sudan shows that religion, Islam is a very important factor; however, Muslim politicians 
quickly exploit it for their own political egos. Its exploitation displays a scenario of a competition 
over the racial ideologies which each leader uses to justify the need for a change from the present 
religious status quo to the other farther defined ideological and ethnic religious category. At this 
stage, the competition may develop in a long or a short term to religious or ethnic sectarian violence 
within one religious faith. This religious phenomenon gives us a space of an argument that a 
constructed national identity, under the basis of religious doctrines produces an artificial ethnic, 
religious and political uniformity, but is still susceptible to more political and religious schisms, 
because the ethnic inclination can become stronger than the religious one. We have two examples in 
the Islamic Sudan, where Islam shows precarious development of this type. First, Warburg says that 
in January 1885, Muhammad Ahmed Bin Abdullah, known as Al-Mahdi captured power in 
Khartoum from the joined British and Egyptian colonialism and declared Sudan as an Islamic state. 
After his death, the „Islamic Council‟ paid allegiance to Khaliffa Abdullahi Bin Muhammad from 
al-Ta‟asha tribe of the Baqqara Arab as a successor. Later, the Ashraf Arab tribe led by Muhammad 
Sharif Bin Hamed considered the al-Ta‟asha tribe to be an inferior group to represent the Islamic 
state and conspired against the successor. In reaction, within twelve months in power, the successor, 
Abdullahi Bin Muhammad with the support of his kinsmen from Darfur, especially the Governor of 
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Darfur, Muhammad Khalid attacked and defeated the Ashraf. In the aftermath the Muslim Arab 
Governors from the Ashraf were removed from all administrative powers with the exception of 
Usman Diqna that represented the non-Arab ethnic group, the Beja.
144
 Second, de Waal explains 
that the NIF that aims to build an Islamic state in Sudan started in 1999 to wrangle over power and 
interpretation of Islam, until it rifted into two political organisations the NCP, under President Al-
Bashir and the PCP, under Turabi. After that split, members of the former NIF from Darfur who 
allied with Turabi were considered unfaithful ones and replaced in the essential security apparatus 
with those loyal to Al-Bashir. General Abdalla Safi el-Nur from Reizegat Arab tribe of the Southern 
Darfur, an ally to Al-Bashir was chosen and brought into the security apparatus. El-Nur intensified 
the recruitment of the Arab ethnic groups in Darfur to fight against the indigenous Muslims of Fur, 
Massaliet and Zagahwa making Darfur a disaster zone of violence between the militia Muslim 
Arabs, janjaweed and the indigenous Muslim Africans of Darfur.
145
   
   The present state of the racial war between the janjaweed and the indigenous ethnic groups of 
Darfur marks the climax of racism within the model of ethnic territorial nationalism in Sudan. Such 
a racial approach gives an impression that power in Sudan rejects cultural ethics of responsibility 
over its inclusive diverse ethnic groups. In the modern world, different ethnic and religious groups 
need a pluralistic system in all public scripts in state as equal citizens in institutions. According to 
Marshal, political citizenship means the right of a citizen to be treated fairly, irrespective of ethnic, 
religion, gender, conscience or colour.
146
  
   The unstable phenomenon of political development in Sudan forces the author to argue that a 
successful democracy in Sudan needs to de-link itself from religious ideologies with regard to its 
citizens. It needs to adopt the territorial democratic pluralism, where religions are mere references 
in the national constitution and not derivative sources of legislation for the diverse citizenry.   
1.2 Ethnic territorial national pluralism 
Sociologically, the ethnic model of pluralism is a political construct that emerged after the fierce 
resistance of ethnic minorities in USA to the sociological ideology of the „melting pot‟ that aimed to 
assimilate them into the culture of ethnic majority. In general, it is an ideological theory that 
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explains the scientific approach to the interaction of different peoples with different cultural traits in 
a territory with intent to assimilate the minorities into the dominant culture. Some sociologists in the 
USA conducted a research in 1910; under the theme what happens when a group of people of 
divergent cultural groups come into contact and the possibility of conflicts arises. The answer to this 
research theme was unsettling; one sociologist, Robert Ezra Park provided the answer to the 
thematic question of the study. Park postulated a race relations cycle that comprises three cycles, 
„contact‟, „accommodation‟ and „assimilation‟ of the minority culture.
147
 Some argue that Park 
never meant to imply a complete disappearance of ethnic differences. Instead, the intention was 
tolerance to the culture of the unique ethnic groups; however, its opponents view ethnicity as a 
powerful phenomenon in public institutions in the USA and urge its maintenance within different 
institutions. Under these conflicting theoretical positions, the model of ethnic pluralism emerged as 
one of models in construing a national identity.
148
 
   This study argues that the prevailing civil violence in Sudan is a product of the new consciousness 
within the Islamic North emerging from the peripheral regions in resistance to the „melting pot‟ and 
in favour of ethnic territorial pluralism. In practice, this claim is derived from the new 
reconstruction of ethnic political parties that are based on Muslim Arab parties versus indigenous 
Muslim African parties in western Sudan of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and the eastern Sudan of 
the Beja ethnic group. According to Morton, in Western institution, Sudan is defined as a state 
divided into an Arab Muslim North and an African Christian Animist South. Currently, this 
definition is misleading, since within the North there are ethnic political organisations which claim 
representation of their ethnic minorities in opposition to the main Sufi order parties of the Umma, 
DUP and the NIF. These new regional movements from the marginal areas, include, the „Sudanese 
National Party‟ (SNP), a Nuba party and the „Beja Congress‟ composed exclusively of the Beja, an 
ethnic group with a strong sense of maintaining its linguistic and cultural uniqueness along the Red 
Sea and Kassala provinces.
149
   
   In addition, members of the indigenous ethnic groups from Darfur resigned from the Northern 
Islamic parties and formed their own ethnic based political organisations mainly the Sudan‟s 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Mans explains that 
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most of these organisations armed indigenous of Darfur were members of the Northern political 
parties of Umma and NCP and now they have deserted those Islamic political organisations and 
opted for armed confrontation against the centre. The parties claim that they want to eradicate the 
political suppression, oppression and marginalisation of their region, Darfur in terms of power and 
wealth sharing. Mans concludes that SLM asserts that Sharia must be removed and replaced by a 
secular system which rejects racial exclusion.
150
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2   ORIGIN OF RACIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION IN 
SUDAN 
 
 Essentially, the current conflicts in Sudan originated from early power in the state that constructed 
divisive racial settings of the territorial population into „Blacks‟ and „Browns‟, „Muslims and 





 These racial categories are void of political comprehensive 
meaning among the territorial citizens; instead, they simply represent racial exclusion and inclusion. 
According to Guba and Lincoln, exclusion is a coherent body of performance that power pursues in 
setting imbalances of national institutions, which can be “understood in reference to objectives and 
purposes attached” to its setting.
153
  
   The body of the first political setting of public institutions in Sudan was based on the social 
exclusion and inclusion of „us‟ and „them, „we‟ and „they‟ „theirs‟ and „ours‟.
154
 The first phase of 
this setting commenced in 1821, when Muhammed Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt ordered his army to 
invade the „Nilotic Sudan‟ in order to access Black slaves for the slave trade and to fill the ranks of 
his army. His „Turco-Egyptian Rule‟ modernised local administrative systems, under Hakimdar 
(General Governor) in its four provinces of Dunqulah, Berber, Sinnar and Kordofan all in the 
Northern Sudan. The regime established a system of education, a monetary system, post and 
telegraph services and laws in courts to the exclusion of the South, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana 
Hills and Darfur. Those marginal regions remained as mere sources of slaves.
155
 Under the new 
Turco-Egyptian administration, the Jellaba, a term that refers to the Northern Sudanese Muslim 
Arab merchants and administrators crossed into the deep territories of the South and extracted 
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slaves, especially from the „Nilotic country‟ of the Dinka, Nuer, Anyuak, Jur Col and Shilluk.
156
 
Second, the exclusive category was passed to the second power in the same form and manner.
157
 In 
1881, a Muslim Arab, Muhammad Ahmed Bin Sayyid Abdullah Al- Mahdi instigated the Muslim 
people of the North and the Animists of the South to rebel against the Turco-Egyptian regime. 
Under his influence, the Dinka from the South participated in uprooting the Turco-Egyptian forces 
in their territories and Al- Mahdi took complete control of power in 1885.
158
  
   The administrative system of Al-Mahdi soon revived a breaking in the social and political 
continuity between the Animists of the South and the Muslims of the North. It shifted from the 
solidarity of having fought collectively in dismantling the foreign administration to the former 
category of dividing the territory into distinctive divisions of Muslim Arabs in the North versus the 
African Animists in the South. The former were superiors and slavers and the latter were inferiors 
and slaves.
159
 Furthermore, his successor Khaliffa Abdullah maintained these constructed categories 
of excluding the Southern identities from the system. From1885-1889, the regime allowed slavers 




   In the view of Miles and Thränhardt, when a territorial region is built on the logic of exclusion 
with its underlying shaping practices, then racist conceptions of „otherness‟ become operational 
within the national institutions.
161
 The extensive experiences of racial exclusion, since the origin of 
Sudan to some ethnic groups has built consistent racial category of „otherness‟ based on the 
 
 
156 Kebbede, Girma (ed.) (1999). Sudan‟s Predicament Civil War, Displacement and Ecological Degradation, 
Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 11. The Turco-Egyptian regime promoted the existing trafficking in black 
population of Nilotic South. The Jellaba kidnapped thousands of slaves from the South.       
157 Nuba Muslim students such as Ibrahim Muhammad el Nur, from Omdurman Alia University, Zinab Abdel Hussien 
from Omdurman Ahlia University and Sara Babker and Zaki Kouku from University of Juba maintain that social 
exclusiveness of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and South Sudan was inherited by the Arab rule of  Mahdi from the 
Turco-Egyptian rule.   
158 Nikkel, op. cit., p. 58. During the revolt of el Mahdi against the Turco-Egyptian regime, the Governor of the regime, 
Frank Miller Lupton of Bahr el Ghazal reported that he heard the “Dinka shouting the war cry of the Mahdists”, while 
fighting the Turco-Egyptian forces and carrying the green flag of the Ansar soldiers. And Agar Dinka attacked the 
regime military garrison at Rumbek.   
159 Collins, Robert O (1962). The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898 a Struggle for Control, London: Yale University Press, p. 
23.  Al-Mahdi regime re-established the social exclusion of the indigenous population of the South. The regime 
permitted its loyal Muslim Arab militants, Ansar to continue with the policy that legitimated Muslims Arabs from the 
North to enslave non-Muslims from the South. 
160 Johnson, Douglas Hamilton (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan‟s Civil Wars, Oxford: James Currey, p. 6. The 
regime of Khaliffa permitted the Jellaba to move to the South and bring slaves to rescue the shaking economy of the 
regime. 
161 Miles, Robert and Thränhardt, Dietrich (eds.) (1995). Migration and European Integration the Dynamics of Inclusion 





opposing categories of Muslim Arabs in the North of Sudan and the indigenous Christians and 
Animists in the South. These constructed racial categories have made it impossible to achieve 
unified political resolutions between the opposing identities in order to build unified institutions for 
the people of Sudan. Any political, social or economic project on the agenda within the institutions 
of the state encounters parallel interpretations based on these categories. This is reflected in the 
question posed to students in the questionnaire of this research, which states “How did the east, 
west, far north and centre become the Northern Sudan Region in exclusion of the South and what 
does the name of your region and Sudan mean in your native language and do you experience any 
difficulty in articulating it ?” The students‟ responses to this question provide paradigms of 
conflicting categories depending on the region from which they came. Most Muslim Arabs of the 
North argue that the division of Sudan was a foreign construct: British imperialism divided Sudan 
into the South and the North.
162
 „There is no difference between the South and the North; the South 
was just a compass and not people‟. „Our brothers from the South listen to the Christians from the 
Western World. Those Whites people do not want our political and economic stability. They always 
say that Muslim Arabs are bad; they enslave non-Muslims‟.
163
 A Muslim student concludes that 
Islam is a good religion; it fights slavery and maintains good relationships in the social order.
164
  
   In contrast, some Christian and Animist students from the South reject this assertion. As it appears 
from the answers of the questionnaire question that asks “Do you think national projects such as oil, 
Jonglei Canal and Al-Gezira Scheme can create cross interaction and equal work opportunities for 
the diverse regions of Sudan, if yes or not, please explain?” Some of them claim that „Arab 
Muslims continue … to create conditions for enslaving the people of the South. They create 
conditions that kill and starve us, until our present day‟.
165
 „Lucky enough, the presence of our 
environmental natural swamps impede them from identifying all those means and possibilities. Yet, 
these means are frequently applied against our population of the South in the twenty-first 
century‟
166
 and when „the people of America and Europe … say that we want to know the reason 
for killing us, then the Arabs respond that the Western World is responsible for this problem. The 
White people have become the loophole of escaping crimes committed against the Animists and 
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Christians. Did the West … delegate the successive Muslim Arab Governments in Khartoum to kill 
the people of the South or they themselves choose to do so? For us in the South, we do not … 
admire … political liars‟.
167
    
   In Sudan serious political disagreement between the Christians and Animists of the South in 
opposition to Muslim Arabs of the North is not rationally discussed as a spontaneous internal 
problem without encompassing the Western World. It is a common political pattern of political and 
intellectual „Islamists‟ in Sudan to accuse the West as the cause of various political crises in the 
country. For instance, Mohammad argues that the Southern Sudan became a closed district in the 
thirties, free from any Islamic influencing contact. In mission schools, the Southern students were 
oriented that their „brothers‟ from the North were the source of their present life of hardship. In the 
religious and history classes, missionaries exploited every opportunity to keep the memory of 
slavery alive.
168
   
   The pattern of accusing the West is widely reflected in the responses of Muslim Arab students. 
For example, the questionnaire question that states: “How did the east, west, far north and centre 
become the Northern Sudan Region in exclusion of the South and what does the name of your 
region and Sudan mean in your native language and do you experience any difficulty in articulating 
it ?” Some students who have answered this question argue that the concept of the South to be a 
state is a creation of the USA and the European Union (EU).
169
 For example, one said; the West 
uses the Christians and the Animists from the South as its Trojan horses to execute its detrimental 
project against the unity of this country and Islam.
170
 One student concludes that the behaviour of 
the Western World towards the South has caused a departure in political opinions and led to the 




   Participant observation shows that it is not easy to find political consensus between Muslim Arab 
students in the North and Christian Animist students from the South. Most of them provide parallel 
conflicting views in reference to the given questionnaires. Further typical examples in which this 
conflict is revealed come from the question: “Do you think national projects such as oil; Canal 
Jonglei and Al-Gezira Scheme can create cross interaction and equal work opportunities for the 
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diverse regions of Sudan, if yes or not, please explain?” Answers to this question unfold the value 
of swamps of the Nile. Many Christians‟ and Animists‟ students from the South describe the 
swamps of the Nile tributaries as “… have been our sanctuaries from the aggressive forces that 
come from the North of Sudan”.
172
 Some of them define these swamps as their “… natural and 
valuable friendly creatures which have been protecting us from Muslims Arabs of the Northern 
Sudan‟ and now the Islamic power wants to remove them by digging a canal in Jonglei. We shall 
never accept this claimed national project”.
173
 
   A new phenomenon that the researcher observes from some „Christian-Animist students is the 
personification of swamps, hence, they receive special eulogy such as “… we praise swamps for 
their care and protection of us from our public enemies. We the Nilotics have been the victims of 
Muslim Arabs, since the time of Al-Mahdi State, where we were their slaves”.
174
 Some claim that, 
during the last war between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan (GoS).
175
, the swamps were 
hiding locations one explains: “During the war, the government forces could not carry heavy 
machine guns to the swampy locations, where people used to hide … swamps have saved many 
lives among the Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, and Anyuak people of the Nile”.
176
. Some conclude that the 
intention of the government to dig a canal in South Sudan to drain the swamps so that its water can 
be used for irrigation of farm lands sounds partially reasonable, but there might be also a hidden 
agenda to remove these sanctuaries‟.
177
 
   The value of the swamps and the digging of a canal is an intertwined issue among Christian and 
Animist students. As one of them states “Swamps are our fences that protect us constantly from our 
foes, the Muslim Arabs”.
178
 The other claims that the digging of a canal opens possibilities of 
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However, a Muslim Arab student describes the digging of a canal to drain swamps as a significant 
national project for the development of agriculture in Sudan‟.
180
  
   According to Deng, before or after the advent of Islam, Arabs from the North of Sudan accessed 
slaves from South Sudan with difficulties. Natural swamps, flies, climate humidity and violent 
resistance from the Nilotic people, Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anyuak made it impossible for Arab 
slave traders to penetrate deeply to the Southern territory.
181
   
   These perceived conflict interpretations to the swamps are paradoxical, but our concern is that the 
claims of students show the point of racial departure in political views and interpretations of events 
and plans between the Christians and Animists in one category and the Muslim Arabs of the North 
in the opposite. Such constant political binaries function negatively in designing economic, cultural 
and social projects for the territorial people of Sudan.  
2.1 Project of Canal Jonglei and interpretations of its objectives 
In 1978 Sudanese and Egyptians Governments initiated a joint project to dig a canal in the Jonglei 
region in South Sudan. The former President of Sudan Nimeiri gave a green light for its excavation. 
It was planned that the digging would be finished in the middle of 1980, but the SPLM defined the 
project as one of its main military targets and that definition halted the work with a little less than a 
third of the project left unfinished.
182
  
   The justification for the project was that the sudds (the swamps) of the White Nile impede the 
swift flow of water towards the north. The stated intention was that a canal would drain the swamps 
and allow the flow of water to the north and that water would be used for the irrigation of a larger 
swath of land for agricultural food production that might benefit two countries, Sudan and Egypt.
183
 
The Northern Muslim Arab students who responded to the question; Do you think national projects 
such as oil; Canal Jonglei and Al-Gezira Scheme can create cross interaction and equal 
opportunities for the diverse regions of Sudan … describe the digging as a great project for the 
development of the country.
184
, but one Christian and Animist student describes the digging as: “…. 
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an abhorrent project that threatens the underlying concepts of the swamps”.
185
 The students present 
different suspicions against the realisation of this project, including its impacts on the economy and 
security of the South.  
2.1.1 Economic benefits and insecurity 
First, some students claim that the digging of a canal in Jonglei drains the swamps and makes them 
vulnerable to the Muslim Arab governments of Egypt and Sudan.
186
 The students point out that the 
swamps prevent the transfer of heavy machine weapons which the two governments may use 
against them, if there is an abrupt war. A Dinka student elaborates this suspicion as an experience 
and states: “On different occasions, government tanks could not reach our areas of swamps, during 
the war between the SPLA and Muslim Arab Jihadists in the Northern Sudan, since May 1983 to 
January 2005”.
187
 Some Nilotic students claim that swamps protect them from the people whom 
they describe as “ambitious Muslim Arab slavers”.
188
 Brink writes about the racial relationships 
between the Dutch and the Khoin people of South Africa, where the former misrepresents the latter 
and in reaction against this racial misrepresentation the latter argue as: 
   We of the Khoin, we never thought of these mountains and plants, these long grasslands and 
marshes as a wild place to be tamed. It was the White men who called it wild and saw it filled with 
wild animals and wild people. To us, it has been always friendly and tame. It has given us food, 
drink and shelter, even in the worst of drought. It was only when the Whites moved in and started 
digging and breaking and shooting and driving off the animals that it really became wild.
189
  
   For the majority of Christian and Animist students of the South, the swamps have never been 
weird. They have been their sources of fish and unadulterated water, bulwarks for security and 
above all, areas for grazing their cattle and other animals. It is only the plans of two governments, 
Egypt and Sudan that would indeed, transform them to unnatural wilderness. These arguments of 
students go as, first, a Shilluk articulates “The plan of Egypt and the Northern dominated 
government to dig a canal in Jonglei to drain swamps is an ill plan. It denies us from fish, clean 
water, and evaporation of swamps water for rain in our lands and it pains me … much whenever I 
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hear it; but all in all, any attempt to undermine the validities of these swamps represents an 
invitation for the resumption of war in Sudan”
190
. For Nuer student, the benefits of these swamps 
include security as he explains “During the war between the SPLA with the Muslim fundamentalist 
government in Khartoum, the government fired cattle and herdsmen in grazing lands with their aero 
planes from the sky. Fortunately, those beside … natural swamps, were saved. But, if you were 
somewhere at the dry locations, then you are gone. Today, if the digging of the canal is revived, 
then I would look for a gun and fight.
191
  
   Some Southern Sudanese students are much concerned over the economic advantages of this 
project and the role of those advantages to their security. For them, if the canal is dug, then the 
Jellaba, would introduce mechanised agricultural farms in the drained land and in turn, the wealth 
produced from these agricultural farms might be used against the local people. Perhaps, it would be 




   These conflicting interpretations towards the economic benefits from the Canal Jonglei plan 
represent the racial division of Sudan. Sociologically, the racial character of racism is explained on 
the basis of economic structural plans and its continuity. Hall observes that social division which 
assumes a distinctively racial or ethnic character can be explained principally by reference to 
economic structures and processes introduced in accessing such economic benefits.
193
  
   The native students from the South‟ resistance to the digging of the Jonglei‟ Canal is not only 
limited on racism of cultural xenophobia; it also includes their fear of the negative effect of the 
digging on the Southern environment.   
2.1.2 Cultural xenophobia and ecology 
In 2003, the national media in Egypt started to advertise that the Governments of Sudan and Egypt 
had revived the programme of settling some Egyptian farmers into South Sudan in order to cultivate 
there. Some Egyptian diplomats discussed it in public media confirming the request of Sudan from 
the Government of Egypt to send five thousand Egyptian farmers to be permanently settled in the 
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 For some students from the South that initiative of resettlement is connected to the digging 
of a canal in Jonglei, so that a space for their resettlement and cultivation would be secured. In their 
view, that plan is very dangerous for the future of their unique culture. It makes them fear possible 
cultural clashes between them and the settled Arab Muslims within their territory as one of them 
argues: „If a canal is dug, then the Jellaba and Egyptian agriculturalists would move to occupy our 
lands as farmers and pollute our culture and that may lead to violence of cultural differences‟.
195
 
Another more harsh comment comes from a student who claims that: „the digging opens the way for 
Arab slavers to smuggle their slavery culture to our places.‟
196
  
   Mohamed Suliman explains such conflicting interpretations between the people of the North and 
the people of the South of Sudan towards this project of the canal in Jonglei region. According to 
him, the Nilotic peoples (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anyuak, Bari Mundari and Jur Col) fear the 
prospect of a flow of aliens that may settle in their midst and be a  source of possible conflicts. Back 
in November 1974, rumours that Egyptian farmers would be sent to the canal area immediately 
sparked students‟ riots in Juba, capital city of the South.
197
  
   An analysis of these student riots in resistance to the project of the canal in Jonglei reveals two 
situations. First, it denotes the racial phenomenon, where each group of the racialised social 
categories is influenced by the media and comes to the conclusion that promotes racism, under the 
pretext of protecting cultural identity and avoidance of insecurity. The rejection of the Egyptian 
farmers and the Jellaba by the rioting students gives an impression of classified racial groups, 
where each one is defined as a „foreigner‟ and not needed among „us‟ (the people of the South). It 
represents the dynamic building of racial territories of „they‟ (Muslim Arabs of Egypt and the North 
of Sudan) and „we‟ (Christians and Animists of the South). According to Huysmans, reading 
newspapers, magazines, watching television and listening to the radio give an impression of racism 
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and xenophobia of insecurity in social structures. The security tale constructs the racial identity of 
„us‟ and „they‟ threaten not only individuals, but the whole “us of our identity”.
198
  
   Second, ecological or environmental claim of the Christian-Animist students from the South is a 
very essential point which needs serious attention and genuine study. First, one would argue that 
there are adequate and serious deficiencies in the adopted research data on digging a canal in 
Jonglei. Two governments of Sudan and Egypt favour the aims and objectives of the research data 
that concentrate only on the digging of such a canal for the achievement of the flow of water to the 
lower zone of the region at the north
199
 without reviewing the parameters of the various ecological 
impacts and the effects of the drained swamps of the White Nile to the Nilotic community and the 
environment. Digging requires a reliable research body that will adequately consider the fauna and 
flora of the region. And any limited data assessment would automatically reflect negative impacts 
on the ecology and that would explain an adequate political opportunism of racial exclusion of the 
Christians and the Animists of the Southern region to benefit from their fauna and flora of their 
environment. The presence of fauna and flora is important for the states of Sudan and Egypt to 
provide alternative measures in protecting the very genus and exotic species of birds, animals and 
plants in the environment to avoid the possibility of their extinction. Practically, the swampy area of 
the „Nilotic country‟ embraces different species of animals, plants and birds. All these living beings 
rely on these swamps for their survival.
 200
 Elsiddig observes that the Government of Sudan fails 
several times to respect natural environment, which different animals use as their refuge place
201
    
2.2 Racism in social structures 
It is common to find two racial categories among Muslim students of the five targeted universities 
for this research. The African Muslim students are often in opposition to the Arab Muslim students. 
The research question: have you ever experienced any form of discrimination in any region of 
Sudan, if so please explain reveals that the present relationships among Muslim students are based 
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on race, rather than, religion. Some instances can be found from the answers of the African Muslim 
students to the questionnaires. First, a Muslim student from the Fur ethnic group of Darfur claims 
that „social structures in the Northern Sudan justify every day a sense of racism against the Fur. the 
student states: „Any African Muslim boy from Darfur working in periphery restaurants of Muslim 
Arabs in Khartoum is called Fur, even though the boy might not be from Fur and the reason for 




   Second, some argue that: „... if you read Islam, you would (sic) find it a good religion coming 
from God; when you come to meet with Muslim Arabs in political and social institutions of Sudan, 
then it looks unattractive‟.
203
 This unattractiveness comes into religion, because the „the successive 
Muslim Arab governments in Sudan reject the Islamic norm that urge equality of all Muslims and 
favour the Arab race in public institutions‟.
204
  
   In contrast, some Arab students‟ reject these claims at their answers to the question “Is religion 
important and what is your concept about the world in accordance to your religion, does it allow 
space for other religion(s)?” They argue that: “Islam is not a worthless religion; it is a worthy 
religion that devotes the life of a believer to Allah (God), but some Muslim leaders mingle it with ... 
corrupted politics. Such negative practice distorts its holy message among the Dinka, the Nuer, the 
Shilluk and the Bari and all (sic) people in the South, including the Nuba in Nuba Mountains”.
205
 
Another respondent wrote: “After the foundation of the infidel organisation (sic), the so-called 
SPLA and SPLM, the people of the Nuba Mountains and Darfur (sic) joined it gradually. The 
reason for their ... participation in the rebellion … against us was that the successive government 
forces discriminated, marginalised, and killed them unjustly in their regions. The correct message of 
Islam is peace and justice. When a Muslim person kills and enslaves a person without a reason, then 
that was not the ethos of the religion our Prophet Muhammad preached for all people in order to 
become Muslims”.
206
 One student concludes that “… practice of killing is a deviation from Islam 
and it is difficult to bring the Animists people of the South back to the fold of Islam. Today, many 
brothers from the South, even at our university here hate whatever (sic) involving a Muslim Arab 
and prefer to discuss anything involving an African Muslim of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Beja 
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and Ingessana Hills. This is racism against us and we need to rethink, otherwise, African Muslims 
of these areas will join their lost brothers in Christianity.”
207
  
   Some scholars argue that Islam in Sudan is not free from racial discrimination between Muslim 
Arabs and Black Muslim Africans. A Black Muslim could still be a slave of an Arab Muslim. First, 
Fisher points out that, during the time of the slave trade, Black Muslim clerics dared not travel 
freely. They feared being kidnapped and sold in slave markets. This phenomenon forced Ali Dinar, 
a former Muslim ruler of Darfur to react against the Kababish Arab Muslims of the Northern 
Kordofan. Ali asked them to provide the legitimacy of enslaving other free Muslims.
208
 
Additionally, according to Idris, the Muslim Arabs of the Northern Sudan are not satisfied that a 
Black African converted to Islam in the country is of the same equal status of faith in Islam. A 
Black Muslim could be enslaved in social institutions and mocked as hayawan al-natigq (a talking 
animal).
209
   
   The author argues that this phenomenon of racism among students, Muslims, Christians and 
Animists alike at the higher institutions of learning has a link with social and political orientation in 
national institutions of the country. It is a reflection of the social and political environment that is 
full of a racial norm that promotes it, instead of a norm that rejects it. And subsequently, it builds up 
conflicting racial institutions based on the categories of the African Muslims that unite with the 
Christians and the Animists against the Arabised Muslims in North Sudan.  The cultural norm is a 
regulating power in social and political relationships. It displays a function in the organised system 
of social, political and cultural structures of people. The norm directs behaviours of social groups 
within a territory to promote what is wanted and reject what is unwanted. It regulates and directs 
rules and guidelines for the behaviour of society by distinguishing between the vicious and the 
virtuous in social institutions and commending nations, people and social groups in a specific 
environment to divide human practices into wrong and right. Norms emerge from human evaluation 
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   Sudanese Muslim Africans, Christian Africans, Animist Africans and Muslim Arabs might not be 
serious in teaching norms to their children in social and cultural institutions of learning to avoid the 
binary racial categories of a Muslim Arab versus a Muslim African or a Muslim versus a Christian 
or an Animist‟. Implementation of norms, however, depends on individuals or groups in social 
structures. It is the responsibility of each member in social institutions to react against those 
deviating from the common norms that maintain positive relationships. Teaching children to grow 
in social and political surroundings with norms which are entirely void of all forms of racism and 
discrimination can be an alternative resolution to racism and discrimination. Such an orientation is a 
necessity for the institutions of Sudan to function smoothly and coherently without racial 
segregation. Sudan is a state party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR). 
Article two of this Charter articulates that every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any 
kind of race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion.
211
  
   At the moment, some of the UN organs have introduced measures for combating all such negative 
norms which support racial discrimination. For instance, on 4 December 2008, the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) financed a coalition of interested parties for a global 
campaign against discrimination of women by “encouraging fathers and father figures to set 
example to young males”.
212
  
   The modern political Muslim elites in North Sudan set symbolic examples which promote 
discrimination in national structures. Alier argues that Muslims in power, since the foundation of 
Sudan to the present day build institutions that revive the aggressive shape of slavery. After the 
independence of Sudan on 1 January 1956, power started to give names to the public roads in 
Khartoum, capital city of Sudan. Today we have a road in the centre of Khartoum that bears the 
name of Zubeir Pasha, while Zubeir was responsible for the institution of slavery, slave trade and all 
forms of capture and mistreatment to all the slaves from South Sudan. Alier concludes that the 
increasing eulogy of slavers in the national institutions of Sudan makes it difficult to ease the 
memory of slavery from the descendants of the victims of slave trade and that represents a symbolic 
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    Zubeir Road at the centre of the national capital city of all the citizens of Sudan represents a 
deviation example not only from the respect to the former victims‟ relatives of the slave trade and 
slavery, but also from the international convention of slavery of 1926.
214
 Without the introduction 
of alternative norms which reject the deviation from the accepted public values among the people of 
Sudan, then the racial category of the „lost brothers‟ will gradually persist in national structures of 
the territorial Sudan. 
2.2.1 Stereotype of the ‘lost brothers’ 
Interaction between different groups in social structures opens a way for the construction of the 
phenomenon called stereotype. It is a social perception invented by members of a certain social 
group as an in-group. The opposite is an out-group. The members of an in-group generally apply 
this constructed perception to the out-group without exception as their inclusive characteristics 
rather than individual ones.
215
  
   Sudan social institutions are not free from this social categorisation. It has its stereotype of the 
„lost brothers‟. For example, responses to the question: “What do you think about the people in 
Sudan who follow other religious faith and traditional rituals than yours and please state the 
reason(s) of why you think so?” reflected stereotypes such the following: „Our existing political and 
religious conflicts among us ... came to be, because of British colonial policy towards the South of 
Sudan. Colonialism closed some areas to Arab Muslims of the North to interact with the pagans of 
the South. Free interactions between us, Arab Muslims and the pagans of the South would have 
helped in converting the pagans from Animism to Islam, instead of being lost to Christianity.‟
216
 
„Islam is the best religion; I believe that without interference of Kawajat (White people) (sic) with 
their religion, Christianity, our things would have had a chance to move positively‟.
217
 „Imagine 
Islam, a religion that establishes just social order is rejected in the South. I believe our brothers 
from the South have missed the way to heaven.‟
218
 „We would have been one and all of us together 
would have been living as good peaceful Muslims receiving the blessing of God, but our brothers 
got astray to the foreign religion and the Kawajat … with their Christianity planted the seed of 
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hatred in the minds of the Southerners to dislike the religion of their brothers in the North.
219
 One of 
them presents a conclusion that: „I believe those who follow other religions in the South are lost ... 
from the way to heaven. Islam is a very special and clear religion in its message to mankind. Those 
who reject its salvaging revelation, like our brothers in the South and Nuba Mountains are not alone 
lost, but bitterly dead with their idols.
220
 At the same time Christian-Animist students from the 
South reject this stereotype of the „lost brothers‟ in their responses to the same question. In their 
view, „all religions are important in all aspects, but the activities of Arab Muslims in Sudan project 
Islam as a bad religion. For this, we reject it and embrace Christianity, but they call us … „lost 
brothers‟.
221
 Another student states: „Calling us „lost brothers‟ is a naïve construction, the question 
that our brothers fail to answer is; have we ever … been at one time Muslims, in order to call us 
lost‟? There are genuine questions here. First, the Nubians were Christians and had quickly 
developed oblivion to Christianity. Why did they accept the religion which had annihilated their 
culture? Why on earth did they deny their civilisation? They are lost brothers indeed and we have 
preserved the civilisation of the Old Christian culture in Sudan. The Christian heritage has been 
here for centuries … and centuries, but, it is unfair for the Nubian people in Sudan to avoid the 




   The history of Sudan teaches that Christianity, under the Nubians pre-dominated the North of 
Sudan for almost one thousand years. It became the official religion in the region in the sixth 
century and lasted more or less, until the fourteenth century. During their wars against the Muslims, 
the Christian Nubian Kingdoms resisted the change of their Christian identity for seven hundred 
years.
223
 The Nubian Muslim students from Mahas, a subsection of the Nubians
224
 argue: „a lost 
person is one assimilated (sic) to another racial identity. The Nubians maintain their identity. So, we 
are not lost, since we are not assimilated to Arab culture. It might be true that some Nubians are 
lost, but not the whole Nubian ethnic divisions.
225
 „Some of us are not ready to trace their (sic) 
genealogical lines to the Arabs. It is true, we are Muslims, but Islam is a religion … it is a religion 
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of God to all mankind, irrespective of race, ethnic, and the colour. The membership of becoming a 
Muslim is not acquired through a recitation of an Arab name. It is not; it is very clear in Holy 
Quran. For me, I am a Mahas and a Muslim. I speak Mahas as a Nubian language. I really speak it 
and … it is my identity and I am proud of it, so I am not lost‟.
226
  
   The ethnic Nubian Muslim students from the Mahas have illustrated an essential political issue for 
analysis. What really constitutes identity in the context of Sudan language, religion or tradition? In 
the view of some Christian-Animist students, self identity is derived from a combination of 
customs, traditions, language and religion. This definition is derived from their following 
arguments.  „It is not enough for one to be a Christian, and Animist or a Muslim. A person must … 
maintain ethnic culture in dealing with situations. Me, I am not lost because, I am a Christian 
Animist and a Jieng. I speak my language, but my identity is not alone based on the language of the 
Jieng; it is not enough to speak a language. Some people do not know their languages, yet they 
follow their traditions and customs. Our brothers, the Nubians have abolished their traditions and 
customs of Christian civilisation and are lost to the Islamic Arab culture‟.
227
   
   Some continue to claim that „the Nubians are „lost brothers‟ certainly and we always tell our 
colleagues at the university to retrieve their heritage and teach it to their children.‟
228
 „It is unfair for 
this great nation … to avoid restoration of their religion, Christianity, tradition and civilisation to 
their children. For me, if I do not warm my memory with my traditions, then I am not a Jieng; the 
Nubians are lost Christians. They deny their identity and claim the religion of Arabs and the culture 
of Arabs in their way of social life‟.
229
 According to Idris, the Nubians, both the Mahas and the 
Danagella, at the far north of the country have retained their language as a sense of their identity 
despite their adoption of Arab culture in their institutions.
230
  
   Historically, the stereotype of „lost brothers‟ is a generalised racial category to the heterogeneous 
ethnic groups residing in the South of Sudan as Christians and Animists. Their nationalism emerges 
in opposition to the new construction based on the ideology of Islamic and Arab traditions. The 
groups orient themselves towards the people of East Africa in order to build an African nation. On 
the other hand, the political Islamic sector in North Sudan builds its nationalism on the resistance to 
the African traditions and favours linking up with Arab world, especially Egypt to build an Islamic 
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Arab cultural identity in Sudan. El-Affendi explains that the nationalism of the people of South 
Sudan as a political ideology that rejects Muslim and Arab North Sudan and attaches itself to the 
African countries of Kenya and Uganda. And the nationalism of the Muslims in the North is 
constructed on the Arab-oriented culture. The educated classes of Arab Muslims seek to attach the 
identity of the state to Egypt and the Arab world. The Northern intelligentsia aim to regain back the 
“lost brothers” from the South who follow the alien values of Christianity and reject their “brothers” 
in the North who are longing to restore them back to the fold of the Islamic fashion.
231
  
2.2.2 Logic of stereotypes 
Yinger observes that the logic of stereotypes comes up in an interacting society, which intends to 
maintain some kinds of social discrimination. For instance, most European settlers to the „New 
World‟ developed a comfortable rationalisation, in which the native Indian was “a lying, thieving, 
murdering savage”.
232
  Today, laying such attributes on the indigenous population of Indians is not 
longer regarded as socially acceptable. Yinger concludes that, such a descriptive generalisation 
came from a well-established system of culture that many people who have had an opportunity to 
witness an Indian would come to accept that all the Indians are of such characters and that form of 
culture is an ethnic stereotype.
233
  
   In the case of Sudan, it is not easy to reach a conclusion over the stereotype of the „lost brothers‟, 
but the British imperialists manipulated religious and ethnic sentiments of the territorial population 
of Sudan in a way that suited their political logic. According to Lesch, British colonial power 
followed the prejudices of the preceding regimes of the Turkyyia and the Mahdiyya. Those regimes 
conceived the people of the South as pagans. After the British power conquered Sudan and 
dismantled those regimes, it began to legalise the flow of Christian missionaries to the South to 
convert the local Animists to Christianity. And at the same time, it refused those Christian 
missionaries permission to propagate their religious propaganda to the Islamic North.
234
       
   Today, Muslim Sudanese leaders in power apply the same logic. The government encourages the 
method that intertwines the ethnic race of Arab with the Islamic religion as inter-independent 
entities. Mere conversion to Islam as a religion is not enough. A confessed Muslim needs to identify 
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himself or herself as a Muslim-Arab in social and political domains.
235
 This research argues that the 
interconnection of the Arab race and Islam in Sudan impedes some ethnic groups to embrace Islam. 
And at the same time; it can be assumed as an underlying stimulating factor for some Nubian ethnic 
group in Sudan to develop reconstruction of the new identity, after their conversion to Islam. Some 
of them have constructed an ancestral genealogy reaching back to an Arab descent. The 
reconstruction was invented to establish a kinship relationship with Arab tribes that retained a 
tradition of heroism in the distant nomadic battles in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Deng, 
construction of Islamic identity was indispensable to the new Muslims in Sudan. It was associated 
with the Arabic language and culture and established a new phase of living with the superior race, 
Arab and not only the religion, Islam. For this, many Nubians and other Blacks resorted to fabricate 
their genealogies to have an Arab origin. Some counted themselves as kin to the tribe of the Prophet 
Muhammad, the Quayrash to suit the required religious and ethnic identity. Hence, the intertwined 
Arabisation with Islamisation brought the current assumed descent identity in the North of Sudan 
contrary to its previous identity of religious and ethnic diversity. This group persistently 
reconstructs the diverse Sudan‟s societies along this indispensible Islamic-Arab model. 
236
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3   RECONSTRUCTION OF DIVERSITIES IN SUDAN 
 
Nationalism is a perceived conceptual political ideology that certain groups of people pursue in 
order to establish a sovereign territorial state for themselves. Nevertheless, within that territory, 
power endeavours to build institutions, but it encounters certain obstructions arising from the choice 
of multiple models to be adopted in building those institutions for citizens. In selection, one 
economic, ethnic, racial or religious model may influence power to adopt it as a pattern for 
constructing national identity in the constitution of a state. At this phase, conflicting controversies 
may arise and become the dominant phenomena between power and institutions and the relationship 




   After the decolonisation of Sudan, power in the state strives to build national identity on the 
intertwined classical ideological category of Islamic Arabism. It is an ideological model that 
interlaces Islam and Arab as one entity. Prunier observes that the successive ruling Muslim Arab 
elite in control of power in Sudan, since independence conceive Islamisation of the territorial state 
as an instrument of Arabisation.
238
 Some Muslim Arab students consider this model a positive step 
and provide different reasons for it. Some articulate that their support to the model is an ideological 
one because; it helps in unifying the existing ethnic and religious diversities in Sudan. In practice, it 
has already homogenised the diverse Northern ethnic groups from the far north, the west, the east 
and the centre as one group known as „Muslim Arabs of the Northern Sudan‟.
239
 Others claim that 
the identity of these regions came to be one, because Islam is a religion which removes the divisions 
of people on ethnic lines. Therefore, each of these Islamic regions was transformed into an Islamic-
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   The claim of some students that Islam transforms different ethnic groups into an Arab identity 
puts sociological study into a serious search for a model that could really constitute national 
identity. Studies of two scholars suggest an ethnic group as a principle constituent that constitutes 
national identity in a state, however, each of them presents different definitions for the term „ethnic 
group‟. First, Yinger limited his definition that ethnic group is a composition of people connected 
by supposed ties of blood manifested by community of language, religion, and customs and in turn, 
those supposed ties become the basic sources for the formation of a nation‟.
241
 Second, for Barth, 
there is no specific constituent that constitutes national identity, beyond an ethnic group. This 
conclusion prompts him to define the ethnic group as a category, where its actors ascribe to 
themselves what they want as their distinctive national identity that distinguishes them from 
others.
242
 This definition suggests that a group of people can take one of the supposed ties of ethnic 
groups such as „language‟, „religion‟ or customs and make it a model of its national identity.  After 
the departure of all foreign systems which have ruled Sudan, power commenced to pursue this 
model in constructing Sudan‟s diverse identities. Idris argues that Muslim Arabs in Sudan control 
power and wealth and divide the population into the „Civilised Muslim Arabs of the Northern 
Sudan‟ and the „Black heathens‟ of the Southern Sudan. In practice, two models, Islam and Arab 
culture are introduced in institutions to become undividable entities and power applies them as one 
model in determining the identity of the state. Idris concludes that such a form of transformation of 
diverse identities promotes an exclusion of those defined as the “heathens”, primitive and 
uncivilised in the South of the country.
243
 
3.1 Civilised Muslim Arabs of North Sudan and internal conflicts 
The territory of Muslim Arab Northern Sudan actually consists of heterogeneous ethnic groups, 
rather than, the homogeneous Arab race. It is a composition of the diverse Arabised ethnic groups 
that includes the Christian-Arab minority originally Egyptian Christians, Copts, and Syrian 
Christian Orthodox Church. Generally, this group of Arabs constitutes 40% of the total population 
of the whole country and it lives mostly at Gezira, north, centre, north of Kordofan, the southern 
Darfur and minority in Nuba Mountains and the east of Sudan.
244
 The Beja ethnic group with its 
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vast sub-ethnic divisions in eastern Sudan is Muslim, but distinct and represents 6% of the total 
population of Sudan. There are extensive and diverse groups in Darfur and Nuba Mountains of the 
western Sudan. People of Darfur include, the Fur as a majority totaling 2% with minorities such as, 
Daju, Beigo, Zagahwa, Berti, Massaliet, Gimr, Tama and many others.
245
 The Nuba in the Nuba 
Mountains at the Southern Kordofan State represent 5% of the total population. The Nuba are 
divided into more than fifty groups.
246
 Within western Sudan, there are West African immigrants, 




   Does the taking of the intertwined Islam and Arab race as one model for unifying these 
heterogeneous groups succeed in transforming different groups in Sudan to become one culturally? 
Whitehouse observes that a group of people may live within a territory of a state as one nation. Yet 
they are not one; certain cultural performances distinguish them as different groups. For instance, 
cultural practices of dance mark their distinctiveness of being different, because, dances reflect their 
unique diversity. Participants in each group in dancing dress in accordance with their cultural dress, 




   Cultural uniformity based on indispensable Islam and Arab models in Sudan reflects the same 
situation as Whitehouse describes it. First, practical cultural performances show that the Nuba 
groups within this territory called civilised Muslim Arab of North Sudan, display different symbolic 
references of uniqueness in their dances. Each one of them in the region follows its distinctive 
cultural and social performances, which are irrelevant to Arab culture. The Nuba students explain 
this situation as: „The people of Nuba Mountains are identified through their different social or 
cultural dances. Some dances are annual, especially the dance of harvesting, but there are dances, 
which are played, after three years with exception of siber, a kind of a dance that is played after 
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every six years. Our cultural dances show that the Nuba are not part of the North of Muslim 
Arab‟.
249
 One of them from Muro section of the eastern Kadugli characterise the method of their 
dress during public dances as: „We the Muro dress … horns of animals on our heads and dress 
feathers and irons on our legs and ankles, during occasions of our dances‟.
250
 One of them 
concludes that the Nuba are not Arabs and Arabs are not Nuba, so the annexation of the Nuba 
region to the constructed Northern Sudan of Muslim Arab and calling the Nuba as Arabs is wrong. 
He states: „Our culture proves that we are not Arabs‟.
251
  
   The narratives of the Nuba students about their cultural dance represent their resistance to the 
imposed dualistic model of Islamic Arabism that rejects the unique cultural identity of the Nuba 
people. It represents the conflict between the oppressive ideological force and the oppressed Nuba 
within the Northern Muslim Arab region. de Waal observes that dance, wrestling and musical 
performances in the Nuba Mountains attract the tourists into the region, but the ruling party, NCP in 
power categorises those cultural performances as non-Islamic and strives to impede them. On the 
other hand, the SPLM views them as manifestations of distinctive cultural identity which have 




   Generally, historical experiences show that Christian and Muslim missionaries attempted to 
control Africans by associating their traditional cults to Islam and Christianity. This form of control 
has caused controversy between the missionaries and the converted Africans to historical religions. 
As a matter of faith, the African religious group started to seek alternative resolutions to overcome 
cultural hegemony of foreign customs and traditions of Christianity and Islam. The result of the 
search led to the formation of independent African religious institutions apart from the national ones 
in Africa. According to Herskovits, the rejection of missionaries to the linking of African animistic 
religions to Christianity and Islam led to the foundation of independent African mixed religious 
centres with their own religious cults.
253
  
   At the present, some African Sudanese Muslim politicians issue statements which seem to suggest 
the promotion of founding independent Muslim religious associations connected to African 
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Animism. Yusuf Kuwa Makki, a Muslim politician from the Nuba Mountains
254
 asserts that the 
Nuba must resume their traditions of kujur (African religious rites). Yusuf concludes that in the 




   In fact, Yusuf Kuwa Makki with some few Nuba rebelled in 1985 and joined the rebels‟ 
movements the SPLM and SPLA. These Nuba were trained in the rebels‟ camps and marched after 
military training with other trained Christian and Animist rebels from the South to the Nuba 
Mountains, under the battalion „New Kush‟.
256
 
    The name, „Kush‟ is referred roughly to the northern part of present Sudan
257
 and its use by the 
rebels suggests a proposed new reconstruction of a new identity in opposition to the existing 
territorial identity, Islamic Arab North. It characterises a search of decision makers in search of 
identity. It indicates that Sudanese decision makers construct identity superficially that does not 
constitute tolerance to its diverse identity and each endeavours to reconstruct it. In practice, such 
instability revives constant and opposing social and political constructs based on Islamic and Arab 
traditions in conflict with the Christian and the African Animism. Iyob and Khadiagala argue that 
there is no clear programme by which the people of Sudan and the constant events they constructed 
could be identified, beyond, the binary racial categories in the public media of the African-Christian 
Animists of the South versus Muslim Arab in the North. Such opposing categorical constructions do 
not provide anything, since what are underlying the visible surface are complex and infinitely more 
revealing than all the superficial wisdom taken now as the truth. Iyob and Khadiagala conclude that 
“we offer an examination of historical myths, shifting identities, metaphors … paradoxes 
constructed from ambiguous social understandings, confused beginnings, and uncertain endings all 
part of the extraordinary complexity that was, and still is, Sudan of today”.
258
   
   The description „still is Sudan of today‟ is a reference that Sudan is stagnant in finding an 
encompassing system which its citizenry would embrace as a common source that represents them 
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as their national identity. This political stagnancy continues to function, under the binaries of favour 
and discrimination of the citizens in public structures. Recent political developments within the 
institutions of the constructed territorial identity as the civilised „Northern Sudan Region‟ that 
comprises the far north, the east and the west of Sudan
259
 show that the model is not functioning 
within the national institutions of the region. Sociologically, a functional society manifests its 
interrelated structures in established economic, political and social institutions. Each of these 
institutions has a function that contributes to the overall stability and sustainability of the social 
system in the territorial sovereignty of a state.
260
 The present political violence within the Islamic-
Northern Sudan Region demonstrates the disintegration of its inter-related institutions. In its current 
institutions, ethnic categories and colour dominate more than the religion, Islam. The comparison is 
carried to the religion, where the indigenous African Muslims in the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and 
the Beja are not equal with the people of Arab-Muslim origin in different public institutions. 
Religion does not determine their social status, instead, their ethnic backgrounds as non-Arabs. 
Prunier asks the question, how could a new war conflict be developing in a region wholly populated 
by Muslims when it was known by everyone that the war in Sudan was between the Arab Muslims 
in the North and the Southern-African Christians in the South? Prunier concludes that by the 
summer 2004, a sinister term of racism was a dominant description of violence within the Islamic 
North between the native people of Darfur and the Government of Sudan with its Arab Muslim 
militia fighting the Darfurian indigenous Muslims.
261
  
3.1.1 Discrimination against the Nuba 
A Nuba student states: “The name Nuba is a strange name; it does not exist in our villages. The 
name is foreign to us; we … come to know it; after we came to Dalenj and Kadugli towns that we, 
the Black population residing in the extensive mountainous region of approximately ninety nine 
mountains are called Nuba. At past, I hate it, because, it was a name constructed by Muslim Arab 
slavers.  At present, the term has shifted to the status of our nationalism, so many of us start to 
accept it and we are Nuba”.
262
 Many Nuba students are Muslims; nevertheless, they argue that 
Muslim Arabs discriminate against them in social structures in a similar way as they do against the 
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Christians and the Animists of Nuba Mountains. They present their arguments as: „we are treated as 
dhimmis (protected non-Muslim groups residing in the land of Muslims) within one religion, Islam 
by the Muslim Arabs‟.
263
 „When a Muslim Arab takes power militarily in Sudan, then Arabs rally 
behind him, and when a Nuba Muslim does the same action, then the Arabs would say who will 
clean the toilets. This is to mean the Nuba are second-class citizens and are expected to engage in 
marginal professions in Sudan‟. The student concludes by presenting a question; „so, how do we 
become one, under this clear racism?‟
264
 According to Lesch, the Nuba people adhere to 
Christianity, Islam and Animism. Yet, the tension between them and Muslim Arabs in control of 
power and resources remains largely intense. The Nuba complain that the state treats them as 
“second-class citizens”
265
 equal to the Dhimmis, even though, the majority of them are converted to 
Islam and quite assimilated to the Arab cultural identity
.266
  
   Experiences of some Muslim Nuba people with Muslim Arabs in the region reveal the existing 
discrimination based on the belief in an Islamic North among the Muslims. African News 
interviewed Yusuf Kuwa Makki and claimed that the majority of Muslim Arabs in Sudan believe 
that angels in paradise are divided into black angels and white angels. These angels receive the dead 
in accordance to their colour. Black angels receive the black souls of Animists and throw them into 
hell and the light-skinned angels receive the Muslims and take them to heaven.
267
  
   Consistent discrimination by Muslim Arabs towards Muslim Africans in Sudan has also been 
experienced by another Black Muslim leader, Ali Abdel al-Latif. According to Idris, during the 
formation of Sudanese nationalism, the issue of race and ethnic descent became the crucial 
determining factor in politics of building the nation state. „Being an Arab‟ was more important  than 
being a Muslim. Abdel al-Latif, a Muslim from the Dinka ethnic group was not a true representative 
of Muslims in the thinking of the Northern Muslim political leaders. The leader of the Muslim 
Ansaar sect, Abd al-Rahaman al-Mahdi described him as a self-representative figure and not a 
representative of the nation. Idris concludes that this racial description was projected in Muslim 
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   Currently, some leaders in the Nuba Mountains claim that the Government of Sudan mixes 
religion, Islam with the Arab race. Educational opportunities for a Nuba are conditional. First, a 
Nuba must convert from Animism or Christianity to Islam. After the conversion to Islam, then the 
condition of adopting an Arab name comes up. Simon Karlo, a Nuba politician has experienced this 
conditions and states “I embraced Islam myself, when I was a pupil at the primary school and 
changed my name to Ismail, otherwise, I would have not finalised my education”.
269
 One of the 
questions posed in the questionnaires was: “How conversion from one religion to another religion 
in Sudan is conducted; do you encounter an obstruction on the process and have you ever felt that 
there has been an interference of your ethnic customs, cultures and traditions to your religion, if 
yes, please explain?” One Muslim Nuba student provides an explanation to the question as „the 
obligatory method of conversion to Islam is that a person must testify „there is no god but God, and 
Muhammad is the Prophet of God‟. That testimony originated from the Holy Quran, but in Sudan 
race interferes with this method of conversion, meanwhile, God in the Holy book, Quran does not 
require a Nuba to testify an Arab race, but Muslim Arabs in Sudan feel very comfortable to see 
Nuba Muslims changing their names to Arab names. This testimony is universal, it dictates a 
believer to recognise the unity of being and there is no instruction that dictates a converter to 
change an original name into an Arab Name.
270
 One Muslim student concludes „indeed, this 
religion, Islam is innocent from this indispensability of Islam and Arab; it is power of Muslim 
Arabs in Sudan which adheres to this ideology in order to maintain marginalisation of Muslims of 
non-Arab origins and not Islam.
271
  
3.1.1.1 Resistance against marginalisation 
Amal Muhammad, a Nuba Muslim student believes that government authority in any state is an 
essential source of power and has been expecting government to operate as a tool for the realisation 
of prosperity for the people of Sudan as one nation. In her view, Sudanese political parties that 
inherited power from the colonial system of Great Britain practice it in a way that does not reflect 
this aspiration. The student argues that, during the national struggle for the independence, two 
political slogans „equality‟ and „prosperity‟ were the dominant claims advertised by political 
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parties. Post independence, contradictions between these slogans and performances of the 
successive governments dominate institutions. Two religious sectarian groups, the Umma and DUP 
inherited power in the country and marginalised the people at the peripheries of the Nuba 
Mountains, South Sudan, Darfur, Beja and Ingessana Hills.
272
  
   The history of power sharing and violence in Sudan shows that the Nuba were quick to introduce 
the process of rectifying political marginalisation in two ways. First they tried a democratic 
pluralistic approach, thus, in 1964 the Nuba formed an association „General Union of the Nuba 
Mountains‟ (GUN). An objective of the GUN was to build a political consciousness among the 
Nuba and demand their economic and political rights from the Government of Sudan. The terms of 
this objective were defined and clandestinely circulated. The Umma and the DUP parties were 
branded as sources of political and economic marginalisation of the Nuba people and that required 
an objective approach to combat it.
273
  
   The objective approach to political marginalisation could not be achieved; thus, the Nuba turned 
to violence to re-address political grievances between them and the Jellaba. The Nuba students 
explain: „the manifesto of the SPLM calls for the introduction of political equality and the adoption 
of a constitutional system that considers ethnic and religious pluralism in the state as a source of 
legal codes in the country‟.
274
 Another one states: “In early 1987, the manifesto satisfied us as the 
members of Komolo, an underground political organisation of the Nuba Youth … that used to 
operate in social institutions and yet we continued to define that religion, Islam is innocent of the 
existing inequality and started to influence the intellectual group from the Nuba to join the SPLM 
and SPLA
275
. One of them concludes: „We recruited and delegated them to the training camps at the 
western Ethiopia. After the military training, they returned as armed forces and commenced to 
attack the military installations of the government in our region, Nuba Mountains. The combatants 
raised the slogan that religion, Islam was innocent in the violence and maintain the respect to 
religious centres of Islamic symbols as divine sites for all Muslims, Christians and Animists. Many 
from the Nuba continued to join the rebel military training within South Sudan and western 
Ethiopia‟.
276
 Suliman enumerates that the Nuba feel dissatisfied politically with the „Jellaba‟, a 
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term that identifies Muslim Arab officials and traders from the indigenous population in Nuba 
Mountains. The Nuba accuse the Jellaba of marginalising them in distribution of power and wealth 
and they intend to re-address this marginalisation with all available options, therefore, many of 
them joined the SPLA and SPLM.
277
 
3.1.1.2 Innocence of Islam and Conflict between the Church and the Government 
It is worthwhile to analyse the political performances of the government within the Nuba Mountains 
region. Its performance will show us the nature of social relationships of the people in the region 
and the role of politics towards these relationships. It is through these relationships where we could 
infer the „innocence‟ of the religion Islam which some Nuba students emphasise and accuse the 
Jellaba of resisting the application of its precepts into institutions. First, some Nuba students argue 
that „our social relationships with the Jellaba, Hawazama and Missieria have been very peaceful for 
a century. Our current deadly wars are influenced by Khartoum‟.
278
 „The Arabs Muslims in power 
know that the majority of the Nuba are Muslims, but power does not care about the religion, it does 
not care about its values of equality and justice for all Muslims.
279
 Instead, it favours „the Arab 
Muslims and arms them to kill us claiming that we support the SPLA‟. 
280
  
   In comparison, some Jellaba students stress their opposite arguments: „our ancestors have lived 
with the Nuba in the Nuba Mountains for over a century in peaceful relationships with each other 
and abruptly some problems which were not political came up and polluted our relationships. In this 
way, we neglected our religion, Islam which unifies us and we resorted to race, because the Nuba 
performances demonstrate enmity. This behaviour developed to hatred and disaster, but different 
governments in Khartoum have not presented solutions, instead they behave in a way that fans 
racial conflicts between us and the Nuba‟.
281
 According to Suliman, in the past, some problems 
related to water and land occurred between the indigenous Nuba and the new settlers, the Jellaba. 
These problems were easily addressed at annual conferences composed of the Nuba mekks (Muslim 
Nuba leaders) and the Arab sheikhs (Islamic Arab leaders). The two parties abided by the 
resolutions reached in these conferences and peace and prosperity was maintained. In reaction 
against the insurgents of the SPLA, the government sought to make the Jellaba in the region as its 
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proxy fighters to fight the rebels. Suliman concludes that the government combined forces of the 
para-military and regular soldiers have not spared the Nuba civilians from the violence; thus their 
villages became the targets and they were uprooted.
282
  
   Taking into account some students claimed experiences the recruitment policy of the government 
was based on discrimination. It recruited the Jellaba as a militia with the intention of fighting the 
SPLA and Muslim Nuba who were interested to join the militia experienced exclusion from 
recruitment. This exclusion jeopardised the Nuba civilians to a vulnerable situation, where they 
became the immediate targets of the Jellaba militia. The Nuba students explain this phenomenon as 
„during the war, the militia composed of Missieria and Hawazama targeted us. It launched attacks 
against our traditional residential areas, killed, looted, and burnt the houses‟.
283
 „Since 1986 to the 
present moment, the governments in Khartoum based their recruitments of militia on the basis of 
race‟.
284
 „In 1987, some Nuba whom I know … tried to join the militia that was intended for the 
population of the region to defend itself from any armed interfering forces into their civil 
institutions. Young Nuba who went and registered for recruitment in the militia in the cities of 
Kadugli, Talodi and Dalenj were rejected and their cohort Muslim Arabs were armed and given 
weapons‟
285
. These recruited „Muslim Arab militias had not seen us as equal Muslims, but chose 
havoc, terror and killing of Muslim Nuba, Animists and Christians at their… residential areas‟
286
. 
One of them concludes „the killing of a Muslim Nuba at their homes was not an Islamic way, our 
religion; Islam is innocent from this discrimination‟.
287
   African Rights reports that the SPLA made 
its first incursion into the Nuba Mountains in July 1985. In response, the government began to arm 
the Baqqara Arabs as a militia against the Nuba. The Minister of Defence, Fadalla Burma Nasir 
from Missieria Arab armed the Baqqara Arab of Humr, Missieria and Zurug. The Nuba civilians 
called this militia, muraheleen, a term that refers to the nomad Baqqara Arabs. This group revealed 
its hidden agenda that appeared, during its military operations. It wiped out the Nuba from their 
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   Some scholars thought that the situation would change in the Nuba Mountains after the restoration 
of a democratic multi-party government in April 1986. In the opinion of Mahmud and Baldo, the 
people of Sudan expected that the Prime Minister, Sadiq Al-Mahdi from the Umma Party would 
restore stability to the vulnerable Nuba area suffering from the muraheleen. Instead, the Premier 
promoted the role of the Baqqara in the Nuba Mountains. He maintained Fadalla Burma Nasir, a 
Baqqara and Former Minister of Defence of the Transitional Military Command Council of 1985 as 
a Minister for Defence in his government. Nasir aggravated the recruitment of the ethnic Arabs 
from Baqqara into the militia which in turn launched indiscriminate assaults against the Nuba.
289
 
   This scenario of racial conflict against the Nuba remained unchanged and escalated after 1989, 
when the Salvation Revolution captured power by force from the democratically elected 
government claiming that it wanted to protect Sharia as a law for the people of Sudan. At this time, 
some Sudanese Christian religious leaders such as the Catholic Bishop Macram Max Gassis of the 
El-Obeid Diocese became outspoken critic of the Salvation regime. The Bishop alleged that the 
Salvation Revolution had dismantled the democratic system claiming that it wanted to protect 
Sharia. Under Sharia, the „Salvation Revolution‟ was responsible for terror, assassinations, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, mass-arrests, extrajudicial executions and religious persecution 
in Sudan. He concluded that the Church must extend its voice to be heard on behalf of the people of 
Nuba Mountains as they have been absolutely neglected in the world media.
290
  
   This Christian rhetoric creates an image of two opposing camps: the camp of the Christian Church 
and the camp of the government represented by the Islamists of the Salvation Revolution. These 
two parties develop incompatible claims on the people of Sudan in general. The institution of the 
Church constructs itself as the rightful defender of the people of the Nuba Mountains in particular. 
On the contrary, the government claims absolute responsibility over the citizens and rejects any 
involvement of other bodies. These contesting claims cannot be justified; however, an analysis of 
the nature of each claim through certain services of each to the destitute Nuba may be a principal 
tool for justification. An equal healthy treatment of any form of power collectively in a political or 
social space with valuable series of service delivery, during a physical disaster constitutes chances 
of a certain degree of confident and willing relationships. The question on the questionnaires is 
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religion important … provides some clear role of the Church to the Nuba. Students of the Nuba 
explain: „religions, Islam and Christianity, are very significant to humanity. First, without the 
Church, our suffering at the hands of Muslim Arabs would have not been unfolded to the American 
people‟.
291
 „There was no any Islamic state that had bothered itself, when the National Islamic Front 
Government, known now as Salvation Revolution imposed Jihad on us; even though many of us are 
Muslims. Churches in America understand humanity, a very rare quality in our Islamic setting in 
Sudan‟.
292
 According to Meyer, after the news of the government-sponsored Jihadist attacks against 
its own citizens in Nuba Mountains in 1992, the Nuba were heard in the United States. An 
American Pastor, Tom Tiscornia moved with his personnel to the area to pay their respects to the 
Nuba families who had lost their loved ones. At the same time, the Catholic Church delegated 
David Coffey of Montgomery, Alabama as a Representative of Bethlehem, a Pennsylvania-based 
Catholic Medical Foundation to dispatch donations collected by Bishop Macram Max Gassis from 
American citizens to the people of the Nuba Mountains.
293
  
   In contrast, some Muslim Arab students argue: “What do you do with those Muslims who object 
to the dominance of Sharia as the law that God dictates”.
294
 Another respondent said: “The Nuba 
were attacked because of their rebellion and it was a duty of a responsible government to get rid of 




 One of them concluded: “Conspiracy of the West against 
Sharia stimulated the Nuba to reject the law of their faith and cooperated with the infidels from the 




   Muslims fighting other Muslims, because of religious opinion represent religious intolerance 
which is a topic some students have emphasised in their responses to the questionnaires. For 
instance, the question in the questionnaires “How conversion from one religion to another religion 
in Sudan is conducted; do you encounter an obstruction on the process and have you ever felt that 
there has been an interference of your ethnic customs, cultures and traditions to your religion, if 
yes, please explain?” Some Muslim students who have answered this question allege that the 
government of Sudan controls power and promotes intolerance against the people of other religions. 
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It orients its adherents to reject religious freedom; meanwhile Islam decrees that no compulsion in 
religion.
297
 It strives to create all possibilities of imposing Islam and eradicating other religious 
faiths.
298
 One of them concludes: „brother denounced Islam and became a Christian in 2001 and the 
government wanted to kill him, because of his new faith and we wanted him to live, because it was 
not our basic problem, since religion is one.
299
 According to Mahmoud, the leading figure in the 
government of Sudan Hassan Abdullah Turabi of the NIF party uses religion, Islam in order to 
convince Muslims to support the legitimacy of his Islamic system of the Salvation Revolution. For 
example, Turabi constructed the conflict in the South as a religious one in order to rally Muslim 
people behind his government. He helped to Islamise it and invited the Muslims of the Northern 
Sudan to participate in this war, under the slogan of Jihad against the opposition of the Nuba people 
in the region. Mahmoud concludes that the NIF promotes intolerance against other religions.
300
   
   Generally, experience shows that a mixing religious faith with politics creates uncertain political 
institutions, in regards to religious tolerance. It divides people within a territory into political 
religious associations. This usually happens under the influence of the interest political group, who 
may adopt religion as a means of manipulating their followers to implement their political aims. 
Such religious structure promotes religious intolerance at different stages.
301
 
3.1.2 Darfur and the origin of religious (in)tolerance 
Darfur is a composition of two words: „Dar‟ means a space of a land inhabited by a group under a 
specific leader and „Fur‟ refers to an ethnic group, Fur. This group occupies the central highlands 
and is dominant in local political and economic life in the region. It has sub-tribal divisions that 
include the Masabat, Kunjara and Keira.
302
 The Muslim Sultanate promoted Islam largely to be 
adopted in the territory as a model of national identity. During the era of Suleiman Solongdungo 
from Keira, religious practices related to Animism were forbidden in all social institutions and 
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Islam was proclaimed to be the only official religion in the region.
303
 Yet, the scale of conversion 
was low and his grandson, Sultan Ahmed Bakr introduced measures of conversion from Animism 
to Islam. He erected mosques, imported Arab teachers of Islam and compelled the Fur to 
disassociate themselves from Animism and adhere only to Islam.
304
     
   Those in Darfur who became Muslims began in time to view others who remained Animists as 
„lost brothers‟ on the way to heaven. These sentiments can be found in the responses to the 
question: “What do you think about the people in Sudan who follow other religious faith and 
traditional rituals than yours, and please state the reason(s) of why you think so?” Some Muslim 
students offer lamenting responses such as: “In the beginning I thought Islam had extirpated racial 
divisions between Muslim Arabs and Muslim indigenous Africans of Darfur. Our former Kings 
brought Islamic Arab teachers and converted us to Islam and we thought we were brothers in 
Islam”.
305
 The students continue: “Today, the majority of the indigenous people of Darfur came to 
observe that we were lost; Arab Muslims are not … brothers in religion”.
306
 “The Arab League, 
mostly composed of the Muslim majority as a political regional agency stands on equal political 
footing with the regime in Khartoum that discriminates against us and kills us ... because we are not 
Arabs, but African Muslims of Darfur”.
307
 “Many of us in the past assumed that the Christians from 
the South were lost brothers from true religion, Islam.”
308
 “Now, experience of this racial war has 
provided us consciousness, and indeed, our brothers in the South … were not lost, but, they are our 
brother African Christians”
309
. “For the Arab Islamic regime in Khartoum with its janjaweed, the 
United States of America is a land of lost devils, since, it is a Christian country, but it is not 
conceived like that in Darfur, we know their identity. The Americans are angels; they value 
humanity to the certain degree of defending us from Arabs. Without Christian Americans pressing 
the government to cease its indiscriminate aerial bombardments, there would have been no 
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   These expressions from Muslim indigenous students of Darfur demonstrate the scale of dynamic 
racism. They epitomise a paradigm that whenever racism is embedded in national institutions 
against a certain group, then the search for the production of a new identity becomes inevitable. The 
victims of racism search for new cultural identity and reject the existing dominant one. Today, there 
is a public alarm from the international community to deploy an international reliable force in 
Darfur in order to protect the civilians from the violence between the indigenous rebels and the 
Government of Sudan. The civil society of these Muslim indigenous people of Darfur is badly 
affected by the violence and many regard African Union (AU) force in their region as an 
insufficient organisation to shelter them from the Arab Muslim-sponsored militia, the janjaweed as 
well as the government forces. The situation demands the deployment of a well equipped 
international force in the region.
311
 Despite this alarming situation, Muslim Arab countries and the 
Arab League (AL) resist this demand. The AL supports the deployment of this force, but insists that 
it should be under the directives of the AU which it describes as the only viable security 
organisation for the Darfur crisis. For years, the policy of the AL has been completely in line with 
the official Sudanese government position rejecting any other international force to help in stopping 
the massacre of the Muslim indigenous civilians in Darfur.
312
 
3.1.2.1 Territorial and power reconstructions in Darfur  
Muslim Arab students from other regions claim that Darfur is undeveloped compared to other 
regions within the Northern Sudan.
313
 On the other hand, some Darfurian Muslim students argue 
that: „after the annexation of our region to the Nile Sudan, it has experienced systematically a 
serious marginalisation in terms of power and wealth. Many of us have witnessed … the exclusive 
policies of Arabs in Sudan; our people know that the central Government of Sudan excludes our 
region‟
314
. Another student states: “The perspective of wealth and power marginalisation … 
stimulates the majority of our indigenous population to define themselves as outsiders in the 
territory of Sudan. Economic exclusion makes us feel not a part of Sudan; indeed, we are not part 
of… Sudan”.
315
 One Fur student concluded that: „some of us never know that we belong to the 
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territorial sovereignty of Sudan, instead, Khartoum is the Sudan and some know it, yet they want to 
be counted out from the territory‟.
316
  
   Some central claims of this student invite analysis. First, the claim that some indigenous ethnic 
groups in Darfur have no knowledge that their region is part of the territorial Sudan denotes a 
typical territorial economic exclusion. Under this dissatisfaction, some citizens of the marginalised 
region define their territorial identity off the territorial map. Bush notes that the Darfurians in 
Nyala, capital city of the Southern Darfur with a huge population of Fur say that: “the train has 
come from Sudan”, when in essence the train came from Khartoum the capital city of Sudan.
317
 
Second, the claim that some Darfurians know that they belong to the territorial Sudan, yet they 
exclude themselves from any Sudanese territorial national identity is a crucial political vision. It 
represents a search for an independent autonomous region. Karklins observes that, when a regime in 
a multi-ethnic base structure fails to address the diverse interests of the pluralistic ethnic groups, the 




   Historically, Darfur was annexed to the British protectorate of Sudan only in 1916
319
 and from 
that time until today, the region remains undeveloped. Frequent visits of the author to the area have 
shown that Darfur covers an estimated area of about 190, 420 square miles and visibly remains 
completely without virtual communications of roads that can connect its population. With its fragile 
ecology, deep boreholes and some few oases are the main sources of water. In economic terms, 
most Darfurians, especially the Fur rely on agriculture and the occasionally prolonged drought 
accelerates desertification, where most of the lands are covered by cactuses.  And due to this natural 
circumstance, the nature of their land fits with some specific crops and fruits which resist drought 
such as millet and melon, particularly cantaloupe. Yet, all require a minimum of rainfall in order to 
be fully ripened. Lack of sufficient rainfall subjects the region to famine and death of cattle mostly 
belonging to the Zagahwa ethnic group.  
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   In the view of some indigenous students from Fur, Zagahwa and Massaliet of Darfur, the latest 
famines have a connection to the present war in Darfur. They regard the starvation of their people as 
neglect of the central government, under the “dominance of Muslim Arabs”.
320
 According to Bush, 
during the last century, Darfur had experienced starvation and death of animals five times, due to 
the shortages in rainfall. In 1982 the same phenomenon occurred and the former Governor of 
Darfur, Ahmed Dereige from Fur cautioned the central government about the scarcity of rainfall. 
Dereige warned that such shortages would cause a severe famine and urged the government to 
declare Darfur to the international community as a humanitarian disaster zone, so that emergency 
aid could quickly reach the region. President Nimeiri rejected the request and denied the 
humanitarian organisations access to the area. This denial caused disputes between the Governor 
and the President, and the former resigned.
321
 
   The experience of famine in Darfur reveals that an emergency situation constructs two forms of 
leadership quality of authority in a state. First, the sympathetic leadership refers to the authority that 
cautions decision-makers to declare a danger to the public in search of humanitarian aid. Second, 
the parasympathetic leadership is referred to the authority that rejects the promulgation of a danger 
to an international community to attract humanitarian aid; instead, it endures its painful effect that 
may lead to fatality.
322
 The famine threatened the life of the indigenous Darfurians. Lesch explains 
that some emaciated escapees from the famine managed to reach Khartoum and camped in the 
suburbs of Omdurman. In reaction, the authorities in the capital introduced kasha, a legal measure 
that authorised police forces to roam vigilantly on streets of Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri to 
detain the people of Darfur, South Sudan, and Nuba Mountains who lived there without 
professional identity cards. The destitute Darfurians were evicted from their camps and forcedly put 
into several train wagons and sent back to Darfur.
323
    
    Kasha can be defined in accordance to the nature of its application as cleansing, removing, 
expelling and uprooting unwanted groups from Khartoum, the surrounding cities and suburbs. 
Ahmed Dereige, however, retaliated against the „kasha‟ by collecting people of Arab origin from 
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Darfur, loaded them into train wagons and sent them to Khartoum.
324
 Most importantly, the 
application of kasha reconstructs two territorial boundaries of residence within one sovereign state 
of Sudan. First, the north of Sudan that includes the capital city Khartoum, Omdurman, Bahri and 
other nearby cities, where the specific ethnic groups are reconstructed aliens and unwanted. On the 
other hand, it constructs Darfur as a territory, where some specific race, a Muslim Arab from the 
northern part of Sudan is an intruder into the area and, must be deported to his or her territory, 
Khartoum.  
   These territorial reconstructions to the citizens and other political disputes between powers of 
Darfur and Khartoum developed, leading to the resignation of the Darfur Governor and who into 
exile. The resigned Governor, Dereige explains that he left the Governor Position of Darfur, 
because of two issues: first, the refusal of the Nimeiri regime to declare Darfur as a disastrous zone 
of famine, and second, because of the new Islamic fundamentalism that led to the imposition of 
Sharia which prohibits alcohol. He argues “I consider alcohol as a symbol of freedom in the 
country for the citizens … to choose between drinking and abstaining”.
325
 Dereige concludes while 
in exile, he with others revived struggle that aims to eradicate the marginalisation of Darfur in 
wealth and power sharing.
326
   
3.1.2.2 Ideological conflicts and racism in Darfur 
Most Muslim students from the indigenous population of Darfur acknowledge that Islam has had 
success in homogenising parts of Sudan, including their region, Darfur, but the contradictory 
political approaches of the successive central governments revive ethnic lines. Responses to the 
question: “How did the east, west, far north and centre become the Northern Sudan, in exclusion of 
the South and what does the name of your region and Sudan mean in your native language and do 
you experience any difficulty in articulating it ? Responses to this question provide the reason for 
political Islam. Islam was developed as an ideology for creating a majority of a political umma 
(nation of Islam) to overshadow the conservative traditional African Muslims, Christians and 
Animists in Sudan. The students enumerate this situation as: „Islam has really united us, but Arabs 
changed it for their political egoism to deny our majority as African Muslims, Christians and 
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 „We have just discovered that we have been deceived in the beginning to 
drop our ethnic affiliations to create umma, but we have known now that different regimes, under 
the control of Muslim Arabs in Khartoum made it as a means of creating political majority, but not 
Islam‟.
328
 „It is true that Arabs are Muslims, and we are Muslims, but in words, the Arabs speak of 
being one with us in religion, but in practice, they marginalise us and build their unexcavated long 
agenda of an Islamic-Arab nation versus an African nation within Sudan‟.
329
 
   We begin our analysis here with this new rejection by some indigenous Muslim students from 
Darfur to the ideological model of „Islamisation and Arabisation‟ in order to discover whether their 
rejection has some links with the current violence of ideologies in Sudan. First, their rejection 
matches with the agenda of the SPLM, which claims that the minority-Muslim-Arabs control the 
state and use Islam in institutions in order to divide the indigenous African majority and to dictate 
the terms for ruling and marginalising other regions in the name of the Muslim majority.
330
 It is 
argued that SPLM‟s rejection the „Islamisation and Arabisation‟ model has motivated the 
indigenous Fur and Zagahwa ethnic groups in the region of Darfur to launch armed assaults against 
the government institutions in their territory. de Waal explains that the violence started in February 
2003, when a collection of armed men from these two ethnic groups attacked a police station in 
Jebel Mara. After this assault, the rebels formed themselves into a political and military 
organisation called the „Darfur Liberation Front‟, DLF and chose Abdul Wahid el-Nur from Fur to 
lead the movement. The SPLM influenced the DLF to change its name into a form that would 
reflect a wider movement representing the ideological discourse of the „New Sudan‟.
331
 This in turn, 
is defined as Sudan, where laws for citizens are entirely secular and where all citizens are equally 
represented in national institutions of state, irrespective of race, gender, ethnic, moral conscience 
and religion.
332
 Accordingly, the DLF changed its name into Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) 
and it military wing, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Many Furs embraced the new organisation, 
but soon another rebel organisation appeared as well, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 
Most of it recruits are from Zagahwa. Some people in Sudan including students claim that the JEM 
has a link with the Islamic political ideology of transforming Sudan into a national Islamic state, 
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where laws are derived from Sharia, but its leaders deny this allegation and explain that their 




   This claim is expressed in an anonymous book „The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth 
in Sudan‟, whose authors identify themselves as „Seekers of Truth and Justice’. The book argues 
that the country has constantly been, under the rule of the Arabs from the Northern Sudan. These 
rulers, whether they are secularists, theocrats, autocratic, aristocratic, democratic Islamists, military 
dictators or multi-party democratic pluralists, all act in a pattern of promoting injustice and 
discrimination against the non-Arabs in the state of Sudan. Most of the developmental resources 
have been concentrated on the development and welfare of the central northern regions around 
Khartoum, where most of the ruling Arab elite live.
334
 Most of the Northern Muslim Arab students 
believe that the anonymous Black Book was written and published by the present leaders of the 
JEM. For example, a Shaiqqiyyia Muslim Arab student from the Northern region argues: „the 
violence in Darfur is not genocide; it is … a normal one. The SPLA trained the SLA in their 
military zones, during the war between the South and the North. Justice and Equality Movement, 
JEM is an organisation of Hassan Abdullah Turabi. After Turabi disagreement with President Al-
Bashir in the party, the NCP, his allies that included Khalil Ibrahim, the Head of the JEM rebelled 
and formed that movement and Turabi supports him morally and politically‟.
335
  
   In addition, a Ja‟aleen Muslim Arab student argues that the JEM: „is an organisation which 
supports Turabi‟s ideologies. This Islamic religious ideologue wants to make Khartoum as a centre 
of the Islamic Empire for all global radical Muslims‟.
336
 According to Petterson, after Turabi ceased 
power militarily in Sudan, he began to articulate radical methods for building an Islamic state, 
where Sharia would be the source of legal bills and which would extend also to other parts of 
Muslim world. He instituted an international centre called the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference 
in Khartoum. The centre was open to all radical Islamists around the world. After this, he invited 
Osama Bin Laden, the Head of a claimed Pan Islamic organisation, Al-Qaeda from Pakistan to 
come to Sudan and establish his organisation there. In response to this invitation, Bin Laden moved 
to Sudan with his associates which included Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Abu Nidal 
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Organisation, al Jama’at al Islamiyya of Egypt, the Islamic Resistance Movement, (HAMAS) of 
Palestine, and other organisations composed of some radical Muslim movements from Algeria, and 
Eritrea.
 337
           
   If it is true that the leader of the JEM, Khalil Ibrahim has a link with Turabi‟s Islamic ideology, 
then Darfur becomes a centre of a larger ideological discourse that may lead to a further conflict of 
ideologies between two rebel organisations in Darfur, the SLM and the JEM. The definition of a 
state in accordance with the Islamic discourse claims that an Islamic state must be religionised, and 
that Sharia forms the legal constitution around which all the functions of national institutions are to 
be formed.
338
 This Islamic ideology is contradictory to the secular concept of „New Sudan‟ to which 
Abdul Wahid Mohammad el-Nur the founder and the first leader of the SLM assigned his support. 
For el-Nur, the Sudan constitution must be exclusively based on laws derived from secular bills. He 
states “We call for the united federal, liberal secular state” in Sudan.
339
  
   The existence of conflicting ideologies between these two armed organisations has been 
documented by some scholars from the very beginning of their military operations against the 
government institutions; however, both have been generally described as insurgents from Darfur 
based on ethnically divided support. For instance, de Waal says that the JEM draws much of its 
support and combatants from the Zagahwa subsection of Kobe, while the SLM recruits come from 
the Tuer, the Bideyat, the Fur as well as the Massaliet. The SLM introduces a secular political 
orientation to its recruits and the JEM has never promoted a separation of state from religion. 




   It is not easy to confirm the suspicion that the JEM holds ideological perceptions that link it with 
the Islamists of Turabi; however, inference to the Black Book is necessary in regard to this issue. If 
the author of this book is a founder of the JEM, then that confirms its connection to the Islamists of 
Turabi. The anonymous author of the book provides definitive perception to the duties incumbent 
on Islamic leaders towards the citizens in a state. His definitions rely very much on the derivative 
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Islamic theories taken from the Holy Quran. For him, the state must observe the five prerequisites 
defined by one of the key Islamist scholars, Gamal Al-Banna. According to the author, Al-Banna 
declares that God instructs Islamic leaders to act as caliphs (successors) for Him on the land and to 
develop it for the prosperity of umma (Islamic nation). Secondly, God also dictates the followers of 
Islam to guarantee a political atmosphere of religious freedom defined in the Holy Quran according 
to which „there is no compulsion on faith‟. Third, the essence of a successful Islamic state requires 
the application of justice as a model in dealing with believers. God instructs believers to be just 
because justice is the essence of equality among Muslims. And for this, the Prophet Muhammad 
rejected injustice and strongly prohibited it.  Fourth, Shura, (Islamic consultation) is needed on 
issues of state and the caliph must act, after having sought complete opinions from stakeholders in a 
state, but his action and decisions should rely on God. Finally, the detracted laws and rules from the 
Quran must be dictated to people and God “is the sole One to be worshiped in the land”
341
 without 
any other deity beside.
342
  
   These five prerequisites in an Islamic state unfold the discourses which define the political 
identity of the author. First, there is a volume of evidence in his textual discourse indicating that the 
author is seeking an alternative way in establishing an Islamic state; yet, his state remains typically 
an Islamic one with contradictions. A general overview of the five conditions gives little attention to 
other definitions of state from other sources
343
and relies mainly on the Islamic source in building 
institutions of state. These views leave no space to the people of other faiths in Sudan. For instance, 
the assertion that urges people to worship only God „on the land‟ contradicts with the religious 
freedom the author claims in the statement „no compulsion in religion‟.
344
 The former statement 
manifests religious intolerance.
345
 In this sense, a caliph of an Islamic state is a Muslim that 
represents God „on the land‟ and it is incumbent upon him to introduce measures that eradicate 
religious diversity and impose Islamic way of worship „Allah‟ (God) as the only „One‟ to be 
worshipped in a state. These Islamic ideological views suit with an environment, where all citizens 
are Muslims, but not in a political environment like Sudan. Yet, it violates Article (2) of the African 
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   The practical way of worship among the African Muslims is mingled with fetish, which is an 
assumed source of power; still God is worshipped as the ultimate aim. The author‟s observation of 
the indigenous African Muslim guerrilla soldiers of Darfur marks this distinction of the African 
Islam. Soldiers pray five times a day towards Mecca as Muslims. Yet, they all attire themselves 
consciously with objects around their necks which they believe carry within them a power to protect 
a soldier against bullets. For this, a massive collection of talismans offer covers their necks and 
chests.
347
 This dualistic religious practice expresses diversity within Sudanese Islam, which this 
research calls the African Islam of God. Also, the name Allah is controversial; it creates conflicting 
definitions between the African Muslims, Arab Muslims and non-Muslims in Sudan. For instance, 
in response to the question: is religion important … A Muslim from Fur ethnic group responds: 
“All religions, Animism, Christianity and Islam are equally important, but Arab Muslims in power 
have transformed religion and developed it in the name of Allah into „fundamentalism‟ confusing 
between politics and God. Is Allah really a God or a band of Muslim Arab politicians?”
348
 In 
addition, Deng Stephen Garang Angui argues that: “For a Muslim fundamentalist in Sudan, there is 
no any other genuine name for the Creator of earth and heaven, than the name Allah. I tell them … I 
think Allah possibly could be what I know as a Dinka; it is what we the Dinka call Nhialic, but their 
practice makes it difficult to understand the relationship between Nhialic and Allah. I do not know 
why they kill the indigenous Muslims of Darfur who have been reciting the name Allah”.
349
 Aliir 
Aquilino Akot Aliir notes: „religion is very important, but its deviation to fundamentalism makes it 
ugly in Sudan. In our Church as a Christian interacting with non-Dinka community communicating 
in English; we call Him God, because the native-English speaking people know Him by that name. 
So, there is no difference … you call Him Allah, it leads to God; you call Him Nhialic; it defines the 
same identity; Allah, but the Muslim fundamentalists here do not comprehend this diverse names of 
One God, except Allah that is attached with ideological definitions. In practice, the name Allah 
became ugly among the Dinka, because Jihadists attack them in their villages, while shouting, Allah 
is Great, Allah is great; Allah is great. Today, among the illiterate Dinka that shout represents death 
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and not Nhialic and is known in pejorative name among them as the ruon allahkuber (the year of 
Allah was Great) that caused inclusive killing of other Sudanese people. It develops to be uglier 
now in Darfur, where the janjaweed shout the name of Allah, while committing massacre of the 
indigenous Fur, Massaliet and Zagahwa.
350
   
   Violence in the name of an abstractive entity known in English as God, Nhialic in Dinka and 
Allah among the Arabs comes as a result of an attempt to mix politics with these three abstractive 
names and such political endeavour denotes unstable exploitation of religion in politics of Sudan. 
Some Muslim students give instances, where Islam has been used in politics leading to the political 
crisis. The question, “Do you think the exclusion of the South has a link with the past civil wars 
between the South and North, and if you think so, what about the current violence within the North 
Sudan as in Darfur, how do you evaluate it?” Some students who answer it claim that „politicians 
use religion to divide the people in Sudan. Many use it to reach out to the people‟s minds to give 
them power.
351
 Khalil Ibrahim, the rebel leader of the JEM in Darfur was formerly a Minister in the 
Government of Turabi and President Al-Bashir. He used to speak of the need to protect Muslim 
religion from its enemies, the Muslim oppositions and the non-Muslims. Now, he is out from power 
and his views have dramatically changed. He still speaks about Islam, but in a different way than 
his former political allies in power. Islam has become a source for political debate and not a 
spiritual quest for God that we see in the Quran and the Sunna of the Messenger Muhammed.
352
 
According to Prunier, most people of Sudan describe the leaders of the present Government of 
Sudan, under Al-Bashir as tujjar ad-din “(merchants of religion)” and they derived this description 
from their experiences, where these leaders on many occasions manipulated the Islamic religion for 
their political aims.
353
   
   Exploitation of Islam in politics has largely failed in Darfur and it has been replaced by racial 
constructions between the janjaweed and the indigenous population and this has led to another 
definition of the current war by some students as „genocide‟. Such views have also received support 
of some human rights organs in the USA
354
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Muslim Fur, Massaliet and Zagahwa students admit that Islam has once been a unifying factor in 
fighting against the rebels of the SPLA in the South, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, but now 
that political situation has changed. The Government of Sudan has begun to favour racial 
alternatives in eradicating the rebellion in Darfur.
356
 The new alternative measure for fighting the 
rebellion drops religion, Islam as a unifying entity in the region of the Muslim Arab of the Northern 
Sudan.
357
 Alternatively, race is introduced by inculcating into the minds of Muslims with ethnic-
Arab origins in the region of Darfur that the indigenous ethnic African rebels are not good Muslims. 
In reaction to this inculcation, solidarity and cohesion among the Muslim Arabs in the western 
Sudan has been ensured under the Arab militia organisation, the janjaweed which seeks out non-
Arabs in Darfur and kills them.
358
  
   In the view of the indigenous Muslim students from Darfur the janjaweed have a major role in the 
current violence within Darfur. The question “Do you think the exclusion of the South has a link 
with the past civil wars between the South and North, and if you think so, what about the current 
violence within the North Sudan as in Darfur, how do you evaluate it?” produces students‟ 
arguments such as: „the war in Darfur is the war between the Muslim Arabs, the janjaweed that 
receive backing from the Arab Muslim government to kill the Muslim indigenous Africans of 
Darfur. The Muslim Arabs with their janjaweed believe that their Islamic ethnic way of life is the 
best and become arrogant.
359
 Another states: „My experience with the janjaweed Muslim Arabs 
shows me that their faith in Islam is … mediocre. They are only confident in Arab traditions which 
they wrongly attach to Islam. For me, this is the reason; they resist other African Muslims to 
penetrate and teach them about authentic Islam. Islam as a religion urges the universal Muslims to 
establish equality in institutions, but they see this religious obligation of equality as a threat to their 
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of ethnic Arab … and set the religion apart in distribution of power and wealth in the country‟.
360
 
According to Mans, in the aftermath of the rebellion in Darfur, the slogan formerly used by the 
Northern Muslims to define the war between the South and the North as violence between the 
Christians and Animists on one side confronting the Muslims of the North has become an illusion. 
Religion was smuggled into the present war in Darfur emotionally, but not objectively. Man 
concludes that currently the government resorts to the recruitment of Muslim Arabs of Darfur the 
janjaweed as its proxy soldiers to fight Muslims of African ethnic background, the Fur, the 
Zagahwa, the Massaliet and other non-Arab groups in the region of Darfur.
361
  
   In the „Peace Agreement‟ signed in Abuja, Nigeria in 2006 between the Government of Sudan 
and one of the rebel factions in Darfur, the SLM led by Minni Minawai Arcua, the term janjaweed 
was mentioned several times. For example, the agreement urges the Government of Sudan to 
complete verifiable disarmament and demobilisation of its militia, the janjaweed not beyond the 
middle of October 2006. The government was also urged to restrict the movements of its other 
militia, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and required to downsize it. A detailed sequencing and 
phasing schedule was to ensure that the janjaweed and other armed militia have been disarmed, 
before the rebel forces assemble and prepare for their own disarmament and dis-engagement.
362
  
   The janjaweed also draw bitter criticism in the question posed to the students: “What is a practice 
in your religion regarded as sinful, indecent and immoral in which a violator is sentenced, what you 
think of it and how to deal with believers of other religion(s) violating the same practice in Sudan?” 
The responses of some students to this question clearly provide the origin of the term janjaweed. 
Students argue that: “Sins are innumerable in Darfur; janjaweed are devils”. Their origin comes 
from the classical Arabic word: jin means a devil and has nothing to do with jawad which means a 
horse. In colloquial Arabic of Darfur, jin was distorted and read as jan and juxtaposed with jawad 
and the two words became one word, janjaweed, to mean two things, a man with a gun on a horse 
or a devil on the back of a horse.
363
 One student adds that: „Today, after the war erupted between 
the government in Khartoum and SLA/M in the region, its vocabulary changed to include any 
armed nomadic Muslim-Arab tribesmen in Darfur‟.
364
 Another student concludes that these armed 
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men constantly unleash discriminating armed assaults on the Fur, the Zagahwa, the Massaliet, Tama 
and other indigenous African communities in the region. So, in Darfur janjaweed are sinners and 
immoral Arabs.
365
 According to Prendergast, there are actually two definitions of „janjaweed‟. First, 
a group of Arab people armed with modern weapons that constantly attack the villagers of the 
Black-African origin. The victims of the attackers in Darfur call them janjaweed, whether they 
actually come from the tribal-Arab militia, or the PDF. The United States, however, argues that the 
state of Sudan recruits its Arab militia, the janjaweed, and that both practice a discriminating war 




   The United States has been much concerned about the violence in Darfur. Different institutions in 
that country have conducted a series of independent investigations and reached the conclusion that 
the Government of Sudan has committed genocide against the people of indigenous African ethnic 
origin in the region of Darfur. Among these institutions is the State Department, where the 
Ambassador responsible for crimes of war, Pierre-Richard Prosper has cautioned the Members of 
the Congress to be patient, while his team conducts research to determine the nature of the war in 
Darfur. Prosper argues that the USA is collecting all information that it can to make a conclusive 
determination.
367
 After this caution to the Congress, some USA human rights defenders, such as 
members of the American Bar Association and International Coalition for State Department 
travelled to Chad, a neighbouring country to Darfur hosting a large number of Darfurian refugees, 
and started to interview them. The team delivered its report to the Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
During his testimony over this issue before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 
September 2004, the Secretary defined the practice of the Government of Sudan and janjaweed as 
amounting to a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities of killings, rapes and burning of the 
indigenous villages. Those who committed these atrocities are the janjaweed and the government 
forces against non-Arab villagers. The report states “We conclude that genocide has been 
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committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan with its janjaweed bear responsibility and 
genocide may still be occurring”.
368
  
    Powell‟s assertion that „genocide may still be occurring‟ conforms to the opinions of the majority 
of students from Darfur who responded to the questionnaires. For example, a Zagahwa student at 
the University of Khartoum argues: “In my evaluation of this war in Darfur, it is genocide. Arab 
militias attack and kill a significant number of civilians, because of their being not Arabs, so how 
do we define such systematic practice?”
369
 In contrast, the Arab Muslim students provide a different 
version. There is not a single Arab Muslim student who defines the practice of war between the 
indigenous ethnic Darfurians and the Government of Sudan as „genocide‟. Just one instance, a 
Kababish Arab student of Northern Kordofan studying at Omdurman Ahlia University argues: “The 
government of … President Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir has no project of killing non-Arabs in 
Darfur. I saw on different international television channels a massive destruction which must be the 
work of janjaweed; perhaps this militia determines the identities that they want to kill in Darfur, but 
not our President Al-Bashir”.
370
 Also, the indigenous ethnic students from Darfur do not believe 
that the international community is making a humanitarian move to defend them from „genocide‟.
371
 
One student argues: “When you deny a person existence, because of his race, then that is … 
genocide. The Arab militias of janjaweed hunt for the specific race in our villages rape their women 
and kill them, yet the world watches the genocide. When it was committed against the Muslims in 
Serbia, Europe was outspoken, and when its atrocities are beyond compare with those committed in 
Serbia, the institutions of the Europeans Union option talks and talks without military measures to 
stop genocide of a big number of our people dying every day in Darfur”.
372
  
3.1.2.3 Humanitarian crisis and controversy over genocide  
The question in the questionnaires “Do you think the exclusion of the South has a link with the past 
civil wars between the South and the North, and if you think so, what about the current violence 
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within the North as in Darfur, how do you evaluate it? The responses to this question causes the 
majority of students coming from Darfur to claim that they had mothers, sisters, brothers, maternal 
and paternal uncles and many other relatives who have lost their lives due to “genocide”.
373
 The 
claim goes as: „I came to study at this university and left my mother and my brother in the town of 
Bindisi in Darfur. Today, they are dead, because they are not Arabs and that is what I evaluate as 
genocide.
374
 Another stated: “For me, the classification of who is to be killed, because of being a 
non-Arab is what the people of Darfur face … today. Killing them, because of who they are, is 
organised in Khartoum and it is continuing and that is genocide”.
375
 Some students blame China‟s 
role in blocking international recognition for acknowledging that genocide has occurred in Darfur 
and they praise the role of the USA for having stood against the Government of Sudan. They 
present their arguments as following: “The … government instructs janjaweed to kill every Fur, 
Zagahwa and Massaliet in villages of Darfur and the UN panel of investigation covers up these 
facts. The UN is under the control of some egoistic countries such as China which cares less about 
humanity and pursues all interest in Sudan”.
376
 One of them asks a question; “What evaluation 
could one offer in describing this war more than genocide organises in Khartoum and no one report 
says this, than the USA and cannot act, because the Security Council of the UN is an organ of China 
and the Arabs”.
377
 One Muslim from Fur concludes that: „the people of my ethnic group, the Fur are 
hunted … in the area as if they were wild beasts simply, because they are Fur; if the USA were not 
embedded in its war in Iraq we would have not continued to die in Darfur. The USA understands 
humanity and China understands economic advantage‟.
378
  
   The UN definition of genocide forbids deliberately inflicting on any the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part.
379
 In reaction to the arrest warrant 
issued by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo for the 
President of Sudan, Al-Bashir for the alleged genocide and war crimes committed against the Fur, 
the Zagahwa and the Massaliet ethnic groups of Darfur, the  Head of the government Humanitarian 
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Affairs Commission (HAC), Hassabo Mohammad Rahman accused thirteen international Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in service delivery to the IDPs in Darfur of espionage and 
conspiracy against the President. He argued that the NGOs collaborated with the ICC in giving 
information which targeted the President. On 5 March 2009, a decree of expulsion of thirteen NGOs 
was issued and their offices with their available assets were confiscated and their bank accounts 
were closed. The licenses of other three national NGOs which operated in Darfur were revoked.
380
  
   A few days after the expulsion, some international NGOs warned that the expulsion jeopardizes 
1.1 million people to starvation, 1.5 million without healthcare services and at least one million 
without access to water in Darfur.
381
 This specific circumstance of humanitarian crisis prompted the 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to raise a general alarm urging the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) to reverse its decision of expulsion. Ban stated: “I have made my sincere appeal and also 
urge the many Arab and African leaders to influence … President Al-Bashir to reverse the decision 
of expelling humanitarian workers”.
382
 Under this alarming condition, the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator John Holmes visited Khartoum and held several sessions of discussions with the GoS 
to reverse its decision.  Reporting to the UN Security Council on 11 June 2009, Holmes stated “… 
the gap left after the March expulsion of the international organisations was particularly serious in 
areas such as education, reproductive health and livelihood assistance and the overall humanitarian 
situation”.
383
 Holmes concludes that the GoS assured him that it would readmit some expelled 
NGOs, under the condition of introducing some changes to their logos.
384
 In contrast, visiting 
Zamzam one of the IDPs camps in Darfur, the US Presidential Envoy Scot Gration confirmed that 
70,000 IDPs in the Zamzam were in extreme shortage of food, water and health services. He 
argued: “I don‟t think that the prospects for returning the thirteen NGOs as a group of thirteen are 
very strong or very high”.
385
 Gration continued to argue that such humanitarian circumstances need 
a humanitarian agency to immediately come up with creative ways, and stated: “I say immediately, 
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I mean in the next weeks to be able to compensate the critical situation by bringing in resources and 
the determination of taking steps to expand the capabilities of the existing NGOs”.
386
  
   In fact, Gration‟s language has constructed two new phenomena of relationships between the GoS 
and the NGOs. First, it has emboldened Khartoum with impunity to deny the access to any 
humanitarian organisation which does not fall within the definition of its political regulations 
designed by HAC in service delivery to the IDPs. Some few international NGOs left on the ground 
after the expulsion operate now, under an environment of anxiety and dilemmas between the 
defined strategies of the HAC and their defined mandates of their missions as non-political, but 
humanitarian agencies. For instance, in Nyala city one director of an international organisation 
complains to the author that its agency has seriously deviated from its ethical mandate in Darfur, 
because of the HAC.
387
  Second, Gration‟s language has stalled the appealing efforts of the 
Secretary General of the UN to press the GOS to reverse its decision of expulsion. Addressing the 
audience on 23 July 2009, at a rally in el-Fasher, capital city of the Northern State of Darfur, 
President Al-Bashir responded to the UN that his government would expel more agencies of the 




   Indicators on the ground show that the expulsion has created a new situation of move of a search 
for security and shelter for the IDPS. For the last nine months, since the expulsion of the aid 
agencies, the humanitarian situation has been appalling. During September the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) in combination with the janjaweed launched the deadly attacks to the areas around Korma 
town, northwest of el-Fasher as well as Jebel Marra in the Southern Darfur State of Nyala.
389
 The 
presence of this researcher in the field as an eyewitness, during the last visit to Sudan in early July 
2009, indicates a convergent line with the other NGOs claim that the expulsion has triggered a 
catastrophic humanitarian profile to the IDPs of Darfur. The IDPs at the extensive locations of 
camps are in grave risk of starvation, endemic diseases, lack of oil to pump water from deep holes 
and leave alone the right of the IDPs children to education. Currently, the situation is disastrous; the 
IDPs are subjected to a dilemma: hunger in the camps and high profile of insecurity at their villages. 
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Some who attempted to return to their villages were faced by the janjaweed attackers. Some crossed 
to Raja, a city that borders Darfur at the Western Bahr el-Ghazal State of South Sudan.  In Raja they 
reside in appalling conditions in their squatter areas of Khor-Madia and other squatters are in the 
north west of the city.
 
The researcher had witnessed those with meningitis and others who clutched 
their abdomen with complaints of unknown ailments and those with severe diarrhoea. Pregnant 
women remain without access to health service. There are no sources of food supply, no schools for 
children, shelters and clothes.  In towns of Aweil capital city of the Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State 
and Wau capital city of the Western Bahr el-Ghazal State have been receiving a huge number of 
desperate IDPs from Darfur. The condition of women and children of IDPs from Darfur in the 
camps of these two towns is dramatic and tragic. The rapid increase of IDPs from Darfur has 
aggravated the humanitarian situation of the first IDPs at Gondolo camp in the city of Wau. The 
camp is in grave need of food items with clear total absence of shelter and hygiene.   
   The present search of the indigenous population of Darfur for a refuge and security for their rights 
to life in the South disqualifies the report of the two formers United Nations/African Union Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID). In August 2009, Commander Martin Agwai, during the end of his tenure 
issued a statement on the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) claiming that: As of today, I would 
not say there is a war going on in Darfur”.
390
 In addition, Rodolphe Adada Special Representative 
UNMID repeated Martin‟s statement, when departing at the end of his service contract. Adada 
claimed that: “There is no more fighting proper on the ground”. Right now there is no high intensity 
conflict in Darfur … Call it what you will but this is what is happening in Darfur---a lot of banditry, 
carjacking, attacks on houses”.
391
  
   The statements of these two former leaders of the UNAMID contradict the joint report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations of the UNAMID, during the tenures of those two men. The report states: 
“Consistent information gathered by UNAMID and Human Rights Offices (HROs) indicated that 
Military attacks” against the villages of Sirba, Silea and Abu Suruj at Western Darfur “violated the 
principle of distinction … to distinguish between civilian objects and militarily objectives. As a 
result, at least 115 persons were killed, including elderly people, women, children and more than 
30,000 individuals forcibly displaced to other locations … NGO clinics and offices, community 
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centers, water structures, schools, food storages, milling machines and shops were systematically 
pillaged, vandalized and/or set ablaze. Livestock was also looted”.
392
 The report concludes that the 
coordinated attacks of the Sudan Armed Forces and militia against the areas of the indigenous 
people have increased the number of the IDPs, where more than 450,000 were newly displaced. 
During 2008 alone there were 317,000 IDPs.
393
  
   The humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to escalate and there is no progress of peace 
negotiation as the SLM leader El-Nur places pre-conditions for negotiation with the Government of 
Sudan. He states: “No negotiation without security on the ground; the government must first stop 
genocide, rape, disarmament of janjaweed militia, expulsion of the foreign identities being resettled 
in the lands of Darfur”.
394
   
3.1.3 Beja Congress 
Beja is a nomadic ethnic group that lives in an extensive region that borders Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
the eastern part of Sudan along the Red Sea.
395
Most of the interviewed Muslim Beja students offer 
five political grievances against the central authority. Their complaints date back to the historical 
foundation of the independent state of Sudan and to different political experiences they have faced 
at different phases during the process of constructing a Sudanese citizen state. These political 
grievances appear from the answers of the question which asks “How did the east, west, far north 
and centre become the Northern Sudan Region in exclusion of the South and what does the name of 
your region and Sudan mean in your native language and do you experience any difficulty in 
articulating it?” First of these complaints is the issue of the territorial national identity. Some of the 
students claim that the Beja were originally an independent and distinct cultural group, under their 
own territory known as Hadarieba.
396
 This Hadarieba was attached to be a part of the current 
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   The students claim that it was the Turco-Egyptian regime that forced the national borders of the 
current Sudan forcing the Hadarieba to join Muslim Arabs. The students argue that: „our norms and 
values as Beja Muslims are quite often different … from Arab Muslims. These cultural differences 
were ignored and the Beja became one with the Arabs in the territorial state of Sudan”.
398
 Another 
continues: „The Arabs were … immigrants with their cultures and we were here on this ground as 
its owners with the Nilotics residing at the centre of Sudan and now in South Sudan”.
399
 One 
student concludes that: “… it would have been logical to attach the primary natives of the land 
together, but South Sudan was set apart from us and Arabs want to assimilate us; we shall seek for 
our destiny and establish our territorial state of Hadarieba.” 
400
  
   After the independence of Sudan, the Beja developed political consciousness of their specific and 
unique identity. In 1957, Taha Osman Bileya with other intellectuals from the Beja formed the 
political ethnic organisation, „Beja Congress‟. The aims of the organisation were many; however, 
they included maintenance of Beja cultural identity, eradication of economic marginalisation of 
their region and an equal participation in power sharing. Studies by Holt and Daly maintain that the 
Beja is a conservative ethnic group and this is specially the case with its sub-ethnic group, the 
Hadendawa which has its own customary norms. The Beja reject association with the Arabs; they 
always define themselves in political and social contacts as Beja. They dismiss efforts of linking 
them with Arabs. Its political wing, the Beja Congress urges the central government to open up 
opportunities in power and wealth distribution that include their region.
401
  
3.1.3.1 Marginalisation and assimilation of the Beja 
Beja students also complain about their economic and political marginalisation. In their opinions, 
different political constructors of national institutions in Sudan marginalise them extensively in 
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terms of distribution of power and wealth in the territory which they call their „own land‟. This 
came up from the answers to the research question, “How do you want national identity of these 
regions to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan and under what system best suits Sudan 
and why you think so?”Answering this question, one of the Beja students says that: “Democracy 
with its values of freedom and equality within all institutions of Sudan is the best, but Sudan has 
never experienced such a system in its political institutions, under the power of the Arabs in 
Sudan.” 
402
 One concludes that: “The Arabs marginalise our region in developmental projects and 
whenever, we express our grievances, then they use power and kill us.” 
403
 
   The students‟ claims of the absence of democratic values and economic marginalisation of the Arabs to the 
region of Beja are necessary for our analysis. The reason is to gain explicit understanding of the claimed 
„democratic values‟. According to Haralambos and Heald, in a democratic society, laws are not always “an 
expression of value consensus but a reflection of ruling class ideology. They serve to legitimate the use of 
ruling class power. Thus, a general commitment to laws by members of society as a whole is an aspect of 
false class consciousness since, in practice; laws benefit only a ruling minority.” 
404
 A body of a legislature 
in a democratic society that enacts constitutional laws in a national parliament without a consensus of the 
other existing political parties represents an oppressive democracy, since those laws are not necessarily 
advantageous for the inclusive territorial citizens; instead they privilege a specific body of a class, which 
may be ethnic or religious group. This phenomenon transforms democracy to become an unattractive 
political strategy in political forums for the benefit of an identical class. It characterises it to become an 
ambiguous term in our minds, and therefore, what is really democracy?  Traditionally, the term democracy 
originated from the Greek word, kratos refers to power or rule. Thus, democracy stands for „rule by the 
demos‟ and the term demos meaning the people.
405
 This definition creates a conflict of the democratic 
theory. Held explains that theoretically, the term democracy has created a conflict, whether it refers to 
popular power “a form of politics in which citizens … engaged in self-government and self-regulation) or an 
aid to decision-making (a means of conferring authority on those periodically voted into office)”. Held 
concludes that these conflicting definitions have resulted three models of democracy. First, participatory 
democracy, which is a system of decision-making that directly involves citizens about the issue of public 
concern; second, there is a liberal or representative democracy, which is a system of rule based on the elected 
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representatives that represent the interest and views of citizens and uphold the „rule of law‟. Finally, there is 
a democracy based on one-party system, which regulates laws for citizens.
406
  
   In the view of this researcher, representative democracy with its modern version constructed by Abraham 
Lincoln, former President of the USA in his Gettysburg address of 1863, where he defines democracy as a 
„government of the people by the people and for the people‟
407
 best suits the current diverse ethnic and 
religious institutions of Sudan. The government in power, however, does not identify these democratic 
virtuous values for its inclusive people. For this reason, the Beja people complain and in reaction, the 
government „imagined‟ them as „enemies‟. According to de Waal and Abdel Salam, in early 1993 the Beja 
Congress took up arms against the central government in Khartoum. In reaction to their demands, the 
government defined them as “enemies of Islam” and attacked their villages. de Waal and Abdel Salam 
conclude that, in a press conference in Kampala in February 1999, some of the Beja leaders, such as Sheikh 
Omer Al-Tahir raised up a partly burned text of the Quran by the government armed forces to their area of 
Gedamayeb and presented a question while holding up the text: “How can a Muslim government do 
this?”
408
 In addition, imam (pious Islamic cleric) Adam Tutu Atrun commented on the scene of Holy Quran 
as: “Islam does not allow Muslims to do this”.
409
 After this rebellion, the leader of the organisation, Musa 
Mohamed Ahmed defined the political objectives of the organisation that it took arms to rectify 
discrimination of Arabs in sharing power and wealth.
410
 Antalöv and Ngo observe that in an authentic 
democratic environment of political pluralism, “the ballot ruled, not the bullet”.
411
  
   The reversible political structure of Sudan from „democratic values‟ of freedom to expression and 
peaceful demonstrations have a negative repercussion among the citizens of Sudan, where the 
„ballot‟ system is absent and the „bullet‟ rule of system is in operation. The Beja went for political 
demonstrations urging the Government of Sudan to introduce projects of development in their 
region in January 2005. Their demonstrations led to a violent reaction from the government. 
Amnesty International reports that some Beja staged a peaceful demonstration on 26 January 2005 
in the city of Port Sudan demanding equal and fair share of the wealth and power in the region. On 
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Saturday, 29 January 2005, the police and security forces shot twenty demonstrators dead. Amnesty 
concluded that the security forces seemed to have acted discriminatively as many of those killed or 
wounded were children uninvolved in the demonstration.
412
  
   Some Beja students present bitter arguments such as: „colonialism was cautious of the democratic 
values, but it handed power to the barbarian Arab elite of capitalism in the centre of the country, 
Khartoum.‟ 
413
 Another one said „these elite gripped power and commenced to marginalise the 
marginal areas at the east, the west, and the south.
414
 One concludes: „the Arabs directed the 
national wealth of state on the developmental projects around their regions‟.
415
  
   Marginalisation on wealth and power sharing prompted the Beja to form the ethnic party, Beja 
Congress, since 1958.
416
 Experience of political marginalisation by certain groups in Sudan 
motivates them to construct and maintain ideological associations to assert their identity and 
political interests. Lesch observes, since the independence of Sudan, two Muslim Arab sectarian 
organisations, the Khatimyyia with their party the DUP and the Ansar with their party the Umma 
dominated Sudan. During the election of 1958 for the National Assembly, political representatives 
from the South, the Beja, the Nuba and the Fur adopted a unified stance as the marginalised people 
and sought a decentralised governance system that would allow them to participate in the decision-
making. Their demands were rejected by the Umma and DUP in power and they could not do 
anything due to their “smaller numbers and limited representation in the parliament”.
417
   
   The third complaint is against attempts by the elite to remove the structures of diversity and 
substitute it with homogeneity based on the inter-independence of Arab identity and Islam.
418
 Some 
students argue that: “Sudanese thought that after independence, we would have a suitable system 
which embraces the culture of all ethnic and religious groups, so that peace is … maintained, 
unfortunately power was inherited to the Jellaba. These Arab elite started to pursue the policy of 
getting rid of the existing ethnic and religious diversity in favour of un-dividable Arab and Islamic 
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identity versus indigenous people of Sudan.” 
419
 another states: “The Beja are very strong nation to 
be assimilated into Arabism …. It is only … we are Muslims, yet, with our unique way of life it is 
difficult for any regime to assimilate us. One Beja student concludes: „We have resisted all the 
historical endeavours of Arabs, Romans, Pharaohs and Turks to assimilate us. Now, political efforts 
of the present Arabs in power to Arabise and Islamise the state have caused racial discrimination 
and segregation within the social and political domains of the country‟. 
420
 One of the students 
offers democratic pluralism as an alternative system for the country claiming that it allows political 
space for negotiating political differences that may lead to the eradication of discrimination, but that 
the „autocratic Islamic‟ system of Al Ingaz (Salvation) Revolution of the President Al-Bashir 
assembles Muslim Arabs and raises a threatening slogan that says: „whatever taken in force must be 
restored back in the same way‟. So, for me, Islamic autocratic system of Islamic fundamentalism 
understands only the language of weapons and not negotiation.” 
421
   
   The Government of the President Al-Bashir is an extremely radicalised Islamic government that 
gives no opportunity for political negotiation to any political body that would hold enough power to 
threaten its existence. For instance, addressing the gathering at the Republican Field in Kassala 
town for the nineteenth anniversary of the militia, the PDF, President Al-Bashir stated: “We do not 
fear anyone, except God; and we do not bow before any one; nor do we praise anyone except Him.” 
422
  
   The radical threatening language used by President Al-Bashir has changed after the ICC 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo applied a warrant to arrest him for the alleged genocide 
committed against the Fur, the Zagahwa and the Massaliet ethnic groups of Darfur. 
423
 Al-Bashir 
has adopted more patience, interest and tolerance towards the opinions of other political parties in 
Sudan.
424
  Nine days after the news from The Hague concerning the arrest warrant, Al-Bashir 
visited Darfur on 23 July 2008 and spoke of the necessity to reach a consensus over the issue of 
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peace, instead of violence between all peoples of Darfur. He accepted some demands of the rebels, 
such as the refund of those indigenous people whose possessions have been destroyed and looted by 
the janjaweed and government forces. He also asserted to negotiate with the JEM, which he had 
ruled out of any negotiations.
425
 
3.1.3.2 Prejudice against the Beja 
The fourth complaint by the Beja students is discrimination and prejudice by the Arabs in power 
against them. They argue that ethical teaching of Islam prevents discrimination, and so religion, 
Islam is free from this political discrimination in Sudan. Islam as a religion is not the reason for 
political instability. Politicians misuse Islam for their political benefit and discriminate against 
Muslims who are not Arabs. The result of that discrimination has brought the prevailing disunity, 
hatred and war between the indigenous Muslim Beja against Muslim Arabs within the Northern 
Sudan Region.
426
 Under discrimination, one of them argues: “We must know that, war against the 
Beja Muslims reminds us … that it is not the first time in the Islamic history for some Arabs to 
pursue discrimination of non-Arab Muslims from the divine message of Islam for all … nations. 
Muslim Arabs in Sudan reject deliberately the obligatory equality articulated in Islamic religion to 
all Muslims. They practice contrary norms of Islam, especially racism against converts of non-Arab 
origins to Islam, and not because they do not know the Quran; they know it, but lust of power and 
greedy for wealth blind them”. 
427
 Sudan‟s Presidential Advisor, Mansour Khalid argues that Arab 
racism in Islamic Sudan is traditionally inherent in the original racial discrimination towards 
faithful non-Arab Muslims. The Arabs in Sudan fail to comprehend the Prophet Muhammed‟s 
definition of an Arab. The Prophet warned the Arabs that: “you people, God is One and One Father, 
Arab is not Arab from an Arab father and mother, but the tongue, so whoever that speaks Arabic, 
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   Some Beja students claim that they usually experience racial prejudice within the institutions of 
Sudan, but this prejudice was inherited by the Arabs from the colonial British policy that 
categorised the Beja, as “aggressive and uncultured.” 
429
 According to one Beja; the Arabs in 
control of power in Khartoum follow the same derogatory prejudice that categorise “us as 
uncultured ethnic group.” 
430
 Many of Beja students present more arguments that Islam is an 
independent religion that unifies worshippers in faith, but has not successfully dropped racism 
within Islam.
 431
 Another one states: “It is true, we are Muslims, but there is a difference between 
religion and race. Islam unites us as the people of one faith, but it is difficult for one like me to 
identify myself as an Arab, because I am a Muslim.” 
432
 One Beja concludes: “If a Beja person 
denounces Beja cultural identity, it would equally reflect a cultural suicide of eradicating cultural 
distinction”. 
433
 Holt and Daly observe that the five sub-ethnic divisions of the Beja express 
diversity in terms of cultural practices. The Hadendawa who reside at Tukar in the region of Gash 
have been categorised as the most aggressive and “uncultured savages”.
434
  
   This form of derogatory stratification of ethnic cultures into „uncultured‟ and „cultured‟ originated 
from the colonial British officials in Sudan and has entered into the social institutions of the Islamic 
North; however, not all British Administrators were involved in such categorisation. According to 
Deng, British Administrators in Sudan were divided over their observations of the Hadendawa. 
Some described them as uncultured, nomadic and savage and others viewed them differently. For 
instance, the Former British Governor T R H Owen expressed his great love towards Sudan and in 
particularly the culture of the Hadendawa.
435
  
   Applying social theory in analysing the divisive categories of British Administrators on the 
cultural identity of the Hadendawa, we must conclude that some of the administrators were affected 
by „sociological imagination‟, during their interactions with the Hadendawa. In the view of Mills, 
when a person is exposed to an environment of alien cultures, social imagination helps to imagine 
the other group as distinct and its behaviour does not necessarily match with the privately 
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experienced cultural behaviours of one‟s own environment. 
436
 Some of the British Administrators 
might have expected the Hadendawa to quickly adopt their British cultural experiences and that 
expectation prevented them from viewing the Hadendawa as they are and what they were in their 
social, cultural and political environment of the eastern Sudan. 
3.2 Territorial African pagans and slaves 
In Sudan, according to the Christian Animist students from the South, the term „pagan‟ is a 
derogatory racial description of the heterogeneous African population residing in the contemporary 
South Sudan, whether Christian, Muslim or Animist. Historically, these „pagans‟ face „genocide‟, 
„ethnic cleansing‟ and slavery in the name of Jihad.
437
 According to Gray, Arabs immigrated to 
Sudan and commenced to impose Islamic and Arab homogeneity throughout the country. The 
indigenous populations of the part known today as the Northern Sudan were receptive to the 
assimilation into the new identity. The current indigenous inhabitants of the South, however, 
continued to resist this assimilation to the present day. Gray concludes that after this, the rigid 
Islamic concept which divides the world into two categories, Dar al Islam that is the domain of 
peace and Dar-al Harb, the domain of pagans was applied against the mostly Christian and Animist 
indigenous groups who resisted assimilation to Islam and an Arab identity.
438
   
3.2.1 Ethnic composition of the pagans 
Pagan African Sudan is a composition of heterogeneous groups. Their total number is reckoned to 
be around 572 and scholars divide them into three groups, taking into consideration linguistic 
similarities and customs. The largest group is the Western Nilotic group that includes the Dinka 
who form 10% of the population of Sudan, the Nuer with 5%, the Shilluk with 1%, and the Anyuak, 
the Acholi, the Luwo, the Bor Balanda and the Pari who are smaller still.
439
 The second category is 
the Eastern Nilotic group, which is divided into two sub-categories. The first is the Bari speaking 
 
 
436 Mills, Robert (1989), p. 46.  
437 Akot Yel, a Dinka Animist Christian, South Sudan, University of Juba: “Since the foundation of Sudan, genocide 
was committed by the Arab Muslims in the name of Islam, until today, they killed us during the war, because we were 
Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk Africans, even among us, we have Christians, Muslims and believers of Animism, yet we are 
all pagans”. “The Arab Muslims conducted ethnic cleansing with their Jihad against us from the very beginning until 
now. In the name of Islamic Jihad, Ja‟aleen and Danagella excluded us from administrative institutions of Sudan by 
killing us, because we are pagans who worship beings. We experienced Jihad, because the Muslim Arabs think that we 
are pagans, because we have resisted assimilation to their religion”.    
438 Gray, Richard (1961). A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2-7. 





ethnic groups, which encompass more than ten tiny minorities further fragmented into six sub-
groups. The Bari form 2 % of the Sudanese.
440
 The third category is known as the Ubangi-speaking 
and Central Sudanic speaking group and it includes the Azande, the Muru, the Ndogo, the Sere, the 
Mundu, the Biri Balanda, the Madi and many others.
441
  
 The interviews with the students provide us with some additional names which are not 
recorded in this categorisation. They include the Burun, a community that speaks at least four 
different Western Nilotic languages and manifests different cultural identities. Bandala, however, 
belongs to the „Ubangi-speaking group and Jurbeil, who know itself as Beli or Wulu belongs to the 
Central Sudanic group. 
442
 The Kachepo of Boma in the Eastern Equatoria State remains 
unclassified in linguistic and cultural terms, yet it can be possibly categorised as Surmic. These 
„pagans‟ are the pariah of Sudan from the point of view of the central government.      
3.2.2 ‘Unsaid’ discrimination 
It is paradoxical that the incessant constructions of social systems in Sudan are metaphorically 
political and ambiguous towards national identity in Sudan. The metaphoric arguments neglect the 
inherent realities of Sudan‟s social and political structures of ethno-linguistic and religious 
diversity. These fundamental facts are often not debated at national political forums and, hence, 
they constantly recycle and divide the people of Sudan. Deng argues that the people of Sudan have 
„hypocritical‟ attitudes that avoid addressing the political crisis of identity. This behaviour gradually 
stifles the need for addressing other issues and finding alternatives. Among these issues of national 
identity is the question of how to manage the combination of two identities, African and Arab.  
Also, no clear definition has been produced concerning the relationship between religion and state. 
Instead, the government fuses Islamic religion with the state and thus defines a national identity 
based on one religion.
443
    
   Some Christian and Animist students from the South blame the central government for having 
entrenched political and social institutions of Sudan into a system that discriminates the people of 
the South. This claim comes from the answers to the questionnaire question “Have you ever 
experienced any form of discrimination in any region of Sudan, if so, please explain?” The students 
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claim that discrimination is ostensibly covered up to sound brotherly, but in essence it amounts to 
the exclusion of the population of the South from participating in institutions of state. In the view of 
these students, four political issues in Sudan remain „unsaid‟. The first of these is the term Junubi 
(Southerner). If a Northern Arab Muslim calls an indigenous non-Muslim from the South „Junubi‟, 
he does not refer to the literary meaning for the term as a person from the South. Its underlying 
intrinsic social meaning among Muslim Arabs is an exclusive racial category term that excludes the 
Southerners from the social institutions of Muslim Arabs in the North. Its hidden meanings include 
„lost brother‟, (an identity of a person that has rejected Islam); slave, destitute, sordid awesome and 
an outcast from the umma.
444
   
   Second, the issue of incorrect writing of the non-Muslim names is intentionally made in official 
documents in order to urge the Africans to abandon their traditional names, so that they are 
assimilated into Arab names. One student states: “Muslim Arabs write our African names wrongly 
and when you complain, then they respond, isum ajami (non-Arab speaking name). Personally, I 
understand it is a symbolic reference of indirect discrimination which is „unsaid‟ in our institutions, 
but we understand its denotation. It means change your name into an Arab Muslim, if you want the 
correct orthography of your name”. 
445
  
   The third one is the issue of systematic discrimination by the ruling power in treating its citizens 
in public institutions of Sudan. Experiences of some students concerning Sudan‟s political 
institutional setting indicate to them that it operates consistently, under the criterion of racial 
discrimination. It rejects the principle of equal treatment of „African -Arab‟ identities within Sudan. 
The „African‟ identity can be subjected to severe discrimination while Arab identity is favoured. 
This feeling is partly derived from the treatment of power in Khartoum to three Sudanese 
politicians. Answering the question “Have you ever experienced any form of discrimination in any 
region of Sudan?” one Dinka student says that he has not yet experienced any political 
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discrimination based on colour in Sudan. Nevertheless, he refers to the case of Sadiq Al-Mahdi who 
has been detained by the police several times, but exempted from physical torture, while at the same 
time; Eliaba James Surur and Isaiah Kualeng Mabor have experienced torture in political detention 
cells in Khartoum. According to the Dinka student, the reason for the exemption is that Surur and 
Mabor are non-Muslims and non-Arabs and both come from the South. To him, “… the three men 
are equal Sudanese and great politicians, but in the eyes of the government security, they are not 
equal; Al-Mahdi is superior as an Arab and a Muslim, but what is strange; no one says this 
discrimination, except the victims understand it. Mabor says that an Islamic and Arab identity could 
explain the exemption of Al-Mahdi from torture and Surur gives the same explanation”.
446
  
   Sadiq Al-Mahdi is a former Premier of Sudan during the democratic period of multi- party 
pluralism from April 1986 until the military coup of 30 June 1989. During that time Eliaba James 
Surur was the Head of the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) a composition of seven parties 
mainly from the South and Nuba Mountains regions. Isaiah Kualeng Mabor was a member of this 
organisation and a Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal region in the South. In this way they are politicians 
of the same status and it is a duty of power in the state to treat them equally, either to exempt them 
from its system of torture or if there is any obligation to torture than it should torture them all, since, 
after the NIF took power, detention, torture and disappearance of the opposition figures became a 
consistent practice in the capital city of Khartoum. Lesch explains that the National Security Guards 
of the NIF confiscated the buildings of the „Bar Association‟ and the former office of the Electorate 
Commission and turned them into prisons. These buildings became “ghost houses” 
447
 for the 
detention and torture of political dissidents.
448
 
3.2.2.1 „Thudan‟ and Sudan 
The fourth issue taken up by students is the territorial name of present Sudan, which the Nilotic 
ethnic groups, the Dinka, the Nuer, the Shilluk, the Anyuak and the Luwo known also as Jur-Col 
actually call „Thudan‟. This was addressed in the answers of some Nilotic students to the question, 
“How did the east, west, far north and centre become the Northern Sudan Region in exclusion of 
the South and what does the name of your region and Sudan mean in your native language and do 
you experience any difficulty in articulating it? First, a Dinka student declared: “I have a big 
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problem with the name Sudan. My mother is an illiterate and she resides in the displaced camp at 
Muwaealla, behind Omdurman city and she really lives in her own world, which she calls Thudan, 
instead of Sudan and to me a suitable new name is an expedient to extricate the Nilotics from the 
burden of S”.
449
 Second, Another Dinka states “The Jieng people do not understand the Arabic 
constructed term, Sudan. We have no „S‟ in our linguistic setting of sounds, so some of us call it 
„Thudan‟, for two reasons. First, to avoid Arabisation, because using  ”S” which we do not have 
promotes assimilation to Arabic. Second, we want the name to be changed to Thudan so that it fits 
to our tongues”.
450
 Third, a Nuer argues: “For me as a Naath, Sudan was a name imposed on us by 
Arabs. Among us the Nilotics, there is no ”S”, but Arabs want to make us Arabs with their sounds, 
yet our native speakers refuse and call it „Thudan”.
451
 Fourth, a Shilluk states: “A Collo man 
communicating with another Collo person pronounces Sudan as „Thudan‟ and that is a general 
situation to the Nilotics, because we have no „S‟. Recently, we understand that the intention of 
bringing this other alphabet to our tongue was to make us Arabs”.
452
 Anyuak student concludes: 
“Sudan means in Arabic, „Black‟ and the Arabs … refuse to be translated into English to „Black‟ 
and the reason is to assimilate us by adopting the notorious sound „S‟, which is missing among us, 
hence we say „Thudan‟”.
453
 
   In 1978, Francis Mading Deng published Africans of Two Worlds the Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. 
Deng wanted to illustrate that contemporary Sudan is composed of many ethnic groups, yet he took 
two identities, the African Dinka as „Afro‟ living together with the Arabs as an example.
454
 His 
choice for the title; „Two Worlds‟ acknowledges the presence of two contradictory linguistic 
cultural identities „Sudan‟ and „Thudan‟ in one territorial sovereign state. This observation of the 
existence of „Two Worlds‟ has been neglected in studies, while it presents the problem of territorial 
identification among the largest indigenous populations of the Nilotic ethnic groups, the Dinka 
(Jieng), the Nuer (Naath), the Shilluk (Collo), the Anyuak and the Luwo in South Sudan.
455
 The 
author observes that socialising and discussing politics with the Nilotic students is very easy. 
Nevertheless, a listener will quickly observe their territorial identity in their use of the term 
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„Thudan‟. These conflicting territorial identities remain “unsaid” in the political forums and 
academic intellectual debate of the country. Three interviewed Nilotic students were asked to 
provide the reasons for using the name „Thudan‟, instead of Sudan. A Nuer student answered that „it 
is just the absence of “S” sound among the Nilotics, but the Arabs put it in assuming that we shall 
become Arabs, if we speak their sound‟.
456
 For an Anyuak student, Sudan means in Arabic, Black 
and the Arabs here refuse to be translated into English to Black and the reason is to assimilate us by 
adopting the notorious sound of „S‟, which is missing at all among us and for this, we say 
„Thudan‟.
457
 Luwo student claims that his rejection of the name „Sudan‟ and adoption of „Thudan‟ 
is to avoid discrimination in colour, because, the term Sudan means „Black‟ in Arabic. He explains: 
„the name Sudan is a description of the Arabs to the people of the present land, Sudan. It means 
“Black” and that represents discrimination in colour‟.
458
  
   Answering to the question how do you want identity of Sudan to be defined in a national 
constitution, the Nuer student states “I have a problem with the name „Sudan‟ and I want it to be 
changed in the national constitution to the Nilotic Republic. All people in Sudan are attached to the 
Nile, but why do you name the state in colour? Sudan originated from Arabic vocabulary Bilad al-
Sudan to mean the land of the Blacks. We know ourselves that we are Blacks with other Blacks 
around the world and their states are not called Blacks.”
459
  
Sharkey argues that Sudan emerged as a result of Arabisation entailing the gradual spread of both 
Arab identity and the Arabic language. Members of the Arab elite developed national consciousness 
of Arab national identity and in the process the elite adapted the term „Sudan‟ for a territory, which 
is derived from the Arabic word for „blackness‟. Nonetheless, the name carries its previously servile 
connotations of the native Black populations.
460
       
   The new demands of some students to change the name of the country from Sudan to the „Nilotic 
Republic‟ or Thudan in order to escape what they perceive as a discrimination has some links with 
the theoretical view of setting race as a model for constructing territorial identities of nation-states. 
According to Miles, races do not naturally emerge as populations in social institutions. Instead, 
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there are social reasons and conditions for some social groups to resort to this illusive discourse of 
race and apply it as a model of building national identities.
461
  
   Although most names of states in the world were accidental results of their histories.
462
  The 
situation of Sudan is unique taking into consideration the resistance of some citizens such as 
students to its adaptation as a territorial identity, this makes one admit that the reconstruction is 
controversial. A debate on a territorial identity sometimes leads to the change of its name into 
another territorial identity. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a new reconstructed 
territorial name for the former Zaire.
463
 One student argues that there are no nations whose 
territorial national identities have been constructed on the basis of colour. Most nations put into 
consideration the circumstances of their environment and derive the name of a territory from that 
environment. The student concludes that the indigenous popular inhabitants of Europe, France, 




   The student‟s view carries empirical truth that there is no contemporary European country calls 
„White‟. Certainly, the indigenous population of Finland is white in skin colour and its territorial 
nation state is not identified by the physical appearance of the plural colour, rather than the Finns.
465
 
If identification was to be so, there would have been no difference between the territorial Sweden 
and Finland, because the native populations of these two countries are Whites in colour.
466
 Indeed, 
some of the European territorial names for states originated from territorial tribal names.
467
 
According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, most of the European nations of the nineteenth century 
acquired their national identities through adaptation of some traditional surroundings. Practical 
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traditions of religious heritage, ethnic languages and customs were ideologically modified and 
forged as entities for establishing territorial identities of groups as distinctive nations from others.
468
  
   In regard to Sudan, what prompted the earliest decision-makers in power, during those days to 
suspend the environmental names and favour the foreign vocabulary term „Sudan‟ is mysterious and 
it requires analysis in order to discover the underlying reasons behind it. The current population 
residing in modern Sudan used to have no unified territorial identity, but that does not mean there 
were no environmental names for their identities. There were names used by its indigenous people. 
First, the Nubians who resided in Upper Egypt identified their territory as Kush and the population 
was Nubians or Kushites. After their conversion from Animism to Christianity, they established 
Christian Kingdoms.
469
 For the Romans, this population was called the Nubians and the territory 
was Nubia.
470
 Second, the Nilotics (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anyuak and Luwo) who live along the 
Nile know it in their vocabularies until the present day as „Kiir‟ and the colonialist British called 
them the Nilotics as a translation of Kiir.
471
 Studies of Mawut supported by archaeological 
excavation demonstrate that Khartoum the site where the capital city of modern Sudan is located 
was the Nilotics original area of settlement.
472
 For the Nilotics, the confluence of the Blue and 
White Niles is Khartoum and its meaning is synonymous among them. Some say it is called 
Kiirtoum, which is a composition of two words, Kiir and toum. The former refers to the river (Nile) 
and the latter refers to the confluence of the two rivers, White and Blue Niles. Some say it is a 
composition of two words, khar and toum. Khar refers to a branch of a river (Nile) and toum means 
the confluence of the same two rivers, thus the location became known Khartoum.
473
 Third, the 
territory of the Beja along the Red Sea was known as „Hadarieba‟ and in the fourteenth century, the 
Black King, Amarah Dunqas established the Kingdom of Funj and its capital in Sinnar along the 
Blue Nile and the territory of this Kingdom extended from Old Dunqulah in the north to Kadugli in 
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the South. Under the influence of the wealthy Arab Muslim settlers in Kush, Dunqas embraced 
Islam and cooperated with Muslim Arabs and overthrew the Christian Kingdoms.
474
  
   After the destruction of the Nubian Christian Kingdoms, a new phase of history had to be set and 
that needed a regime that interprets its reconstruction. Sociologically, every regime in the world in 
power seeks an interpreter that construes its truth in different categories of political forums.
475
 
According to Deng, the Kingdom of Funj, though its origin is obscure, historians generally believed 
to have been Black, but during the reconstruction of Sudan, Muslim Arab settlers in the territory 
became the virtual decision makers in this territory and Dunqas was a nominal leader. The territorial 
Kingdom was officially changed from Funj (Black) to al-Sultanate al-Zerga (Blue Kingdom). Deng 
concludes that the change was made, under the influence of the racial ideology of Muslim Arabs in 




   First, historically, the name Sudan originated from the classical Arabic vocabulary, Bilad al-
Sudan. It has a referential meaning, where Bilad refers to lands or homes and Al-Sudd means the 
Black populations residing in the area extending from the Nile to the Atlantic borders.
477
 In this 
way, the research argues that there were underlying mysteries behind the maintenance of the name 
Sudan, synonymous with the Black, an assumed symbolic identity for slavery. First, the virtual 
Muslim Arabs that interpreted the political power divided the territory into two; the land of the free 
and the land of un-free (slaves). The former refers to the Black Muslim inhabitants who had 
received their freedom and were identified as Zerga (Blues). The latter defined the population that 
lived in the territory, but not free, since they were not Zerga. Second, the interpreters of power, the 
Muslim Arabs might have hoped that their presence among the Blacks (slaves) and Zerga was a 
temporary one and had not thought of remaining as permanent citizens to be identified in the long 
course of time with the Black groups in the country as „Sudanese‟. The issue of families left behind 
in the arid Arabian Peninsula and Egypt was an adequate reason for them to live in hope of return to 
the homelands as all forms of connections were still strong and intact with their homelands.
478
 
Third, the interpreters might have feared that an inclusive reconstruction of the territorial identity as 
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Zerga would have set every territorial resident from the colour of black (slave) to the category of 
free men and women (Zerga). In Clarke‟s view, Muslim Arabs in Sudan dropped the business of 
ivory and gold and resorted to the trafficking in the Black populations as slaves, because the 
demands for slaves in the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt was increasing to a large scale.
479
     
   Recently, the descriptive identity, Sudan has been restored in political discussion. According to 
Deng, Some Muslim Arab scholars and statesmen from the North think there should be a better 
national territorial name, than Sudan. Some of them have proposed alternative names that might suit 
the real structure of a free Muslim Arab identity, than the identity that associates them with Negro 
Africans, the downtrodden of our planet. Among the proposed names include the original legacies 





   The intentions for the search of a new territorial name other than Sudan at present may differ; 
however, it not only emancipates Muslim Arabs, but also the Nilotics. The researcher observes that 
most educated Dinka students continue to acquire the transmitted sound of „S‟ and occasionally 
some of them manage to articulate the territorial national identity as Sudan. This is not possible for 
the illiterate Nilotic community, instead the country is „Thudan‟ and its population is the 
„Thudaniith‟ to mean the Sudanese. Yet, the name Kush carries the sound „S‟, but in the Nilotic 
orthography, „-sh‟ stands for „C‟
481
 and Kush would appear Kuc. Generally, any possible revival of 
old names or any other constructed new name to substitute the name Sudan remedies the Nilotic 
population from „Thudan‟ and Thudaniith otherwise, they will continue with their territorial identity 
of Thudan, instead of Sudan. Yule observes that people are not capable to articulate sounds that are 
not in their linguistic property. Each group has “unique properties”
482
 of language as an identity. 
One of these properties is „displacement‟. It is an attempt of people to speak about things, which are 
totally missing at their immediate cultural environment. Displacement is an opposition to the 
linguistic property called cultural transmission, which is an acquisition of a language as a cultural 
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3.2.2.2 Promises of equality and federal system 
In the view of some students political developments in Sudan demonstrate that the issue of the 
relationship between state and religion as well as the sharing of power and wealth do not fall into 
the category of „unsaid‟ ideological practices of power in state. They have been „said‟ and 
negotiated in political conferences and alternative resolutions for them have been found and agreed. 
Yet the successive governments dominated by Muslim Arabs fail to respect such agreements by 
violating them and the crisis of national identity between the African and Arab identities continues. 
These claims by the students are expressed in answers to the question, how do you want national 
identity of different regions in Sudan to be defined in a national constitution, and under what system 
suits Sudan best and why you think so? A Dinka student argues that: “Every system under the 
control of the sons of our sisters, Muslim Arabs is bad; it applies classical marginalisation of the 
South in terms of equal development. In a political debate in Juba Conference for the issue of the 
relationship of the South with the North, British colonisers proposed that the South was 
undeveloped and was not necessary to be independent by then. When the Muslim Arabs heard that 
they reacted and shouted; no; no; we would develop it, but they fail to fulfil their promise. From 





 The Conference in question was held on 12 June 1947 in Juba, a city in South 
Sudan. The British Civil Secretary in Sudan James W Robertson summoned the Chiefs from the 
South and some prominent figures among Muslim Arabs of the North to attend it. During the 
opening session, Robertson reiterated that the policy of British regarding the South is to act upon 
the facts that the people of the South are distinctly African and Negroid. Only political geography 
and economic situation combined them with the North. This situation required assurance from the 
political force of the North that the South will be developed in the future, so that the two territories 
become educationally and economically equal.
485
  
   This study argues that in Sudan power attracts the people of the South, during any political 
discussion that threatens the territorial unity and presents economic promises to attract the 
population of the South. The indigenous people of the South regard the introduction of 
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developmental projects in the South as something that would make them independent actors within 
their region than being sub-ordinates citizens. Beniah Yongo-Bure argues that, whenever the people 
of the South plan to break away from the North, the political North offers them small independent 
projects.
486
 For Dau Akol, a Southern Dinka Christian Animist, “… after the SPLM and NCP 
signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, Khartoum promised to make unity attractive 
through development. Currently, the NCP has forgotten its promise. At least we had expected it to 
revive our companies and projects of Kapoeta Cement Factory, Foundry, Fruit Processing Plant, 
Nzara Agriculture Production Corporation, Wau Fruit Canning Factory, Tonj Kenaf Project, Wau 
White Nile Brewery Project, Melut and Mangalla Sugar Cane. The resumption of those defunct 
companies would have made unity attractive for me. Today, unity is primarily unattractive an 
woman for me …” 
487
 On the issue of power distribution, a Nuer student argues: “During the 
decolonisation process, the Muslim Arabs agreed to offer us our own federal government in the 
South that would protect our cultural identity from assimilation to Arab and Islamic culture. 
Strangely enough, after the British left, they unanimously rejected the offer of the federal system to 
the South and set the policy of Arabising and Islamising us as an alternative.” 
488
 Johnson points out 
that, before the independence of Sudan, the political forces in the South demanded the provision of 
exceptional power based on a federal system as an alternative resolution to the re-unification of the 
North and South. They claimed that such a system would protect their traditional values of 
Christianity and Animism from assimilation to the Islamic and Arab culture. After a long discussion 
the Northern Muslim Arab politicians accepted this demand, but shortly after independence, they 
rejected its adoption in the South, under the claim that federation was the first step for the 
separation of the South from the North.
489
 
3.2.2.3 Status of women in Sudan 
 The status of women in Sudan divides students into two factions, which appear in the answers to 
the question, “What are the fundamental duties of faithful ones in your religion and is there any 
division of roles in terms of gender?” A Nuba student argues: “... our African Islam places women 
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on the same level with men, but the problem here is with our Arab Muslim fundamentalists. They… 
continue to apply the primitive tradition that had placed the women in an inferior category. In 
Khartoum, Muslim fundamentalists have revived their traditional discrimination of women.
490
  
Another student states: “In the Northern Sudan, women are segregated … on the streets, in 
cafeterias, at universities, in hotels, in public transports, to the extent of forcing them to sit 
separately in buses, and when you ask about the reasons for this inequality, then, religion is the 
scapegoat to be the source of this inequality.
491
 One Nuba concludes that: “The government has 
failed to digest that Prophet Muhammad had freed the women, by prohibiting the discriminatory 
killing of female children. In Khartoum no one cares to interpret … Quran and Sunna for our 
equality, except in Nuba Mountains, where we are all the same, no segregation, our Islam is 
connected with our traditions and customs, which reject discrimination against women”. 
492
 On the 
other hand, a Muslim Arab student answers the same question argues: “Sharia organises social 
setting of Muslims, where women know their statuses and the same to men and those are in our 
constitution in Sudan. Some Muslim women at our university … fail to follow the obligations of 
Sharia by dressing immodest clothes and by rejecting scarves on their heads”. 
493
  
   The absence of political vision among the political forces in power to address such religious and 
ethnic cultural differences as realities divides the Muslims in Sudan, but they have not seriously set 
an open political dialogue in order to find a solution for this reality. Nuba Muslim leader Yusuf 
Kuwa Makki provides an example of the divisive experiences which originate from conflicting 
identities between Muslim Africans versus Arab Muslim traditions. He states that, while he was still 
a student a discussion took place in the class over the subject of women‟s rights in Islam. In the 
view of Muslim Nuba students in the class, Muslim women deserve the same equal status with men 
in public institutions by contesting and voting in national elections, but Muslim Arab teacher 
opposed such views and reacted; “women‟s rights; why should they be given any rights?”
494
 In 
theory, culture is a source of discrimination against women. According to Marler, in the feminists‟ 
view, the transition from the cultural system of feudalism to industrial revolution has shifted a 
woman from being culturally limited as a “primary (re)producer of children and religious piety in 
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the domestic or private sphere” to equal opportunities in the most public and private institutions 
with male in the West.
495
  
   This author argues that it is the culture which each group has adopted that constitutes their views 
on equality and inequality between women and men in Sudan. Some Muslim women in Sudan 
accuse the present government of promoting violence and discrimination against women. Amnesty 
International organised a conference on human rights in February 2005 and invited a Sudanese 
woman, Asma Taha to address the conference. Taha urges the Government of Sudan to “stop 
violence against the women”. 
496
 The legislature has contributed on the larger scale to the 
derogatory status of women in Sudan. Public Order Law (POL) of 1991 with article 153 limits 
women‟s dress. On 3 July 2009, Police of Public Order (PPO) entered into a popular decent 
restaurant in the centre of the capital city Khartoum and singled out thirteen women from the 
restaurant. The police accused them of having attired themselves in pants; which is a form of a dress 
the law defines as indecent and obscene for women to wear in public places. Out of the thirteen, ten 
were flogged forty lashes, fined and discharged after two days in police custody; meanwhile, Lubna 
Ahmed Hussien and two others rejected flagellation. Hussein argues: “I am not afraid of flogging 
…. It is about changing the law that discriminates us, it is un-Islamic”.
497
 The case of Lubna 
Hussien provoked the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and he invited her to come to France for 
protection.
498
 Legally, Lubna could not freely board a plane from Khartoum to Paris. The 
„Nationality Act‟ of Sudan limits women‟s mobility. A woman is not free to cross the territorial 
boundaries of Sudan without the approval of her parents, a brother or a husband, if married.
499
 
Despite this limitation, Lubna escaped to the Yemeni capital, Sana‟a, while ostensibly attired in 
niqab, a large piece of fabric cloth that cloaks the body from head to toe with a mesh or a small 
patch of gauze to see out. Lubna explains: “They wanted to prevent me from leaving I resorted to 
the niqab and managed to leave. I requested documents to be able to travel, and this is the only 
means I found to be able to leave Sudan”.
500
 Lubna announced in Paris her published book entitled 
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Forty Lashes for a Pair of Pants. French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner in a joint Press 
Conference with her rejects the violations of all forms of rights, and specially the rights of women. 
He states: “We are all concerned by this (situation) because the subject of the violation of human 
rights, particularly the rights of women affects us all”.
501
  
    As this author is a participant observer to the status of women under this law in Sudan, a number 
of the government official men constantly issue directives urging female students and women in 
government offices, universities and public places to attire themselves according to what they 
always prescribe as „an Islamic dress code‟. In fact, these codes entail only wearing a veil or a scarf 
covering the head without legal provision defining clearly the acceptable dress that fit women, 
beyond the veil or scarf. Instead, the law grants the PPO unit virtual immunity from prosecution, 
even though on too many occasions, the unit applies uneven treatment on the woman accused of 
immodest dress, before she could reach a criminal court to face flogging.  
3.2.2.4 (In)compatibility of religions  
 A Muslim Nuba student argues that: “All the universal religions have a common source. They 
come from God, the Creator of the universe and most of us as African Muslims, particularly in 
Nuba Mountains understand this reality and we have no religious conflicts. Animists, Christians and 
Muslims co-exist, but Arab Muslim fundamentalists of the National Congress reject this tolerance 
and accuse us … as pagans in the region”.
502
  
   The claim that religious co-existence is interpreted as a promotion of pagan religions in Nuba 
Mountains represents a paradigm of racism in the public institutions of Sudan. It indicates that 
Islam in Sudan has not been regarded as a unifying principle. It involves racism, where some 
Muslims are defined as pagans due to their ethnic background. In response, Yusuf Kuwa Makki as a 
politician has sought a political dialogue in order to find alternative resolutions for religious 
compatibility in Sudan. He argues that the classification of the non-Arabs, whether Muslims, 
Christians or Animists as pagans in Nuba Mountains has affected his political attitudes and that 
dictated him to seek an alternative that might remedy the racial discrimination within the Islamic 
institution of North Sudan. He argues: “We want to retrieve the role of the indigenous religion of 
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   In essence, such expression indicates the acknowledgement that being a Muslim is incompatible 
with Animism. Islam recognises only the believers of Christianity and Judaism as followers of the 
Book.
504
 So, that was a dilemma moment for Makki as a Muslim, he could not combine two 
practices which his own religion rejects. This situation pushed him to seek a further alternative 
resolution. Yet, there was no solution, beyond the experience of the Former President Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania which exposes the practical compatibility of Animism and Christianity in 
African ritual worship. Nyerere‟s „Let Us Run While They Walk‟ was an alternative. Makki says that 
the religious experience of Nyerere has taught him that Islam and Animism could be practiced 
compatibly as religions. Nyerere writes that when he was twelve years old he became a Christian 
and believed in Christianity. Still, he continued to believe in African religious rituals as he explains: 
“I became a Christian when I was twelve years old and I believe in Christianity. Still I believe that 
we Africans have our own rituals”.
505
    
   In fact Nyerere unveils his dualistic religious identity; although he identified himself as a 
Christian, he continued to participate in African Animistic religious rituals. He explains that one 
time he accepted one of these rites to be performed on him. As a young chap, he returned with his 
stepmother from the religious funeral of Animism with a goat handed to them by the relatives of his 
stepmother. On the way, he faced a difficulty in pulling the goat, as he was very young. This 
difficulty was relieved religiously as a certain African man performed an Animistic religious rite, 
which reconciled him with the goat. The rite was that the man took some hair from the head of 
Nyerere and snatched some hair from the goat and mixed them together, surprisingly the result was 
that the goat cooled down and followed Nyerere without resistance, until he arrived home.
506
   
   The performance of this African religious rite reveals the religious identity of Nyerere as he was 
both a Christian and a believer in Animism. The research calls a religious person who practices 
Christianity in compatible with Animism „a Christian Animist‟.  The procedure of this worship 
suspends some Biblical obligations, which reject any performance that could be interpreted as 
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irrelevant to the Christian teaching.
507
 Nyerere suspended some typical interpretations of the Bible 
and chose tolerance to both religions and internalised them as his religions. In contrast, Makki 
promulgates this way of beliefs exist in the Nuba Mountains, as kujur (Animistic religious rituals). 
The people of Nuba Mountains perform these rites in public and it is difficult for the audience to 
explain the relationship of their physical performances and the results they produce. For example, 
one time, a serious drought came and the Nuba Muslims and Animists had to inform the kujur to 
intervene. Those with these ritual powers performed their religious creed and indeed, a short time 
after their performances the rain started to drop down in abundance.
508
  
   Strict teaching of Christianity rejects any ritual performance not related to the tradition of the 
Church. The Holy Bible instructs Christians that: “You shall have no other god before Me; you 
shall not make for yourself a carved image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven and above 
or that is on the earth”.
509
 In practice, some African Christians suspend certain interpretations of the 
Bible and choose tolerance to both religions, Animism and Christianity as fitting to their social 
environments. For Makki, such suspension of strict applications of Islam and Christianity exist in 
African beliefs among the Nuba people of Nuba Mountains, as kujur.
510
 The presence of Animistic 
beliefs among the Nuba might have motivated some Nuba students to support the creation of a 
constitutional system that contains this religious diversity as some of them argue: “If we take alone 
Islam as the source of legal code, then what would the country do with the Nuba”. 
511
 Another said: 
“In Nuba Mountains a person could be a Muslim or a Christian and continue to practice 
Animism”.
512
 Some Muslims in Nuba Mountains argue and propose the possibilities of combining 
Animism with Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The logic behind this compatibility of the four 
religions is that „religion is one‟.
513
  
   The concept of oneness of God is common to all three religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam; 
however, divergences are found in the organisation of social lives. In response to the question do 
you think that inter-marriages can curtail regional diversity in Sudan, and if so, what marriage do 
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you prefer and explain why? Ali Abdel Muneim an Arab Muslim student responds: “Marriage in 
Islam is very important; a pious Muslim could marry everywhere, including heaven, if he dies in 
defence of Islam”.
514
 The discourse of marriage in heaven has been a dominant claim among senior 
figures of the Government of Sudan, under President Al-Bashir. According to Mahmoud, in Sudan, 
Muslim leaders of the NCP celebrate ceremonies of marriages in heaven on the ground. They do 
this, under the belief that the Muslim soldiers killed on the battlefields in the South died in defence 
of their religion, Islam. Thus, they are identified as martyrs in the name of religion, and are 
automatically married to houris (paradise virgin women).
515
  
   In contrast, this belief is in conflict with the view of Christian students. One of them states: 
“President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir claims that the dead Muslim students in the South, Nuba 
Mountains … and other places, during the war have had their marriage in heaven. This decept ion 
motivated some of my Muslim friends to aggregate into the South to acquire women in heaven. In 
my Christian faith, social marriage ends on the earth. Therefore, we do not fight for sexual aims in 
heaven”.
516
 Some Christians and Animists from the South accuse the present ruling party, the NCP 
of being in anti-religious co-existence. It encourages a derogatory characterisation of the non-
Muslim religions in the country. This claim can be seen from their responses to the question: “How 
many festivals do you celebrate in your religion; where and how do you offer sacrifice and do you 
face restriction or limitation of worship in anywhere within Sudan?” One of them argues: “The 
national Congress Party is too Islamic and that blinds it to act as a ruling party to maintain different 
religions in harmony. It teaches its allies to see themselves as superiors in the way of their worship 
and for that they characterise the contrary worship of the people of the South as uncouth”.
517
 
Another student adds that: “In Sudan, the National Congress of Al-Bashir fails to understand being 
an Animist Christian does not mean pagan. We tell them we are not pagans; we are Christian 
Animists, we profess Animism and Christianity compatibly”.
518
 Many interviewed students from 
the South identified themselves as both „Christian and Animist‟ and gave explanations concerning 
the compatibility of these religions. For instance some students argue “Christianity is a good 
religion; it accommodates somehow the Dinka traditions and Islam rejects all forms of our identity 
that is our customary way of life; … we are very religious, but do not fit with Islam, which is 
 
 
514 Ali Abdel Muneim from Shaiqqyyia, University of Khartoum. 
515 Suliman Mohamed, Suliman (1999), op. cit., p.3.  
516 Santino Dau, a Dinka Christian Animist, University of Juba.  
517 Gatwitch Bechok, a Nuer Christian Animist.     





extremely external and un-free of Arab traditions and customs”.
519
 Another concludes “Christianity 
allows me to attend the church‟s offerings as a Christian and simultaneously, I attend the offerings 
of Jieng Animism, as an Animist, therefore, I … feel not displaced from my tradition, since I am 
both a Christian Animist”.
520
 In the view of de Waal, the ruling Muslim political organisation of 
Sudan, NCP former NIF has no reconciling political strategy for ethnic pluralism. It has constituted 
a system at the national level, where Islamism became a hostage to Arab racism and ethnic politics. 
This racial attitude motivated some indigenous ethnic Muslim MPs from Darfur in 1988 to abandon 
the NIF claiming that the NIF is not free from the Arab tradition of racism.
521
  
   It is very common that scholars refuse to characterise the population of the South of Sudan either 
entirely as Christians or Animists. The usual and common religious descriptions are expressed 
simultaneously as „Christians and Animists‟.
522
 This expression is meant that the indigenous 
population residing in the South is composed of baptised Christians and followers of Animism. 
Such descriptive religious identity is partly true and partly untrue.  Students‟ responses to the 
question: Your religious affiliation or identity a. Christian, b. Muslim, c. Animist d. Christian 
Animist e. Muslim Animist‟ f. Agnostic g. Any other, provide simultaneity. The Nilotic and some 
Nuba students argue that they practice Christianity and Islam compatibly with Animism in their 




   This religious compatibility obliges one to identify most of them in accordance to their given 
religious identity as „Christian Animist‟, rather than „Christians and Animists‟ and „Muslim 
Animist‟. The former defines a baptised Christian or a converted Animist to Islam. Yet, he or she 
practices Christianity or Islam compatibly with Animism and the latter identifies the baptised ones, 
the „Christians‟ and the non-baptised ones are „Animists‟. Two scholars provide more plausible 
compatibility of religious structure in South Sudan and Nuba Mountains. First, Johnson argues that 
the civil violence in Sudan is described as a competition between the prophetic religions, Islam and 
Christianity. Under this description, the people of South Sudan are not projected as people with 
 
 
519 Justin Juac, a Dinka, University of Bahr el-Ghazal. 
520 Juac Ater Mou, University of Juba. 
521 de Waal (2004), p. 98.  
522 Hentoff, Nat (1996 August 20). “Here is the Proof, Mr. Farrakhan”, Village Voice, Vol. 41, Issue 34, p. 10. The 
Black people in the South of Sudan as Christian Animists.  
523  Kuc Deng, a Shilluk Christian Animist, University of Juba, “Christianity and Animism are very close, so I practice 
them side by side”. Rabi Hussein, a Nuba Muslim Animist “I pray at the Mosque and I attend traditional rituals of my 





their own coherent religions; instead anthropologists described them with “depressing regularity as 
„Christian and Animists‟ or sometimes even „Christian animists‟”.
524
 Second, Ewald observes that 
in Nuba Mountains, some Muslims perform African traditional rituals to secure rains, good 
harvests, and traditional medicines for the Nuba people. The Islamic North, however, describes this 
form of religious performance as a pagan practice and believes it is necessary to convert this 
population to strict Islamic cultural identity, but the implementation of the conversion encounters 
the dilemmas between economic interest to own the non-Muslims as slaves and converting them to 
Islam.
525
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4   DILEMMA BETWEEN ISLAM AND WEALTH 
 
Some Muslim students blame the Christian and Animists of the South in resisting conversion of the 
„pagan‟ population in the South and Nuba Mountains to Islam. For instance, Muhammad Al-Tom 
states: “The elite Christians in the South are responsible for the failure of Islam to convert the 
pagans in the South into an Islamic faith”.
526
  Another argues: “The British imperialists prevented 




   In contrast, Christian Animist students claim that, if Islam was introduced in an appropriate 
manner from the very beginning, the Animist population in the South would have embraced it as 
their religion, but slavery and looting of cattle and other atrocities stimulated them to reject Islamic 
faith. The students argue: “Our problem with Arab Muslims started, since the time of Muhammed 
Ahmed Al-Mahdi system of Mahdism, which was a regime that … had legitimated the Muslim 
Arabs to enslave us and kill us. Mahdism classified the citizens into slaves and slavers and without 
the British who created a law that prevented them to enter the South we would have had all 
disappeared to different markets of the slave trade”.
528
 Another student states: “Today the ruling 
party, NCP thinks that the religious and ethnic diversity is a sin; it is an infidel system and for that it 
dislikes British colonialism for maintaining it”.
529
 Furthermore, one student concludes: “For us, we 
love British people … their system of colonialism rejected later slavery and closed the South from 
Arab slavers. These Arabs were not for religion, Islam but were … searching for wealth; thus they 
spoiled the world of peace by enslaving us and looting our cows”.
530
 According to Ewald, 
Muhammad Ahmed, a Muslim faqih (Islamic cleric) promulgated himself to be the Mahdi, a 
divinely pious Islamic leader who would unite and purify the Muslims and convert the infidels as a 
preparation for the end of the world. In practice, this divine message turned out to be a total 
devastation of the non-Muslims Black communities in Nuba Mountains and beyond. Ewald 
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concludes that Al-Mahdi legitimated trafficking in civil populations in Nuba Mountains and South 
Sudan, where his Ansar (followers) were mostly free to loot and act in a theocratic way.
531
  
   Islam as a religion is defined in the Quran as an eternal path for peace.
532
 However, its 
contradictory propagation of its propagators that juxtaposed conversion, looting and killing of the 
Animist population of South Sudan and Nuba Mountains has constructed a collective derogatory 
vocabulary among the victims of looting and murder. The Dinka describe the time of Muslims‟ 
arrival to the South as „the time when the world was spoiled‟. The Ansar murdered the Animists, 
looted tools of their livelihood and at the same time testified that „there is no God, but the One God 
and Muhammad is God‟s Messenger‟. Two scholars write about these conflicting performances of 
Muslim Arabs in South Sudan. First, Deng says that he interviewed in 1973, some Dinka Chiefs 
who had experienced this situation, including Chief Makuei Bilkuei. This Chief in his nineties 
testified: “It was the Ansar (Mahdi missionary followers) who destroyed the country … That is 
what is called the spoiling of the world …Yes, (they) would come with camels, and donkeys and 
mules and guns … That is how they killed people … (They destroyed areas until they reached us 
here. They took the people and sold them … They said, „la Illa, ila Allah, Muhammad Rasul Allah 
(There is no God, but the One God and Muhammad is God‟s Messenger). That was the way they 
chanted they slaughtered and slaughtered and slaughtered”.
533
 Second, Nikkel explains that the oral 
tradition of the Dinka recalls the time of harmony, when the world was at peace and mankind 
flourished with vast herds of cattle. To the Dinka, this state of affairs was irrevocably altered, when 
the Jellaba of Shaiqqiyyia, Danaqla and Ja‟aleen Muslim Arabs of North Sudan penetrated their 
county of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile of South Sudan as people of Islam. However, they set 
them into slavery and looted of their cattle. Nikkel concludes that the Dinka describe that time of 
destruction in their oral narrative as “the time when the earth was spoiled.”
534
  
   There exists a grave contradiction between the idea of giving the new religion, Islam to the 
Animist population of the South and the looting of their cattle and imposition of slavery. Although 
slave trade fundamentally has little to do with Islam or any religion, beyond economic 
exploitation
535
, Islam as a religion in Sudan was and is today a symbol of slave raiders to the 
Animists of the South.  The population of the South intertwined Islam with the first and present 
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attitudes of Muslim Arabs in power towards them as the authentic nature of Islamic religion. Those 
attitudes have serious negative impacts on the Islamic religion in the South. Tow scholars show 
earlier and current Muslim approaches to the Christians and Animists of the South. First, according 
to Gray, traditional Islamic views in the North sanctioned enslavement of the converted Muslims 
and that contributed to the acceptance of the age-old slave raiding to the South to enslave the pagan 
people of the area. Slavers took slaves, married from these pagan tribes and established themselves 
as a ruling caste. Today, slavery has resulted in an embittered relationship between the Animists of 
the South and Arab Muslims from the North. The population of the South view Muslim Arabs as 
the cause of their long suffering and the hardships of their present life.
536
 Second, An‟Naim argues 
that it is abhorrent for the current Islamic government, under Al-Bashir to continue sanctioning 
slavery today. The fact that slavery is permissible under Sharia does have serious practical 
consequences not only in perpetrating negative social attitudes toward the former slaves and 
segment of the population that used to be a source of slaves, but also in legitimizing forms of secret 
practices akin to slavery. In the Sudan, for example, images of slavery under Sharia and Islamic 
literature continue to support negative stereotypes of the Sudanese from the Southern and Western 
parts of the country, which were sources of slaves, until the late nineteenth century. Moreover, 
recent news reports indicate that Muslim tribesmen of the southern western Sudan feel justified in 
capturing non-Muslims from South Sudan and keeping them in secret slavery.
537
    
    In practice both past and present times, Muslim Arabs in Sudan have been in constant dilemma. 
Historically, few Muslim slave traders thought that it was significant to convert the pagan tribes in 
the South into the domain of Islam. The majority preferred the acquisition of wealth through slave 
trade and slavery of the pagan tribes to conversion, because, theoretically, Islam illegalises Muslims 
to own other Muslims as slaves. According to Deng, in the beginning, the Muslim Arabs in Sudan 
were faced by with a dilemma, between Islam as a religion and economy. Islam teaches Muslims to 
avoid enslaving other Muslims, while the economy of the ethnic Arab Muslims in Sudan and their 
Christian forerunners of the Nubian kingdoms were built on trafficking in Black slaves from South 
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   The illegalisation of Islam to the enslavement of a converted person into Islam is a controversial 
subject-matter in academic debate of national institutions in Africa. According to Lewis, some 
Black Muslim Africans from the oasis of Tuat, Mali submitted a petition to Muslim jurists seeking 
the reasons for wide spread enslavement of Muslim Africans in the area. The response to the 
petitioners was a lecture derived from the provisions of classical Islamic interpretation towards the 
legality of slavery in general. It was explained to them that all Muslims and infidels residing, under 
the protection of Muslim society are exempted from slavery; however, heathens who are captured in 
Jihad must be subjected to severe slavery. The social status of such a group does not change, even 
though they subsequently embraced Islam and became Muslims.
539
  
   In contemporary Sudan there are an enormous number of documented scientific references which 
unfold the presence of slavery in its national institutions.
540
 In Sudan it is possible for a Muslim 
Arab to enslave a Muslim African, but what are incomprehensible are the status of historical pagans 
captured through the Jihad from Nuba Mountains who embraced Islam, as well as the status of their 
children born and raised as Muslims. Ewald notes that at the past Black ethnic groups, the Nuba 
were Animists and the majority of them converted to Islam through the method of violence. Muslim 
Arab men from Kordofan viewed the area of the Nuba as a field for religious proselytisation. In 
practice, the interest in converting them has been in conflict with the interest of some Muslim Arabs 
to enslave them. Ewald concludes that currently, the Nuba converted from Animism to Islam still 
experience slavery under Muslim Arabs.
541
  
   The social relationship between the Muslim Nuba and Muslim Arabs demonstrates that, even 
though some Nuba became Muslims, a Nuba Muslim could still experience slavery. For instance, 
Mende Nazer from Nuba Mountains identifies herself as a Muslim. We cannot know how she 
became a Muslim between the two ways of conversion, forced to admit Islam through the Jihad and 
free optional conversion. She, however, tells her story in the book as a young girl, a Muslim Arab 
master put her into the live of slavery in 1990. She was redeemed from this type of servitude by the 
British organisation, „Christian Solidarity‟. Nazer is a co-author of the book Slave, the True Story of 
a Girl’s Lost Childhood and Her Fight for Survival. The book is translated into Finnish and 
throughout the chapters, Nazer narrates, the circumstances of her capture, physical and 
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psychological systematic mistreatments inflicted on her by a Muslim Arab slaver who used to call 
her “abid” (slave).
542
 Another question asked was: “How conversion from one religion to another 
religion in Sudan is conducted; do you encounter an obstruction on the process and have you ever 
felt that there has been an interference of your ethnic customs, cultures and traditions to your 
religion, if yes, please explain?” Some Muslim students who answered this question claim that 
Muslim Arabs in power endeavour to convert the inhabitants of Sudan into the fold of Islam in 
order to build the umma. However, this endeavour manifests contradictions by constructing 
opposing categories of strangers and non-strangers, and of enemies and non-enemies in one 
religion, Islam. The students present their claims as: “We the Fur, we thought that Islam has … cut 
the racial category of Arabs and Africans and we are people of one faith, Islam. But the practices of 
the successive Arabs in power see us as foreigners in Islam. We are seen as a bunch of African 
Muslims used for making a political Muslim majority to threaten non-Muslim African minority in 
the South.” 
543
 Another one states: “Islam is a good religion, since it creates brotherhood in faith, 
but activities of Muslim Arabs holding power in the country show to us that we are not their 
brothers in faith but big enemies of Darfur. They take us for political aims to make a big number of 
the population of the Muslims”.
544
 Someone else, comments: “Most of us in Nuba Mountains know 
that Islam is a religion of God where we are all equal. This is contrary to the practice of the regime 
of al-Bashir. It divides us into good Arab Muslims in the North and the (sic) stranger Muslims in 
Nuba Mountains. Under this classification, we endured the Jihad of the government against our 
region in 1992”.
545
  Finally, a Beja student argues that in my home town, Port Sudan, when a 
Muslim Beja says he wants a high position in the Port, then he would be sent to work in a less 
privileged position and a Muslim Arab would take the highest position. This is not Islam which 
preaches justice and equality; it is a unique Islam of the Arabs in Khartoum.
546
 According to 
Bauman modernity regulates, and classifies circumstances. It has given us a society that organises 
itself and strives to regulate institutions, laws and moral codes and at the same time, it unfolds 
contradictions, since it classifies people into normal versus abnormal and barbarises other 
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   Islam in Sudan has become a source of forming political associations and building racial entities 
among the Muslims. Three scholars observe this dilemma among the Muslims of the Northern 
Sudan Region. First, Hassan notes that the pastoralist Arab tribes of the Habbaniyya, the Beni 
Hussain, the Zeidiyya, the Beni Halba, the Djawama, the Reizegat and the Mahariyya and many 
others, together with Muslim Jellaba (Arab merchants and Arab government officials) residing in 
Darfur converged together in the middle of 1990 and organised themselves into an exclusive 
organisation, Arab Congregation. The non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur, the Fur, the Zagahwa, the 
Massaliet, the Meidoub, the Berti, the Tama, the Tunjur and others had organised themselves earlier 
in the middle of the 1960s, into a political body Darfur Development Front (DDF).
548
 Second, Iyob 
and Khadiagala observe that the Islamic slogan that was proclaimed in Northern Sudan was a 
source in building unified Sudan, but has now been diminished. The ruling Arab group in power has 
widened the ethnicisation of Islam, while the indigenous ethnic Darfurians experience 
discrimination. In this perspective, Afro-Muslims of Darfur have lost the feeling of being in the 
umma as they have found themselves excluded from the political Islamic sphere. Muslim Arabs in 
power stress Arabness against the Muslims that attempt to hold on their African roots leading to the 
current war between the janjaweed, an armed militia of Muslim Arabs, and the indigenous Muslims 
of Darfur rebels.  Muslim non-Arab groups in Darfur have rejected what they call “Arab 
segregation” 
549
 and commenced to repulse the janjaweed militarily.
550
   
   The ethnicisation of violence between the indigenous Muslim people of Darfur and the janjaweed 
who receive arms from the government symbolises institutionalised racism and such racial practices 
appear also within the institutions of the capital of Sudan, Khartoum. For instance, the faction of the 
Darfurian rebels, the SLM composed mostly of ethnic Zagahwa and few from other African tribes, 
under the leadership of Minni Arcua Minnawi signed a „Peace Agreement‟ with the Government of 
Sudan in Abuja in May 2006. After this peace, Minnawi was appointed as a Senior Presidential 
Assistant of Sudan and the Head of the „Transitional Governments of Darfur States‟ (TGOD). 
Minnawi lives in Khartoum with his guards who come mainly from Darfur. Some of these guards 
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live in a rented house in Omdurman, the second largest city within the capital. On 24 March 2007, 
clashes occurred in Omdurman between a Zagahwa guard and an ethnic Muslim Arab resident of 
Omdurman. The police accused the guards of disorganisation and provided them an ultimatum to 
hand over some of their members for accountability, but the latter refused.
551
  
   In reaction, a force of armed Muslim Arab police with tanks attacked the residential house of 
some of the guards. Eight guards were killed and part of the house was devastated. Four guards 
were burnt to death inside a car.
552
 After this fatal incident Minnawi held a Press Conference and 
described the event as a pre-organised massacre by the ruling Muslim Arab party, the NCP, against 
the Muslims of non-Arab people emerging from Darfur. Minnawi argued “The house was for my 
guards and handicaps and I want to know the reason of massacre”.
553
 The Police Deputy Chief, 
Muhammad Naguib el-Taib explained that the government had acted in that way because the 
Darfurians group refused to hand over a member involved in the earlier incident in Omdurman.
554
  
   The response by el-Taib who refused to lament the deaths and emphasised the legitimacy of the 
killing of the guards creates more suspicions towards the impartiality of the police.  According to 
Collins, after the, NIF seized power in Sudan new recruitment standards were created for all 
national institutions, under the basis of religious Islamic orthodoxy. Muslims and non-Muslims in 
police who tended to disregard radical Islamic ideology were sacked in the name of what the NIF 
calls dismissal for the „general interest‟ in the state. New officers mainly from those Muslim Arabs 
who supported strict Islamic system were installed.
555
  
   Tayyib Khamis, a spokesman for the eight killed men argued that the police attack was made in 
order to legitimate a declaration of war against the indigenous non-Arab people of Darfur and that 
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they were “ready to reply with the same method they have used”.
556
 Subsequent events 
substantiated this threat. Three days after the Omdurman incident, the Zagahwa unleashed deadly 
assaults against some Arabised ethnic groups of Darfur that support Khartoum at the village of Abu 
Dangle in the province of Sheeriyyia in Darfur. The local acting Chieftain Abdullah Hassan Adam 
reported that Zagahwa forces loyal to Minni Arcua Minnawi kidnapped six men of Bergid ethnic 
group on 27 March 2007 and might have killed them as a vengeance to the killing of Zagahwa in 
Omdurman.
557
   
   Why in Sudan is Islam emphasised in politics as an inclusive model for all the believers, and at 
the same time, some political actions seem to reflect ethnic race in social and political hierarchies 
among Muslims themselves? This question has been studied at the „Institute of Peace Project‟ in the 
United States. David Little notes that while different ethnic groups in Sudan were converted from 
their traditional religion to Islam, yet this did not remove conflicts of national identity. What is 
precisely the connection between religion and ethnicity in nationalism in Sudan?
558
 
   Interviewed Muslim students provide conflicting reasons for the connection between Islam, 
ethnicity and nationalism. Some of them provide answers which are based on the Islamic religious 
ideological doctrine that views all Muslims as an umma, a nation in faith. One Muslim student 
explains that the Prophet Muhammad dysfunctionalized ethnic kinship and Muslims became all 
brothers and sisters in Islam. For this reason, Islam is the best system in Sudan.
559
 Nevertheless, in 
the view of a Nuba student: “The constructing Arab rulers in Sudan exclude the South and use 
Islam as a unifying factor for the rest of other regions for the purpose of building a majority that 
faces the Christian and Animists of the South”.
560
 In the opinion of the student Adila Khadier this 
model of constructing the umma could be the best only, if the Arabs in power practice Islam in its 
authentic way that considers equality of all Muslims, irrespective of ethnic and race.
561
 For 
Muhammad Abel Wahab: “Arab Muslims use Islam in double standards. First, they are minority 
and it is … Islam which they adopt to raise their number to the status of majority and in distribution 
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of jobs, Islam is put aside and Arabs in power favour Arab race in all national organs”.
562
 
According to these students religion is used in Sudan as a way to create a political majority group. 
Some statistics claim that the Arabs represent only 31% of the population of Sudan and 69% is 
African.
563
 On the other hand, the number of Muslims is estimated as 70% of the population 
whereas only 25% is Animist and 5% Christians. Most of the latter live in the South.
564
  
   These ethnic and religious terminologies of majority and minority play an influential role in the 
functions of public institutions in Sudan. According to Simone, Islam is used as a cement to build a 
Northern Muslim majority and it has been developed as an ideology that unifies the diverse ethnic 
groups in the North as Muslims. In this sense, the Christians and Animists residing in the South are 
a minority and therefore less influential in political decision-making.
565
 This perspective that 
considers religion as a means of constructing a majority transforms Islam in Sudan into an 
ideological religion, rather than a faithful religion. There is a difference between the faithful and 
ideological religion. According to Nandy, distribution of things among the believers makes a 
distinction between religion as a pure faith and religion as an ideology. When religion is held as a 
faith, it is located in the domain of everyday life, where every faithful person receives equal 
treatment from public institutions and serves them in turn. Other words, it is the whole body of 
believers who are involved without the distinction of majority and minority categories. Ideological 
religion establishes categories of racial discrimination among the believers.
566
  
   Distribution of wealth and power in Sudanese institutions shifts religion to the status of an 
ideology. Under this religious ideology, an equality based on the Islamic faith among the Muslims 
vanishes and an Islamic ideology based on ethnic Arab background supersedes. Two sources claim 
this form of structure in the institutions of the Islamic Sudan. First, Senior Presidential Advisor, 
Minni Minawai Arcua defines the NCP as “a racial organisation… and that would lead to the 
separation of the South from Northern Sudan”.
567
 Second, an anonymous book The Black Book; 
Imbalance of Power in Sudan Seekers of Truth and Justice argues that excluding South Sudan 
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which is in a state of war against the Islamic Arab North, all national resources are confined for the 
development of the northern Arab territory and only a small part of this development goes to the 
east and centre. The entire western region of Darfur has no single development project. Oil 
refineries in the west are all defined as national projects, but in practice Arabs from Khartoum 
control employments in these refineries. The local indigenous Muslims are confined to manual jobs 
while all higher positions at these refineries are given to the Arabs brought from the north. For 
instance, drivers and officers of the security personnel are selected from among people with Arab 
background. The selectors are themselves Arabs and favour their fellow Arabs barring non-Arab 
Muslims from owning wealth and power.
568
  
   In the opinion of a Nuba Muslim student, the structure that favours Arabs in dealings with other 
Muslims in Sudan has been a consistent political model of Sudan from its foundation to present day. 
The student argues: “The Arab culture sees the Black Muslims as slaves, because they associate 
religion, Islam to their Arab culture and behaviour. For this reason, the ruling Arab systems which 
have ruled Sudan, including the present one are unsuccessful, because their aristocratic and 
theocratic power that builds intertwines Islam with Arab culture. In their good minds, they view the 
African Muslims who are non-Arab Muslims as inferiors and assume themselves to be superior to 
the Muslim Africans”.
569
 A Muslim Arab student from the Hassaniya of the Central Region of El-
Gezira does not regard the linking of Arab culture with religion as a manifestation of superiority 
over non-Arab Muslims in Sudan. For him, Quran was revealed in Arabic, therefore, Arabic is a 
holy language of the Quran and this justifies the national identity of Sudan to be defined in a 
national constitution as an Arab Islamic state. History of Islam justifies that Islam is linked with 
Arabic. Hence, there is no obstacle to connecting religion with Arabic constitutionally in the 
country. A Muslim understands that there is a connection between Islam and Arabic. Essential 
Quran was sent to mankind in Arabic; therefore, it is a holy and blessed tongue.
570
 This assertion is 
opposed by a Fur Muslim student who argues that a good system takes into consideration social 
structures as realities. In Sudan, social institutions are culturally diverse, but some Muslim Arabs 
connect Islam with Arab culture, under the claim that God gave Quran to the Prophet and ordered 
him to recite it in Arabic. He states: “It is true; the religion was delivered to the Prophet in Arabic, 
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but in my opinion, it was, because the Prophet Muhammad understood only Arabic and had nothing 
to do with the religion”.
571
  
   The association of Arab cultural identity with religion stirs a conflict between some Muslim Arab 
students and some Muslim African students. Some indigenous Muslim students from Darfur 
explained their rejection of the association of Islam with Arabic. They claimed that the first 
revelation of God‟s contacts with the Prophet Muhammad through the heavenly Messenger, Jabra‟il 
was void with any instruction to the Prophet Muhammad to sanctify Arabic.
572
 For them, any 
language is appropriate for the Quran and has nothing to do with Arab as a race.
573
 Another one 
concludes: “If the Prophet Muhammad had been a Dinka man and God had chosen him to convey 
His message of redemption to mankind, he would have communicated in the Dinka language. The 
Holy Quran would have descended down in Dinka, which Muhammad would have understood, but 
these Arabs want to own the religion of God”.
574
 
   Furthermore, some Muslim Arabs at the University of Khartoum object this opinion that attempts 
to de-link Arabic from Islam in their responses to the question: how do you want national identity of 
the diverse regions to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan…? Some of them propose that 
any constitution in Sudan should take into account the Muslim majority and mention the special 
position of Arabic and Islam.
575
 One of them concludes: “Arabic has no comparison with other 
languages; it is a divine and special language that comes from a nation worthy to God, because the 
Prophet said, „I am an Arab‟ without „a‟ „rabb‟ means Lord”.
576
  
4.1 Islamic-Arabic and skin colour 
Learning Arabic as a religious language has become a viable claim in Africa. For instance, Leblanc 
says some African Muslims are convinced that understanding Holy Quran in strict methodological 
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teaching requires Muslims to pay attention to Arabic as the original language of the Quran.
577
  This 
view of paying „attention‟ to Arabic conforms to the argument of a Muslim student who states that: 
“An authentic Muslim must admit a constitution that embodies Arab culture. The Quran means read 
something written in Arabic neither in Nubia, Fur nor in Dinka tongues in Sudan. A Muslim who 
reads Quran in Arabic is transformed and assimilated into a new Islamic Arab race.”
578
 A Muslim 
from the Zagahwa ethnic group from Darfur presents his opposition to the linking of Islam with the 
Arab language. In his opinion, a Muslim comprehends the Quran as a derivative word from Arabic, 
recited or read. A Muslim is someone who submits himself to God and not to Arabic as a 
language.
579
 Another student Nimeiri Sabur argues that every religion is fed by its traditions; Islam 
is not special from other religions. It takes Arabic language as a source of divine message.
580
 
Furthermore, Muhammed Sultan argues that Arabic is the only language which a Muslim can 
ultimately recite al-Fatiha. Reading it in other languages distorts its divine and sacred essence.
581
  
   The views of these students are emphasized here in order to establish the existing point of 
departure among the Muslims of Sudan. According to Lesch, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Head of the Islamic 
sect, Ansaar and Former Premier of Sudan from the Umma Party insists on the association of Islam 
and Arab culture. For him, both Arab culture and Islam are dominant features of the Sudanese 
people, which provide a prestigious status for their nation-state, Sudan.
582
 One of the students 
provides an answer that reflects the position of Sadiq Al-Mahdi as he argues that Arabic and Islam 
are interconnected entities. Arabs came to Sudan with a civilised religion as a redemptive power to 
the former Black slaves and freed them. Now in Sudan each one is free and identified as „Brown‟ in 
documents. Before, the Black people were not free in Sudan, but Arab Muslims freed them by 
changing their status into „Brown‟. Arabic is a tongue of a prestigious nation with the true faith.
583
    
   Generally, power in Sudan has constructed the colour of the Arab skin as „green‟ and 
contextualised it as a colour of pride as opposed to the „black‟ colour which it considers as a colour 
for slaves. Such racial category based on colour neglects the fact that most of those who claim Arab 
identity carry in their veins African blood and that Blacks living in the South have never been 
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slaves. Francis Mading Deng wrote at the foreword of the book War and Faith in Sudan that the 
Northern Sudan Arabs call their colour as „green‟ to express a pride and „blue‟ as a polite version of 
their black colour, which is constructed to represent the identity of a slave. The Arabs use it as a 
result of suffering with an inferiority complex. Yet, they forget that their veins contain blood from 
the black people since many of them are children of Black women.
584
        
4.2 Brown and black skin colours  
Questionnaires and public discussions with students provide a continuity of conflicting definitions 
of identity in Sudan. A Muslim student argues that general observation of the people in Sudan gives 
an image that we are all the population is black. The physical features of the most people appear 
black, so there are no pure Arabs here as they are in the Arabian Peninsula.
585
  
   The issue of the colour „black‟ is problematic in Sudan. Some students say that their physical 
identity of being „blacks‟ cannot be used in the national institutions of the state. For instance, an 
official document for the establishment of nationality provides a space where an applicant is 
requested to describe the colour of his or her face. An applicant that chooses to describe it as „black‟ 
is considered to deviate from the system and to make an incorrect identification. One student 
explains that: “I had wanted to get a passport to travel with my sister to Egypt. I found a question 
that urges the applicant to describe the face, so I wrote „black‟. It was not accepted, so in my 
passport, my face is described as brown”.
586
 Salwa Osman explains that “One time, I filled out the 
application for the passport, after I got admitted to the University of Khartoum. I described my face 
as „black‟; the police lady in control rejected it and wrote her own description that I was brown”.
587
 
Another student concludes that it is incumbent upon a police officer in charge of the forms of 
nationality to remove the „black‟ description and insert asmer (brown).
588
  
   Thus, brown colour appears to be a colour in national documents for the skin colour. As another 
student states: “If you describe yourself in our national state‟s document as „black‟, the police 
would refuse and insert a preferred colour, „brown‟. So in Sudan, we are all „Browns‟ rather than 
„Black‟ people”.
589
 In this sense, every „Black‟ person is conceptually characterised as „Brown‟. 
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This is reflected in the students‟ answers to the research question that states: “Have you ever 
experienced any form of discrimination in any region of Sudan, if so, please explain?” Most Black 
Christians, Muslims and Animists complain about the rejection of their real colour in the official 
documents of the state. For example, a Dinka Christian Animist gives a testimony of her experience 
with the National Interior Ministry that offers documents of nationality and passports. She states: 
“When I got admitted to the university I wanted to travel … I went to fill the form at the National 
Interior Ministry in Khartoum. During the filling of the form, I found a blank space, which 
demanded the description of the face. I wrote there the colour of my face, „black‟, but the police in 
charge urged me to change it to brown. I refused, but she cancelled the „black‟ and wrote „brown‟ 
there.
590
 When the author asked to explain what she thought about the action of the police the 
student responded: “These Arab Muslims they practice prejudice against the black colour. It was for 
this reason; the police woman thought that she … had acted in a good faith. It was a removal of 
what they wrongly assume … Islam had freed us from paganism and slavery, so we are all equally 




   The obligatory insertion of the „brown‟ colour, instead of the „black‟ colour in official documents 
indicates that power in Sudan seeks to construct identities in a way that suits its own purposes at the 
expense of the interest of the applicants.  This practice in the Ministry of the Interior contradicts the 
view of the President Al-Bashir. According to him, “We are all Africans and we are all Blacks; our 
current conflicts and problems in Sudan are caused by the colonial powers American, Israeli and 
British. This alliance wants to come back to re-dominate the region”.
592
 In reaction to the 
President‟s speech, a Dinka university student responded “For every Black soul in Sudan, we better 
have Israel, American and British as our colonisers. We are told to choose, just like you chose”.
593
  
   The definition made by the President in the international media to call the Sudanese people 
inclusively „Blacks‟ could be interpreted in two ways. Perhaps he wanted to influence public 
opinion of the Black Muslim African Americans as he states “I was using the address to call on the 
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mass media and American public to learn the truth about my country.”
594
 Second, the President 
might have wanted to express his physical appearance in comparison to the Black Muslim African 
Americans, who are often lighter than he is Akbar Muhammad, a representative of the American 
Islamic organisation Nation of Islam pointed at him during the interview declaring “he is darker 
than me”.
595
 Simone says that some of the Islamic movements in Sudan, including the NIF have 
reached to the conclusion that the establishment of national coherency could be achieved by 
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5   ASSIMILATION  
 
Most Christian Animist students from the South believe that there is no suitable constitution in 
Sudan which would be a convergent body representing all the heterogeneous Muslim Arabs with 
the Christians and the Animists of the South. They argue that British colonisers and Muslim Arabs 
overshadowed this extreme and diverse heterogeneity of religions and customs between the two 
populations and arbitrary made them as one territorial nation.
597
 Some explain that during the 
colonial period Great Britain separated the South from the North, because of the opposing religious 
cultures. The past separation was a significant precedent that no constitution could bind them 
together.
598
 Muslim Arabs of the North want the state to be Islamic and Arabic constitutionally, 
while the Christians and the Animists from the South want the criminal and civil penal codes in the 
country to be derived from Christian secular laws and African customs.
599
   
   The students‟ claim of the past territorial separation is a fact of history. For twenty-five years, 
from 1922 until June 1947, British colonisers ruled the current Sudan officially as two different 
territories. In 1926, two British colonial officials in Sudan, Civil Secretary Harold A. McMichael 
and the Secretary of Finance, Sir George Schuster acknowledged the existence of wide cultural 
differences and introduced measures to the British Government to administer the population of the 
South independently. The intention was to groom the South towards its culturally similar zones of 
East Africa, particularly Uganda and British East Africa (modern Kenya). At that time, the Northern 
political institutions such as the Graduate Congress and Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan 
operated in the North independently in exclusion of the people of the South.
600
  
   The reunification of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of Sudan did not take into account the 
conflicting cultures of the two territories. Instead, it was made in accordance to the interests of 
Muslim Arabs of the North in coordination with the British Civil Secretary, James W Robertson. 
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According to Johnson the re-unification was influenced by Ismael Al-Azhari, a leading Muslim 
Arab nationalist at that time. During the arrangements made for the de-colonisation of Sudan, the 
British Administration set up a system called Legislative Assembly in the North as a step for a post 
independence national assembly in exclusion of the South. In 1946, al-Azhari raised the question of 
the South at the political meeting of the Graduate Congress. According to him, the South was an 
economic backbone for the North and there was a need to re-attach it to the Northern territory. He 
made a motion raising this issue to the British Administrators in charge of Sudan.
601
 One year later, 
Sir James W Robertson British Civil Secretary for Sudan organised a conference under his 
Chairmanship from 12-13 June 1947 in the town of Juba, South Sudan. The representation in this 
conference was not proportional in terms of number and educational backgrounds. Seventeen men 
including clergies, administrators, a police sergeant and ten illiterate traditional Chiefs represented 
the Christians and the Animists of the South. And five men, some of them with advanced 
educational degrees represented the Muslim Arab North.
602
 The agenda for the conference 
presented to these representatives was whether they consider the South to be essentially one with 
the North or whether it should remain an independent sovereign territory.
603
  
   The Chiefs were illiterate. 
604
 Yet, they were capable of communicating their views about their 
culture over this question. During the colonial period, the role of the African Chiefs was not limited 
to the traditional institutions, but also extended to include political institutions. They played roles of 
settling issues falling within their indigenous national structures and influencing political issues in 
the colonial government.
605
 For Robertson, it was important to fulfil the social discourse “nothing 
about us without us.”
606
 Thus, he invited the Southern Sudan‟s Chiefs to the conference as decision-
makers to provide their views on the issue of the two territorial identities. The Chiefs represented 
the will of their communities. Yet, the representatives of the Islamic Arab North and Robertson 
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disdained their concerns and views over the proposed bill on the re-unification. Consider the 
statements of three Chiefs. First, Chief Cier Rehan from Northern Gogrial of Tuic Dinka rejected 
the re-unification. He argued that the South was distinct culturally as Christian and Animist and the 
North was Islamic and Arabised and according to him, this cultural contradiction impeded re-
unification.
607
 Second, Chief Hassan Fertak, from the Kerish ethnic group of Raja at Western Bahr 
el-Ghazal, who was himself a Muslim,
608
 states  “The tribes of the North have much more common 
culture, Islam and they could be one, but we in the South have our different culture which is not 
common with them, so there is no basis for becoming one”.
609
 Third, Chief Ukuma Bazin presented 
the question: “What are the guarantees for the safeguard of our customs; if the population of the 
South were to re-unite with the people of Muslim Arabs of the North as one people?” 
610
 
   Practically, these principal concerns and worries of the Chiefs towards the re-unification were 
totally ignored. On the second day of the conference, Robertson summed up the discussions by 
reading out instructively the resolutions of the re-unification of the territories. According to him, the 
people of South Sudan wanted a unified Sudan with the people of the North and to participate in the 
proposed Legislative Assembly in Khartoum. Also, the people of the South were not sufficiently 
advanced to participate immediately in such assembly. Therefore, it was important to hasten the 
establishment and development of Local Government in the South. Finally, the Southerners should 
at first attend the Legislative Assembly only as observers.
611
  
   The research theme of this study is not to research on the history of Sudan, yet history becomes 
important, because it is a continuity of the past and present. Thus, the views of Christian, Muslim 
and Animist students towards the historical amalgamated conflicting cultural identities of present 
Sudan are of the great significance. Their suggestions and thoughts as citizens and future leaders of 
the country contribute in addressing this long conflict of identity. Conflicting observations in regard 
to the definition of identity in Sudan can be found in students‟ answers to the question: “How do 
you want national identity of these regions to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan and 
under what system suits Sudan best and why do you think so?” Some Muslim Arab students urge 
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the application of Sharia in all public institutions of Sudan as the will of the majority. They argue 
that: “We are the majority in population as Arabised Muslims and it is an important issue for the 
political masses in the country to consider it in a national constitution. Our identity as the majority 
is embedded in Islamic and Arabic culture.” 
612
 Another states: “God in the Holy Quran instructs 
the Muslims that those who do not judge in accordance to Sharia as God given law, then, they are 
infidels, oppressors and corrupts (Surra Maida 44-45, 47)”.
613
 It would be a challenging step for 
any Muslim political leader to undermine such views and produce a constitution that reflects 
secularism.
614
   According to one Arab Muslim student, Islam is the only religion which provides a 
chance of homogenising heterogeneous cultural identities peacefully into “a faithful Muslims nation 
without problems, but enemies of Islam refuse to give it a chance”.
615
  
   On the other side, some students identify themselves as Muslims and yet, they reject the 
application of a constitution that derives its civil and criminal codes from Sharia, where hudud is 
applied with punishments like amputation of the limbs for a theft. One of them states: “I am in 
particular for the constitutional system that is empty of religious Islamic laws, because it is capable 
to sustain the religious diversity of Sudan.” 
616
 Another Muslim in support to this view argues that: 
“In Muslim‟s Sudan, hospitals inflict bodily harm leading to the handicap of the Sudanese citizens. 
In these hospitals, medical doctors chop limbs of citizens and in turn, the amputated citizens 
become unwanted handicaps. This practice is contrary to the neighbouring Muslim majority country 
of Egypt. In Cairo, the capital city of Egypt, human limbs could encounter tragic accidents leading 
to their fracture on public traffics, yet hospitals receive them for treatment”.
617
  
   The author observes that Sharia is not widely embraced among the interviewed students except 
for the fear of reaction of the radical Islamic Government with allegations of apostasy that may 
victimise any opponent to its application. Several medical students claim that the majority of 
surgeons amputate human limbs, because they are forced to do so by the authorities, but they abhor 
the nature of this practice, since it contradicts their moral ethic of the medical profession in treating 
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 According to An‟Naim, in Sudan Sharia is defined constitutionally as a divine law 
and such definition prohibits all attempts to criticise or discuss it in a way of offering alternative 
legal views to it. Power in the state charges its critics with apostasy, which is a crime punishable by 
death, under section (126) of 1991, Penal Code of Sudan.
619
   
   Some Muslim students who call for Sharia to remain a source of legislation constantly threaten 
the opposition students who call for the resumption of the non-Islamic constitution as murtadeen 
(apostates). They argue that any constitution that ignores the majority Muslim Arab interest in 
Sudan must be declared as a constitution of murtadeen.
620
 The rejection of Sharia by various 
opposition forces is equally an invitation of Jihad to fight them as apostates.
621
 Some Muslim 
students state: “Islamic constitution makes us close to God”
622




   Such conflicting political views between the majority Muslim Arabs, or Arabised Muslims, and 
the assumed minority of the apostate Muslims and non-Muslims in the South becomes an 
obstruction in reaching a consensus on the unified constitutional legal code. The contradictory 
religions, customs and cultures make it difficult to forge an inclusive constitution that would be 
acceptable to the people of different faiths and cultures in Sudan. In the social view, power and 
wealth in a state determines the constitutional identity of a people in a country. It is the interest 
group in control of power and wealth in national institutions that has the upper hand in dictating the 
terms of national identity. Its wealth is an instrumental tool that protects its power and both are used 
for the construction of political aims.
624
 According to Lesch, ethnic Muslim Arabs in Sudan have 
monopolised power and wealth in all organs of public institutions of the state. In this way, their 
ethnic and cultural dimensions become the derivative sources for determining the operations of the 
institutions in the country.
625
  
   In the opinions of some Muslim students from Darfur: “Muslim Arab politicians in the North 
exercise a policy of exclusion of South Sudan from the rest of the regions, since the foundation of 
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their ethnic religious and political movement, the Graduate Congress.” 
626
; “This elite group defines 
our national identity constitutionally as Islamic and Arabic.” 
627
 “We are not Arabs, but some of us 
are African Muslims, African Animists, African traditionalists and African Christians.” 
628
 “When 
we say, Sudan is composed of different religions, cultures and customs, Muslim Arabs in control of 
power and wealth use these means to dictate Arabism on the non-Arabs in the country.” 
629
  
   These opinions of the students return us to the history of Sudan prior to its independence; in 1938, 
the intelligentsia from the North formed a Graduate Congress an association composed exclusively 
of Muslim Arabs. In 1942, this association raised the issue of nationalism of the people of Sudan to 
determine their territorial national identity. The group drafted a memo addressed and submitted to 
the British Civil Secretary Sir Douglas Newbold. In response, Newbold defined the memo as an act 
of an individual interest group that did not represent the whole country. During that time, Muslim 
Arabs were divided over the issue of independence without participation of the people of South 
Sudan. Ismail al-Azhari who became later the Prime Minister headed the group that demanded the 
annexation of Sudan to Egypt to become one territorial nation. His opinion received support from 
the Islamic religious sectarian group, al-Khatimyyia of Ali al-Mirghani. Some within the Congress 
opposed this opinion and sought support from Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi who headed the 
Ansar Islamic sect in Sudan.
630
  
   Those responded and interviewed students, Muslims, Christians and Animists who identify 
themselves as non-Arabs claim that these political and Muslim sectarian associations inherited 
power and continued to pursue the policy of assimilation of the diverse cultures to the Islamic Arab 
culture. The students argue as: “Whenever I read the history of Sudan, I see it as dirty and 
misleading. It has been based on the assimilation of the non-Muslims and the non-Arabs to become 
Muslim Arabs in all walks of life.” 
631
 Since, the time of independence, two Muslim sectarian 
political parties, the Umma and the DUP have been striving to assimilate us to be Muslims and at 
the same time Arabs.” 
632
 “These parties want the diverse cultures of the people in Sudan to be 
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Islamic and Arabic throughout the time.” 
633
 “Our representatives from the South rejected that 
constitution and we continue to reject it, until today.” 
634
 One Christian concludes: “People of the 
South want a pluralistic constitution; if not the solution is the separation of the Christian Animists 
of the South from the Islamic North and we become an independent neighbouring states, the Islamic 
North and Christian and Animist South.” 
635
  
   Historically, the conflict of ideologies between the adherents of ethnic territorial national 
pluralism, who call for a secular constitution and the adherents of ethnic territorial nationalism, who 
advocate the Islamic law, Sharia dates back to September 1958. At that time, a panel of National 




 Three members represented the South and forty-three the 
North. During their discussions, race and religion divided the commission. The forty-three Muslims 
drafted a constitution that defined Sudan as an Islamic Arab nation-state and recommended the 
adoption of that definition in the state‟s national constitution. Three members from the South 
interpreted the draft as a democratic Islamic ideological assimilation. They accused the Muslims of 
having legislated assimilation of ethnic and religious minorities and urged the adoption of a secular 
constitution. Yet, the majority finalised the draft of a constitution in its defined form Islamic and 
Arabic and presented it to the Parliament. During the parliamentarian debate, forty MPs 
representing the Christians and the Animists of the South withdrew from the session in protest of 
the majority attempt to impose a constitution that constituted Sharia a source of legal provisions 
and Arabic an official language in national institutions of the state.
637
 
   Critics describe a democratic majority system that disregards minorities‟ rights within a territorial 
state as tyrannical. Under such a democratic majority, protection of minorities‟ rights as distinctive 
groups is jeopardised. Cunningham explains in some democratic institutions, the majority may exert 
its interest at the expense of the minority on the provisional conception of democracy. Such a 
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democratic approach is „tyranny‟, since the majority neglects the rights of minorities and legitimates 
assimilation in the democratic circumstances.
638
  
   Sociologists have no uniformity in defining assimilation. Steinberg defines it as a total 
obliteration of ethnic diversity in social structures for the purpose of establishing superficial 
uniformity of ethnic identity within a territory. Its adherents use it systematically to eradicate the 
existing differences that distinguish minorities as unique and to substitute such differences with the 
culture of the dominant ethnic group.
639
 This definition conforms to the form of assimilation that 
some of the students claim to be operating within the institutions of Sudan. For instance, a Dinka 
Christian Animist argues: “Muslim Arab politicians in Sudan … try to constitute a constitution that 
assimilates us; it is an assimilation that takes away every cultural practices of the Dinka. It takes 
away our religion and imposes their religion. A practice that looks so deeply strange, since it takes 
way and only takes. It is difficult for me when I think of it to find a word describing it; it is anomia. 
All in all, it takes away everything of our cultural environment and transforms us to an Islamic 
identity. It is really an anomia; however, it kills its resisters to its trend of assimilation.” 
640
 The 
term anomia which the student uses in describing the measures taken in transforming the non-
Muslims to the Islamic identity in Sudan is of great significance for the analysis of the assimilation 
in Sudan. It provides us with an insight to the way ideological assimilation works. Its application to 
the non-Muslims in social and political institutions eradicates all unique cultural religious and 
ethnic characteristics and sometimes; it turns to violence to the extent of killing it resisters. Second, 
in order to have a comprehensive knowledge of the term, we must resort to its linguistic meaning. 
The word anomia refers to a difficulty that a person faces in finding the correct word to describe a 
specific situation of event.
641
  
   Taking into consideration the origin of the term in association to the student view towards 
assimilation in Sudan, then the anomia assimilation is defined as a difficulty that faces an intended 
person for assimilation to find a word that can describe the measures taken by power in state in 
eradicating diversity and imposing uniformity of cultures in Sudan. In other words, its application in 
public institutions creates a difficulty in the mind of an affected person to find a word describing its 
consequences, because its effects look bizarre, freakish and incongruous to his mental and cultural 
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vocabulary. Since, it totally eradicates differences and inserts uniformity by elevating the intended 
unique culture among other cultures through different methods, including legal ones and the use of 
violence.  
   The political institutions of contemporary Sudan show that some ruling democratic multi-parties 
have been introducing assimilating measures for suppressing minority ethnic cultures. The 
procedures have been aimed at eradicating certain groups as distinct people in a clandestine way. 
They have sent military forces disguised as civilians to kill those opposed to the objectives of 
assimilation. The intended victims of assimilation have resorted to seeking the means of resisting 
eradication and continue to perform their cultural habits. Two scholars observe this kind of 
assimilation; first, Nor Adam says that under the democratic pluralism of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, before 
June 1989, observers were dissatisfied with the presence of insecurity among the emigrants from 
minority ethnic groups from South Sudan and Darfur within the boundaries of the Northern Sudan. 
For instance, in 1989 a massacre of some Christians and Animists from the Shilluk ethnic group 
took place in the presence of security forces in the town of Jabellein along the White Nile region of 
the Northern Sudan. Anor Adam concludes that some Human Rights Agencies suspect that some 
security men masqueraded as ordinary Arab civilians and participated in the massacre of the 
Shilluk.
642
 Second, Cheadole and Prendergast say that the massacre of the African Dinka in 1987 at 
the town of Dhein by the Muslim Arabs of Reizegat was followed by the massacre of the African 
Shilluk under the democratic regime of Sadiq Al-Mahdi. Both political massacres send a signal of 
insecurity to the Black African populations within the territory of Sudan. At least some indigenous 
ethnic groups from Darfur took note and remained vigilant to defend their villages which had been 
under constant attacks from the nomadic Arab Muslims in the region while the democratic regime 
of Sadiq Al-Mahdi failed to protect them.
643
    
5.1 Anomia assimilation  
 A majority of the interviewed students claim that all the systems of autocratic, aristocratic, 
theocratic and democratic regimes which have ruled Sudan have applied a political pattern of 
assimilation that intends to aggressively eradicate the uniqueness of the Christians and the Animists 
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 Such a form of political assimilation characterises the successive systems of 
power in Sudan as, according to one student, a group that is „detrimental to the wellbeing‟ of the 
people of Sudan in their different social structures”.
645
  
   Description of the successive leaders in control of power in Sudan as „detrimental‟ for the 
„wellbeing‟ towards the citizens requires some sociological analysis. This description of Sudanese 
leaders puts the Sudanese society in a political situation of no „wellbeing‟ in sociological theory. 
Harris defines society as a composition of a group of people sharing a common habitat and usually 
depending on one another for their “survival and wellbeing”.
646
 The claimed treatment of the 
Government of Sudan to its citizens justifies that there has been no Sudanese society that depended 
on the survival and wellbeing of social and cultural categories, rather than, the anomia assimilation. 
For instance, the Students give testimonies of the current application of anomia assimilation by the 
present ruling government NCP, under President Al-Bashir. According to them, the system recruits 
the paramilitary organisation, PDF and entrusts it to fight the rebels, but in practice it targets those 
who resist the process of Islamisation and Arabisation of the state.
647
 During its operations, the PDF 
has deliberately attacked the Muslim, the Christian and the Animist civil population in South Sudan, 
Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, because of their resistance to mashurua el-hathari (the project 
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 It is an Islamic project that intends to convert the territorial citizens of Sudan to 
Islamic fundamentalism and kill those who attempt to resist it.
649
  
   It has become visible that mashurua el-hathari and the PDF are inter-independent organisations, 
where mashurua el-hathari is an Islamic ideology that aims to assimilate Sudan‟s cultures into an 
Islamic one. And at the same time, the PDF is a militia organisation that implements the defined 
objective of the mashurua el-hathari of anomia assimilation. These allegations of students that 
mashurua el-hathari kills those resisting it have been confirmed by some Human Rights institutions 
and the Sudanese media. For example, the Sudanese Human Rights Organisation (SHRO) reports 
that the NCP with its militia the PDF pursue extra-judicial killings against those who resist 
mashurua el-hathari in Sudan. During the 1990s, the government recruited the PDF militia under 
General Tom el-Nur to hunt for the Dinka in the largest Dinka city of Wau in South Sudan. Many 
Dinka civilians, including Luka Ngor, Director General for Forestry Department were murdered by 
the militia in an open place and the government did not react. Government soldiers applied the same 
policy of killing the Dinka on 14 June 1998, when fourteen Special Guards of the Governor of the 
Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, Kuwac Makuei, a Dinka, were collected and taken to the shared 
garrison of the army and the PDF at Mathiang, two kilometres from the capital city of the state, 
Aweil. The SHRO concludes that all fourteen were shot by an intelligence officer, Abdel Basit in 
charge of the promotion of the mashurua el-hathari.
650
  
   The leaders of Sudan constantly emphasise in the public media and political rallies the two terms, 
mashurua el-hathari and the PDF. First, Nafi Ali Nafi, Presidential Assistant, Deputy to the 
Chairman of the NCP and Head of the Political Mobilisation in the party threatens the international 
community as follows: “The price of our relationship and cooperation with the international family 
over the issue of Sudan‟s identity cannot be compromised at the expense of Sharia. We are not 
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stupid, not illusionists, nor dreamers, and we do not ask reconciliation and relationship from any 
one; we will defend mashurua el-hathari by all means”.
651
 At another rally, Nafi threatened the 
SPLM after its temporary withdrawal from the Government of National Unity (GONU) in 
November 2007 saying that: “It is an illusion to the SPLM to think that democracy means the 
change of the skin of the National Salvation Revolution. Our policy is behind our slogan no god 




Second, addressing a mass rally in the second largest city in Sudan, Wed Medeni Stadium, during 
his political disagreement with the SPLM over the implementation of the „Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement‟, President Al-Bashir threatened that: “Now, we order the PDF, the legitimate son of the 




   Whenever there is political resistance to the territorial Islamic and Arab assimilation from the 
Christians and the Animists of the South, the successive Governments of Sudan have preferred to 
resume war as a means of addressing assimilation. The result of this has caused a massive death toll 
of the civilian population in the South. Malwal observes that it has become an apparent policy to 
Muslim Arab northern governments to treat every Christian and Animist of the South as a rebel, 
whether or not he is a soldier.
654
 Treating every Animist and Christian Dinka as a rebel is a typical 
paradigm of anomia assimilation based on the inclusive killing of the territorial residents as 
enemies. Richard Williamson, a Presidential Special Peace Envoy of President George W Bush to 
Sudan reported on the fate of the Christians and the Animists of Abyei area between the borders of 
the South and the North in an informal session of the UN Security Council. Williamson said that on 
16 May 2008, Sudanese army Brigade 31 attacked the Dinka Ngok Christians and Animists town of 
Abyei in South Sudan. During the attack, the soldiers committed a deliberate and brutal killing of an 
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   Some students claim that there has been no regime in Sudan free from oppression of the people of 
the South, neither autocratic nor democratic. Students provide historical instances. First, in August 
1955, the departing British Governor-General of Sudan, Sir Alexander Knox Helm tried to persuade 
the Southern Corps that had mutinied in Torit town in order to resist assimilation into Arab Muslim 
culture to surrender to the Northern Arab forces.
656
 When some agreed to surrender, the government 
under Ismail al-Azhari a Muslim Arab ordered its troops to massacre them.
657
 Second, during the 
reign of General Ibrahim Abboud, military planes were used to bombard non-combatant civilians of 
the South in their villages; meanwhile the locations of the rebels were in the caves of mountains and 
not villages. Civilians were massacred in the towns of Yei and Juba of the Southern Sudan.
658
  
   The tenure of Abboud was a critical time for the Christians and the Animists of the South. The 
military regime emboldened its Muslim cohorts to embargo diversity of cultures and to extradite 
Christian missionaries from the South. The indigenous territorial peoples were put at the brink of 
cultural extinction as citizens in Sudan. According to Lesch, Abboud introduces measures for 
assimilation, under the model of Islamisation and Arabisation. He argues that the unity of the 
country must be based on eradication of Christianity as an alien religion brought by the Christian 
missionaries to the South. In May 1962, the government instituted a bill, the Missionary Societies 
Act, which forced the Chiefs of Azande and Toposa to convert into Islam together with their people. 
Friday was substituted for Sunday as the resting day. Mosques and Muslim schools were allowed to 
be erected in different locations in the South, in opposition to chapels and churches.
659
  
  Students provide more examples of anomia assimilation concerning the second democratic rule in 
Sudan from 1965, under Muhammad Ahmed Mahjoub of the Umma party. During that regime the 
Christians and the Animists of the South experienced tragic events they have still not forgotten. On 
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8 July 1965, the government soldiers reduced to rubble some three thousand grass thatched houses 
and “massacred in cold blood” more than one thousand men, women and children in Juba the 
capital of South Sudan.
660
 Three days later soldiers “murdered” seventy-six persons in Wau capital 
city of the Greater Bahr el-Ghazal at a Dinka wedding party.
661
 In August the army attacked the 
Shilluk village of Warajwok, a few kilometres south of Malakal, where one hundred and eighty 
seven “Collo people were massacred in cold blood”.
662
 More tragic events occurred at the village of 
Arini, near the town of Akobo, where forty-five Nuer men were massacred and left to be eaten by 
the vultures.
663
            
   The third term of the democratic multiparty system in 1986-1989, under Sadiq Al-Mahdi of the 
Umma Party was a disastrous time for the Christians and the Animists. A democratically elected 
government did not observe the values of democracy towards the people of the South. In broad day 
light in the town of Dhein, the Dinka were massacred by a conspiracy between the police and the 
Reizegat Muslim Arabs.
664
 The claims of the students have been documented. According to Deng, 
the power system in Sudan has been in the hands of the Northern Muslim Arabs and after the 
rebellion of the South in 1955 against their domination, they reacted by brutalising the rebels and 
the civilian population alike. Civilians‟ urban, rural centres and villages in three provinces of 
Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper in the South were incinerated.
665
 
   It appears that „anomia assimilation‟ has developed into its worst stage, under the current system 
of monolithic ideology of Islamic fundamentalism of President Al-Bashir. The application of Jihad 
in fighting Muslims, Christians and Animists people of the South, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana 
Hills as group resistant to the system of Islamic fundamentalism aggravates anomia assimilation in 
those regions. Yet, even radical ideologies based on war cannot rely solely on violence. They resort 
also to negotiation in order to reach a political settlement with the dissidents. Two views support 
this claim. First, in his pastoral letter on 17 November 2000, the Sudanese Catholic Bishop of El-
Obeid Diocese, Macram Max Gassis revealed the catastrophic situation that Jihad has caused to the 
people of South Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hill. He stated: “Nothing seemingly 
penetrates the indifference to Jihad in Sudan. Under Jihad of the National Islamic Front of Al-
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Bashir, hundreds of young girls … have been abducted and made to be concubines to Jihadists. 
Under Jihad, houses of the civilians in Nuba Mountains have been bombarded leaving the dead and 
maimed people spread everywhere. Under Jihad, the people of Bahr el-Ghazal are rounded up in 
their villages and sold into slavery. Under Jihad, starvation of the Christians, the Animists and 




   Second, a Nuba student claims: “When Omer Hassan Al-Bashir seized power with the intent to 
promote his „Islamic fundamentalism‟, he first wanted to kill all pagans in the South, Ingessana 
Hills and Nuba Mountains. He did kill many of them with his Jihadists, the PDF militia, yet he 
could not … finish them all. Hence, he dropped his conservative Islamic trend and reasoned with 




   An analysis to the imposition of „anomia‟ assimilation by political demagoguery in the national 
institutions of Sudan projects all democratic, theocratic and autocratic systems in Sudan into a 
series new political dimension. It stimulates other classes within the institutions of state to perform 
a practice that reflects a lust to power. Virtually, the practice encourages military juntas to capture 
power and transform the existing democratic systems based on pluralism into unilateral ones based 
on the method of aggressive dictatorship that exerts political efforts to eradicate religious pluralism. 
El-Affendi observes that the conflict between the Christians and Animists of the South as advocates 
of the democratic pluralism and the Muslim political forces of the North as advocates of the Islamic 
law has led to the capture of a democratic power. The first instance of this occurred in November, 
1958 when Major General Ibrahim Abboud seized the democratic elected government of the Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Khalil Bik of the Umma Party. El-Affendi concludes that Abboud became an 
aggressive dictator and closed institutions which were un-Islamic in the Christian South and its 
military forces killed resisters.
668
  
   Imposition of „anomia‟ assimilation also revives ethnic and racial cultural identity, rather than, a 
religious cultural uniformity based on Islam. In other words, its application makes African Muslims 
of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Beja of the eastern Sudan drop the Islamic culture that unifies 
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them with Muslim Arabs of the North. These African Muslims from the marginal zones of Sudan 
unite with the African Christians and Animists of the South and resist „anomia‟ assimilation.
669
  
   To explain these views of Muslim students from these regions one must compare them with the 
views of the Christians and the Animists from the South and Nuba Mountains. This matter has been 
dealt in the research question that asks: how do you want the identity of Sudan to be defined in a 
national constitution and why do you think so. A Nuba Muslim student claims that “We the Nuba 
become one with the Christians and the Animists of the South, when Muslim Arabs call for the 
application of Sharia constitutionally in Sudan. We are Africans as those Christians and Animists 
are also Africans. Sharia does not leave any room for our African traditions to co-exist with Islam, 
so we stand together in resisting it”.
670
 For a Beja student “It is true that we can come together as 
umma in faith, because we are Muslims, yet we the Beja in general … have our unique cultures 
which Muslim Arabs intend to wipe away, so we unite with other indigenous Africans in the west, 
centre and South Sudan to resist Islamisation and Arabisation of the state constitutionally”.
671
 And a 
Fur Muslim from Darfur argues that: “The so-called North Sudan of Muslim Arabs versus South 
Sudan of the Christians and Animists is a construct of colonialism. The dominant Muslim Arab 
political parties at the centre of Sudan exploited that exclusion of the Christians and the Animists at 
the South. Muslim Arabs in power „cheated‟ the indigenous people in Nuba Mountains, Darfur, 
Ingessana Hill and Beja at the east by propagating … that the people of the South are pagans and 
Trojans of the Christian West, which wants to extirpate Islam and Arabs in Sudan and separated 
us.
672
 One Muslim student concludes: “It was, under this deceptive political propaganda that the 
illusive political North collectively fought the South for almost half a century. In essence, our … 
problem is not the so-called the pagans of the South, but it is a total lack of constitutional political 
objective that could sustain political aspirations for the territorial citizens”.
673
 On the other hand, 
Christian Animist students present their claims as: “Historical building of national institutions in 
Sudan reflects one culture of „Islamism‟ and „Arabism‟, and the application of this culture within 
these institutions divides the state into two entities, the African Christian-Animists from the South 
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and the indigenous Muslims people of Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hill and Beja in 
opposition to the Muslim Arabs.” 
674
 Another student claims: “The division between us as Christian, 
Muslims and Animist Africans in resisting oppressive forces of Muslim Arabs is rooted in our 
hearts and it makes it very difficult to select any constitutional systems that may suit … Sudan, 
including democratic or militarily constitutional secularism”.
675
 One student concludes: “We have 
tried all those systems and none of them has been observed by … Muslim Arabs in power. Instead, 
power ... promotes an Islamic religious sectarian constitution in National Parliament, under the 
basis of being Muslim majority at the expanse of Christian and Animist minorities. At this 
circumstance, our indigenous African Muslims from the west and the east stand with us in resisting 
Arabism and ideological Islamism”.
676
  
   The problem of constructing a national identity places Sudan in a state of continuous political 
instability. Only a stable and a compromising constitutional system accepted by all the diverse 
religious faiths could restore the lost trust between the marginal people in the South, Darfur, Beja 
and Nuba Mountains and the Centre. Hassan observes that the problem between the Muslim North 
and the Christians and Animists of the South is a difficult task that prevents a unified constitution. 
Some Sudanese hope that political unity will prevail; however, the presence of the radical 
organisation, NCP of Al-Bashir in power makes it impossible to achieve one constitution for the 
Sudanese nation.
677
 Responses of some students to the research questionnaires provide us with 
different alternative views to the political crisis of national identity in Sudan. Some claim that there 
is no constitution that could unite the diverse citizens of the South with Muslim Arabs at present 
and in the future.
678
 Often, Muslim Arabs deceive people in conferences and refuse to implement 
the agreed constitutional issues. Respect for the identity of the minorities‟ ethnic and religious 
background is a remote hope in a united Sudan.
679
 One Dinka student concludes that: “Many of us 
hate lies and this makes the territorial Sudan as a sovereignty composed of contradictory societies. 
Most of Muslim Arab leaders at the North are „liars‟ and most of the political forces of the 
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   The division this student makes of the political institutions of Sudan into the categories of „liars‟ 
and truth tellers perhaps gives an impression of racial religious egoism and „ethnocentrism‟.
681
 Still, 
it is a political characterisation derived and theorised from various political developments between 
the two conflicting populations of the territorial South and the North. Let us take two instances; 
first, the Minister of Religious Affairs in Sudan, Islaam Ahmed Al-Bashir delivered a speech to the 
audience in a conference of religious dialogue and co-existence organised in Beirut, Lebanon in 
2003. Al-Bashir emphasised in his speech that as a Muslim, his government promotes religious 
tolerance. Surprisingly, the Sudanese Christian leaders in the conference room responded to his 
speech that “We had many talks and promises before and nothing had been implemented on the 
ground to alleviate our suffering in the South”.
682
 Second, during the first political negotiations 
between the Chiefs from the South and the politicians from the North in the „Juba Conference‟ in 
June 1947, Chief Cier Rehan suspected Muslim Arab politicians of the North and said that the 
Muslims would lie to them, if the two territories, the South and the North were to reunite. Cier 
stated “The people of the South are distinct culturally from the people of the North; if we join the 









   The recent history of Sudan; however, indicates that Muslim Arabs in power have refused to 
listen to the successive political representatives of the South and Darfur. The promise of listening 
has proven to be a ploy to make time pass. Such behaviour builds political mistrust between the 
population of the South and the Islamic Arab Muslims in power in the North. We have two 
examples of such mistrust. First, Minni Minawai Arcua, Senior Presidential Assistant and Chairman 
of the Darfur SLM accuses the Islamic Northern government in power of lie. Minni states: “The 
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Islamic National Congress is a lying organisation… with racial intentions, even in administering the 
state.
685
  Second, according to Deng, the Dinka Chief Makuei Bilkuei accused the former President 
Nimeiri of deception and argued: “We the Chiefs what … we hate is deception. The Arab said; You 
South, let us unite. If you accept, what they say, then ... open one eye and close the other one. Leave 
the other one to speak with the Arab. Nimeiri said to us that the country is one, that the black people 
have been given their own house. Tomorrow we will meet in the field; when we have borne our 
children in our small huts, but do not accept the breast.”
 686
 Deng concluded that what the Chief 
meant by „breast‟ was that the Southern Christian Animists are allured and deceived with superficial 
pleasures. If a woman allows you to touch her breast, then, she can allow you to proceed further. 
Tomorrow she could go and claim before a court that she had been violated. Holding the breast of 
the Arab is thus very dangerous. It is a deception to the Christian Animists of the South and will 
lead into Arabisation and Islamisation by deception.
687
  
5.1.1 Addis Ababa Agreement  
The people of the South originally rebelled against the domination of the Islamic North in August 
1955. Later the rebels operated under the political organisation, „South Sudan Liberation 
Movement‟, SSLM. In 1970, Joseph Lagu became the head of this organisation and its military 
wing known as Anya Nya. A year before, in May 1969, Ja‟afer Muhammad Nimeiri, a Major in the 
National Army of Sudan had seized power from a democratic elected government becoming the 
president of the state. Nimeiri sought a political settlement between the South and the North under 
the mediation of the Pan African Council of Churches and he began discussions with the SSLM in 
May 1971. Additional private discussions were held in Addis Ababa in November, and from them 
developed full-scale political negotiations in February 1972. In March 1973, the agreement was 
ratified giving the South „Regional Government‟ with its independent executive body the „High 
Executive Council‟. In 1983, the President reversed his course and withdrew this autonomy by re-
dividing the South into three regions. Daly concludes that the re-division of the South was widely 
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rejected by the Nilotics in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile former provinces and consequently the 
war was revived on 15 May 1983.
688
  
   Some Muslim students argue that the Christians and pagans of South Sudan rebuke both 
democratic and autocratic rule in Sudan. Under all these systems, the Northern Muslim Arab rulers 
have signed agreements with the South and say that after a short time: “The pagan Dinka with their 
brother Nuer would withdraw from these agreements”.
689
 For instance, after Major Ja‟afer 
Muhammad Nimeiri took power in May 1969 he appeared as a good „apostle‟ to them and 
eventually gave them „Self Autonomous Government‟ in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Still, in the 
end, the Dinka and Nuer again mobilised themselves and went back into the jungles to start a new 
rebellion.
690
 On the contrary, Christian Animist students argue that all the systems in Sudan fail to 
function, because Muslim Arabs remain in power. The reason for this is that they have systematised 
Islam as the salvation religion for all people, irrespective of individual beliefs.
691
 Nimeiri succeeded 
to earn the trust of the people of the South and thus they supported him. The reason for their support 
was his initiative to separate religion from the state. One student states: “The (sic) Addis-Ababa 
Agreement made him to be accepted in ... home, the South, but later he jumped away and crossed to 
those carrying the flag of Islamic religious fundamentalism and described this agreement that it was 
neither the Quran nor the Bible and took it away”.
692
 Another one said after that: “Nimeiri imposed 
Sharia on the Christians and the Animists in order to create his dream of assimilating them into 
Islam.
693
 Finally, one student concludes: “Because of dismantle of the Addis Ababa Accord, the war 
resumed in 1983, between us and them”.
694
  
   Why indeed, President Nimeiri dropped Addis Ababa Agreement? In the opinions of some 
Muslim students, Nimeiri had to dismantle this agreement in order to attract the resisting Muslim 
sectarian political parties of the Islamic ideology into his political camp.
695
 Careful analysis, 
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however, of Sudan‟s politics under Nimeiri shows that the President promoted very contradictory 
policies towards the Christians and Animists of the South. First, his courageous political initiative to 
ratify peace with the SSLM in 1973 had attracted the people of the South to his political ideological 
camp. On the other hand, his unilateral withdrawal of the terms of the agreement culminating in the 
re-division of the South into three small regions against the regional system defined in the 
agreement caused political mistrust in the South and led to the resumption of violence in May 1983.  
5.1.2 Nimeiri’s multiple conflicts 
The majority of all Muslim students, Christians and Animists view the democratic pluralistic rule as 
„the best‟ system and superior to the theocratic or autocratic ones, but it depends on who is applying 
it.
696
 The Southern Christian and Animist students claim that the Islamic sectarian religious political 
parties in Sudan have manifested contradictions in their political approach to the citizens of Sudan. 
They have advocated the method of democratic pluralism and at the same time, they have 
contradicted themselves by rejecting its respect to religious and ethnic diversity. For them, it meant 
the eradication of heterogeneous ethnic and religious minorities and substitution of assimilation to 
the Islamic-Arab norms of the majority within a unified Sudan.
697
 This approach is entirely stripped 
of the democratic pluralism as practiced in the Western institutions.
698
 One student concludes that: 
“The South needs a special treatment that excludes it from the Islamic and Arabic assimilation, but 
… Muslim sectarian and secularist democratic forces in the North cheat us and have done so for 
about fifty years with democratic pluralism that intends to absorb everyone to their Islamic and 
Arab culture”.
699
 Warburg explains that before the independence of Sudan, the Northern Muslim 
Arabs of the Islamic religious sectarians and the secularists unanimously offered a federal system to 
the people of the South who wanted it for the preservation of their non-Islamic cultures. This 
agreement was dropped after independence and the traditional sectarian Muslim leaders of the 
Khatimyyia and the Ansar agreed to aim at an Islamic constitution as one of their most significant 
goals. Warburg concludes that the initiative was a reference to the rapid Arabisation and 
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   When Nimeiri seized power from these sectarian religious multi-parties, he rejected assimilation 
and articulated firmly that the unity of Sudan must be preserved on practical social objectives that 
recognise the cultural differences between the ethnic Muslim Arabs in the North and the African 
Christians and Animists in the South under the system of „Sudanese Socialist Union‟ (SSU). He 
promoted an ideology of building a socialist society and endorsed laws that preserved respect to the 
Muslims, the Christians and the Animists as equal citizens constitutionally in Sudan.
701 
Nevertheless, Johnson maintains that Nimeiri later changed his views. After the discovery of oil in 
the territory of the Christians and Animists in the South in 1980, he introduced a new demarcation 
that annexed the oil regions to the territory of the Muslim Arab North. This initiative built a new 
territorial conflict of „theirs‟ and „ours‟ as demonstrated by the population of the South, which 
interpreted the new demarcation as a way to capture their natural resources and staged serious 
demonstrations, which were violently opposed to it.
702
  
5.1.2.1 The search for the status group 
Students from different ethnic Muslim groups give arguments concerning the imposition of Sharia 
by Nimeiri and Al-Basher‟s maintenance of it. Some argue that President Al-Bashir is ideologically 
unstable. For instance, he overthrew the democratic power and described the civil political violence 
as a war between the „socialist pagans‟ of the South and the faithful Muslims striving to establish 
Sharia as the law of the land.
703
 And at the same time, he vows to sustain all forms of political, 
economic and cultural relationships with the Chinese. The culture and economic operations of the 
government of the People‟s Republic of China are entirely oriented towards socialist ideology, 
which does not include the significance of any religion in cultural politics.
704
 In reference to African 
Rights, President Al-Bashir gathered Islamic clerics in el-Obeid, capital city of the Northern 
Kordofan on 27 April 1992. In that gathering, the clerics with Al-Bashir defined the violence in 
Sudan as a religious war between the infidel pagans and Christians of the South supported by the 
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apostate Muslims of the Nuba Mountains. The resolution of the conference confirmed that the 
violence was a religious war and must be conducted in religious terms in order to defend Islam and 
Al-Bashir was announced as Amir el-Mumeneen (the pious leader of the Islamic believers). Under 
such a religious definition, Al-Bashir immediately declared Jihad against the guerrilla organisation 
of the SPLM and SPLA in Southern Sudan, Ingessana Hill and the Nuba Mountains.
705
  
   In contrast, some students claim that Nimeiri overlooked the importance of Sharia in the Muslim 
community.
706
 “When this soldier came to power; he started to extirpate the powerful will of the 
Muslims to adopt Sharia for their lives, but we … forced him to adopt it, because he was left alone 
without political support from different political forums”.
707
 Some claim that Nimeiri, however, 
imposed Sharia, because, he wanted to appease Muslim sectarian political parties and not due to a 
personal interest in this law.
708
 He had lost political backing from his own party, the Communists, 
and hence needed the support of a new political group.
709
 Two scholars outline the unstable political 
ideologies of Nimeiri of as un-Islamic and Islamic. First, Johnson maintains that Nimeiri seized 
power and presented his ideological and political identity as a socialist and a secularist. This 
ideological definition separated religion from state and banned political institutions that based their 
politics on the Islamic religion. Under this ideology, the secular communist party, Muslim 
secularists in the North and the Christian and Animist parties of the South were sufficiently satisfied 
with the system and joined the cabinet. The official speeches and media disclosures were entirely 
empty of religious intonation and the cabinet was composed entirely of secularist ministers.
710
 
Second, Lesch says that Nimeiri lost the political backing of the Sudanese Communist Party in 
1971, and was left with a huge support from the population of the South which he gained, after the 
signing of peace agreement with the Southern revolutionaries in Addis-Ababa in 1973. Yet, some 
influential political forces from the South deserted him claiming that the President frustrated them 
with his unstable political performances, especially, his imposed plan of digging the Jonglei Canal 
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along the Nile to drain water from the swamps of the White Nile and his attempt to annex the 
productive Southern oil areas to the Northern territorial zone of the Islamic Arab North.
711
  
   Multiple and contradictory political actions by Nimeiri and Al-Bashir with different political 
forces characterise them as metamorphosis Presidents. Their actions can only be analysed by 
adopting a social theory. In the social view, society is structured on conflicting groups that contain a 
„status group‟. It is a composition of individuals that share a common culture, such as their style of 
life, profession and specific prestige in social, political and cultural categories within a certain 
territory.
712
 Recently, Al-Bashir has dismissed his earlier definition of the government waging a 
religious war between the pagans in association with the Christians in support of the apostate 
Muslims. Addressing the annual Coptic (Christian Egyptians) religious occasion organised in the 
Coptic Club of Khartoum on 12 September 2008, Al-Bashir declared that the former violence 
between the SPLA and the government forces was not a religious war between the Muslims on one 
side fighting the pagans the Christians and the apostates at the other side. It was merely a political 
violence based on the scarcity of economic resources and the wrangle over power sharing.
713
  
   It is likely Al-Bashir rejected the religious connection of the war, because, he was seeking the 
support of the „status group‟ the Coptic community in Sudan at the ballot box. On 9 January 2005, 
Al-Bashir signed the CPA with the former rebels, the SPLM. Article 1.6 paragraph 1.6.2.11 of this 
agreement states: “Every citizens shall have the right and the opportunity, without distinction and 
unreasonable restrictions, to vote and to be elected at a genuine periodic elections, which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free will of the 
electors”.
714
 The same situation applies to Nimeiri. He was eventually left without powerful 
political forces to rally behind his ideological system of “socialism”.
715
 Hence, he resorted to the 
religious laws in order to find a new status group. Durkheim says that religion provides a vital 
function in maintaining the social system as a whole. It originated from social interaction, rather 
than, a supernatural one. For this reason, common practices of religious rituals create deep 
solidarity of a society. For example, the religious rituals of Christmas, funerals, baptism, Ramadan 
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(Islamic holy month of fasting) and the Sabbath and other religious occasions remind a society of its 
common group membership.
716
    
   During the time of political crises in Sudan, Nimeiri began to regularly attend the Islamic 
religious rituals.
717
 The new move of Nimeiri can be interpreted as a way to remind Muslims that he 
was of their „status group‟ and that he needed them. According to Khalid, some leading „Muslim 
Brotherhood‟ figures from the banned Islamic political party ICF took Nimeiri to visit the Chieftain 
of the Sufi order, namely Awad Al- Jiid Muhammad Ahmed. During their meeting at the rite, Awad 
Al-Jiid communicated to Nimeiri that he had “a telepathic communication” 
718
 with the Prophet 
Muhammed, and in that communication; the Prophet told him that President Nimeiri would apply 
Sharia in institutions of Sudan.
719
  
   The statement of Awad Al-Jiid to the President Nimeiri that mentioned Sharia is a conditional 
reference for accepting him to the Sufi religious order. It required him to re-consider his ideological 
belief in secular socialism.
720
 After this meeting, members of the ICF, including their Head, Hassan 
Abdullah Turabi were appointed to the cabinet. Some concerned supporters complained how the 
Islamists could join this government, which had destroyed their Islamic and Arab ideology in 
Sudan. Turabi answered that his political association had decided to collaborate with the President, 
in order to reform the institutions within
.721
  
5.1.2.2 Religious fundamentalism 
Although, the term „fundamentalism‟ originated from an old language, Latin as fundamentum 
meaning base
722
, it has characterised contemporary sociological and political scholarship of the 
Western institutions
723
, most Muslim and Christian students interviewed reject the association of 
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their religions with this term. Muslim students argue that religious fundamentalism originated from 
Christianity and that it continues to reflect itself in it, but does not affect Islam.
724
  
   In turn, the Christian Animist students reject this view and argue that religious „fundamentalism‟ 
is deeply rooted in Islamic Sudan.
 725
 They claim that, during the war in the South the government 
inculcated „Islamic fundamentalism‟ into the multitude of Jihadists, the PDF. The members of this 
Islamic organisation were given homilies at the Islamic religious centres claiming that: “If any one 
of them kills a Christian, a Muslim or an Animist at the side of their enemy, the SPLA then the 
killer would certainly enter into heaven, where he would marry hurris (heavenly virgins) and … the 
killed opponent would get to hell. And if he was killed by a Muslim, a Christian or an Animist at 
the side of the SPLA, then his sins on the earth were forgiven in heaven and he would marry in 
heaven to virgin angels”.
726
 One student concludes that in this sense: “We have no place in heaven 
in all ways and such egoistic religious exegesis of Islamic scriptures represents fundamentalism in 
religion”.
727
 According to Salih, the Government of Sudan, under President Al-Bashir has 
reconstructed the concept of Jihad towards what it calls iris al-shaheed (wedding of the martyrs). 
This form of religious reconstruction stimulates members of the government militia, PDF to avoid 
marriage with the women living with them in Sudan. The women of the earth hurr al-dunia (dark 
eyed virgins of the earth), and they hope to marry in Paradise huur al-jinna (dark eyed virgin of the 
Paradise). Salih concludes that the government agents instructed the families of the militia to treat 
the death of their loved ones in the Jihad with jubilation, and should not mourn, since death is iris 
al-shaheed, the wedding of the martyrs, which should be celebrated also on earth as in heaven.
728
  
   These dichotomies between the views of some of the Muslim students with some of the Christian 
and Animist students call for tracing the origin of religious fundamentalism. Each side claims that 
the other practices religious „fundamentalism‟ as an ideology. The claim of the Muslim students 
that religious „fundamentalism‟ is inherent in the Christian religion is unequivocal. Historically, 
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modern fundamentalism dates back to the nineteenth-century conservative Christians who rejected 
the proposition of Darwin‟s evolutionary theory that dismissed supernatural creation. For the 
fundamentalists, God alone was the Creator of all living beings whereas the Darwinists insisted that 
life evolved through evolution.
729
 This conflict of ideological theories has continued between the 
adherents of creationism and evolutionism.
730
  
   The Creationist view is not in conflict with traditional Islam, which also does not recognise 
evolution. Instead, many verses in Holy Quran refer to God as the ultimate Creator of the 
universe.
731
 God is identified as the Organiser of the existing order in the world
732
. The term 
„fundamentalism‟ surfaced in the academic discussion, during the early twentieth-century with the 
call by the conservative Christians to preserve the fundamentals of their faith. For them, it was a 
question of contextual beliefs, not a political manifesto to change society and its laws.
733
    
   Contemporary „Islamic fundamentalism‟ is a political ideological discourse that intends to revive 
strict Islamic traditions of the past and encode them into constitutional systems of states for the 
territorial citizens.
734
 In this sense, its adherents became known in public institutions of the state as 
„Muslim fundamentalists‟, a group that strives to transform the state through the Islamic cultural 
identity and rejects the adoption of pluralistic ethnic territorial nationalism. Their aim is the 
establishment of a „just‟ Islamic „order‟. According to Kelsay, Islamic fundamentalism was a 
reaction to secular rule in Muslim countries.
735
 This discourse conforms to the statements of some 
interviewed Muslim students. Their values focus mainly on Sharia and the Sunna. They say “We 
are Muslims and we must revive our Sunna and Quran of our religion in our political 
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 “In the Islamic institutions, Sharia guides the life of every Muslim and we need its 
application as a law in Sudan”.
737
 In that sense, another one states: “Citizens of Sudan would only 
be good ones, when they revive the sanctity of Sharia as the guiding order of Sudanese society”.
738
    
   The complete revival of the contents of the Quran and Sunna into the modern diversity of Sudan 
is what Yusuf Kuwa Makki, a Muslim Nuba politician and a former Governor of the SPLM in Nuba 
Mountains defines as “Islamic fundamentalism”.
739
 Makki argues that he was about to adopt it to 
himself, during his primary school time.
740
 Such a definition by a Sudanese Muslim politician
741
 is 
very significant for the concept of „Islamic fundamentalism‟. For Makki, religion is divisive and it 
leads to the breaking down of all social, political and cultural continuity based on tolerance in his 
home region, the Nuba Mountains. He acknowledges that ethnic and religious composition of the 
Nuba Mountains is very heterogeneous. It is comprised of Muslims, Christians and Animists and to 
maintain this diversity is to suspend religion from politics. The Nuba intellectuals organised a 
conference in Khartoum and pointed out that religion was a very divisive entity and endorsed a 
resolution that separated it from politics. A secular association, the Komolo, was formed among the 
Nuba. This organisation was defined as a political movement for the youth of the Nuba, irrespective 
of faith and moral conscience.
742
  
   Nonetheless, this research argues that the separation of religion from the constitution of a state 
does not prevent individual persons from developing „Islamic fundamentalism‟; as Makki states: “I 
was passionate in my religious classes and the faith in general and would have registered the 
identity of Islamic fundamentalism”.
743
 This statement highlights for us the basis to define a 
Muslim fundamentalist as an Islamic believer that refuses to suspend the received individual 
religious homilies and apply them in their basic form without sifting or refining them to suit 
political, cultural and social institutions.  
   The practice of Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology that strives to impose Islamic customs and 
scriptures on public institutions has been in operation in its strict terms, under the current 
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Government of President Al-Bashir. For instance, Muhammad Abas Muhammad Saeed, Minister 
for Engineering Affairs in the Upper Nile State, South Sudan, instructs the staff of his Ministry that 
includes Christians, Muslims and Animists by stating: “Any written paper or application in the State 
of Upper Nile must carry the Islamic tradition of introduction: „In the name of God the Merciful, the 
Compassionate‟. Any applicant‟s document without that introduction would be invalid”.
744
 




   In Makki‟s view, moderate Muslims are dominant among the indigenous people of the Nuba 
Mountains region. Nuba Animists, Muslims and Christians consider traditional beliefs of „kujur‟, 
forms of African religious rituals as important parts of their religious life. Animists, Christians and 
Muslims of the Nuba perform them in open spaces. Christians and Muslims who are not party to 
these beliefs do not take part in them, but watch them without interrupting or banning them.
746
 The 
question, “Is religion important and what is your concept about the world in accordance to your 
religion, does it allow space for other religion(s), if so, please explain?” One Muslim student 
answered it by noting that: “I see the world as a composition of unexplainable powers and this 
shows that God is in every religion”.
747
 This view conforms to the opinion of two Indian Islamic 
scholars, Shah Waliyullah and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. According to Aziz, both scholars 
declare that God has unified the religions in Quran at the verse that states: “And We have revealed 
to thee the Book with the truth, verifying that which is before it of the Book and a guardian over it” 
(Quran 5: 48). Aziz concludes that these scholars describe this Quran verse as a reference to the 
unity of universal religions. Individual religious communities may differ in accordance to the laws 
of worship, but their essence as religions is one.
748
          
5.1.3 Imposition of Sharia 
Answers to the question, what are the fundamental duties of the faithful ones in your religion and is 
there any division of roles in terms of gender makes some Muslim students to attach Sharia as one 
of the Islamic objectives for a Muslim in social, political institutions as they present their views as: 
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“It is not enough for the Muslims in Sudan to articulate … that we are the Muslim majority. It is 
true that we are majority, but we should … be committed all to the higher law that is Sharia and 
codify it into territorial constitutions.
749
 Another continues “Because, religion, Islam obligates its 
faithful Muslims to apply a just system”.
750
 And in the opinion of another, “There is no any other 
just order in social structures in Sunni interpretation, than the Sharia as Quran requires”.
751
 One 
student concludes; therefore, Sharia must be the source of our constitution”.
752
 
   The majority of Muslims in Sudan belong to the Sunni Islamic order.
753
 For this reason, we could 
assume that the student might be from Sunni as his answer to the same question carries some similar 
religious statements such as: “In Sudan, many of us are Sunni Muslims and we must … apply in our 
lives the dictation of God that states: „show us the straight path the path of those whom you have 
favoured, not the path of those who earn your wrath nor of those who go astray‟. The Sunni 
associate Sharia with al-figh (jurist prudence), in regard to this verse. And it is an obligatory call of 
God to apply the „just judgment‟ and there is no law which is just beyond the Sharia”.
754
  
   These similar invocations for the application of Sharia with reference to the term „just‟ define the 
religious identity of the two students above as Sunnis. It was this verse which the former President, 
Nimeiri considered on 8 of September 1983 and issued a decree that elevated Islam above other 
religions in Sudan as the source of criminal and civil laws in Sudan. The decree defined Sharia to 
“be the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan” and judges at different courts throughout 
the country were instructed to apply the sets of the new Islamic legal code.
 755
   
   One Muslim student interprets the application of Sharia by Nimeiri in his own way and argues: 
“It is a duty of a faithful Muslim to observe and implement Sharia in daily life, but Nimeiri was an 
atheist and hypocrite and for this, he had failed to apply Sharia in the right way and now, an Islamic 
constitution is applied in its authentic procedure and this is what we want, we the Muslims of 
Sudan”.
756
 This claim of the Kababish Muslim student that dismisses the method of Nimeiri of 
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applying Sharia in Sudan needs to be scrutinised. How Sharia could be applied correctly and why 
does he think that Nimeiri was an „atheist‟?   
   First, Sharia is a divine system that regulates the method of worship, performance of rite and 
conduct of Muslims.
757
 Yes, there is no uniformity of its application. Muslims in different countries 
follow different schools of Sharia. For instance, the former Ottoman states in the Middle East 
adhere today to the school of Hanafi doctrine. Abu Hanafi was the founder of this legal sect and 
theorised ray (opinion) and istihsän (jurist preference) as main method of applying Sharia in the 
courts. This is not applicable to the Muslim countries of North Africa, where the Maliki School of 
Sharia operates. Malik Ibn Anas adopted the practical Islamic religious relationships that existed 
among the earliest Muslim community at Medinna. He considered these religious precepts as 
genuine sources of Islamic precedent and referential ones of Sunna. The Hanbali School of Sharia 
is adopted in Saudi Arabia and was founded by Ahmed Ibn Hannibal. This school observes Hadith 
(acts and sayings of the prophet) and Islamic traditions as the basic sources, on which the Sharia 
relies. Malaysia and Indonesia practice the doctrine of Shafi‟i. The founder of this school was 
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi‟i. He systematised some Islamic theories which reflect similarities 
with the Maliki School and legalised them.
758
 What unifies these schools is Holy Quran, but they 
differ in methodology and theoretical legal process.
759
  
   Therefore, the presence of five schools with their different methodological approaches 
disqualifies the claim of the student that Nimeiri had applied Sharia incorrectly. It would have been 
better, if there was a unified method of Sharia, but since each school follows its methodology and 
theories, then it would be a misleading for any Muslim in Sudan to blame Nimeiri over the 
methodological application. An-Na‟im observes that the application of Sharia law in the judiciary 
of Sudan carries serious contradictions, since there is so much diversity of opinion among Islamic 
schools of thoughts and scholars. Hence, its enactment of its principles as legal laws is only based 
on the selection of some opinions over others, thereby denying believers the freedom of choice 
among equally legitimate competing opinions. Moreover, there is neither a paradigm of precedent 
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of an Islamic state to be followed, nor such state practically viable today with exception of the 
Prophet in Medinna as to be useful and adopted today.
760
  
   The second issue is the description of Nimeiri as an „atheist‟. This was not uncommon allegat ion, 
taking into consideration his common life within the social structures of Sudan. The private life of 
Nimeiri included experiences that contradicted Islamic religious obligatory norms. Lesch reiterates 
that, after Nimeiri‟s imposition of Sharia, some Sudanese were astonished, and mostly his ministers 
who used to drink with him suspected his religiosity. They accused him of having advocated an 
Islamic hard line and stopped them from consumption of alcohol as an alternative to his doctor‟s 
advice to cease drinking, after the operation on his heart. In response to this allegation, Nimeiri 
denied and gave two reasons for the imposition of Sharia. First, in his opinion, the country was 
backward economically and Sharia would change the people from bad Sudanese in deeds to 
virtuous Sudanese Muslims. According to him, good Muslims would only look after consolidation 
and solidification of socio-economy without practicing bad activities such as drinking. Second, 




5.1.3.1 Religious Puritanism and economies  
According to some Muslim students, Sharia is a divine legal source that opens economic prosperity 
for an Islamic nation.
762
 One of them concludes that: “The economic success of Christians, 
especially the Calvinist sect in Western Europe was a result of their commitment to their religion, 
Christianity and its culture. For this reason, Nimeiri imposed … Sharia to the national institutions 
of Sudan, so that God could help him in improving the economy of the country”.
763
    
   In fact, President Nimeiri thought that the application of Sharia would improve socio-economic 
and insure prosperity and success in his local economy. According to Lesch, President Nimeiri 
argued that immoral bad deeds of the people of Sudan had caused failure in achieving economic 
success; hence, the implementation of the strict religious laws derived from Sharia would revive 
economic success.
764
 The teaching literature of the Calvinist Protestant theory attributes the success 
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of the capitalists in the Western European societies to the religious Christian „Puritanism‟ of 
Calvinists. This religious movement carries out its religious and ideological ethic that is based on 
regular conscientious work. The Puritans unanimously believe that God has predestined them, either 
salvation to heaven or hell as damnation and nothing they could do to change the predetermined 
destiny only a minority would enter into heaven. Hence, it is incumbent upon the believers to 
refrain from hedonism and commit themselves to religious practices which represent the 
glorification of God. Under this teaching, the Calvinists avoid spending profit on pleasures, rather 
than investments. The Calvinists interpret the economic prosperity in the Western European 
institutions as a symbolic success of the world. In their conceptual belief, such success represents 
them as the chosen faithful group to enter into paradise.
765
 
   The claim of the Muslim student that Nimeiri imposed Sharia as a result of imitating the 
European Christians was flawed for three reasons. The European traditional commercial method 
was not entirely based on Puritans‟ economic conservative view; it involved irreligious practices of 
pirates and other haphazard methods of acquiring wealth. Second, European merchants have been 
effectively involved in disposing of their money in expensive centres of social recreations 
consuming alcohol and other foods and drinks.
766
    
Third, the economic procedures of the capitalist West do not conform to the economic procedures 
of Islamic states, where laws are derived from the Sharia. The regulated economic mechanism of 
the Islamic systems shows the economic discrepancies in their economic policy structure. In 
reference to An‟Naim, Pakistan, Sudan and Iran apply Sharia in their economic regulations, thus, 
their economic organs refrain from adopting interest in commercial dealings.
767
 Commercial 
transactions of the Sharia reject interest in its institutional economic system
768
 , while interest is the 
objective of the capitalist Western European entrepreneurs in all their economic institutions.
769
  
   In the view of some Muslim students, Nimeiri acted abruptly without sufficient economic means 
for applying Sharia.
770
 Islamic states need to secure appropriate economic sufficiency, where each 
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According to Simone, theoretically, Sharia forbids black markets and currency speculation and 
hoarding; however, he states that the members of the NIF party that applied this Sharia “have 
grown through these very practices, merchants who finance the NIF are highly dependent on the 
second market”.
772
 Simone concludes that, after the introduction of Sharia, crime increased, as drug 
dealers and alcohol brewing became major sources of economic income and survival.
773
 
   The research argues that President Nimeiri has not heeded the practical situation of Sudan that 
qualifies it to the category of Sharia. A state without the „means of some change is also without the 
means‟ that constitutes the revival of religious and cultural conservative.
774
 According to An‟Naim, 
Sharia obliges an authority of an Islamic state to ensure social and economic standards for its 
citizens as a prerequisite for its strict application
775
. Nimeiri ignored this prerequisite; meanwhile, 
the socio-economy of Sudan, during that time had deteriorated to the extreme. The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) had shrunk to 3.6 percent with heavy accumulation of foreign debt, devalued 
Sudanese pound currency, high prices of food items and gasoline for the people of Sudan.
776
   
   This situation stimulates us to argue that the prevailing economic shortage, during those days 
implied having no means for the adoption of Islamic religious orthodoxy in such poor economic and 
social institutions. If absolutely necessary, the economic prosperity would have been first improved 
prior to the imposition of Sharia and followed by institutionalisation of Islamic religious orthodoxy 
with the aim to build a conservative society, in the due course of time. Yet it should exclude hudud, 
since it amounts to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.
777
 Acting 
contrary to this theory and imposing the adoption of Sharia without an economic change in the 
prosperity of the people in Sudan and observation of human rights has caused resistance, even from 
the leader of the Islamic religious and ethnic Arabs. According to Daly, during the imposition of the 
Sharia in national institutions of Sudan, the head of the Islamic religious sect, Ansar, Sadiq Al- 
Mahdi reacted and argued “how could there be an amputation for a poor man forced by the 
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circumstance to steal and feed his own family”.
778
 Daly concludes that Al- Mahdi did not reject its 
essence as a law, but because of the prevailing political and economic impoverishment in the 
environment of Sudan.
779  
   Yet, the study disagrees with Sadiq al-Mahdi on his promotion of the application of Sharia, if the 
economic situation improves in Sudan without denouncing the hudud penalty. A faithful Muslim 
negotiates with God to eliminate a culture that is not suitable for human nature. God is a living One 
that listens and heeds attentively to the petitions and concerns of the faithful people and evaluates 
them and offers a „gradable‟ law to the nature of human being. According to Horrie and 
Chippindale, God instructed the Prophet Muhammad from heaven through Musa to promulgate to 
the followers of Islam that prayer must be conducted fifty times a day. Muhammad realised that 
fifty sessions per day devoted for prayer was too much for the culture of human nature. The Prophet 
introduced negotiation with God through Musa explaining the burden of prayer fifty times per day 
to the faithful Muslims. In the end, God was receptive to the concerns of the Prophet and allowed 
him to inform the Muslims to pray five times a day, instead of fifty times.
780
 In the view of the 
Sudanese Lawyer, Ali Mahmoud Hassanien, hudud, (flogging and amputation of human cross 




5.1.3.2 Arguments on the hudud punishment 
 Students express their views and opinions over the introduction of the Sharia in Sudan at different 
responses to the question: “What are the duties of faithful ones in your religion and the roles of 
women?”  Some Muslim students say that it is their duty as faithful Muslims to establish a just 
Islamic society that could only be achieved by applying the Sharia
782
. One of them concludes that: 
“Application of Sharia is a must in order to fight all forms of corruption on the land”.
783
 Islamic law 
states that “The only reward of those who make war upon God and His Messenger and strive, after 
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   Fighting „all forms of corruption‟ in the universe in an Islamic way, include detention, flogging 
and amputation of human cross limbs in Sudan. In reaction to this kind of system, a „Christian 
Animist‟ student argues: “Nimeiri introduced a system that hunts for people to fill the prisons with 
those who are conscious of themselves, but the current regime allege them of having drunk 
beverages and makes them … hostages, under the detention within its dirty cells”.
785
 According to 
Lesch, detention and hudud that includes the amputation of human limbs and flogging of people 
escalated in Sudan, after the adoption of the Sharia in the judiciary. Public police are armed and 
instructed to move from house to a house in search of alcohol. A large number of men are whipped 
every day in different courts of Khartoum, under the accusation of having drunk liquor. The public 
prison is filled every day as, during the first days of its introduction, two young men were 
amputated and an adulterous was hung and a thief was killed.
786
   
   A „Christian Animist‟ student describes this phenomenon as „a choke‟ and argues that: “Sharia, a 
law that prevents freedom to take alcohol raises serious questions on the control of our cultural 
characters and the insertion of such a legal system that chops the limbs of the non-Muslims equally 
with the Muslims. I was choked and had to leave immediately Khartoum … after I saw the 




   The adoption of the Sharia in national institutions of Sudan might have stimulated a large number 
of the Christians and the Animists from the South to join the rebellion, SPLM and SPLA. 
According to Liben, the Southern Christian, William Ochan Ajjugo from Juba, capital city of South 
Sudan says that the people of the South were shocked, after the imposition of the Sharia: “… soon I 
began seeing the results people with arms and legs cut off for violating the Sharia; I was dissatisfied 
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   After the imposition of the Sharia, John Garang with his political and military organisations, 
SPLM and SPLA escalated the fighting against the Nimeiri system that applied hudud. At this time, 
Garang became a charismatic popular leader with his determining visionary goals among the 
Christians, Animists and marginal Muslims at the peripheries. Some students of Muslims, and 
Animists of South Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hill claim that: “After the imposition of 
… Sharia, there was no hope for our religions and cultures, under severe hudud penalties. We the 
African marginalised Christians, Muslims and Animists majority in the South, Nuba Mountains and 
Ingessana Hill thought only of John Garang as an alternative to Nimeiri regime”.
789
 Another said 
“Garang rejects the eradication of our cultures and represents a radically different vision against 
Nimeiri by defining off diametrically the status quo of Islamic hudud. He captures … our hearts and 
our minds and became our public saviour from the imposed vision of monolithic, religious 
intolerance of Islamising and Arabising us and killing us with harsh hudud”.
790
 Further, another one 
added: “Because of Garang, Nimeiri failed to create an exclusive political Islamic nation based on 
suppressing Christianity and Animism and inserting the law that chops people.
791
 Akot Kuot 
concludes that Nimeiri considered the followers of these religions as his major dissidents and 
removing them might relieve him in turn, these followers would embrace Islam or become second 
class citizens in their own natural land.
792
 According to Sidhamed and Ehteshami, the radical 
Islamists in Sudan have desperately encoded the Sharia, under the claim of establishing a just social 
order in the country. This form of law in Sudan applies hudud, an Islamic penalty that settles 
different forms of crimes. Under hudud in Sudan, cross limbs of thieves are amputated, women 
proven guilty of adultery are flogged, including all men and women found guilty of drinking 
alcohol and beverages must also experience flagellation in a criminal court of the Sharia. While the 
married women confirmed of having committed adultery are penalised by stoning them to death.
793
   
   Currently, this law is still being applied in the jurisdiction of the political North of Sudan. One 
question that asks: “What are practices in your religion regarded as indecent or immoral, in which a 
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violator must be sentenced and do you think such practices are manifested at your university 
campus and any other place in Sudan?” One Muslim student at University of Khartoum rejects the 
penalty of hudud, under the circumstance that: “It is an uncivilised law that … contravenes the 
regulation of the world civilisation. For me, the best system that suits our country is secular 
democratic pluralism”.
794
 Another concludes: “Sharia builds an abnormal society by cutting their 
hands and their legs. We have an abnormal boy, Mohammad Hassan Hamdan in Darfur. He was not 
… born abnormal, but the current regime of Omer Hassan Al-Bashir in power amputated his right 
hand and left foot in 2003, when he was sixteen years old. Hamdan has become a burden on us now. 
So, Sharia should be abolished and go for all, since it abnormalises the citizens”.
795
 Amnesty 
International, and the Sudanese Human Rights Agency based in the United Kingdom (UK) Sudan 
Victims of Torture Group (SVTG) released an urgent appeal on 23 January 2001, urging the 
Government of Sudan to suspend the amputation of Ibrahim Gumai, Omer Salim, Salih Omer, 
Abakar Jalab and Dafa Alla Mowloudi from the indigenous ethnic groups of Darfur. On Thursday 
25 January and Saturday 27 January 2001, the right hands and the left legs of these five men were 
amputated.
796
 In 2003, the Sharia court in Nyala, a town in Southern Darfur convicted four men 
from the indigenous ethnic group of Darfur after being alleged of highway armed robbery at the 
town of Dhein, south of Nyala. Their right hands and left legs were amputated.
797
 
    The amputation of limbs is a routine and consistent practice as the author visits these victims of 
amputation, but what is not answered is the sordid situation of the victims as power in state does not 
offer alternative measures to alleviate the hardship of life they experience as handicaps. Some 
Dinka Christian-Animists describe the hudud penalty that amputates the human limbs as abnormal 
law as one argues: “Under Sharia, my Christian relative, Deng Ngot Riny was about to experience 
abnormal punishment of amputation to his … limbs in Port Sudan
798
.  Another concludes: “This 
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abnormal practice is the way the Muslim Arabs in power think they could convert us to Islam … a 
religious law that transforms us to become abnormal ones is not ours”.
799
  
   The description of Sharia as an „abnormal‟ law creates more controversies among the students. 
For instance, a Muslim student from Shukuriya Arab at University of Khartoum does not embrace 
this description and argues: “Sharia is a God‟s law; it should be applied without any hesitation and 
complaint in Sudan”.
800
 A Christian Animist from the „Collo‟ ethnic group opposes the 
generalisation of Sharia to include the non-Muslims and argues: “If different „democratic‟, 
„theocratic‟ and „autocratic military‟ systems that have been in power in Sudan were to take Sharia 
as the law for the Muslims, it would have been better”. On the contrary, another concludes: “The 
Muslim successive systems control laws of the non-Muslims in the country. They … strive to 
constitute Sharia to include the Animists and Christians and in this way … customs and traditions 
as sources of our laws are neglected”.
801
 Preis argues in protest over the control of social and 
political leaders to cultures of other people and use their cultures as the measures for addressing 
social and cultural issues of others. In her view, the rights of people cannot be circumscribed by the 




   In the opinion of Fur and Nuba Muslim students at University of Khartoum the rights of people 
should not be measured, under the standard of a single culture. A Fur student notes: “The non-
Muslims like the people of the South living in the North should be treated in accordance with their 
customs as the constitution dictates”.
803
 For a Nuba student: “In Sudan, the constitution speaks 
alone and power in Khartoum speaks differently, but we shall force the power to respect the 
diversity stipulated in the national constitution.
804
  
   This writer has noted that non-Muslims are sentenced to flogging by the courts, because of having 
drunk alcohol and that is a violation of their customary rights encoded in the constitution. It seems 
customs are not practical within the territorial North of Sharia. Some of the victims of Sharia in 
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Sudan came from different customs and cultures which would have been used as standard measures 
for their punishments, but Sharia does not allow. The „Penal Code‟ of 1991, article 146 states 
“Anyone having sex outside marriage shall be punished with execution by stoning.”
805
 This legal 
code is applied in Northern Sudan jurisdiction; however, it does not exempt non-Muslims. For 
instance, in 2004, this single culture of Sharia was imposed on the Dinka woman, Alakor Lual 
Deng in the town of Nahud in the western Sudan. The court found her guilty of adultery and 
sentenced her to be stoned to death. After torturous move from human rights organisation, the High 
Court of Justice upheld her appeal and quashed the sentence in June 2004.
806
  
   According to the Dinka students, this penalty is contrary to their customary law that settles cases 
related to adultery. The questionnaire question, “What is a practice regarded as sinful, indecent or 
immoral in which a violator must be sentenced, what you think of it and how to deal with believers 
of other religions violating the same practice in Sudan? A Dinka student at Omdurman Ahlia 
University answers it as, in Dinka religious customs, rituals are performed in accordance to the 
nature of a situation which requires a sacrifice. For example, aci khor (adulteress) needs a 
traditional divine priest to purify her in a religious ceremony, since she is a married woman. It is 
believed that a married woman that has undergone sexual practice outside apart from her husband 
has committed a serious act that entails guilt and shame and above all, is a sin. This sin requires 
reconciliation with God by purifying her spiritually, before she resumes sexual relationship with her 
legal husband. In addition, the adulterer man pays eight cows to a husband of adulteress.
807
 One 
Muslim student, however, argues that Sharia comes from an old culture and needs to be revised in 
order to meet the technical world. In Sharia courts, it is claimed that adultery must be proved by 
four men who must witness two opposite sexes engaged in sexual intercourse. Our common sense 
teaches us that it is impossible to witness adultery in the contemporary world of cultural technology, 
because modern houses of today are not easily accessed like the primitive houses of the medieval 
ages, where four outsiders could witness adultery.
808
 Another Muslim concludes: “Legislation of 
Sharia puts the institutions of Sudan on the right dimension of assimilation”.
809
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5.2 Gradable assimilation 
 Some Muslim students at University of Khartoum from Nuba Mountains present their opinions on 
the best system that fits the religious diversity in Sudan. The first student argues: „for me, the best 
system that suits our country is a secular constitution that constructs a gradable assimilation‟.
810
 
Another one defines the „gradable assimilation‟ as „it is a form of an assimilation that does not 
remove fully the existing religious and ethnic diversity.
811
 One student concludes that the adoption 
of the „gradable assimilation‟ makes it possible for the ethnic Muslim Africans, Animist Africans 
and Christian Africans to live together in the country with the Muslim Arabs and Christians, where 
each takes the gradable culture of another‟.
812
  
   The opinions of Muslim students who favour secular system, instead of the Islamic system to be 
adopted in national institutions of Sudan as a suitable model, because it does not fully assimilate; 
instead, it allows „gradable assimilation‟ urge the search for further definition of assimilation. 
According to Yinger, assimilation is a process of reducing boundaries that occur, when members of 
two or more societies, ethnic groups, or smaller social groups interact in political, social and 
cultural spaces.
813
 In studies of antonyms or opposites, something gradable is referred to as a 
comparison of identical entity. For instance, the opposite of a long thing is not necessarily 
something short; it could be medium.
814
 This logical comparison forces the author to acquiesce to 
the students‟ claims that secular constitution builds „a gradable assimilation‟. In this way, a gradable 
assimilation can be defined as a kind of an assimilation that endeavours to reduce cultural 
boundaries without the imposition of a strict political initiative that eradicates diversity; instead, it 
creates likeness of cultures and it is not necessary to completely transform them to the dominant 
culture of majority. In another words, it is an assimilation that seeks gradable methods not 
necessarily a complete removal of differences between the interacting groups of different cultures, 
but a typical reproduction of likeness.  
   The laws inherited from colonialism conformed to the cultural diversity of religious and ethnic 
structures were constituted and applied in a method that was gradable; however, the imposition of 
Sharia in national institutions of Sudan has removed the gradable method. According to Hale, the 
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British had two forms of law in Sudan: first, the secular laws dealing inclusively with civil cases 
and individual non-Muslims and consenting Muslims; secondly, there were courts of the Sharia 





The issue of an official language in national institutions in Sudan is controversial among the 
students of the higher education in Sudan. Instances of this controversy begin as: “I am a Fur; I 
want my cultural identity to be connected with my language. The successive governments in Sudan 
control the flow of other tongues to be in national institutions constitutionally”.
816
 Other states: “We 
try to revive the Nubian language, but leaders are Arabs, so they adopt Arabic as an official 
language in our schools and prevent speaking in the Mahas language”.
817
 Another student argues: 
“Those whose their languages are rejected in national institutions and struggle to revive them are 
derogatorily described by Muslim Arab leaders as the „lost brothers‟”.
818
 One student concludes: 
“The reason for the description of those who speak in their languages as „lost brothers‟ is to control 
these languages to accelerate assimilation to Arab identity. With all these political initiatives of the 
control, the indigenous Africans of Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hill and Beja are not fully 
assimilated. We still express our arts and music in our languages …. We live with Arabs, yet we 
remain different in classical music.
819
 According to Sharkey at the decolonisation of Sudan, the 
Arab Muslim nationalists turned ta’rib (Arabisation) into an official state policy that sought to 
propagate Arabic quickly throughout a territory where scores of different languages were spoken.
820
     
   This author argues that social interactions of social group in national institutions or between  
neighbours creates a new culture perhaps not instituted or imposed politically, but functions within 
the intensity of language cultural contacts. In this sense, a gradable assimilation based on each 
cultural language expression in performances of music and arts may be reflected from another 
cultural performance of a neighbour social society and when that functions within different 
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language community, then such a society lives in a political environment of „gradable assimilation‟ 
of languages. At this moment a state could promote them in their respected institutions, while the 
widely spoken language(s) at the status of advanced science could be agreed politically and taken as 
a language of instruction in national institutions without prejudice to other remaining languages. 
According to Daly, during British colonialism, Secretary for Education and Health, J G Mathew 
organised a conference called the „Rejaf Language Conference‟ in April 1928 at the village Rejaf in 
the former provincial territory, Mangalla in the Southern Sudan.
821
  
   The issues for the discussion at the conference were, first, the drawing up of a classified list of 
languages among the ethnic groups of the South and second, to conduct deliberations, whether it 
was possible to open up boundaries of some ethnic languages to be adopted for educational 
curriculum and if so, what languages deserved to be selected among the languages of the various 
ethnic groups in the South without prejudice to the other languages of the cultural minorities?
822
 A 
third goal was to discuss and propose a unified system of orthography in the South, while fourth, 
they were to make proposals for co-operation in the production of text books and the adoption of a 
skeleton grammar, reading books and primers for general use. The delegates selected six languages, 
under the category that they were widely spoken by the majority and suitable for development and 
the rest would remain as potential ones within different communities to be developed. The chosen 
languages were: the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Azande, Bari and Latuko.
823
 These languages were 
applied to the beginners of primary schools, along with English at other extensive levels of learning. 
The languages maintained possible reciprocity with each other without conflict.
824
 
   The turning point of the conflict based on language identity in Sudan came after the shifting of 
power in Sudan to eradicate this „gradable assimilation‟ that emerged, after the imposition of 
structural change of educational curriculum in the South. Reference to Lesch, the educational 
system in accordance to the Rejaf linguistic conference of 1928 allowed the South to operate in its 
local languages and English. During the preparation for independence, the ruling Muslim Arabs at 
the transitional tenure eradicated these languages from the curriculum of education in the South. 
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The reason for this plan was to create a unified educational system, under the control of the state. In 
the South the subsidised missionary schools came under scrutiny. A report in 1954 by an 
„International Commission on Secondary Education‟ had advocated the transfer of the missionary 
schools to government control and replacement of English and other languages with Arabic as the 
only language of instruction. Such a policy was insensitive to the traditional African people of the 
South who unanimously rejected it. In 1957, the government proclaimed its decision to nationalise 
the system of education into Arabic in all the schools within the territorial state. Forceful measures 
were taken with the aggressive policies to impose Arabisation of education, instead of the languages 
of the South and English. Lesch concludes that six intermediate Islamic institutes were opened in 
the South and Christian missionaries were barred from opening any more schools.
825
 Muhlhäusler 
observes that power sometimes introduces some measures of control to the use of some ethnic 
minority languages in a state. It could label them in a derogatory way as useless and lacking 




   The approach of power that favours Arabic above local languages including English as the only 
language of education in Sudan contradicts the thoughts of the subordinate people of the South. 
These people hold their ethnic languages as worthy of maintenance in educational curriculum. 
English for them is more appreciated than Arabic claiming that is disconnected from Arab culture. 
These sentiments are reflected in the statements of the majority students who argue that it is not 
necessary to adopt the Arabic language for the operation of institutions.
827
 English and all other 
African languages could constitutionally co-exist with it.
828
 One of them concludes that 
„unfortunately‟, those Muslim Arabs in power regard Arabic as „their blessed language and the rest 
are the languages of the pagan tongues‟.
829
 Idris observes that the successive rulers of Muslim 
Arabs in Sudan describe Arab identity as flexible in uniting the people of Sudan. They swiftly 
articulate this model by generalising the definition of an Arab identity. For them an Arab national is 
referred to as any one that communicates in Arabic and adopts an Arab name. Idris concludes that 
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Muslim Arabs think that such adoption provides an open culture of unifying mechanism for the 
simple national identity, Arab, than an African one.
830
 
   The imposition of a language or any cultural identity beyond „gradable assimilation‟ to another 
unique culturally group creates a new general evaluation to such a system. Those affected evaluate 
it and seek alternatives in many ways, including violence against the state.  We have an instance of 
this claim in Sudan, where English has been the language of instruction at the University of 
Khartoum. Abruptly, the structural shift of the state for inserting Arab identity based on Arabising 
institutions included this university into the scale of changing the system into Arabic that is 
intertwined with religious classes to the non-Muslims. This shift has caused some Christians and 
Animists of the South to drop out from Universities in Sudan. Some of the affected group chose to 
march into the bush and became members of the SPLA fighting against the central government. 
Kane explains that young Christian men and women of the South Sudan became disadvantaged, 
after the introduction of the Sharia in Sudan at learning higher institutions, including University of 
Khartoum, where the Faculty of Law imposed new measures that forced non-Muslims to study 
Sharia in Arabic. This situation dissatisfied the Christians and the Animists of the South and moved 
to the organisation revolutionary movement, the SPLA. Aleu Akechchak Jok, a Catholic Christian 
from the largest ethnic group in the South, the Dinka was among the group affected by the 
Arabisation at the University of Khartoum. Aleu argues: “Me as a Christian how do I become a 
Sharia student studying in Arabic”.
831
 
   The African Christian Animist people of the South prefer English, rather than Arabic, while both 
languages are aliens to them. According to Collins and Deng, the Christian Animist population in 
Southern Sudan regarded the British colonisers, during their first interaction as other invaders who 
would undoubtly attempt to suppress their independence and exploit their human and natural 
resources. For the first twenty-five years of British rule in Southern Sudan the district officials 
spoke English or an African language, rather than Arabic and closely identified themselves with the 
people they ruled. They trekked throughout the countryside visiting Chiefs and villages and 
attended the religious and social occasions. This was in contrast to their relations with Muslim 
Arabs in Northern Sudan. The African people of the South resist Islamic Arabic culture, because of 
their experiences with the Al-Mahdi slave trade, slavery and booty. Collins and Deng conclude 
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those practices have severely traumatised the indigenous population of the South and they disliked 




Intermarriage is one of the models of assimilation that causes disappearance of physical 
distinctiveness of individuals.
833
 There are different forms of marriages, but two types of marriages 
dominate in the social institutions of Sudan. First, exogamy is an institution of marriage from 
outside of a group member category.
834
 The second one is endogamy the opposite of the former; it 
limits marriage within the category of an in-group, and hence; it is also called in-marriage and it is 
practiced by both matrilineal and patrilineal societies.
835
  
   In social structures, each group of these marriages categorises its social practices as the best. The 
exogamous group defines the endogamous as easily tempted members towards their relatives and 
describes such form of marriage as incest, which is a restriction or strongly prohibit ion of sexual 
relationship with a kin. On the other hand, the endogamous group claims that exogamous marriage 




   The Head of the Islamists in Sudan, Turabi sees intermarriage between Muslim Arabs of the 
North and the African Animists and the Christians of the South as a possible model that could 
accelerate assimilation to Arab and Islamic identity in the country. Turabi claims that such 
exogamous marriage practice could not succeed, because of the colonial power of Great Britain that 
separated the South from the North. According to El-Affendi, the leader of the Islamists in Sudan, 
Hassan Abdullah Turabi argues that without the forced separation, the Southern ethnic groups 
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   The theory of intermarriages between the „pagan‟ Africans of the South and the Muslim Arabs at 
the North as a political aim to assimilate the „pagans‟ to an Islamic and Arab identity in Sudan 
might be possible; however, it encounters certain social impediments between Muslim Arabs of the 
Northern Sudan and the indigenous Christians and Animists of the Southern region. First, some 
Muslim Arabs defy exogamous marriage in their central and dominant social structures. A boy or a 
girl at the stage of puberty is oriented towards a kin as his/her cohabitate spouse in the future. This 
form of social custom is contrary to the African Christians and Animists in the South. These groups 
observe incest and their boys and girls adhere to the exogamous marriages.  
   This observation is derived from the answers of some Arab and African students to the question, 
“Do you think cross marriages can curtail regional diversity in Sudan and if so, what marriage do 
you prefer and explain why?” One example comes from a Muslim Arab student who states: “I am 
still single and have already chosen endogamous marriage …. I will marry my relative, on the basis 
of love and my cultural orientation I received from my family. My culture oriented me to observe 
endogamous marriage … and it is good for us to marry a relative, because it has so many more 
advantages than exogamous”.
838
 In contrast, a Dinka student states: “I prefer an exogamous 
marriage for the reason that endogamous is awful; it is incest. I will marry a non-relative provided 
that he is a Dinka”.
839
 According to Deng, the issue of incest gives the freedom to African descents 
to marry from outside, but the Arab Muslims and the Arabised ones of Sudan marry among their 
relative group that could be related in blood as kin.
840
  
   The few above instances show that intermarriage of Muslim Arabs with the indigenous Africans 
is flawed. For instance, the Nilotic ethnic groups with their cultural „conservative‟ ways do not limit 
their males to remain in a constant resistance to intermarriages. A Nilotic male could cross the 
territorial ethnic border and marry from another ethnic group or anywhere in the world. This 
crossing system of males is not equally encouraged to the extent the females. The Nilotic girls live 
under the orientation that the cow is a dignified symbol to be married with. It elucidates to the 
spouses the mysterious intrinsic cultural commitment to one another. It is the ultimate emblem of 
identity which cannot be taken away from an owner by any other issue, than the extreme one such 
as a concrete love for a certain woman. From this perspective, the majority of them resist marriage 
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from the outside, especially to Arab Muslims. A Dinka girl who is married outside is conscious of 
social derogatory attachments to her social identity. The Dinka people will describe her possibly as 
a common lady, as easily going to the Muslim Arabs and above all, a „public girl‟. Dinka student 
girls explain this situation as: “I prefer exogamous marriage, and I will marry a non-relative for the 
reason that endogamous is … an awesome culture. We are customarily exogamous. Yet, I feel as a 
Dinka to be married with cows. Without them, then I have no clear image of pride as a truly married 
Dinka woman”.
841
 Another one says: “In our extreme cultural norms, a Dinka woman from a decent 
family and respected one cannot go to be married with an Arab, even if, he buys thousands of cows 
for the realisation of that marriage. The issue is not … cattle, but dignity not to become partly 
assimilated into an Arab culture. If she does so, then, she is culturally dead. She would be 
everything representing a bad face to the Dinka”.
842
 One girl concludes: “It cannot … happen to me 
to be married with an Arab; I seriously respect my culture and adhere to it as my identity and of 
course, it is important for a spouse to marry you with cows: It expresses the intrinsic beauty of his 
commitment to love, since he loves his cows than everything except marriage can remove them 
from him. Yet, I shall marry a Dinka, because he understands this cultural commitment”.
843
 Deng 
questions whether exogamous marriages could be possible between the Dinka and the Arabs to the 
Chiefs of the Dinka in Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal regions of South Sudan. Chief Makuei 
Bilkuei from Ruweng of Western Upper Nile region replied: “It will be difficult for the Dinka to 
give their daughters to the non-Dinka”.
844
, but Chol Adija from Abyei took a conservative line and 
described the Dinka girls who were married to the Arabs as „prostitutes‟ and asked “Have you seen 
any decent girl, a daughter of a gentleman, marrying an Arab?”
845
    
   The assertions of the Dinka elder with power of decision-making
846
that it would be „difficult‟ for 
the Dinka to allow their daughters to marry outside the Dinka may carry some racial concepts.
847
 
However, „difficult‟ could also be explained in the sense that the Dinka identity is based on cattle. It 
is under this concept of identity which dictates them to pay a dowry in the form of cows and bulls. 
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It is not easy for an alien to secure the number of required cows as payment in order to marry a 
Dinka girl. To marry a Dinka girl one must be prepared to answer many demands for cattle from the 
extended relatives of a girl. Their demand is mostly an expression of this cultural pride over their 
collective right on a daughter assumed as „our daughter‟. An expected marriage of a Dinka 
gentleman must be above one hundred cows and beyond. According to Deng, marriage from the 
Dinka ethnic group by other ethnic identities is impeded by the expensiveness of the payment of a 
dowry in the form of cows as a unique expression of indebted right to a girl that is regarded as “our 
girl”. Dinka concludes that among the Dinka, a single woman costs not less than one hundred and 
fifty cows.
848
    
   Second, the term „difficult‟ may also mean that the Dinka as members of the Nilotic ethnic groups 
are difficult to be assimilated to any an outside culture through marriage. Experience proves that 
they are not adaptable to change of their culture. A Dinka Christian- Animist girl states: “For me to 
marry a non-Dinka is a total displacement of my whole … identity. My language is my identity, 
when my mother speaks in Dinka proverbs I understand which one is for social justice and which 
one is for prayer and which one is for our economy. It does not cross my mind to marry a non-
Dinka that would lead me off the track of my customs; leave alone an Arab Muslim”.
849
  
   We must extract two issues from the resistance of this Dinka female student to establish marriage 
relationship with a non-Dinka for analysis. First, her resistance is based on the intertwined validity 
of the Dinka language to the maintenance of her traditional customs. Her language makes her closer 
to the religious world; it brings her closer to understand and interpret what is „just‟ and wrong in 
reference to the traditions of the Dinka institutions. The same language teaches her perseverance 
through some social difficulties, until success is achieved. Second, her statement gives an 
impression of the conservative line that she will not marry a non-Dinka; if she did so it would carry 
her away from her linguistic community, where she understands its proverbs. Two scholars who 
have studied the Dinka have noted the presence of such expressions as those of the Dinka girl in the 
Dinka traditions. First, according to Nikkel, the Dinka use their rich language in different forms of 
proverbs to express different issues to maintain traditional perseverance to social hardship and 
refrain from stealing and running away from a defined enemy. One instance is that the Dinka say 
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Nhialic agur abik to mean “God is grinding fine flour; what remains is the sifting”.
850
 This 
traditional proverb is applied to invite the group, during war, famine, or any form of unbearable 
suffering. When it appears to the Dinka people that the land of Nhialic (God) who brings blessing 
and hardship is brutally crushing his people, even then, the wisdom of God is at work. It is grinding 
the excellent flour for the satisfaction of the people.
851
 Second, Deng says that the Nilotics, 
especially two ethnic groups, the Dinka and Nuer are very conservative and resistant to change. 
Many anthropological and sociological scholars observe this phenomenon and describe them as 
proud, and belief in their value system mainly derives from their religions and customs. Deng 
concludes that this social system has remained as a defensive weapon against linguistic cultural 
interference from the Muslim Arabs.
852
  
   Third, theoretically, violence creates negative sentiment to a social community. Such sentiment 
places social barriers between communities.
853
 The existing long violence between „Christian 
Animists‟ in the South and Muslim Arabs in the North disqualifies the claim that intermarriage 
could successfully occur between these groups. Domestic „slavery‟, racism and ethnic violence, 
based on the slogan of religion between Arab Muslim identities and the African Christian and 
Animists has negative impacts on social relations between the young men and women.
854
 
Observations of this researcher of the relationships of students at different campuses reveal the 
presence of social borders which cannot be easily crossed at the moment, unless the state introduces 
a change of attitudes. In public, every Christian girl walks with a Christian Animist and the same 
phenomenon is seen among the Muslim Arab girls. They mostly appear with Muslim Arabs on 
different campuses and not with Christians or Animists of the South. It seems that a racial hatred 
has been created by the sentiment of conflict; a Nuer student at University of Juba states: “I can‟t 
marry a Muslim Arab in Sudan; why would you marry the daughter of a foe?”
855
    
   This student‟s assertion does not conform to the opinion of one of the leading political Muslim 
figure in Sudan. Recently, the policy of assimilation based on marriage has shifted from the 
political propaganda of assimilating the Christians and the Animists through the marriage to their 
daughters to an exogamous free choice of marriage that is not limited only to the ethnic groups of 
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the South for the purpose of assimilation to Islamic and Arab cultural identity. Hassan Abdullah 
Turabi issues at different political forums fatwaat (Islamic legal edicts) which invite Muslims to 
disregard the limitation in marriage. For him, it is legal for a Christian and a Jew to get into a social 
relation leading to a marriage with a Muslim female.
856
 In contemporary Sudan, Muslims and 
Christians have already engaged in intermarriages in an official way. Residents of the city of 
Gadaref followed an open marriage ceremony of a Muslim girl to a Christian man. Witnesses to 
occasion were extremely amazed. The open ceremony was conducted following some traditional 
Muslim customs of the Northern Sudan.
857
   
   Observers interpret this marriage as the beginning of the implementation of exogamous legal 
marriages of a Christian to a Muslim woman conforming to the religious edicts of Turabi. This 
Muslim leader invites Christians to avoid shying away from establishing intimate social 
relationships with the Muslim women for marriage. And in order to attract the young Christians to 
the intermarriage, the organisers made the wedding to be celebrated for many hours in two 
locations. The first was celebrated at the main Church of the city. After the end of the matrimony 
service from this church, a second service was held at the bride‟s home.
858
 The participants and the 
others passing by have witnessed the social marriage of two opposing religions in Sudan and 
reported that the girl expressed strong happiness towards having married a Christian. She explained 
to have a full conviction with the whole idea and defends her decision to marry a non-Muslim as a 
response to Turabi‟s verdict to marry a Christian. The marriage, however, divided the family of the 
bride, some supported the right of a woman to be married to a Christian, but other relatives of the 
girl were reported to be furious about the choice of their girl to marry a non-Muslim.
859
 In the 
Islamic religious view, it is reported in Khartoum daily Arabic Newspaper that a certain Sheikh 
forbids such marriage. Abdul Fatah Iddriss, a professor of comparative Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
in the faculty of Sharia at Al-Azhar University dismisses the marriage. He asserts that the marriage 
of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim is haram (not allowed) in accordance with Sharia text. Iddriss 
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gives his rejection to the intermarriage with a proof. He argues that God states in the Holy Quran: 
“and do not sleep with infidels, until they believe”.
860
 
   The occasion of the intermarriage between a Christian man and a Muslim woman within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Northern Sudan, where the Sharia is applied is a turning point in 
religious relationships and may lead to the highest status of religious tolerance. This phenomenon 
challenges the religious borders, under the laws which the student describes as follows: “Legislature 
body makes dubious racial laws that remove freedom of individual girls and boys to create intimate 
relationships that may lead to marriage and to making a family. It is really a pity and a point of our 
dislike of the … regime of President Al-Bashir that places itself above us and decides for us the 
directions to take on issues falling within the boundaries of individuals”.
861
 A girl from Misseiryyia 
Arab of Southern Kordofan at University of Khartoum argues: “I am a single girl and will marry a 
non-Muslim, if he wants to marry me, especially my neighbours, the Dinka from Abyei. It is a 
choice for the legislative powers of Sudan to choose between setting religion aside and allowing the 
choice of marriage to individuals‟ satisfaction to each other. Otherwise, we … will resist these laws 
in different ways in our political ideologies in Sudan”.
862
 
   The organised phenomena of assimilation models, which intend to assimilate the minority 
Christians and Animists in the south to an orthodox Islamic-Arab culture in Sudan leads to violence. 
According to Mushanga, in Sudan the dispossessed group adopts violence for the amelioration of 
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6   VIOLENCE OF IDEOLOGIES 
 
Risto Marjomaa asks why has war been pursued and why does it crucially continue to persist at 
present to haunt our societies around the world?
864
 Generally, what engenders detrimental violence 
to break out among people in political and social institutions is not uniform. Every political and 
cultural institution has its different ideological discourses of violence. For Clausewitz “war is a 
continuation of politics by other means”.
865
 And others claim that “violence is a midwife of 
history”.
866
 It is an instrument which oppressed and exploited classes adopt in confronting an 
oppressive and exploiting class of power. Thus, the oppressed and exploited classes apply it to 




   The students interviewed for this study think that there are ideological complexities which cause 
the long and repetitive civil wars in Sudan.
868
 Such opinions can be found in answers to the question 
“Do you think the exclusion of the South has a link with the past civil wars between the South and 
the North, and if you think so, what about the current violence within the North as in Darfur, how 
do you evaluate it?” Some students argue that: “The civil war of the indigenous African Muslims, 
Christians, and Animists from Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hills and Beja against the ruling 
elite Muslim Arabs in power is caused by political and economic marginalisation, under the 
autocratic military system that marginalises us although we represent majority”.
869
 Another one 
states: “The elite Muslim Arabs in power practice political marginalisation in distribution of wealth 
and power. So, we have a war between the marginalised African majority groups as one body 
against the marginalising Arab Muslim minority in power”.
870
 On the other hand, other Muslim 
Arab students argue that: “Sharing of power and wealth in Sudan equally with other regions which 
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claim marginalisation was not possible, since the foundation of Sudan as a state. Institution building 
commenced in the northern Sudan and the remaining regions embraced enormous illiteracy. Ergo, 
„illiterates‟ could not hold power in national institutions”.
871
 One of them concludes that: „The so-
called „marginalised regions have no wealth which they produce from their lands and the Arabs 
refuse them the development of their areas”.
872
  
   The issue of locally produced wealth in Sudan was defined in the Sudan Constitution of 1973. The 
constitution said that the revenues of natural resources from the South would accrue to the Southern 
Government”.
873
 In 1979, the American company Chevron discovered oil in Western Upper Nile 
Province, specifically the area of Bentiu in South Sudan. President Nimeiri with Attorney General, 
Hassan Abdulla Al-Turabi stepped in to establish new re-demarcation of borders between the South 
and the North. The oil areas annexed to the North, however, had to be withdrawn, after a series of 
demonstrations in resistance to it and the total refusal of the Southern Regional General Assembly 
as well as Abel Alier, President of the South to acknowledge the new borders.
874
  
   These conflicting political discourses between those who claim that their regions have undergone 
a series of marginalisations in terms of economic development and power-sharing and those who 
reject the claim have shifted to the category of an ideological defined discourse of „the 
marginalised‟ identities in opposition to the „marginalising‟ Muslim Arabs in Sudan. It has become 
a national identity for the majority of students in the South, Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana 
Hills and Beja. These groups identify themselves as “the marginalised majority”.
875
  
   From this perspective, there is an ideological identity called the „marginalised‟ which surfaced 
from the economic and power sharing circumstances within Sudan. Yet, political disputes are not 
only based on economic and power dimensions in Sudan. Even though the students from the South 
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claim a unified political identity known as „marginalised‟ with the other regions.
876
 The majority of 
them also argue that religion and ethnicity are the cardinal conflicting criteria responsible for the 
instability of political Sudan.
877
  
   The Addis Agreement created in the South a „Regional Self Government‟ (RSG) which was 
incorporated into the Permanent Constitution of Sudan. That constitution acknowledged the 
dualistic presence of Arab and African identities in Sudan, respected Islam, Christianity and 
Animism and prohibited discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender and language.
878
 
Christian and Animist students of the South claim that these provisions have never been observed. 
Muslim Arabs in power have introduced many political initiatives in violation of this „Permanent 
Constitution‟. For example, President Nimeiri violated the constitution by dividing the South in 
1983 into small regions, which led to the resumption of war in 1983.
879
 On the other hand, some 
Muslim Arab students argue that the constitution was a „pagan‟ one, since; it disregarded Islam in 
its provisions
880
., under the pretence that Islamic law discriminated against the non-Muslims. There 
is no discrimination in Islam‟, since the Sharia preserves the prevailing ethnic and religious 
diversity in Sudan, by protecting individual non-Muslim minority rights.
881
 According to another 
student, constitutions which are void of Islam mainly promote paganism.
882
 One of them concludes 
that the Christians and pagans in the South have a conspiracy to eradicate Islam from political and 
social structures of Sudan.
883
  
   It is very common among many Muslim Arab students to label the people of the South as the 
„pagans‟ and the people of the other regions as religious Muslims. In this sense, Muslim Arab 
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students assume that the problem of addressing national identity constitutionally is not a 
problematic issue to the other regions, where Islam is a religion of the majority, except for the 
pagan South. This view is not accepted by some students from the South. For instance, one of them 
argues: “We the Christian Animists in the South and traditional African Muslims in Nuba 
Mountains, Ingessana Hills and Darfur know those Arab Muslims in power do not respect any 
constitution. We the marginalised from these regions want to promote our African way of practicing 
Islam and Christianity in the national constitution”.
884
 Another one states: “We want a secular 
constitution. We cannot accept … to be dragged into the extreme religious practices of 
fundamentalism. We have no fundamentalism in our traditional practice of religion. Muslim Arabs 
want to assimilate us and that was the reason our leader Dr. John Garang rejected the Addis-Ababa 
Agreement. The agreement was made to deceive the Christians and the Animists of the South to put 
down their guns and to annihilate our African identity with Islamic fundamentalism”.
885
  
    John Garang De Mabior who was a founder of the guerrilla political organisation, SPLM with its 
military branch SPLA in 1983 was interview in the Sudanese magazine, Heritage. Garang himself 
explains his rejection of the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, because its basic terms were first 
to absorb the Anya Nya (military wing of the rebels) into the National Army. Second, it was to 
integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it. So, the main aim was to achieve a cheap victory 
over the Anya Nya forces which fought the war. In brief, the concrete basis for the agreement was 
to disarm the Anya Nya combatants that had proved formidable in the battlefield through peace. 
Garang concludes that all the other coding; vis-à-vis the Regional Self-Government Act, the 
ministerial posts and all things connected with the local autonomy were only peripheral, the main 
objective was to pull out the arms from the Anya Nya and finally neutralise it and destroy it.886  
   Political relationships of President Nimeiri with the Autonomous Government of the Christian 
and Animist South justify Garang‟s claim. Later he published the legality of the agreement and 
dismissed the elected members of the regional assembly in Juba, the capital city of the South in 
1983. The terms of the agreement articulated that the South was to maintain its special status of an 
autonomous system of a government, six thousand of the Anya Nya soldiers would be absorbed to 
the national army and stationed in the South. In 1983, Nimeiri decreed the re-division of the South 
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into three regions. This division came after he had applied the policy of “rule and divide”
887
 among 
the political forces of the South. The majority of the people from Equatoria province supported the 
re-division on the basis that the Dinka dominated the region. Fearing the reaction of the majority of 
the Christian-Animists to the re-division, Nimeiri ordered the transfer of the former Anya Nya 
soldiers from the Southern zones to the North. On 15 May 1983, „Colonel „Dr‟ John Garang, a 
Christian from the Dinka rebelled with some former Anya Nya armed forces in Bor, South Sudan. 
Garang formed the SPLA and the SPLM on the ideological vision of building “New Sudan”.
888
  
6.1 New Sudan 
Janis observes that in some cases of group decision-making, individual loyalty to a group prevents 
members from raising controversial and uncomfortable questions. The members become concerned 
about the maintenance of group harmony at critical times, especially, when a difficult issue related 
to their values and culture emerges. The group ceases from criticising its leader(s) and looks 
primarily to the issue(s) affecting them. This collective decision is called „groupthink‟, a descriptive 






   Observations and answers by the Christian and the Animist students offer a clear example of such 
„groupthink‟. The students support their political leaders on the issues of their territorial identity, the 
South as well as in defence of their Animistic religions mixed with Christianity. They claim that 
one time, the Nilotic ethnic groups had to drop their differences, after they realised that Nimeiri 
wanted to disperse the Anya Nya soldiers, by transferring them to the North as a plan of 
implementing his decree of re-dividing the South into small regions. They unanimously felt that 
they were vulnerable to the system that strived to destroy their territorial unity. This public 
solidarity motivated the majority of them to support their political leaders that interpreted the 
fragmentation of the South from one entity into three regions as a serious marginalisation in 
decision-making on the issue that concerned their territorial destiny. Political activists dropped their 
differences and coordinated with the former Anya Nya soldiers secretly to confront the Nimeiri 
system with violence. The students explain their „groupthink‟ as a Nuer student states: “Our 
brothers, Jiang (Dinka) fight with us sometimes on the issues of individual interest …, but we could 
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simply merge together when there is a threat to our public existence and our religion. When Nimeiri 
tried to destroy our army, the Anya Nya, in order to re-divide the South into three regions, we the 
Nilotics were very quick to know the mystery behind it and opposed the re-division”.
890
 Second, a 
Dinka states: “Sometimes, we the Nilotics, Jiang, Nuer, Collo, Anyuak and Luwo come into 
political confrontation leading to human casualties, but the question of our territory and religious 
practices of our traditions … bring us together against the Muslim Arabs”.
891 
   
   A Shilluk student claims: “During the Regional Autonomous Government in Juba, the Nilotics 
had some disagreements among themselves, but we dropped them, when Nimeiri wanted to 
eradicate our culture and we took guns to fight him as members of the SPLM and SPLA, since 
1983”.
892
 Another one claims: “When Joseph Lagu from the Amadi ethnic group of the Eastern 
Equatoria … became the Vice President of Sudan and planned with Nimeiri to re-divide the South, 
the majority of the Nilotic ethnic groups represented in the Regional Assembly in Juba dropped 
their differences and decisively voted against the proposed re-division of the South”.
893
 Another 
notes: “After the re-division of the South, disparate armed resistance and popular uprising from 
different areas of the Nilotics of Abyei, Bentiu, Aweil, Rumbek and Nasir started. On 15 May 1983, 
the former Anya Nya soldiers mostly composed of the Nilotics at the small town, Bor in the South 
rebelled against the system of Nimeiri
894
. One of them concludes: “Colonel John Garang de Mabior 
was clandestinely the head of the rebellion and his junior assistant, Major Kerbino Kuanyin Bol 
implemented the rebellion, before Garang could arrive from Khartoum. The Christian-Animist 
soldiers stationed in their thousands at the zones of Pachalla, Pibor and other garrisons in the South 
responded and followed Garang to the bush forming the SPLA and the SPLM.
895
  
   In the bush, the SPLM commenced to organise itself and produced a political document, 
manifesto, in which it defined the aims of the rebellion. The manifesto calls for the establishment of 
„New Sudan‟, which is a national political framework that reshapes Sudan towards equality, 
democracy, freedom and progress to all essential ingredients of Sudan‟s diverse society for its 
stability, under a genuine democratic pluralism. The SPLM articulated that the identification of 
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these defined aims was based on a transformative process taking into consideration the positive 
elements of „Old Sudan‟ and inserting them into the challenges that will face Sudan as a state.
896
       
6.1.1 The Birth of the SPLM and SPLA 
Social theory maintains that organisations need leaders with virtue of some unique qualities of 
consistency and capability to influence the behaviours of others. There are two types of leadership: 
first, instrumental leadership and second expressive leadership. The former refers to a leader 
organising a group in pursuit of certain goals. Such a leader poses courses of action and influences 
the members to follow him or her. The latter type is referred to as a creative leader that strives to 
maintain harmony and solidarity among the members. She or he keeps morale high and tries to 
minimise conflicts among the group.
897
  
   Some of the Christian Animist students reiterate that, before Garang could build the SPLM and 
the SPLA, there was already in existence a Southern Sudan revolutionary organisation composed of 
some former Anya Nya members calling itself Anya Nya II.
898
 This organisation was disorganised 
and lacked charismatic leadership quality.
899
 Garang emerged as both an instrumental and 
expressive leader and objected those to who wanted the movement to be called „Anya Nya II‟ 
insisting on the nationalist slogan based on the liberation of Sudan rather than the South alone. This 
was the birth of his revolutionary organisations, the SPLA and the SPLM.
900
 Garang‟s adoption of 
the slogan of liberating Sudan caused a dis-comfort among some Northern Sudanese Muslim Arab 
students. For instance, one student states the question as: “liberation of Sudan from whom?”
901
 The 
Nuba Muslim student at University of Khartoum provides the answer as: “The Northern Sudanese 
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Muslim Arabs dominated power and defined the national identity of the country as Islamic Arab. 
This is the definition which John Garang wants us … to be liberated from it, but Muslim Arabs ask 
the question; “liberation from whom?”
902
  
   A philosophical method of persuasion to acquire reputed wisdom divides the discussion into two 
preoccupations. The first is questions and answers and the second is definitions.
903
 Garang meets 
those Muslim Arabs of Northern Sudan that dispute his slogan for liberation with a reverse question 
“Do not ask me of liberation from whom, but liberation from what.”
904
 He argued that the minority 
Muslim Arabs use the Islamic religion as a tool of homogenising the heterogeneous Africans of 
other regions. This political initiative seeks to bring the combined five regions of the Northern 
Sudan into one body built on a religion and race. Such formation defined racially and religiously as 
„the Northern Sudan of Muslim Arabs‟. According to Garang, this method marginalises the majority 
Africans, under the minority Muslim Arabs. He concludes that the percentage of Arabs in Sudan in 
the first census after was a mere 31%, while Africans formed 61% and 8% were mostly West 
Africans stranded in Sudan, during their way or returning from Islamic pilgrimage in Mecca.
905
  
   Two months after the formation of the SPLM and the SPLA, Garang issued a manifesto for his 
organisation in July 1983 expounding his objectives. In this manifesto, the territorial national 
identity of Sudan is defined as multi-religious and multi-cultured. It presents the adoption of as an 
alternative resolution to the maintenance of this diversity within a united „New Sudan‟. The 
manifesto asserts that an ethnic pluralist constitution based on the territorial diversity of the country 
would protect the minorities and provide equal opportunities in sharing power and wealth as well as 
equal legal rights.
906
 In the view of Graham, the marginalisation of a state to minorities causes 
communal riots with the possibility that fresh disturbances could constantly break out. All these 
factors inevitably could pave the way for popular minorities to secede from a sovereign state. 
Graham concludes that the commitment to the conceptual idea of building a secular diverse nation-
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   Some students from the South argue that they rally behind the revolution, SPLM and SPLA, under 
the ideology of „New Sudan‟, because Garang‟s approach to the war assured them what they were 
fighting to obtain. The primary target was the liberation of the South.
908
 However, Garang pursued 
the war in tactical strategies in what he calls “transfer of war to the enemy, but the ultimate 
objective was always the liberation of Southern Sudan”.
909
 Garang never deviated from his essential 
aim of fighting for the liberation of the South against the successive governments in Khartoum. The 
aim in Garang‟s political vocabulary can only be understood through his military addresses to his 
soldiers. His vision of liberating the whole Sudan was to engage „the enemy‟ in a wider sense, but 
he knew in operation what he had wanted to liberate first. He demanded the bigger cake in order to 
receive an alternative as a hidden target. First, addressing his recruits at their graduation camp in 
Bongo in Ethiopia on 7 March 1985, Garang told the following apocryphal stories. First, he told the 
story of a well-known gluttonous man in Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan called Col Moung. One day, 
he came out from his homeland of Western Gogrial County, and found a large number of hunters 
skinning an elephant. He abruptly paused and told the hunters: „Please, listen, after you have 
finished the skinning of the prey, I want all of its meat with offal; I have a very serious hunger‟. The 
hunters knew Col is a very greedy well known man who meant what he said and unanimously 
reacted to him: „Coldit (Big Col) say something reasonable. We have been hunting this animal, 
since the morning and now you want all of it? You better ask for a thigh‟. „If I were to ask for a 
thigh, you would not have given it to me. Therefore, since you have now granted me a thigh, I am 
contented with it‟, Coldit replied. Similarly, Garang concluded that South Sudan is like that beast. 
Ask for the whole Sudan and at the end you would receive a thigh (Southern South).
910
  
   Second at the same place, Bongo on 14 April 1985, Garang gave a speech to the other graduates 
that said „Among you, there are those who question the principle of fighting for the liberation of the 
whole Sudan. This is because you think that we should liberate South Sudan without the political 
North. For me when „I was in school, I was not good at geography, therefore, I do not know 
precisely the geographical borders between the North and the South those who know the borders 
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should fight and when they have reached the complete liberation of the bound border that they think 
of as the South, then stop there. The South by then is believed to have been liberated. „Me, who 
does not know the borders between the South and the North, I will continue to fight and if I look 
behind and see nobody was following me, then I would definitely come back and join the liberated 
and independent South Sudan”.
911
  
   In the view of Johnson, there were two compelling reasons which made Garang name his 
organisation as a liberation movement for the whole Sudan. First, he wanted to recruit the 
indigenous African marginalised majority from the west of Sudan, the Nuba, the Darfurians in 
Darfur, Ingessana Hills at Southern Blue Nile and the Beja of the eastern Sudan to equally fight the 
centre. These regions, in his view are part of the „Closed District‟ laws of 1922 and 1925. The 
British colonialist system regarded these regions as African areas and Garang had wanted to revive 
that in the minds of these people. He constructed his ideological term that combined these groups as 
the „indigenous marginalised majority‟. Second, Garang was faced by the political circumstances 
that the regime of Ethiopia had no interest to provide logistical support to a separatist organisation, 
while itself fighting the Eritrean separatists. The primary objective of Ethiopia by then was to topple 
the government of Nimeiri that supported the Eritrea separatists.
912
 
6.1.2 Response of the Nuba 
Nuba Muslim and Christian students say that the Nuba people were quick to respond to the call of 
Garang. They began to identify themselves as the „marginalised‟. The question; how did other 
regions become Northern Sudan to the exclusion of the South? A Nuba student at University of 
Khartoum answers it as: “The South became a separate region, under the Muslim Arab ideology of 
adopting Islam as a model of religious uniformity. And the Nuba had to accept it, since Islam is a 
very important religion in their lives. Later, it turned out to be a method of marginalising the 
peripheries, including the Nuba”.
913
 Another Nuba student claims: “Marginalisation of the Nuba in 
economic and power distribution makes it easy for the Arabs to assimilate us, because, „a marginal 
person relies … on a wealthy person”.
914
 According to Doornbos et al., power in Sudan leaves some 
of its citizens without equal development opportunities in their regional sovereignties. It is a 
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phenomenon that transforms their identities as independent actors within their regions, but mere 
sub-ordinate people without decisions over the state‟s public issues within their respective regions 
in the country and such practice attracts the marginal areas to rebel against the centre.
915
  
  In 1986, the SPLM and SPLA attracted some Nuba to its ideological guerrilla activities and many 
of them marched to the training camps in western Ethiopia. In the following year, during the rainy 
season, the first battalion, Volcano of the SPLA guerrilla entered the Nuba Mountains, under 
Commander Abdel Aziz Adam al Hilu. This commander came intentionally to organise a large-
scale recruitment among the Nuba and reiterate the ideological discourses of the SPLM and SPLA 
in the region.
916
 A large Number of the Nuba young men volunteered to join the guerrilla movement 
as one student explains: “After our understanding of the political ideology of the „marginalised 
ones‟, our comrades moved and registered to join the training as soldiers of the SPLA.
917
 In May 
1987, Commander Yusuf Kuwa Makki, a Nuba politician came to the Nuba Mountains and the first 
military confrontation between the Nuba battalion of the SPLA and the army of the government 
took place in June at Rimla, an area to the south of Tira Limon district. There were further 
engagements in Um Dorein and Um Dulu, but the main purpose of the incursions was to mobilise 
the recruits at Achiron Mountains to volunteer for the SPLA. Small scouting groups were sent 
throughout the southern and eastern Nuba Mountains. In January 1989, a combined six battalions 
called „New Kush Division‟, under the command of the same Yusuf Kuwa Makki, again entered the 
Nuba Mountains region and attacked the government forces at different places in the region. Makki 
promulgated to the Nuba that: “We the Nuba have tried politics with the Muslim Arabs and their 
unstable political ideologies starting from Mahdism, Sudanese Socialist Union and Islamism, but 




6.2 The Sudanese Socialist Union and the shift to Islamism  
The research question how do you want the identity of Sudan to be defined in a national constitution 
and why do you think so? Some Muslim students answered this question as: “Most people in Sudan 
have lost trust in the current politicians. The legislature always fails to create a permanent 
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constitution for the people of Sudan”.
919
 One student notes: “President Nimeiri did well at first, but 
proved to be an unstable political soldier in his political ideologies. He captured … a democratically 
elected government, under the Islamic sectarian party of „Mahdism‟ in 1969 and constructed his 
single political party, the „Sudanese Socialist Union‟ (SSU) to operate in Sudan.
920
 Another student 
concludes: Under the SSU, the Sudanese people were oriented to „shout‟ on the public streets; „Our 
Union, Communal, and Freedom‟. Gradually, the President shifted us … from these beautiful 
slogans, after fourteen years in power to Sharia and forced us to learn a new slogan to shout; „there 
is no god, but God and Muhammad is His Messenger‟”.
921
  
   After having taken power in 1969, Nimeiri had lost the religious aspect of his ideological 
discourse. The Sudanese citizens were taught to sing the socialist ideological national anthem „Our 
Union; Communal; Freedom‟.
922
 The shift from this to the slogan of Nimeiri‟s late years „There is 
no god, but God and Muhammad is His Messenger‟ marks the change from the revolutionary 
ideology based on „socialism‟
923
 to the adoption of the extreme religious Islamic ideology, which 
included forced conversion of the citizens in Sudan. The opposition forces rebuked Nimeiri not for 
having adopted the Islamic religious slogan, but for having eradicated legally the freedom of 
religion in Sudan. For instance, the Head of the Muslim sectarian reformist group, the Republican 
Mahmoud Muhammad Taha was bitterly opposed to the imposition of Sharia as the only legal 
source in the national criminal and civil judiciaries. Taha argues that the teaching of Islam states 
“propagate the path of your Lord in wisdom and peaceful advice and argue with them in a kind 
manner. Your Lord is more knowledgeable of those who astray from His path and He is more 
knowledgeable of the guided one”.
924
 In reaction, Nimeiri accused Taha of apostasy and 
assassinated him. de Waal argues that President Nimeiri accused Mahmoud Muhammad Taha an 
Islamic theologian of the Republicans reformist movement of apostasy. de Waal concludes that, 
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   For the Christian and Animist students the Sharia displays the Church of Christ as a community 
which violates the Islamic order that prevents all forms of alcoholic beverages. Under the Sharia, 
the traditional way of Christian worship is quickly interpreted as a legalisation of alcohol 
consumption in the Churches of Sudan.
926
 According to Lesch, after the imposition of Sharia, 
Christian Churches in Sudan argued that the Sharia eliminated freedom of worship. An Italian 
Catholic priest was accused of having kept communion wine in the parish of St. Joseph in 
Khartoum. He was flogged in public court known as the „Court of Complete Justice‟. Episcopal, 
Presbyterian, Evangelical, Catholic Churches and representatives from the staff of Sudan Council of 
Churches (SCC) established a dialogue with Nimeiri. They wrote a petition document, where they 
cautioned him to review the application of Sharia. The Church leaders complained that its inclusive 
application had affected their rights as Christian citizens and placed them at the category of 
„second-class citizens. In conclusion, they urged the President to revive the pluralist secular laws 
that had respected religious equality among the citizens of Sudan.
927
 On the other hand, not only the 
Christian and Animist students reject the imposition of Sharia in Sudan, but the majority of Muslim 
students also do not accept it without public debate on the matter. For instance, some Muslim 
students argue: “You can‟t apply in the modern world a law that chops of the limbs of those who 
steal”.
928
 Another one claims: “A thief does not steal, for the sake of stealing; the state does not 
offer opportunities for him to access food, so I … don‟t support the adoption of Sharia, because it 
cuts their limbs”.
929
 One student concludes: “In Sudan poor people sleep without food and can be 
tempted … to sneak into the pockets of others, but the Sharia amputates them, so what is the use of 
it?”
930
 According to Burr, most of civil servants in Sudanese institutions opposed Nimeiri‟s new 
directives and tried to unseat him from power through mass demonstrations. On 27 March 1984, 
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three thousand medical doctors submitted their resignation in protest of unethical amputation of 
limbs to poor people in the country dominated by poverty.
931
 
   The amputation of human limbs within the judiciary system of Sudan divides the Islamic law, the 
Sharia at two categories. First, its adherents consider it as a worthy law that regulates the citizens of 
Sudan into the categories that abnormalise a healthy person into the new category of handicap by 
amputating the limbs, while they are un-sick, but healthy. In contrast, those who object its adoption 
in the Sudan political environment see it as a worthless law inserted into the public institutions in an 
organised legal order and they strive to resist its application in the country‟s judiciary system. Its 
adoption, however, in the judiciary makes them categorise such a judiciary as a system that 
regulates laws and moral codes towards „abnormality‟ of human limbs in the social institutions of 
Sudan. According to Lesch, after the rejection of doctors to the amputation of limbs, Nimeiri 
dissolved the „Union of the Doctors‟ jailed many of them and closed down University of Khartoum, 
where serious massive demonstrations were taking place. He finally imposed emergency law on 29 
April 1985. At the same time, the SPLM intensified its rejection to Sharia and overrun some army 
garrisons. Nimeiri tried to obtain military support from the USA in order to crush the rebellion, 
under John Garang. He approached the USA with the ideological clarification that tried to project 
the political violence between him and the Southern insurgents as was a war between the capitalist 
religious believers versus the Southern Communist atheists supported by Ethiopia. Some US 
officials from the State Department were not satisfied by this claim and acknowledged that the war 
was not ideologically instigated by Ethiopia.
932
.  
6.2.1 Nimeiri’s disagreement with the Islamists  
Some Muslim students present their views on the Islamic system in Sudan as one of them states: 
“Islamists in Sudan are political opportunists in our social structures. There is no anyone among 
them who applies Islam as it is in the Quran and that makes them change their visions. At last, we 
fail to produce a unified constitution that protects individuals.”
933
 another notes “At difficult 
political turmoil, Nimeiri resorted to Turabi to use his defunct Islamic Charter Front (ICF) 
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movement, but Turabi subordinated the SSU and wanted to apply his Islamic extremism and that 
led to his detention with other members of his ICF”.
934
  
   Students continue: “Nimeiri was an opportunist soldier”. He brought Turabi, the Islamic 
ideologue of the ICF into his system, SSU to support him”.
935
 “When Nimeiri realised that his 
political party, the SSU could not co-exist together with the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, he 
resorted to crush the ICF which was an organisation that collaborated with him to impose … Sharia 
by detaining their leader Hassan Abdullah Turabi. This Islamic ideologue advocates the Islamic 
constitution, where Sharia is the source of everything without any reference to SSU”.
936
 One of the 
students concludes that: “Nimeiri was an „opportunist soldier‟ he detained Turabi in order to restore 
political trust from the moderate Muslim majority in the North as well as the pagans from the South, 
but this new method was too late to rescue him”.
937
  
   Analysis to the instability of Nimeiri ideology unfolds that a political demagogue can exploit 
political circumstances with the expectation that may solidify his political power to remain intact; 
however, that is not possible always, due to the parallel visions of political ideologies. According to 
Lesch, on 25 September 1984, Turabi organised with his members of the ICF the first anniversary 
of the Sharia adoption in Sudan. He collected his Islamists and marched on the streets of the capital 
city, Khartoum with the slogans that projected the ICF as an independent body from the SSU, but 
standing only in support of the implementation of the Sharia in Sudan. In reaction, Nimeiri declared 
that his organisation, the SSU was the only legitimate party. He defined his identity in confrontation 






   On 10-11 March 1985, Nimeiri alleged the Islamists of having attacked the secularists and the 
Christian and Animist Students from the South at the University of Khartoum and arrested more 
than one hundred of them, including Turabi. In the South, the SPLA and SPLM were advancing 
against his installations of power and had forced the American company, Chevron to suspend its oil 
operation in the South as well as the French company that was digging the Jonglei Canal. At that 
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6.2.2 National Alliance for National Salvation  
After the execution of Mahmoud Muhammed Taha, under the allegation of being an apostate, 
Sudanese professionals at different institutions were furious about that political killing in the name 
of Islam and formed a new association on the very day, under the name National Alliance for 
National Salvation (NANS). The aim of that association was focused on the removal of Nimeiri 
from power through civil disobedience in all public institutions of Sudan.
940
  
   The alliance in Khartoum established contacts with some Sudanese professional workers in the 
Gulf Arab countries and the SPLM. Later the SPLM and the other Islamic sectarian Northern 
political parties, Umma, DUP, secular Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and other members of the 
NANS organised a political meeting in London. The meeting discussed what form of a constitution 
would be adopted, if Nimeiri was overthrown. The participants agreed unanimously on a written 
charter that called for the retrieval of the provisional constitution of independence in January1956, 
which allows political and religious freedom of expression in public media, beliefs, independent 
judiciary and maintenance of order and rule of law. It also called for the restoration of the 
democratic system based on pluralism
941
  
   In the opinions of some Christian and Animist students, the application of the Sharia provoked 
the popular uprising. It was a revolution of those who were seriously dissatisfied with the 
application of that law in the state. The TMC turned down the hope of the people and acted in 
favour of the NIF by avoiding its cancellation.
942
 One of them concludes that “The TMC captured 
the revolution of the victims of Sharia who had wanted it to be rescinded, but the army generals 
who exploited the situation were not members of NANS. So, they decided not to drop Sharia”.
943
  
     The claim of students that if the generals were members of NANS, they would have abrogated 
the Sharia is flawed. First, the charter which the SPLM ratified with the political North hung on 
superficial terms of democratic pluralism without reference to the underlying complex values of a 
democratic system. For instance, the charter refrained from addressing the issue of interlaced 
Islamic-Arab identity in opposition to the Christian and Animist secular identity. These two 
contesting definitions of Sudan‟s identity are basically responsible for the current instability of the 
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country. The London charter reaffirmed the necessity of the resumption of the democratic 
multiparty system of pluralism with its accompanying values of freedom of worship and expression, 
but there was no reference to the place of Sharia in the charter. Second, the composition of the 
TMC embodied representatives of the Southern Christians and Animists. Among the fifteen senior 
generals that composed the TMC, two of them that included Fabian Agamlong Guem and James 
Loro were both Christians from the South.
944
  The two Christians remained unconcerned about the 
inequality that Sharia created among the people of Sudan. According to Sumbeiywo, the dominant 
Christian organisation, the SPLM calls for the complete legislation of the secular constitution, 
instead of Sharia in order to permit freedom of worship equally to all citizens of Sudan.
945
 Third, 
the NANS was an unholy alliance, since its composition embodied Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the Head of the 
Umma party. Sadiq rejected the adoption of the Sharia, when he was out of power and refused to 




      The role of Sadiq Al-Mahdi towards the conflicting systems of the secular law and the Sharia 
remains a controversy among students of Sudan. In regard to the question “How do you want a 
national identity of these regions to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan and under what 
system suits Sudan best and why do you think so?” Some students claim that democratic pluralism is 
the „best‟ system, but its application in Sudan always reflects family democratic dynasty, where 
Sadiq never comes up with anything new except for the building of Islamic Arab culture in 
Sudan.
947
 One student states “Democracy is the best system, but those who apply it mostly come 
from the … corrupted families that exploited the people of Sudan in many ways including religion, 
Islam to equip themselves with wealth.  These political groups come from families that have (sic) 
practiced illegal means to access wealth from the citizens of Sudan.
948
  One Muslim student 
concludes that families whose grandfathers have practiced injustice, including slavery against their 
own citizens are not supposed to lead the nation, but our ignorance and poverty blinded the Islamic 
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   Al-Mahdi is the grandson of Abdul Rahman Al-Mahdi who resisted the British attempt to set the 
Animist slaves from the South free.
950
 However, the claim of rejecting some elite in assuming 
power, because of unethical means of wealth in the Third World is a very remote goal to be reached 
in Sudan. It can happen in the Western institutions, where history of politicians and sources of their 
wealth are kept in memory from one generation and transmitted diachronically to another 
generation. Mann observes that in some true democratic systems in the West, some social and 
political groups trace the history of contesting candidates for power. Children of dictators, 




    The interest of some students in removing Al-Mahdi from politics, because of being from the 
family alleged of slavery in the Black Animists from the South is not the major concern today. The 
primary concern is the political role the Prime Minister, Al-Mahdi played towards the drafting of a 
Permanent Constitution of Sudan, when he resumed power from 1986 and onward. One Christian 
Animist student explains: “We had expected Al-Mahdi would come to power and restore the 
equality of the citizens before the law, regretfully, instead he developed Islamic fundamentalism, 
during his tenure as a Premier in power.
952
  Another Muslim student states: “Sadiq as a Premier 
totally refused to restore the rights of the African traditionalists and Christians … to live as equal 
citizens with the Muslims, under a secular constitution by rejecting the earliest political attempts of 
the SPLM to nullify Sharia.”
953
 Further, another student claims that: “Al-Mahdi declared that the 
Muslim majority has a right to apply Sharia, if they want it and the minority of the Animists and the 
Christians must accept the choice of the majority and live with it.
954
 A Nuba Muslim student at 
University of Khartoum concludes: “There is no Muslim Arab in power in Sudan that can make a 
constitution that revokes Islamic law, unless the SPLM dictates such a leader to act”.
955
  
   Dictation of political terms came in 1989, when the SPLM, under Garang met in Ethiopia with the 
leader of the DUP, Muhammed Osman el-Mirghani and reached a consensus of „freezing‟ the 
Sharia in their historic document the „Sudanese Peace Initiative‟ (SPI) signed in Addis Ababa in 
October 1989. In Khartoum, Umma, SCP, National Party (NP) of the Nuba and the Southern parties 
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accepted the SPI contents and were scheduled to endorse it in the NCA. In reaction, the NIF, under 
Turabi instructed its cells in the army to abort the voting. Brigadier Al-Bashir seized power on 30 
June 1989, in a bloodless coup d‟état only twenty-four hours, before the Members of the NCA 
could vote on the „freezing‟ of the Sharia and revived the „Islamic fundamentalism‟ system. He 
called his coup the Revolution of National Salvation (RNS).
956
  
   Two hypotheses can provide for us the nature of the Sudan‟s Armed Forces (SAF) and the nature 
of the „Islamic fundamentalism‟ in accessing power. First, the emergence of „Islamic 
fundamentalism‟ through the might of the SAF suggests the dominance or the influence of officers 
of the Muslim fundamentalists in the SAF. There is no logic that soldiers in national barracks could 
acquiesce to the coup that disrupted the democratic legislature with the intent to insert Islamic 
ideology, if it was not under the control of Muslim fundamentalists. This hypothesis directs us to 
scrutinise the structure of the „Revolutionary Command Council‟ (RCC) that was headed by the 
Brigadier Al-Bashir and his first objective of the coup over the National Television of Sudan (NTS). 
In fact, the members of the RCC were fifteen and three of them were Christians from the South and 
the rest were Muslims. One of them, Colonel Martin Macuie Malual Arop explained over the NTS 
that: “Our revolution is entirely disconnected from Islamic fundamentalism; the fifteen of us 
represent the national characters of the SAF with complete aim to save the people of Sudan from 
the dysfunctional institutions of sectarian democracy and corruption. If it proves later that there is 
an Islamic religious ideology in the revolution that aims to transform our national identity into the 
Islamic image, then some of us would immediately quit‟.
957
  
   Quitting of his own free will was hardly difficult for Martin. On 11 March 1992, Colonel Martin 
was discharged from the RCC. Subsequently, in October 1993, the „Council of Forty‟ (CF) 
members composed of the NIF officers and its civilian technocrats chaired by Turabi worked in 
secret to dissolve the RCC and accommodated its Islamic adherents in sovereign positions.
958
 Al-
Bashir, however, concealed his aims of the coup in a communiqué aired out 30 June 1989. 
According to Jamal, Al-Bashir centred his revolutionary objectives on the first day of his 
revolutionary communiqué on the national media. He claimed that the objective of the coup was to 
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eradicate the „corrupt‟ system of democracy and revive unity among the people of Sudan.
959
 In 
contrast, Alex de Waal argues that the NIF soldiers captured power and supported a consistent 
economic corruption with businessmen in national institutions. The public assets of the state were 
plundered through privatisation. Promotions were based on personal qualities and connections and 
not on an objective qualification process. de Waal concludes that the regime became unpopular and 
people started to ask, why a corrupt system tried to teach them virtue and social morals.
960
  
   Approximately, two years after of the revolution, Al-Bashir commenced to unfold his 
revolutionary identity and aim contrary to the statement that was spread in the public media in his 
first communiqué. According to Voll, Al-Bashir explained: “We upheld the Islamic trend from the 
beginning. An Islamic organisation was created in the Armed Forces …, since 1971. When the 
revolution began in June 1989 … the leadership of the NIF met and decided … to join the 
authorities. We needed a number of their cadres … We are trying to apply the Islamic texts 
gradually and intend to establish an Islamic state in Sudan … We have programme for 
comprehensive daw’a (religious propaganda) as a new civilisation project”.
961
     
   President Al-Bashir provides us with a comprehensive explanation on how Muslim 
fundamentalists propagate their aim to build an „Islamic stat‟. First, a single person or a few of them 
can infiltrate the border of a certain institution; however, since the penetrated institution might not 
embrace the ideology, then he conceals the aim and the identity, until a certain degree of 
transformation to Islamic identity in the penetrated institutions is reached. At this phase, the fog of 
the mysterious identity and the aim are both removed and the task of implementation officially 
begins. Generally, the synopsis of this practice resembles a tick, a small insect that penetrates the 
skin of an animal and absorbs blood within.
962
 Second, an ideological Muslim cloaks his Islamic 
ideology in an irrelevant subject-matter such as „corruption‟ in order to cause nostalgia in the 
audience for an institution, while working gradually within those public institutions to emasculate 
them and embed the hidden ideological aim. Third, an Islamist ideologue is an antagonist of the 
democratic pluralistic system, where the majority outweighs minority ideology. At this stage, he 
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captures a democratic majority system through a mighty army or violence as a means to impose his 
vision of transforming national institutions towards an Islamic state.  
According to Rifat, Muslim fundamentalists claim that the establishment of the Islamic state does 
not require a majority; it is a work of minority believers. Islam as a religion of God does not gain 
victory through majority, since its historical experiences show that a small number of believers 
routed the majority with the permission of God to execute His divine order that focuses only on the 
foundation of an Islamic society ruled by Sharia.
963
  
   The experience of a state that applies Sharia radically into national institutions constructs citizens 
into social classes in terms of religions, where non-Muslims become second-class citizens. Such 
people falling into the second category of citizenship experience political marginalisation, even, if 
the Islamic legislature has legislated laws that protect their uniqueness. Those legal laws remain in 
the constitution and cannot open up equal opportunities for all citizens within an Islamic state. 
According to Hemmasi and Provok, the Iranian Revolution of „Islamic fundamentalism‟ seized 
power in 1979 and produced a constitution that relies on the sources derived from the Quran. This 
constitution recognises the non-Muslim Iranian minority, but in practice, this minority occupies the 
status of second-class citizens residing, under the protection of the Muslims‟ sovereignty. Today; 
the Iranian Jews endure all forms of power and wealth marginalisation. They cannot access 
employment opportunities as equal citizens with the Muslims and as a result, they engage 
themselves in petty jobs and professions.
964
.      
6.3 Ideology of the civilisation project  
According to social theory, a ruling group that adopts a racial ideology within the territory of a state 
may transform it into a set of beliefs to justify the rejection of the status quo with the minority in 
order to legitimate its interest.
965
 Some students including Muslims, Christians and Animists claim 
that radical Islam would have not succeeded in Sudan in 1989, under the democratic system of 
pluralism. Turabi observed that the existing political democracy was a barrier to the transformation 
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of Sudan to an Islamic nation-state.
966
 According to Sidhamed and Ehteshami, Turabi introduced 
his ideological discourse of building an Islamic state to Sudan‟s national army, which collaborated 
with him and seized power from the democratically elected government. Having gained power, he 
commenced to transform all social, political and cultural institutions of the state to radical Islamic 
fundamentalism, where the Sharia became the source of law for every single activity of the citizens. 
Turabi claims that the state is not nationalistic, because the ultimate allegiance is owed to God, and 
to the community of Islamic believers. This allegiance of the state to God negates the concept of its 
territorial sovereignty. It is subject to the higher norms of the Sharia as a „civilising project‟ 
representing the Will of God among Muslim believers. Sidahmed and Ehteshami conclude that, 
during that time, every institution was stocked with the members of his organisation, the NIF to de-
list any group resisting the trend of the tawajha el-hathari (civilising orientation project) equally 
known as the „civilisation project‟ based on Arabism and Islamism in Sudan.
967
  
   For Turabi, Sudan has no territorial sovereignty, since nationalism has only two purposes: First, 
God and second, a community of Muslim believers residing in the territory. According to Petterson, 
by 1994, Turabi had invited extremist Islamic organisations of Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah of Lebanon, 
the Palestinian organisations of the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), 
Islamic, Jama’at Al-Islamiyya of Egypt, and others from Eritrea and Algeria to come to Sudan and 
built their institutions.
968
 If the aim of the invitation to these Islamic organisations is related to the 
definition of Islamic nationalism, then what was the purpose of inviting Ilich Ramirez Sanhez, 
known as Carlos the Jackal, a non-Muslim originally from Venezuela convicted for several murders 
including, three men at the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna 
1975? The Government of France wanted Carlos for the alleged crime of terrorism, committed in its 
territory.
969
 For some students, Turabi faced difficulties in his methods of implementing this 
ideology on the multi-cultural and religious society of Sudan. This claim is widely expressed in the 
answer to the question, how do you want the identity of Sudan to be defined in a national 
constitution? Christians, Animists and also some Muslim students provide many reasons of their 
 
 
966 Wadia Ahmed Awad, Beja (Hadendawa), University of Khartoum “Under democratic debate, Sharia would have not 
been passed in the parliament. So, Turabi resorted to the army and took power to legalise Sharia”. 
967Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Ehteshami, Anourshiravan (eds.) (1996). Islamic Fundamentalism, Oxford: West view 
Press, p. 193. 
968 de Waal (2004), p. 97, 106. 
969 Petterson, Donald (2003). Inside Sudan Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe Revised and Updated, Oxford: 





rejection of the foundation of an Islamic state in Sudan, such as: “I want the identity of Sudan to be 
defined in a public constitution as a diversified pluralistic one; such a constitution respects my 
religions as a Dinka.”
970
 According to other students Turabi rejected such a constitution and 
legitimated discrimination by imposing Sharia in order to force the non-Muslims to become 
Muslims constitutionally.
971
 One of them concludes: “Those of Turabi never wanted the existing 
religious diversity. Hence, they legitimated Islamisation of the non-Muslims in the country in an 
Islamic-classical approach that legalizes the use of force in conversion.
972
  
6.3.1 De jure discrimination in Sudan  
Sociologically, de jure discrimination is referred to as legalised discrimination encoded in the 
national laws of a state.
973
 In general, Christian and Animist students in Khartoum argue that the 
current government, under President Al-Bashir discriminates against non-Muslims. The exiting 
legal system continuously applies an Islamic constitution that rejects the equality of a Muslim with 
an Animist or a Christian in Sudan. It allows a non-Muslim to change his religion to Islam, but not a 
Muslim to convert to another religion. In this sense, Christians and Animists have no equal value or 
status or identity in Sudan.
974
  
   Some students argue as: “I hate an Islamic constitution. Imagine, when Al-Bashir took power and 
applied his monolithic Islamisation, some Christians and Animists were converted into Islamic faith 
… and we had no complaints against their conversion. But when some Muslims in Omdurman were 
converted to Christianity, they were accused of apostasy.
975
 But in the view of another Muslim: 
“Apostasy must be applied, since our country is an Islamic state.”
976
 In reaction to the apostasy 
another student argues: In Sudan, a Muslim is prevented legally not to convert to Christianity or 
Animism. This shows my religion is not protected by the state as an equal citizen with a 
Muslim”.
977
 Others continue to claim: “Islamic constitution of Al-Bashir eradicates me from the 
territory as a citizen, because it claims that I am residing within the Muslim state under its 
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protection, so I am a mere second class citizen under its protection.”
978
 Finally, an Animist Dinka 
complains: “I as a Jieng Animist, under … religious constitution of Islam, Christians and Jews are 
the dhimmis who would live in the claimed Muslims territory of Sudan, because the moral due of 
Islam protects them. Yet, we are not equal citizens with the rest of Muslims. For the Animists like 
me, we are the outlaws, since we are not within the category of dhimmis”.
979
 
   In fact, Article 139 (b) of 1998 Sudan‟s constitution states: “All individuals have freedom of 
conscience and religion”.
980
 Ye according to Amnesty International reports, some provisions within 
the Sudanese law constitute discrimination against non-Muslims in the country. The Criminal Act 
of 1991 permits the non-Muslims to convert to Islam, but not vice-versa. This act defines a Muslim 
that changes religion as an “apostate”, which is a crime a punishable by death in Sudanese criminal 
courts.
981
    
   The permission for conversion to non-Muslims, but not Muslims establishes two dimensions. 
First, the law discriminates against the Muslims by prohibiting them to practice what is allowed to 
the non-Muslims. Second, it accelerates the assimilation of the Animists and the Christians in Sudan 
to Islam as the aim of the Government of Sudan. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that the 
Government of Sudan, under the NC of Al-Bashir has laid down conditions with the aim to 
assimilate the heterogeneous composition of religions and ethnicities to its version of Arabism and 
Islamism. Its legislature legitimates the Sharia to be the only free law in the regions of North 
Sudan. Under that law, there is no freedom for a Muslim to change to other existing religions in the 
country. For example, the Nuba school teacher, Mekki Kuku, who denounced Islam and converted 
to Christianity, was to be tried for apostasy, an allegation that leads to the death penalty in the 
Northern Sudan.
982
 De jure discrimination emerges also through the constitutional adoption of 
Jihad as an obligation of the citizens of Sudan. A Nuba Muslim student at University of Khartoum 
states: “The National Islamic Front, NIF, under Turabi with his old friend President Omer Hassan 
Al-Bashir in power introduced exclusively an Islamic system that kills the Muslims in Sudan, since 
1989, until the present day”.
983
 Another student argues: “By then, we thought the system adopted 
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Jihad to kill the non-Muslims at the South, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hill, but it turned out 
that we the Nuba Muslims were … excluded from the conference, where Jihad was discussed and 
declared in El-Obeid city. The mystery of excluding us from the conference became clear later in 
Nuba Mountains, when Jihad was applied against us in the region, irrespective of our being 
Muslims”.
984
 Article (4) of the Constitution of 1998 binds every Sudanese citizen to join Jihad as it 
states: “Defence of the motherland is an honour and Jihad is a duty”.
985
   
   The constitution of 1998 revived and legitimated the Islamic term „Jihad‟ and defined it as an 
obligation to the people of Sudan without a reference to the status of the non-Muslims. The African 
Rights reports that the last Jihad in Sudan was officially organised and inaugurated in the capital 
city of Northern Kordofan State, el-Obeid in 1992. According to the resolutions of the conference 
attended exclusively by Muslim Arab members, the Muslim Nuba people and the „Christian 
Animists‟ were defined to be in opposition to the government, being supporters of the SPLM and as 
such were „apostates‟. Under this definition, it was concluded that a Jihad would be adopted as a 
legitimate religious approach in assaulting the opposition, the SPLA forces within Sudan.
986
   
   In essence, Jihad is a Muslim religious term for the internal religious struggle for purity as well as 
external defence of religion. Today, it has become excuse to kill political opponents.
987
 Some 
Muslim students maintain that Muslim „fundamentalists‟ of Sudan of NC of Al-Bashir  have 
rejected a constitutional system that would allow the people of Sudan live as equal citizens before 
the law. The government constantly adopts a discriminatory religious Islamic orthodoxy appealing 
to the minds of the Muslims to fight a war against the Christians, Muslims and Animists of the 
South, under the Jihad. One student states: “During the war, Al-Bashir system entirely deceived the 
Muslim fundamentalists that the aim was to solidify an Islamic system in Sudan. For this reason, it 
rejected a pluralistic constitution that preserves the rights of all citizens”.
988
 Another argues: “My 
own observations proved that the aim was to appeal to the minds of those Muslims to assist his 
regime that was threatened by the Christians and Animists of the South”.
989
 Finally, another notes: 
“Al-Bashir adopts the radical Islamism of Jihad, because, he wants Muslims to see that Islam is 
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under a threat from Christians and pagans. For me, Christians and Animists could be sustained 
peacefully, if a non-Islamic constitution operates in Sudan”.
990
  
   The process of taking the name of religion, Islam into war is an exploitation of this religion. First, 
it sanctifies the political violence to religious one between the Muslims and the Christians in Sudan 
and in essence, there is no God inviting the Christians to kill the Muslims neither there is a God 
urging the Muslims to kill the Christians in Sudan. Instead, political warlords masquerade as 
religious figures, before God and make people kill themselves in the name of God as if there were 
direct telephone communications between them and God. This ideological discrimination 
transforms religion into the property of a political leader. It is religion that is used to line up 
warriors to fight the political dissidents. Addressing the seminar organised by Haram Strategic 
Studies in Cairo, Egypt, Nafi Ali Nafi, Presidential Assistant and Deputy President of the ruling 
party, the NC states: “Islam has been the target of its enemies in Sudan, but we are for God service 
and we have Jihadists to defend it from those elements.”
991
  
6.3.1.1 Organisation of Jihad and conflict of imams 
Some Muslim students from Nuba Mountains argue that „Muslims, Christians and Animists in 
Nuba Mountains have developed collective political consciousness as the indigenous people of the 
land. This public consciousness helps them to resist the political dominance of what they called 
Jellaba or Muslim Arab traders and Administrators. In their views, the Jellaba in Nuba Mountains 
exert their wealth to divide the fabric relationship that existed among the Nuba people by placing 
religious borders between them. They claim that the Jellaba tell the Nuba Muslims to keep away 
from the Nasari (Christian) or Nasareen (Christians) and the Animists in Sudan, but they reject this 
division and have effectively participated in the war against the Jellaba exploitation of the people in 
the name of the Islamic religion.  
   Students‟ arguments begin as: “In the Nuba Mountains, we know that the Jellaba use their wealth 
to divide us into categories of the Nassari Nuba, Muslim Nuba and Animist Nuba, but we do not 
want these categories, after all, we are all Nuba”.
992
 However, another one asserts that: “We the 
Nuba are well aware of „divide and rule‟ in the name of Muslim Nuba and Christian Nuba. This 
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clear understanding made us join the SPLM, since the time of its inception.”
993
 Yet another adds 
“Our union is very strong, we emphasis only our political identity, the Nuba, whether you are a 
Muslim, Christian or Animist, it does not matter among us. This is why we registered as the 
marginalised Africans with the SPLM.
994
 But another Nuba comments: “In reaction to this choice 
the Jellaba under Al-Bashir was angry and accused us of apostasy, because of our unity with the 
SPLM. For them, SPLM is an organisation of pagans who intend to wipe away Islam and the Arabs 
from Sudan. That is not true; our SPLM is composed of peace-loving people as our late leader Dr. 
John Garang loved all the people of Sudan from Halfa in the far north to Numuli in the south. It was 
for this reason we … became members of the SPLM”.
995
 Finally, one Nuba concludes: “W joined 
the SPLA/M to claim our rights from the Jellaba and under Al-Bashir, they reacted and defined us 
as a group against Islam and sent us their Mujahedeen (Islamic holy warriors) to kill our parents, 
sisters and brothers in the Nuba Mountains”.
996
 The students continue to claim that in reaction to 
this unity: “The Jellaba from the capital city, Khartoum reject our political unity as the 
„marginalised Africans majority‟ and define our unity as a deviation from the Islamic religious 
inspiration.‟
997
 Under this definition, another Nuba states: “our mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters 
in the jurisdiction of the SPLM were declared apostates”.
998
 One student concludes that “What is 
very strange; the imams that declared Jihad were Muslim Jellaba from the government side. We the 
Nuba … have our pious and devoted imams. If it was true, that our religion, Islam was under threat, 
then why was the selection of imams based on race (Jellaba), instead of us all as Muslims. 
Something suspicious was there and not the religion, Islam”.
999
  
   A UN Rapporteur investigating human rights and the Jihad, Gasper Biro compiled a report on the 
methods the imams adopted in support of the government against the opposition. The most striking 
part of the Biro report was the deliberate religionisation of the war. The government discussed the 
war with six Arab Muslim imams. Biro concludes that the Muslim religious discussants evaluated 
the development of the violence in the country and agreed to define it as a war between the 
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Southern infidels supported by the apostate Muslims against the Islamic government.
1000
 Six 
sheikhs or imams wrote and signed the fatwa that reads “The rebels in the south Kordofan and 
Southern Sudan started their rebellion against the state … and declared war against the Muslims. 
Their main aims are killing the Muslims, desecrating mosques, burning and defiling the Quran, and 
raping Muslim women. In doing so, they are encouraged by the enemies of Islam and Muslims. 
These foes are the Zionists, the Christians and the arrogant people who provide them with 
provisions and arms. Therefore, an insurgent who was previously a Muslim is now an apostate; and 
a non-Muslim is a non-believer standing as a bulwark against the spread of Islam. And Islam has 
granted the freedom of killing both of them”.
1001
  
   Theoretically, Jihad requires an imam to name for the mujahedeen an Amir, (an Islamic organiser 
of the mujahedeen) to lead them in battle.
1002
 According to African Rights, the conference that was 
held in el-Obeid promulgated President Al- Bashir to be the imam of mujahedeen and in turn, Al-
Bashir appointed Husseni, Governor of Kordofan to be Amir of mujahedeen. He also announced 
each from the Muslim Arab sectional leaders that attended the conference as Amirs at their different 
domains.
1003
 In answering the question: What is an indecent or immoral practice in the teaching of 
your religion and how does your religion punish violators? One Muslim student describes Jihad 
that was declared against the Muslims and Christians in Sudan as „a serious sin‟. He states: “you 
cannot declare Jihad against other faithful Muslims and Christians. Those who do so for their 
political mobilisation commit a serious sin in the name of God”.
1004
   
    Jihad was thus used by the Arab Muslims to launch attacks against other Muslims, but non-Arabs 
in the Nuba Mountains as well as the non-Muslims of South Sudan. In reaction to the declaration of 
Jihad, the imams and Muslim scholars from the Nuba Mountains dismissed the fatwa that was 
issued against them from el-Obeid and defined it as an illegitimate Islamic verdict. One of them, 
Sheikh Ismael Suleiman Al-Nur, imam of Eri mosque argues that: “The enemy has no religion; it 
burns our mosques and Quran and even, hunts for the imams to kill them. We have heard the 
version of the Muslim Arab government of Sudan that claims we are helping the kuffar (infidels) 
and therefore, we too are kuffar … I have a message for Turabi. I would like to remind him of Surat 
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al-Baqrra, where God says: „He who kills another Muslim intentionally will have everlasting hell‟. 
We are not kuffar, we are faithful Muslims and this Jihad is for stealing, looting and killing 
discriminately innocent people in Sudan”.
1005
. 
6.3.1.2 Effects of Jihad on civil society  
A great number of Muslim Nuba students from Nuba Mountains and Christian Animist students 
from the South claim that they have witnessed the role of the government forces, during the time of 
Jihad.”
1006
 One Nuba describes the application of Jihad as: “It was a disastrous phenomenon that 
has left terrible and negative effects of relationships between the Nuba Muslims and Jellaba 
Muslims in Sudan general and Nuba Mountains in particular”.
1007
 According to de Waal, the intent 
of Jihad was to clear off the Nuba Mountains of the Nuba people. Deadly squads were sent to the 
Nuba community leaders in their villages, while Military Intelligence (MI) arrested the intellectuals 
of the Nuba in the towns making them to disappear. Khalid Abdel Karim al-Husseini, a younger 
brother of the governor who had served as security intelligence at the office of the governor and 
later defected to London in 1993, presents many accusations against the Government of Sudan. 
Khalid says that, during his terms of active duty, the government collected the intellectuals and the 
professionals of the Nuba to ensure that the Nuba had no one to speak for them. Contacts to the 
outside world were sealed off, so that no one would know what was happening to the Nuba people. 
In 1995, the government evicted many Nuba from their villages to avoid direct international 
scrutiny of the situation.
1008
  
   According to the Nuba Muslim students, during the Jihad, the government forces defined many 
civilian areas as „villages of apostates‟ and reduced them to rumble. Their mosques were 
categorised as being profaned and were incinerated. These areas include Kuada, Kodi, Kucama, 
Kumu, Toror and Um Derdin, Fama in the Shatt Damam area, Kwololo, Um Muzaria, Hajar el-
Dabib and Lagawa, where Mujahedeen of Arabs massacred ninety-eight Nuba people.
1009
 
According to African Rights, during the Jihad against the Nuba, the Mujahedeen launched assaults 
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   For the Christian and Animist students, Jihad was a scourge to their villages. Jihadists with the 
government soldiers used to come out from their different garrisons in the South to attack villages 
and kill people, loot cattle and burn houses.
1011
 According to the Sudanese Human Rights reports, 
an unknown number of people were killed in ten villages of the African „Christian Animists‟ in 
eastern Upper Nile of the Southern Sudan. The scourge of the attack was, under the category of 
Jihad. Fifty-nine dead bodies were found in those burnt villages, including the Pastor, Jacob 
Manyel who was burnt to death.
1012
  
   Looking at Jihad in relation to the nature of its practice makes one to describe it as a scorched-
earth strategy, since it was extensively carried out throughout the areas of the South. For instance, 
the areas of the Dinka in Gogrial, Abyei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal of Aweil counties were 
targeted on the ground by the Mujahedeen, while aerial bombardments targeted the villagers and 
cattle. Sudanese Human Rights reports that the Sudanese government bombed the Dinka villages, 
while the army of Mujahedeen cleared the ground of its civilians. Aerial bombardment had become 
an everyday experience. Listening to the sound of the flying aircraft, the Dinka would easily 
differentiate reconnaissance planes from the fighter bombs or a relief transport aircraft. They 
prepared ditches around their safe havens in their jungles and swamps of the Nile to protect their 
families from air raids. Sudanese Human Rights concludes that on 15 May 2000, the Sudanese 
government authorised the aerial dropping of relief aid at the village of Akak; however, on 16 May 
the Sudanese Air Force bombarded Akak using an Antinov bomber. The Antinov dropped bombs
 
 
killing unknown number of people.
1013
  
   In addition, aerial bombardments devastated the Dinka villages at the border areas between the 
North and the South. These badly depopulated areas included the vast counties of the Dinka around 
Abyei, Gok Machar and Aweil, where unknown number of children, adult women, men and cattle 
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   The majority of the Muslim Arab students refrain from providing responses related to the issue of 
Jihad; however, one of the Muslim students provides an answer to the question that states “What is 
a practice in your religion regarded as sinful, indecent or immoral in which a violator is sentenced, 
what you think of it and how to deal with believers of other religions violating the same practice in 
Sudan?  One student argues that: “There are no practices which I can really grade here as sins 
within our campus, beyond the Jihad of Al-Bashir and Turabi against the people of the South and 




   Some moderate Muslims‟ politicians in dialogue with the Christian leaders agreed on the 
definition of the conflict in Sudan as political and economic violence and not a religious war. The 
ruling „Muslim fundamentalists‟, however, insisted and characterised it as an Islamic one, where the 
inclusive Muslims are invited to participate in the war to launch Jihad against the opposition 
composed of Muslims, Christians and Animists fighting against the government of Sudan. During 
the conference of the religious dialogue between the Muslims and Christians that was held in 
Beirut, capital city of Lebanon, the Christian Pastors accused the „Muslims fundamentalists‟ of 
having shifted the civil violence based on socio-economic dispute to a religious war between the 
inclusive Christians on one side fighting the Muslims in Sudan. Such a definition legitimated the 
Mujahedeen to launch extensive violence against the civil population in the South without 
discrimination of who were rebels and who were mere civilians. In its resolutions, the conference 
rejected the adoption of the religious tones in war and defined the violence of Sudan as 
economic.
1016
   
   The primary concern today is that the application of Jihad and its method in South Sudan has 
created a new view among the Christians and the Muslims of the South concerning Islam as a 
religion that seeks to eradicate the people of South Sudan. For example, a Dinka Muslim student 
argues: “When Muslim Arabs entered into my homeland, Abyei in the South Sudan with the 
message „God is the Most Great‟, we thought the call was a religious prayer of love, dedication for 
human salvation and people attended the prayers. After the declaration of Jihad against us, this call 
has changed in Abyei County. When a Muslim Dinka in Abyei heard the voice „God is the Most 
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Great‟, everyone knew that death had haunted them. The Dinka would know that the Mujahedeen 
have come with the voice of death and ran in astray to ... different directions for sanctuary”.
1017
  
   This perspective of war in Sudan, under the slogan of Jihad has also created a new cultural 
anxiety and uncertainty between the Muslim Arabs at the North and the heterogeneous African 
Christians, Muslims and Animists residing in the South. According to Gudykunst, Anxiety is a 
feeling of discomfort that emerges, when people from different cultures meet each other in their 
institutions. Uncertainty is referred to the perceived unpredictability that results from this 
interaction.
1018
 In Escape from Slavery, the True Story of My Ten Years in Captivity and My 
Journey to Freedom, Bok and Tivan tell of the tragic uncertainty of Dinka ethnic group life in 
general after their interactions with the Muslim Arabs. Bok reiterates that his mother sent him to 
sell eggs and peanuts at a bustling market near his home village in the Southern Sudan. There 
Muslim Arab Jihadists burst into the market place. They were armed with rifles and long knives 
and saw them immediately busy with the murder of the Dinka men and women. When, people ask 
him, he explains: “I saw the dead Dinka men lying all over the marketplace. I saw more dead bodies 
than I could count-without heads, others looking as if they had just decided to lie down in the dust 




   Christian and Animist students testify that, after the declaration of Jihad, they had always 
experienced attacks, killings and displacements from their villages and moved to towns seeking 
protection from human rights agencies. Yet, in the towns they also frequently experienced 
discrimination, sometimes with lethal consequences.
1020
   
6.3.2 De facto discrimination  
As a term of social sciences, de facto discrimination refers to informal discrimination entrenched in 
social customs against a specific group.
1021
 Many Muslims students claim that the present 
government in Sudan advocates different procedures in dealing with the Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) of Christians and Animists from the South, Muslims from Darfur and Nuba 
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Mountains in internal social structures of different cities, where they congregate to evade organised 
government assaults by militias on their villages. One student explains this situation as: “I see 
„sinners‟ in the structure of power in Khartoum. The government forces attack the indigenous 
African Christians, Muslims and Animists in their areas in Ingessana Hills, Darfur, South Sudan 
and Nuba Mountains”.
1022
 Another adds “And those who escaped from these … organised and 
discriminatory assaults moved into exodus to some big cities, under the control of the government 
expecting the international humanitarian organisations to protect them. When some of them are 
rehabilitated by some humanitarian agencies as IDPs, the Arab Muslims in power stir their Arabs in 
social structures at these areas to submit petitions to the government accusing them of having 
practiced customs oppose to the Islamic teaching.‟
1023
 A Muslim Fur notes that: “When the 
accusation is made, then the government acts by denying the IDPs equal access to water, schools 
and healthcare in their places. They expose them to become victims of abuse and humiliation by 
transferring them into a desolate desert and occasionally massacre them in those camps”.
1024
 On the 
other hand, a Christian Animist student argues that: “Proportionally, prevention of services from the 
IDPs is a lesser issue and the greater one is the „conspiracy‟ within the customary institutions of the 
Muslim Arabs. Every system under them applies „conspiracy‟ that causes the death of a large 
number of people from the Christians and Animists of South Sudan. In Sudan, it is possible for the 




   The displacement of Christians and indigenous civilian Muslims from the South, Nuba Mountains 
and Darfur is primarily due to the widespread of violence, under Jihad.
1026
 Yet, the IDPs experience 
serious de facto discrimination also from successive governments. The former democratic 
government led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the present government both have created for them 
wretched and sordid conditions by subjecting them to massacre, abuse, humiliation and mockery 
against them within public institutions. First, Sanderson observes that the democratically elected 
government of Sadiq Al-Mahdi and dislodged by Al-Bashir in military coup in June 1989, 
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disregarded the values of humanity by adopting discrimination within national institutions against 
the Dinka ethnic Christians and Animists of the South. The regime recruited and armed the militia 
of Arabs; known as muraheleen masquerading to fight the insurgents the SPLA. In practice, the 
muraheleen attacked the Dinka civilians at their villages accusing them of being supporters of the 
insurgents. Such practice has caused the displacement of men, women and children of the Dinka 
who moved to the city of Dhein, Southern Darfur. Thousands of the Dinka and women were 
„massacred‟ in March 1987, apparently in an operation planned and organised by the government 
organisations.
1027
 Second, in 1994, the UN report accused the Government of Sudan, under 
President Al-Bashir of pursuing an undocumented pattern of discrimination in the public institutions 
of the state against the Christians and Animists from the South. Their movements were restricted, 
places of worship bulldozed, and they were even deprived food. According to the report, such 
methods evicted the IDPs from their camps and forced them to the desert.
1028  Francis Deng 
witnessed their conditions and described that they were most appalling. The IDPs resided in 
squatter urban areas, where they endured hardships as the government deprived them of shelter and 
food leave alone access to education, health and political rights.
1029
 
   Little has changed after this, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator; Ameerah Haq reported that the 
government forces attacked the IDPs in the Kalma camp, at the suburb of Nyala capital city of the 
Southern Darfur State on 25 August 2008, accusing them of misconduct. Sixty heavily armed 
military vehicles entered the camp that hosts more than 80,000 IDPs. Terrified IDPs reacted and 
armed themselves with sticks, knives and machetes, but the government forces set about shooting at 
them and their straw huts putting them a blaze. Such actions severely threaten the safety and 
security of civilians who have a right to protection, under International Humanitarian Law. Haq 
concluded that the UN urge for restraint and call for the immediate establishment of a humanitarian 
corridor, so that the injured might be evacuated.
1030
 Such acts of de facto discrimination produce 
new identities based on racial definitions among the people as it can be seen from the students of 
the South. The majority of them claim that they have experienced unjustified discrimination from 
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the Northern Muslim Arabs in control of power and wealth and that such treatment has built a 
history of politically shared experiences of hardship and discrimination among them transforming 
them into a unified new political identity of the “the marginalised majority”.
1031
 According to Idris, 
political marginalisation and discrimination against the peripheral African groups by the successive 
governments have caused the heterogeneous populations from the South to unite and claim 
nationalism. Idris believes that in due course, their nationalism will lead to the achievement of an 
independent nation-state from the Muslim Arabs of North Sudan, where they can revive their 
cultural values banned by the Northern Sudan institutions.
1032
  
6.3.3 Ideological Islam versus an Ordinary Islam 
One question in the questionnaire used in this research asks: “How many festivals do you celebrate 
in your religion; where and how do you offer sacrifice and do you face restriction or limitation of 
worship in anywhere in Sudan?” This question elicited controversial responses from the students. 
Some Muslim students claim that: “Islam has given clear method of worship to God as they are 
found in Holy Quran and Sunna. Diversity in religion is a wrong path; a Muslim must acknowledge 
only God and His Messenger and nothing more or less than this holy recognition”.
1033
 Another 
student offers a serious rejection to religious diversity and states: “It is necessary for our Muslim 
politicians in the country to address religious diversity seriously and remove away pagans‟ practices 
among us”.
1034
 A third one claims that: “It is worthy for a Muslim to please God and not to promote 
pagan beliefs disguised as diversity in cultures”.
1035
 One Muslim concludes: “There is a need to 
close off diversity in religions and cultures in our Islamic territory of Sudan”.
1036
 
   The conclusions of these Muslim students about the religious diversity in Sudan have not offered 
alternative solution to the state on how to address the existing and dominant reality of religious and 
 
 
1031 Amal Nur Al-Din Mohammad, a Muslim Nuba, Omdurman Ahlia University: “We have a shared problem that is 
unjustified mistreatment and discrimination of us by Arabs, because we are African Muslims, Christians and Animists 
from Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana. Our shared hardships of lives and discriminations form all the Arab 
Muslims systems in Sudan made us to be one with those in the South, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana. We consider it as 
our nationalism of the marginalised majority.”   
1032 Idris, op. cit., p. 24.  
1033 Al-Nahar Ali Mohammad, Juhayinna Arab of El-Gezira, University of Khartoum from.   
1034 Jadwa Mohammad, a Muslim, a Ja‟alei Muslim University of Khartoum.     
1035 Majid Abdullah Ahmed, a Shaiqqiyyia, Omdurman Ahlia University.    







 Instead, it appears that they support a policy of eradicating diversity and 
substituting a homogenised Muslim population. On the other hand, the majority from the Muslim 
students supports the presence of Animism and Christianity as legitimate religions in Sudan and 
rejects the concept of eradicating them. This appears in the questionnaire question: “How 
conversion from one religion to another religion in Sudan is conducted; do you encounter an 
obstruction on the process and have you ever felt that there has been an interference of your ethnic 
customs, cultures and traditions to your religion, if yes, please explain?” These students present 
their arguments claiming that: “Muslims of Sudan never knew Islam. Some became Muslims in a 
popular way or on the virtue of their parents, who might have been influenced by Islam mixed with 
politics and Arab culture.  Such believers transform Islam into political ideology and at that phase, 
the religion deviates from its authentic category of faith, where we take it as a private issue into 
ideological religion”.
1038
 Another one states: “If the Islamic government in power wants peace in 
Sudan, it must accommodate religious and ethnic diversity in the state, including free worship of the 
Christians and the Animists”.
1039
 One student noted: “In Holy Quran, God dictates respect to 
diversity as states „O mankind, surely We have created you from a male and a female, and made 
you nations and tribes that you know each other”.
1040
 Finally, an open-minded student says: “In our 
university, I have some friends from Christians and Animists, yet, I worship God in the way He 




   The moderate Muslim students provide an alternative resolution that could be interpreted as 
religious tolerance towards people of different religious cultures to live together and exercise their 
different methods of worship. Constitutionally, there are two sources of law in Sudan, the Sharia for 
the Muslims and customs for the Christians and the Animists. For instance, Article (6) of the 
Interim Constitution of 2005, states: “The state shall respect the religious rights to: (a) worship or 
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6.3.3.1 Suppression of libation 
The questionnaire included a question that states: “How many festivals do you celebrate in your 
religion; where and how do you offer sacrifice and do you face restriction or limitation of worship 
in anywhere in Sudan?” A Dinka Christian Animist explains how religious ritual libation is 
conducted among the Dinka and Nuer. He describes: “Libation is one of the oldest religious 
customary ritual performances among us. It is a duty of the Dinka women to produce a sort of drink 
called mou (alcohol) manufactured from milled sorghum flour blended with water and cooked to the 
stage of becoming … semi soft and solid. This substance is mixed with water and traditional yeast 
made of sorghum and left to spend sufficient time to transform itself into alcohol. At this phase, it is 
sifted and its water is entirely transformed into a chemical liquid known traditionally mou. This 
liquid substance aggregates the Dinka people to come together and share it as food and libation to 
the souls of the other world. Those who drink take it as food and libation, while those who do not 
drink participate in it as a libation. Mou with its meaning of libation is not allowed … in Khartoum 
constitutionally. Women who produce this kind of associated religious drink are detained and 
punished in the jurisdiction of the Northern Sudan”.
1043
  
   The sharing of mou transforms it into the status of religious rite, because, it revives the moments 
of communion relationship between the departed souls to the next world and the individual relatives 
that might be drinking or not drinking, but attending, listening and watching the drinking ceremony. 
It reminds them of the continuity of relationships between the past souls and the present people on 
the earth as perceived community. The Islamic North, however, interprets the rite as illegal 
consumption of liquor and detains its producers, the women. Amnesty International reports that one 
of the houses of a Christian family at the suburb town, Haj Yusuf in Khartoum, where majority of 
the IDPs from the South reside was assaulted by the government police force, because the Dinka 
family in that house was alleged to have produced alcohol and drunk it. Amnesty concludes that the 
attack contradicts the legal penal code of Sudan, where article 78 (2) articulates that the act of the 
non-Muslim drinking as opposed to the dealing in alcohol is punishable, if it is in public places or it 
causes annoyance to others.
1044
  
   The detention of Christians and Animists, because of alcohol may depend on the interpretation of 
the customary laws, but the constitution of Sudan that was in effect when Amnesty reported the 
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incident of this detention permits the laws related to religious customs. Article 139 (a) of the 
Constitution of 1998 states: “Sharia, then consensus of the people expressed through referendum, 
the constitution and customs are the sources of law”. This is very plain, unless there is an 
interference of parallel interpretations; otherwise, the constitution allows the customs as the sources 
of laws for non-Muslims, but the reality is different. Often, when a group of Animists conducts 
religious rituals of libation, the security of the state considers the act as a consumption of alcohol; 
however, alcohol is not prevented constitutionally to the non-Muslims. Article (16) of the same 
constitution enumerates that the state will seek by laws and directive policies to purge society from 
… the consumption of alcohol by Muslims.
1045
  
   At this stage, the exclusion of the Christians and the Animists from the Islamic laws which 
illegalise consumption of alcoholic beverages is defined and legalised. The consumption of mou as 
a customary liquor associated to the religious rites of the Dinka and Nuer in locations, where 
Muslims also live conforms to the first religious tolerance between the Muslims and the Christians. 
Its rejection is totally irrelevant to the prophet Muhammad tolerance towards the religious worship 
of other faiths. According to Aziz, Prophet Muhammad has taught tolerance to Muslims towards 
other religions before, one year of his death, he illustrated a concrete example of freedom in 
religions, when a large delegation of Christians from Najran, near Yemen visited him, under the 
guidance of their religious clerics. The reason for their visit was to discuss the existing differences 
between two faithful doctrines of Islam and Christianity. The host accommodated the visiting 
Christians in the rooms which were attached to the mosque. Later, the faithful Christians enquired 
from the host, the prophet a place to assemble for Christian religious offerings and rites. In turn, the 
prophet directed them to perform their rituals in the mosque adjacent to their rooms.
1046
 
   The example of the Prophet to his host marks Islam as a private faith that tolerates religious rituals 
of a diverse religious society. According to de Waal, it is of great significance to distinguish 
„popular Islam‟ and ideological Islam. The two are antithesis as the former appreciates a 
phenomenon of peaceful diversity, where Islam is regarded as a private faith and the latter takes 
Islamism as an inclusive ideological faith. This ideological Islam has been in political domination in 
Sudan and its adherents control power and sponsor their organisations and agencies in social 
structures in order to build an assumed utopian Muslim society based on the Sharia. de Waal 
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concludes that the consequences of the implementation of this aim in national institutions are 
suppression of cultural pluralism in the country.
1047
  
6.3.3.2 What is wrong with Islam? 
For some students, suppression of cultural diversity in the name of a religion is described as a 
„wrong‟ practice that leads the Muslim away from the right teaching of Islam that considers 
tolerance towards other religions, since Islam states: “There is no compulsion in religion”.
1048
 
According to Ansari, the development of what looks like homogenous Islamic fundamentalism 
operating effectively today globally for the revival of a monolithic Islam has reinforced popular 
perception in the Western World of what appears to be “wrong with Islam”.
1049
 Nevertheless, this 
writer argues that something is „wrong‟ with people and not Islam as a religion. In Sudan, the 
author has witnessed that Muslims, Christians and Animists are not allowed to sell food during 
Ramadan, a fasting month of Muslims. In answer to the questionnaire question that asks: “Is 
religion important and what is your concept about the world in accordance to your religion, does it 
allow space for other religion(s), if so, please explain?” The majority of Christian, Animist and 
Muslim students argue that religion is a private business of individuals and allege the Government 
of Sudan of having constituted laws that fight religious diversity. The students believe as there is a 
need for political forces to constitute a constitution that promotes religious diversity in Northern 
Sudan
1050
 rather than formulating an Islamic law in a way that fits Muslim Arab culture at the 
expense of the African Muslims, Christians and African traditionalist cultures.
1051
 Religion is a 
private belief of individuals; however, it does not function in that way in the Northern Sudan. 
During Ramadan, the government police detain people that sell food for non-Muslims in Northern 
Sudan, including Khartoum, our capital city of all citizens that include Christians, Muslims and 
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   Constitutional Court Act of Sudan Chapter six (6) Article (24) states: “Owners of restaurants and 
cafeterias and everyone selling food or drink must not sell during the day during Ramadan”.
1053
 
Those who violate this constitutional provision are detained and punished before criminal courts. 
Amnesty International reports that the application of the Sharia in Sudan places the women at a 
disadvantage. In the towns of Northern Sudan, women hold responsibilities in the majority of 
households. Men might be in the national service of army, dead or to be absent searching for 
agricultural work far away from the cities. This situation obliges women to organise some 
cooperatives to sell peanuts, tea and food, but the policemen arrest them and charge them and they 
can be sentenced to heavy financial fines or imprisonment.
1054
  
   Some Muslim students from the North claim that laws are made in Sudan to promote religious 
intolerance: “Muslim Parliamentary Members in Sudan reject the enactment of one constitutional 
law that promotes diversity”.
1055
 “Laws are only enacted to serve the interest of religious 
intolerance. It is intolerance which brought the existing hatred between the Muslim Arabs versus 
the African Muslims, Christians and Animists in Sudan”.
1056
 Another one states: “It is this religious 
mis-representation that caused the last war between the Christians and the Animists of the South 
against the Muslims in power. This kind of legal initiative has developed and created political and 
social hatred between the Muslim Arabs at one hand against the Christians Animists from the 
South”.
1057
 A liberal-minded student concludes: “I always tell my Muslim colleagues that it is wise 
for us, Muslims, Christians and Animists to introduce a new chapter of religious relationship, on the 
basis of tolerance, because that approach will help each one of us to understand the traditions of the 
opposites”.
1058
 According to Ingpen and Wilkinson, to know the cultures, traditions and customs of 
our neighbours or to cross borders into other states helps us to be more tolerant. The UN defines 
tolerance as a total recognition and appreciation of others as they are. It requires an active ability to 
listen and appreciate others. All in all, it is a sound foundation for political, civil and social 
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   Prevalence of religious „hatred‟ in social structures of Sudan is easily shifted to the level of 
igniting violence, a violence that causes human tragedy and dire situation for food and safety.
1060
  In 
this regard, the existence of conflicts emerging from religious intolerance, power and wealth 
sharing in Sudan dictates political leaders to introduce political alternatives in addressing them. 
6.4 Search for conflict resolutions 
The absence of an acceptable constitutional system for the citizens of Sudan breeds violence. 
Therefore the question “What system suits Sudan best and how do you want national 
identity……… to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan and why you think so?” is an 
essential one in the research questionnaire. The answers reflect the students‟ different opinions, in 
regard to the construction of national identity in Sudan constitutionally. Their opinions could 
contribute in building a unified constitution, where every citizen and every culture is represented. 
One of the students argues that: “Sharia is a law from heaven. It organises our social and political 
life as Muslims and would be difficult for the SPLM to establish the New Sudan that rejects this law 
in Khartoum, unless it applies that in the territory of the South”.
1061
 
   Some relevant views to the promotion of the Sharia come from the answers to the questionnaire 
question that states: “What are practices in your religion regarded as indecent or immoral, in which 
a violator must be sentenced and do you think such practices are manifested at your university 
campus and any other place in Sudan?” Some students who have answered this question argue that: 
“Currently, after the CPA of 2005, „the New Sudan‟ is on the process in the South. Women in the 
South dress in immodest mini-skirts. So, the North and the South are two totally different worlds in 
terms of culture, because, our women in the North dress in modest clothes in order to show their 
Islamic identity as good Muslims”.
1062
 Another student remarks: “We have a solution to the conflict 
of cultural identity in Sudan. „New Sudan‟ is an evil system and thus, those who want it, let them go 
to the South and make their own country of secularism, where a Muslim rejects injunctions of the 
Quran. I hate to watch women of the, so called New Sudan walking around here at our campus 
without scarves at their heads, including Khartoum, the city of Islam”
1063
 Finally, another echoes 
these sentiments and states: “For us Muslims, scarf is a traditional dress received from the modest 
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women of the Prophet Muhammed. So any pious Muslim woman takes it on her head to show a 
respect to Muslims. It is important for a Muslim woman to conceal her body, which the secularists 
of the „New Sudan‟ dislike. Let them go … and build their independent state”.
1064
  
   In contrast, other Muslims who answered the questionnaire question: What are the duties of the 
faithful in your religion and the roles of women argue: “Let me be very clear, we in the „New 
Sudan‟, if the National Congress Party does not want a secular state, then we in Nuba Mountains 
would join the South. I love freedom that does not discriminate. Sharia discriminates against non-
Muslims and women, so why do we live here?
1065
” One Muslim concludes that: “Anyone in Sudan 
who needs a permanent constitution for all people, whether Muslim Arabs, Muslim Africans, 
Christian and Animist Africans must apply the model of John Garang of the „New Sudan‟. This 
political ideology of Garang creates for the people of Sudan a better constitutional system that is 




   The system that Garang advocated is based on the dialectical concept of the „New Sudan‟ vision. 
It is structured in phases, which he called „Modalities for the Solution‟ of the conflict of identity in 
Sudan. Garang considered these modalities as conflict resolutions for war between the SPLM and 
the Government of Sudan.
1067
  The first of these modalities is the structure of the state, Sudan, under 
the name „New Sudan‟. Garang defined New Sudan as a democratic transformed Sudan attractive to 
all citizens. The basis of this attractiveness is the separation of the state from religion. According to 
him, a constitutional system, where laws are derived from any religion eradicates freedom, equality, 
liberty and respect of fundamental human rights of citizens. For him, taking religion into a 




   Furthermore, addressing the audience on 20 March 2002, at the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia in 
the United States, Garang said that the long negotiations of the SPLM and the present government 
disprove the feasibility of the „New Sudan' model. Therefore, the SPLM negotiated to achieve 
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model two, the „Sudanese Commonality‟ based on a confederate system. The SPLM resorted to this 
model, because the Islamic North insisted that the Sharia must not be separated from politics, but 
accepted the exemption of the South. However, the experiences of the exemption of the South from 
the Sharia in legal procedures have proven to be flawed. The Christians and Animists still remain 
victims of the Sharia to the extent of Christian women being stoned. It is under this extreme 
disagreement over religious identity which made the SPLM to another shift, in order to negotiate 
over the building of two states: a Northern state, under the Sharia and another state of South Sudan, 
under secularism. Citizens should be allowed to vote, during a transitional period between two 
models, either the first model of „New Sudan‟ or the model of confederation, but not the current 
model of an “Islamic Arabic Sudan”
1069
 and not even the model based on the indigenous „African 
Secular Sudan‟, because, it also lacks political consensus. Therefore, the only viable alternative 
resolution is the model of two separate states. This happens, after the end of the agreed tenure of a 
transitional period, where the people of the South would vote for self-determination between unity 
and separation of the two territories.
1070
 
   Responses of some students, Muslims, Christians and Animists in Sudan to the questionnaire 
strongly demonstrate that war in Sudan has been fought between the adherents of ethnic territorial 
national pluralism in opposition to the adherents of ethnic territorial nationalism. The former call 
for the adoption of a diverse constitutional system that reflects inclusive cultures in the territory and 
the latter calls for the adoption of the specific identity based on Islamic and Arab culture. These two 
schools have widened their lines of disagreement and that threatens the territorial integrity of 
Sudan. The Christian Animist students argue that “In Sudan, we the indigenous African Animists, 
Muslims and Christians in the Southern territory, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana and Darfur have been 
the subjects of abuse and oppression in our home. Today, we have … united, under the slogan of 
„New Sudan‟ which is free from religious and Arabic slogans that divide us”.
1071
 On the other hand, 
some Muslim students at the University of Khartoum and other universities with ethnic Arab 
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background maintain that the concept of „New Sudan‟ is a complete attempt to remove their Islamic 
religion and Arabic identity from Sudan.
1072
  
   These contradictory statements, even though they come as individual opinions give an impression 
of the existing political relationships between the Christians and Animists of the South in unity with 
the indigenous Muslims of Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Ingessana. The people of the South feel 
wrath towards the Muslim Arabs in power. The presence of such wrath will probably lead to the 
separation of the two religious identities in a referendum of self-determination in early January 
2011 or such a situation will change and the Christians and Animists in the South vote for the 
maintenance of unity.  According to Collins, no amount of rhetoric can overcome the fact that today 
overwhelming numbers of Southern Sudanese are open to speak out as separatists. This is no 
surprise after the slavery, discrimination and racism that they have severely endured at the hands of 
the Northern Muslim Arabs in power. Since independence, too many promises have been broken 
and millions have been killed or driven from their homes. The people of the South are still often 
despised. Collins concludes that it is time the two million unwanted Southern Sudanese Christians 
and Animists milling around Khartoum leave and go to their independent home, South Sudan after 
the referendum of 2011 and under international supervision.
1073
 
   Self-determination for the people of the South was not initially an easy political decision, during 
the successive peace negotiations. Political negotiations were shifted under the auspices of a 
regional organisation, known as Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development 
(IGADD), after the collapse of political talks between the warring parties in Abuja I and II from 26 
April to 18 May 1993. The IGADD is a regional organisation composed of the Eastern African 
countries of Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan.
1074
  On 7 September 1993, the 
IGADD established a „Peace Committee‟ and charged it as a mediating body between the SPLM 
and the Government of Sudan. During political negotiations between these two parties, the head of 
the government delegation, Ghazi Saleh el-Din el-Atabani, announced at a press conference held in 
Nairobi, Kenya that the issue of self-determination had no legal or political basis and the state of 
Sudan would continue to be ruled by the Sharia. On the other hand, the SPLM at its press 
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conference reiterated the importance of separating state and religion and the right of self-
determination to the people of South Sudan to choose between unity with and separation from the 
North, under the international supervision of the United Nations.
1075
   
   Those two press conferences demonstrated the crucial political differences over the issue of self-
determination and separation of religion from the state. In the view of one student: “No one can … 
negotiate with Muslim fundamentalists; it is either you defeat them at the frontline of war or they 
annihilate you. Defeating them on the battlefields of war is a medicine that forces them to the table 
in peaceful negotiation. If you are weak militarily, then you are finished”.
1076
 A lack of progress at 
different forums of peace negotiations between July 18-30 and 6-7 September 1994 was caused by 
the rejection of the Government of Sudan to concede pluralism of cultures and its insistence that the 
Sharia would not be rescinded. Ghazi Saleh el-Din el-Atabani, the head of the government 
delegation and a State Minister at the Presidential Office presumed at another press conference in 
Nairobi that an Islamic Empire would have eventually been established in Africa, if it had not been 
hindered by European colonialism. As colonialism had now been defeated the Government of 
Sudan wished to continue the injunction of Islam not in South Sudan alone, but beyond.
1077
 He also 
declared that the intention of the government delegation in Nairobi was not to negotiate on Sharia 
and self-determination. These two entities could not be negotiated on a political table.
1078
  
   This statement from the head of a peace delegation shows that political settlement was by then 
stagnant, since negotiations over two central issues, separation of state from religion and self-
determination could not be approached. The matter could only be settled by the use of force. A 
Nuba Muslim student from Nuba Mountains states: “The Islamists reject a pluralistic constitution in 
order to get away with Sudan as an Arab Islamic state, but we are not Arabs and our former leader 
Dr John Garang taught them some … lessons on the battlefield and that forced them to the table to 
negotiated in good faith. It was under the bullet of a gun from Garang which fractured them and 
accepted the provision of self -determination to the people of the South and „popular consultation‟ 
to the Nuba which is also self-determination”.
1079
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   There was nothing left for the peace negotiations of the IGAAD Ministerial Committee after the 
refusal of the government to negotiate over the Sharia and a provision of self determination to the 
Christians and Animists of the South as the SPLM was not prepared to give up these conditions. 
John Garang described the fall of the peace negotiations as a “Zero Interim Period”.
1080
 A Dinka 
Christian Animist student argues that: “Omer Al-Bashir as a Muslim Arab imposes constitutional 
Sharia on us and when we say no, then he puts a good number of guns at our chests, and when we 
looked around for the reaction of our friends and brothers in faith, there was no one, except the 
United States of America, Norway, Great Britain and Italy. These are our brothers; they have … 
fulfilled the Jieng wise proverb that says: „God makes me sick in order to know my brother‟. These 
countries supported the people of the South by the time we were faced by the threat of forced 
Islamisation and Arabisation in Sudan.”
1081
 
   Public opinion among the students from the South, Nuba Mountains and Darfur tends to praise the 
United States and its government. Amina Adam Ahmed from Darfur states:  “The USA provides us 
humanitarian shelter; without the USA, we would have … perished under Al-Basher‟s guns”.
1082
 It 
is t be noted that the humanitarian involvement of the USA in support of the people of Southern 
Sudan has established a sense of „brotherhood‟ among many Christians and Animist in the South. It 
dates back to 1989, when US Congressman Mickey Leland from Texas visited the Southern 
Sudanese refugees in western Ethiopia. The visit ended up in a tragic accident, when his plane 
crashed killing him along with fifteen others.
1083
 Second, during the peace talks the Government of 




   Despite the praise from some students, among the majority of Muslim Arab students, the United 
States is not favoured. A student at University of Khartoum argues: “John Garang had wanted a 
constitutional system that makes us become secularists in order to surrender us to the USA. During 
the war … the National Democratic Alliance, NDA betrayed the message of our religion. The 
Muslim political parties within NDA cooperated with the enemy of the people, the USA and John 
Garang with his dangerous philosophy of „New Sudan‟ and they accepted the provision of self-
 
 
1080 Sumbeiywo, op. cit., p. 36. 
1081 Deng Dac Atem, a Christian Animist, University of Juba. 
1082 Amina Adam Ahmed, a Muslim Fur, University of Khartoum. 






determination to the South. To me, that unity was treason; the USA with its International Zionist 
Movement will consider the South as a base to destroy the Islamic propaganda in Africa.”
1085
  
   The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) composed of fifteen political associations which forged 
an alliance, after the military government under Al-Bashir seized power in 1989. The NDA allied 
with the SPLM and accepted the separation of state from religion. In June 1995, the NDA 
announced in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, a document called „Declaration of Principles‟ (DOP), 
according to which, unity with the South must be made through allowing the people of the South to 
exercise the right to self-determination.
1086
 In October 2002 George W Bush, the President of the 
United States, signed the document called „Sudanese Peace Act‟, which pressed the warring parties, 
the Government of Sudan and the SPLM to adhere to the principle of peaceful negotiations.
1087
 In 
2002, the Government of Sudan finally accepted the provision of self- determination to the 
Christians and Animists of South Sudan, during peace negotiations at the town of Machakos, Kenya 
held from 18 June to 20 July 2002. The document of the agreement came to be known as the 
Machakos Protocol.
1088
   
6.4.1 Self-determination and popular consultations 
Generally, self-determination emerges as a political objective for a minority that feels that they have 
been exposed to injustice by the governing group of a sovereign state. In international politics, this 
term gained credence after the First World War, when the victorious great powers asserted that 
ethnic nationals that lived in multiethnic Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires should 
be allowed to determine their political destiny. In practical terms, the right to self-determination was 
nevertheless denied to the defeated nations, such as Germans living in territories annexed by the 
winners, and especially to all non-European peoples living in the colonies.
1089
  
   Peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM led to the ratification of 
peace on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi, under a document called „Comprehensive Peace Agreement‟, 
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 Its terms include article 2.5, which allows the right of self-determination for the people of 
South Sudan to be exercised in an internationally supervised referendum organised jointly by the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A after six years of transitional period. The people of the 
South are to vote either to maintain the present form of a unified Sudanese state or to separate the 
South from the North to form a new independent state.
1091
 Article 3 of the CPA grants to the Nuba 
Mountains and Ingessana (Southern Blue Nile) less right called „Popular Consultations‟ rather than 
self-determination. Paragraph 3.3 of this article stipulates that the legislature of the two States shall 
each establish a Parliamentary Assessment of Evaluation Commission to assess and evaluate the 
implementation of the agreement in each State. The two Commissions shall submit their reports to 
the legislature of the two States by the fourth year of the signing of the CPA.
1092
  
   The issues at stake in the vote are vast, but certain main provisions can be highlighted. Chapter 
three of the CPA deals with the „Sharing of Wealth‟. Article three paragraphs 5.6 articulates that, 
after payments to the Oil Revenue Stabilisation Account and to the oil producing states and regions, 
fifty per cent of the remaining net revenue derived from the oil producing wells in Southern Sudan 
shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) at the beginning of the Pre-Interim 
Period. The remaining fifty per cent goes to the National Government and to the other States at the 
centre, west, east and far north which are called the Northern territory of Sudan.
1093
  
   There are factors in the views of the Animist and Christian students from the South which may 
prompt the indigenous groups in South Sudan to opt for the secession, rather than, unity, yet there is 
no certainty, since students‟ views do not necessarily represent the native people of the South. The 
answers of the Christian Animists to the question, What system suits Sudan best and how do you 
want national identity to be defined in a national constitution of Sudan and why you think so imply 
that these students would not desire the co-existence with the North, because of the 50% of oil 
revenues which the North currently takes from them and goes without a corresponding economic 
contribution to the South. Students argue that the South has no economic advantage to maintain its 
current social and political links to the North. Atong Riak Akon Riak, a Dinka Christian Animist 
student at the University of Khartoum states: “The unity of Sudan should not be maintained at the 
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expense of the South. We produce oil in our land and Comprehensive Peace Agreement compels us 
to give fifty percent of it to our enemies. Who benefits from this unity, we must end this method of 
strengthening the enemy of the people by voting for independence”.
1094
 For Galvin and Cooper, 
social exchange theory suggests that, human beings desire social, economic and political 
relationships that benefit each party. They value relationships in which rewards are greater than 
costs and logically, the theory cannot suggest that human beings desire relationships in which the 
cost outweighs the reward.
1095
  
6.4.2 Attractive unity 
Article 3.2, sub-paragraphs 2.4.2 of the CPA dictate the “Government of National Unity, (GONU) 
in Sudan to improve institutions and arrangements created, under the agreement in order to make 
the unity of Sudan attractive to the Christian and Animists of the South”.
1096
 The responding 
Christian and Animist students from the Southern territories unanimously indicate to vote for a 
separation, because of what some of them call „dissatisfactions‟. They argue that: “There are so 
many … political dissatisfactions and we will vote for separation, because of the long bad terms of 
political, cultural and social relationships between us and the Muslim Arabs in power. Our 
relationships have been entirely based on discrimination that enslaved and Islamised us. Since the 
foundation of Sudan, Muslim Arabs at the North held power and arrogantly categorised us in the 
South to the social category of second-class citizens in our own land. Separation removes all these 
political inequities … of Muslim Arabs against us”.
1097
 The students continue to say: “The claim at 
the CPA that unity must be made „attractive‟ is nothing. Nothing at all can heal the wounds of racial 
discrimination for more than one hundred years of slavery”.
1098
 One of them concludes: “Who 
wants to tolerate the harsh rules of the Sharia; I for one, I will vote for the separation and leave 
them to chop their own limbs with their Sharia”.
1099
 
    The claim of racial discrimination between the ruling Islamic North and the „marginalised‟ South 
is one factor threatening the maintenance of the territorial sovereignty of Sudan in 2011.  
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Addressing a mass rally during an anniversary celebration in Rumbek, the capital city of Lakes 
State, South Sudan for the foundation of the SPLM and the SPLA, the founder and former head of 
these organisations, John Garang proclaimed that the challenge now for the Government of Sudan is 
to make unity attractive to the people of the South Sudan in order for them to vote for unity during 
the referendum in 2011. If unity is not made attractive, why would any Southerner vote himself or 
herself to be a second class citizen? Garang concluded that: … if Sudan does not sufficiently and 
fundamentally change, why anybody should vote to become a servant, instead of being a master in 
his or her own independent house”.
1100
 
   Additionally, the current President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit echoes the same rhetoric 
on certain occasions. For instance, addressing the Christian worshippers at the cathedral of the 
Catholic Church in Juba, Mayardit stated: “When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours; if 
you want to vote for unity, so that you become second-class citizens in your own country that is 
your choice. If you want to vote for independence, so that you are a free person in your independent 
state that will be your own choice and we will respect the choice of the people”.
1101
  
   „Independence‟ is a new legal term of Mayardit, rather than „secession‟ which is the term used in 
Part (A) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, under the title Agreed Principles. Article (2) with 
its subheading of 2.5 states “At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an 
internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS and the SPLM/A, for the 
people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of 
government established, under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession”.
1102
 What has 
influenced Mayardit to suspend the use of „secession‟ and adopt „independence in national forums? 
According to Rolandsen, Sudan is a colonial construct, where there is little binding the territorial 
populations of the country together with exception of the shared history of the Condominium rule of 
the Egyptian and the British. The post-colonial system, however, left these territories unchanged 
and prescribed handing over power to the political and economic elite of Muslim Arabs in the 
capital city Khartoum. Under this circumstance, the populations in the peripheries of South Sudan, 
Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Ingessana and Beja were left with a limited degree of connection to the 
national structure. Rolandsen concludes that the people of South Sudan define the present power in 
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their land as an occupying body with intent to alienate their cultures and promote the slave trade, 
slavery and plundering resources of their livelihood.
1103
   
   The description of the presence of the central government institutions in the South as an 
„occupying power‟ with strategies of destruction to cultural identity, slave trade and slavery is an 
adequate reason for Mayardit to shift from „secession‟ to „independence‟ as an authentic relevant 
term to end the „occupation‟. The two terms „secession‟ and „independence‟ are not explicitly 
synonymous. According to Yohannes, the former refers to a state within a union of federation or 
confederation that seeks to secede from the union and the latter refers to the lifting or the 
decolonisation of occupation from a state.
1104
   Historically, there was no lawful cession of South 
Sudan sovereignty to the Northern Sudan. It was an abrupt occupation leading to the territorial unity 
for the interest of power at the expense of the native population. According to Santi and Hill, the 
Nilotic people of South Sudan migrated from the North and eventually remained untouched by the 
Islamic North; however, Turkish Captain Salim commanded three river voyages as an attempt to 
trace the source of the river White Nile in winter of November 1839-42. The unity of the two 
territories became visible through that voyage for the interest of the Islamic Arab ethnic group 
slavers, such as Shaiqqyyia and Danagella. These ethnic groups rendered great services to the 
Turks. Al-Mattamma, a town in the North for notable for its connection to the slave trade derived 
from the South flourished. “Slaves were sold twice a week” and their “prices differed according to 
their provenance”.
1105
 Santi and Hall conclude that the territorial boundaries were passed to the 
subsequent systems and the phenomenon of slavery and slave trade continued towards the 
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7   CONCLUSION 
 
The successive phases of politics in modern Sudan, since the time of its foundation to present time 
manifest dynamics of racism and discrimination in national institutions of the state. All the 
democratic and military systems which have been in power, since the independence of Sudan from 
Great Britain, until now came from the Islamic-Arab North of Sudan with exception of General 
Ibrahim Abboud from the Beja of the eastern Sudan. The political logic of all the successive rulers 
in construction of national identity constitutionally does not consider the existing religious and 
linguistic diversities of institutions in the country as essential reality. Therefore, it applies an ethnic 
territorial nationalism model that adopts monolithic religious laws derived from Sharia and imposes 
Arabic as an official language of working and communication in national institutions of the country. 
In this way, the non-Muslim and the non-Arab citizens become the victims of religious 
discrimination and ethnic racism in sharing of power and national wealth. Thus, the majority of 
students from Darfur, South Sudan, Nuba Mountains and east Sudan of the Beja ethnic group reject 
this model and some identify it as „anomia assimilation‟. Anomia assimilation is defined as a 
difficulty that faces an intended person for assimilation to find a word that can describe the 
measures taken by power in state in eradicating diversity and imposing uniformity of cultures in 
Sudan. In other words, its application in public institutions creates a difficulty in the mind of an 
affected person to find a word describing its consequences, because its effects look incongruous to 
his or her mental and cultural vocabulary. Since, it totally eradicates differences and inserts 
uniformity by elevating the intended unique culture based on intertwined Islam and Arab among 
other cultures through different methods, including legal ones as the imposition of Sharia and the 
use of religious violence in the name of jihad against its opponents.  
   Specifically, the anomia assimilation is the prime cause of the past and present civil conflicts and 
wars. The model has been inserted in national institutions on the basis of exclusion and inclusion 
and subsequently privileged the current population, which identifies itself as Muslim Arabs around 
Khartoum and far north with education and economic opportunities to the exclusion of the 
indigenous non-Arab ethnic groups in the South, Nuba Mountains, and Ingessana Hills. These latter 
areas were categorised or imagined as the regions of slaves. Thus, the political North allowed the 
Jellaba, Arab Muslim merchants to capture the Black population from these regions for slave trade. 





introduced strict measures to eradicate the slave trade and all forms of slavery by closing and 
preventing the entry of Muslim Arabs to the South.  
   In reaction, the adherents of this model were unhappy about this initiative and to some extent 
continued to raid for slaves for some time. This raiding situation made it very difficult for the 
Animists of the South to embrace Islam. Therefore, the Muslim Arabs in Sudan are responsible for 
the intolerance and resistance of the indigenous ethnic groups of South Sudan to Islam. During the 
era of the slave trade, the relationships between the imagined categories of „free Arab Muslims‟ and 
the „slaves‟ were polarized and a sizable majority of these indigenous people of the South rejected 
the conversion to Islam. For this reason, the adherents of the anomia assimilation in control of 
power in the Islamic North constructed the resistant group to conversion as the „lost brothers‟.  
   Nevertheless, the Christian and Animist students from the South and some from the Nuba 
Mountains and Darfur reject this constructed stereotype. In their imaginations, the real „lost 
brothers‟ were the ancient Nubians who had their own slave raiding in Christian Kingdoms in the 
current North Sudan, but were assimilated into an Islamic identity in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries and currently, most of them identify themselves as Muslim Arabs, instead of African 
Muslims.  
   The completely assimilated Nubians to the Islamic-Arab culture have become mostly the 
adherents of anomia assimilation. The group controls power and never ceased from the project of 
assimilation of the African cultures into the Islamic-Arab image. It adopts the intertwined Islamic-
Arab culture as the „imagined‟ model of homogenising its heterogeneous population in the state. 
Even though the model has constructed negatively the population in the South as „the „African 
pagans and slaves‟ it would has functioned successfully, since it had first managed to unify the 
diverse Muslim-African and Arab inhabitants of the east; far north; west and the centre of Sudan, 
under one region the „Muslim Arabs of the Northern Sudan‟. However, the adoption of racism that 
discriminates the non-Arabs within the region has created a dividing line between the Muslim Arabs 
and Muslim Africans. Muslim Arabs discriminate against the Nuba Muslim Africans in the Nuba 
Mountains in public institutions and in their common religion, Islam. In their imagination, Muslim 
Arabs in power treat the Nuba Muslims as dhimmis, protected non-Muslims living within the 
Islamic society. Such a status qualifies them to be „second-class citizens‟. Arab nationality has been 
introduced as the determining factor in social, cultural and political institutions, instead of Islam as 
a unifying faith to all Muslims. The same situation of discrimination in Islam applies to the 





the state to favour Muslim Arabs and marginalise Muslim Africans in economic and political 
dimensions.  
   These discriminated African groups suspend religion and collectively converge and introduce a 
counterforce model of resistance. Today, there is a consensus among the Muslim students from the 
Beja, Darfur and the Nuba Mountains that Islam as a religion is free from this discrimination. 
Muslim Arabs adopt discrimination in the distribution of power and sharing of wealth as their own 
choice and not in accordance to the teaching of the Islamic orthodox. Having been influenced by the 
presence of discrimination in Islam, some Nuba politicians consequently rebelled and joined the 
rebellion movement that had sprung up in the territory of the constructed „pagans and slaves‟ of the 
South. The rebels fought the central government under the name of the SPLM and its military wing, 
the SPLA.  
   The instances of discrimination within the Islamic religion have created a paradigm of dis-
integration of the territorial Muslim Arab North. In early 2002, the indigenous Black African 
population in Darfur rebelled against the central government and founded military and polit ical 
organisations composed mainly of their indigenous ethnic groups. The first and the largest of these 
organisations was the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) 
followed by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These rebels argue that the ruling Muslim 
Arabs discriminate against them in sharing power and wealth. They do not consider religion, Islam 
as the basis of distributing positions and wealth in national institutions, but favour a race, Arab.  
   In reaction to the insurgents and instead to recruit citizens of Sudan, irrespective of race, ethnic 
and religion, the government resorted to the racial recruitment in order to confront both of them in 
Darfur. It constantly recruits the janjaweed (Muslim Arabs) to be its paramilitary soldiers to fight 
specifically the African Black rebels, but the violence has spread to include the whole Black native 
civilian population in Darfur. The combined government military operations with the janjaweed 
have not spared anyone from attack and the killing. And as a result, the attacks have caused a 
humanitarian disaster for the whole indigenous populations in the region and made hope for peace 
difficult. This situation shows that the violence has reached the peak of racism, where the janjaweed 
hunt for the indigenous African Fur, Zagahwa and Massaliet to kill them in their villages. The same 
situation of discrimination in Islam applies to the indigenous Beja ethnic group living along the Red 
Sea of the Eastern Sudan, but the scale of violence has not reached the level of humanitarian 
disaster. The Beja students admit being Muslims, yet they remain as a unique population with their 
customs totally irrelevant to the Muslim Arabs. The students argue that the Beja people experience 





racism of Muslim Arabs in power, the Beja have rebelled, under their ethnic political organisation 
the „Beja Congress‟.     
   The political perspective of Sudan shows that racism has created the formation of ethnic political 
parties in the Northern Islamic territory. The victims of racism and discrimination resort to the 
reconstruction of their political parties, under the basis of ethnicity, so that marginalisation in power 
and wealth sharing is addressed through violence. Currently, the students interviewed are divided 
into two schools as what comes to finding a common constitutional framework that might 
accommodate the Sudanese ethnic and religious diversity. In their imaginations, some Muslim Arab 
students demand the adoption of a constitution defined on two parameters, Islam and Arab. Under 
such a constitution, Sharia is a source of legislature and Arabic is an official language in public 
institutions. These Muslim students argue that, since Muslims are the majority in Sudan, then it is 
an obligation for them to revive the Quran and the Sunna politically and culturally. In their 
imagination, Islam as a religion does not detach culture from a state and Arabic as the language of 
Quran is to be used in the Muslim state such as Sudan. On the other hand, some Muslims, mostly 
from the marginal areas of Darfur, Nuba Mountains unite with the Christian-Animists of the South 
and urge the adoption of a wider constitution that embraces all forms of religious and ethnic 
diversities. In this way, Sharia would not be a basis for a legislature nor Arabic an official language 
in the state. In their imagination, the group maintains that the adoption of an Islamic constitution in 
Sudan is an excuse for one religion in the country to assimilate other religions. Such form of 
assimilation creates a conflict between the assimilating power and the resisting power. Its 
imposition by the Islamic rulers in the state leads to the „anomia assimilation‟. Hence, all Christians 
and Animists with some Muslim students prefer the adoption of a constitutional system that is void 
of religion. Such a constitution would create a „gradable assimilation‟, because it leaves every 
cultural group to absorb into its cultural values other cultural norms without forceful measures taken 
by the state constitutionally.  
   The former President Ja‟afer Muhammed Nimeiri has once adopted the „gradable assimilation‟ as 
reflected in a secular constitution after the Addis Ababa Agreement between his government and 
the former dissidents of the South, the SSLM with its militarily wing, the Anya Nya in 1973. The 
constitution was secular and it gave equal rights for religions to assimilate each other without 
interference from the state‟s power. Religious conflicts arose after Nimeiri abandoned the 
„gradable‟ assimilation and revived the „anomia‟ assimilation. He violated the Addis Ababa 





South into three regions as a means to avoid the unified resistance of the Christian-Animist South to 
the assimilation.  
   Current conflicts in Sudan emerged, because of Nimeiri‟s revival „anomia‟ assimilation. Such 
assimilation represented a gross violation to the agreement and automatically it recycled the 
conflict, thus, the rebellion resumed in the South, leading to the formation of the SPLM and SPLA 
against the government of Nimeiri. Nimeiri of courses had by then its political reasons, however, 
injustice cannot be allowed in order to consolidate or hold power. He abandon „gradable‟ 
assimilation in order to attract support from some new „status groups‟ of the „anomia‟ assimilation 
mainly the Islamic political parties of „Islamic fundamentalism‟ in Northern Sudan. In September 
1983, Nimeiri promulgated on the National Television that the territorial sovereignty of Sudan 
would apply Sharia as the only source for a constitutional code throughout the country. After the 
application of Sharia, since that time until today, Sudan became a centre of ideological religious 
wars. Those who called for the adoption of Sharia were imagined as the „Muslim fundamentalists‟ 
and those Muslims who reject it were labelled as the „moderate Muslims‟ and the „marginalised 
identities‟ when the Christians and the Animists are included.  
   In 1986, the democratic system of multiparty pluralism was revived in Sudan. Sadiq Al-Mahdi 
from the Umma Party became the Premier in a coalition government with the DUP. The political 
circumstances forced the new leader to drop „anomia‟ assimilation and acquiesce to the „gradable‟ 
assimilation by suspending Sharia, due to peace negotiations with the SPLM. This led to another 
coup as Brigadier Omer Hassan Al-Bashir seized power on 30 June 1989 calling or imagining the 
action as Thura el-Ingaz Al-Wathoni (Revolution of National Salvation). Under the new revolution, 
the scale of „anomia‟ assimilation has been too high against the Christian-Animist South and 
moderate Muslims in the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessana Hills.  
   During the war that ended in 2005, they were imagined or labelled as „pagans and apostates‟. 
Jihad was used to justify ethnic cleansing and slavery against them in their areas. The new regime 
shifted the definition of the war from being a political war to an Islamic war against the „infidels‟ of 
the South and the „apostates‟ of the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills of the Southern Blue Nile. 
This imagined definition was sufficient to introduce radical power restructuring in the national 
institutions of Sudan, under the name Tawajha el-Hadhari (civilisation project). Those who were 
seen as displaying resistance to the new Islamic orthodoxy were discharged from public service and 
members of the Tawajha el-Hathari were installed in their places. The PDF, a militia loyal to the 
new regime was established to fight the war against the rebels. The members of the PDF were 





   The climax of the „anomia‟ assimilation was unveiled in el-Obied the capital city of Northern 
Kordofan. In 1992, the exploitation of the Islamic religion in defining war was pursued. The 
government held a conference in el-Obeid to deliberate on the method to be adopted by the new 
recruits, the PDF and the army in unleashing a war against the defined as „infidel‟ rebels. The 
invitees were mainly selected from the Muslim Arabs in exclusion of the Black African Muslims in 
Southern Kordofan of the Nuba Mountains. The Muslim Arab imams in the conference were asked 
to define the war. They unanimously defined it in their imagination as a war between the „Southern 
infidels‟ who cooperated with the Nuba Muslim „apostates‟ and started to fight against the Islamic 
people of Sudan. The imams resorted to Holy Quran and took out verses which could be used in 
issuing a fatwa, an Islamic legal verdict against the categorised „apostates and „infidels‟.  
   In reaction to this fatwa, the Nuba imams and the interviewed students from the region of Nuba 
Mountains do not imagined themselves as „infidels‟. They denounced the fatwa and described it as 
un-Islamic, since they too are Muslims. Yet, violence in the name of Jihad spread in the South, 
Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills against the rebels. On the other hand, the adherents of ethnic 
national pluralism, specifically, the rebels intensified their resistance, under their imagined 
ideological definition of transforming Sudan into what they called the „New Sudan‟. The SPLM 
argued that the „New Sudan‟ is a framework of a national project for building an authentic and 
sustainable state for the citizens, capable to embrace inclusively the multiple diversities of Sudan, 
separating the state from religion and taking secular laws as basic sources of legislature. Thus, each 
from both sides stood behind its ideological discourses of war and violence that claimed the lives of 
more than two million people and an unknown number of people were displaced in neighbouring 
countries or as internal refugees. Generally, the adherents of „anomia‟ assimilation are responsible 
for the perpetual political instability of Sudan. „Gradable‟ assimilation is the only alternative 
approach that can settle these instability problems. It transforms different ethnic and religious 
groups in Sudan into equal status of citizenship, since it allows each group to freely perform 
cultural and ethnic activities without coercive measures from the state.  Its adoption constitutionally 
may create opportunities for fair distribution of power and maintenance of peace and stability. It 
gives a wider space for political competition and building of institutions for all people. Muslim 
Arab leaders in Sudan with some chieftains of political associations who follow the model of 
„anomia‟ assimilation, which aims to structure institutions within the scope of its ethnic and 
religious range is an akin to racial democracy, where a political ethnic Muslim fundamentalist loses 
power in a democratic multiparty contest occasionally resorts to violence of military might in order 





Hassan Abdullah Turabi striped power through the coup headed by President Al-Bashir and in turn, 
Al-Bashir made another coup against him leading to the rift of their Islamic political party, the NIF 
into the NC and PC.  
   The status quo between the NC and PC shows that in Sudan, some political leaders of ethnic 
group may fail to achieve their ideological goals through the democratic means and they option 
violence as an alternative model to keep a tight rein control of power in the state. A group or their 
leader could be possibly from minority that fears the threat of losing the reign of power in an open 
democratic multiparty pluralism, where majority may win. He can resort to take arms to confront its 
other legitimate leader and perhaps for two sheer reasons, first, lust to power and second, 
maintenance of the imagined ethnic ideologies. In operation, a leader of such minority or majority 
does not do that alone, instead, each may choose to rely on his or her ethnic and religious group and 
instigate them in an army to dictate terms of ethnic and religious control. The result of such control 
has become extremely dangerous for the dynamic co-existence of different ethnic and religious 
groups in the territorial sovereign Sudan, since it leads to „anomia‟ assimilation. Currently, the 
adoption of „anomia‟ assimilation as a model of transforming national institutions in Sudan 
threatens the territorial sovereignty of the state. After long drawn-out peace negotiations both sides 
of the conflicting schools accepted the provision of self-determination to the South in a meeting in 
Machakos, Nairobi in 2002. In January 2005, a final peace treaty was agreed upon and signed 
leading to the production of the peace document called the CPA. Its provisions call for a 
referendum in the South to choose between unity with the North or secession from it. There are 
provisions also which give the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills to exercise „Popular 
Consultation‟ to decide on the current established institutions by the CPA in their regions.  
   It is noticeable that „anomia‟ assimilation has created the challenges for the people of Sudan. 
First, will Sudan maintain its territorial national identity in 2011, when the population of South 
Sudan votes in the referendum? It cannot be predicted, however, it would be a decisive moment in 
the life of an individual person in the South to deliberately contemplate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of unity, under „anomia‟ assimilation and secession. Second, some of the insurgents 
in Darfur have also recently started in the public media to ask the adoption of self-determination in 
negotiations with the Government of Sudan. Third, „the Nuba and Ingessana students are very 
critical against the „Popular Consultation‟, hence, they also vehemently demand the adoption of 
self-determination to choose between unity and secession from the Islamic North.  
   Generally, the application of „anomia assimilation‟ by power in Khartoum and its resistance to the 





into the South, Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hill and Hadarieba states. Therefore, there is a 
grave need for the adherents of „anomia‟ assimilation in power to drop their imagination of the 
citizens in Sudan as their Muslim-Arab subjects to be governed by the intertwined Islamic-Arab 
constitution, which treats the citizens, under the basis of religion and ethnicity and allow the 
legislature to constitutionally enact „gradable‟ assimilation laws, which promote ethnic and 
religious diversity. The adoption of such laws would create a political atmosphere that respects 
human rights and allows the people of Sudan to interact within their national institutions without 
religious and ethnic discrimination, which is a source of injustice, racism, discrimination, 
subordination, oppression and marginalisation of Sudan‟s fundamental diversity of its religious and 
linguistic composition that includes the African Muslims and the African Christian-Animists. Such 
political structural model builds a political institution of religious freedom, where an Arab or an 
African Muslim believer goes to a mosque on Friday and an African-Christian-Animist attends 
divine services in a church on Sunday or engages in Animist rituals of libation on a shrine or a 
sanctuary, yet, each one of them imagines others as equal-free citizens of Sudan before the 
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Aci khor Adulteress or someone who has committed adultery in 
Dinka language 
Al-figh Islamic jurisprudence 
Allah God 
Al-Sudd Black people 
Al-Sultanate al-Zerga Black Kingdom. 
Amir el Mumeneen An Islamic pious leader of Muslim believers 
Asmer Brown colour 
Bilad Al-Sudan Land of the Blacks. 
Caliph An Islamic successor. 
Dar Al-hareb Domain of war 
Dar Al-Islam Land of peace 
Dhimmi A term that Muslims use to identify a non-Muslim living in 
Muslims‟ land, under protection. 
Faqih an Islamic Religious person 
Fatiha An introductory part of Quran 
Fatwa Islamic legal edict 
Hadith Sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammed 
Hakimdar General Governor 
Haram Strictly not allowed 
Hayawan al-natigq A derogatory term Muslim Arab use to define a Black 
person in Sudan to mean a speaking animal 
Houris Assumed paradise virgin women 
Hudud A formal Islamic legal code that stones to death a woman 
proved guilty of adultery, amputates cross limbs of a thief 
found guilty of stealing; flogs any person found drunk with 
alcohol  
Hurr al-Dunia Dark eyed virgins of the earth 





Imam Pious Islamic cleric 
Iris al-Shaheed Wedding of Islamic martyrs 
Istihsän Jurist preference 
Isum Ajami A non-Arab name. 
Janjaweed Arab Muslim militia in Darfur 
Jellaba A term the indigenous population uses to distinguish an 
Arab Muslim merchant or many of them including Muslim 
Arab administrators in Sudan 
Jihad Islamic holy war 
Jihadists Islamic holy warriors 
Jin Devil 
Junubi A derogatory name for a person emerging from South 
Sudan and literary means a Southerner. 
Kasha A legalised search for an indigenous ethnic person from the 
South, Darfur and Nuba Mountains residing in Khartoum 
to be arrested and sent back to an original area 
Kawaja White person 
Kawajat White people 
Khar A branch of a river Nile in accordance to the Nilotic of 
Sudan.  
Khor A Dinka term for adultery 
Kiirtoum Khartoum in accordance to the Nilotic people of Sudan. 
Kuffar Infidels or pagans 
Kujur A derogatory definition of the African religious rites 
La Illa‟ ila Allah 
Muhammed Rasul Allah 
There is no God, but God One God and Muhammed is 
God‟s Messenger 
Mekks Nuba Muslim leaders 
Mou Alcohol or liqueur in Dinka language 
Mujahedeen Islamic holy warriors 
Murtadeen Apostates 
Nazareen Name used by Muslims to mean Christians 
Nhialic A Dinka term for God or Lord.  





hope that God gives 
Niqab It is a long piece of cloth that cloaks a Muslim woman 
body over head to toe with a small patch open to see 
Ramadan Holy month of fasting in Muslim calendar  
Ray Opinion 
Sharia Islamic law 
Sheikh A Muslim leader 
Shura Islamic consultation. 
Sudds Swamps of the White Nile 
Sunna Examples and precedents of the Prophet Muhammed 
Sunni Islamic sect 
Tawajha Al-hathari or 
Mashurua Al-hathari  
Both are synonymous terms refer to the orientation project 
to strict Islamic orthodoxy 
Thudan  A specific name for Sudan in accordance to the Nilotic 
people of Southern Sudan 
Thudaniith The Nilotic‟s pronunciation to the term Sudanese 
Thura Al-Ingaz Al-Watoni National Salvation Revolution 
Toum Confluence of the rivers, White and Blue Niles. 
Tujjar ad-din Traders of religion 
Umma Nation of Islam. 
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Please, answer the below questions by circling and writing on your choice. You can 
write in English and Arabic at the given spaces. You can also use extra paper sheet(s), 
if the given space is not enough for your answers. You are free to skip the question 
that you do not want to answer as well as remaining anonymous. 
1. Your  Background 
a. Name---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b. Racial/ ethnic/tribal group 
i. Arab from ethnic/tribal group--------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ii. African from Ethnic/tribal group-----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
c. Gender 
i. Male  
ii. Female 
2. Region. 
a. Your regional background 
i. Far North 
ii. South Sudan 
iii. Darfur (west Sudan) 
iv. Nuba Mountains (west Sudan) 
v. East Sudan 
vi. Centre (El-Gezira) or Khartoum 
b. How did the east, west, far north and centre become the Northern Sudan 
Region in exclusion of the South and what does the name of your region 



















c. Do you think the exclusion of the South has a link with the past civil wars 
between the South and the North, and if you think so, what about the 





















d. Have you ever experienced any form of discrimination in any region of 





















e.  How do you want a national identity of these regions to be defined in a 
national constitution of Sudan and under what system suits Sudan best and 




















f. Do you think that cross-marriages can curtail regional diversity in Sudan and 
if so; what marriage do you prefer and explain why? 
             i. Exogamous marriage  
             ii. Endogamous marriage 





















g. Do you think national projects such as oil; Canal Jonglei and Al-Gezira Scheme can 
create cross interaction and equal work opportunities for the diverse regions of 
























3. Your Religious Background 
a. Your religious affiliation/identity  
i. Christian  
ii. Muslim  
iii. Animist  
iv. Christian-Animist 
 v. Muslim -Animist. 
vi. Agnostic 
vii. Any other 
 
b. Is religion important and what is your concept about the world in accordance to 
























c. How conversion from one religion to another religion in Sudan is conducted; do 
you encounter an obstruction on the process and have you ever felt that there has 
been an interference of your ethnic customs, cultures and traditions to your religion, 


























d. What do you think about the people in Sudan who follow other religious faith and 
traditional rituals than yours, and please state the reason of why you think so?  
       i. Lost Sudanese Brothers  
       ii. Free Sudanese Brothers 
      iii. Any Other 













e. How many festivals do you celebrate in your religion; where; how do you offer 





























 f. What are the fundamental duties of the faithful ones in your religion and is there 


















g. What is a practice in your religion regarded as sinful, indecent and immoral in 
which a violator is sentenced, what you think of it and how to deal with believers of 

















1. Questions for the Interview 
a. You define yourself in the question of religious affiliation in the 
questionnaire as „Christian-Animist‟ or „Muslim-Animist‟ how do you 
reconcile Christianity or Islam with Animism in Sudan? 
b. Having answered the question in the questionnaire, „How do you want 
national identity of these regions to be defined in a national constitution of 
Sudan and under what system suits Sudan best and why do you think so? 
You described assimilation in Sudan as „anomia‟, what do you mean?  
c. In your answer to the question, „Have you ever experienced any form of 
discrimination in any region of Sudan, if so please explain? You claim that 
a police urged you to define the face as „brown‟ than your descriptive 
choice „black‟; what do you think about the obligatory description of the 
Ministry for the Interior Affairs the face as „brown‟ than „black‟ in 






Historical background for the search of a national identity in Sudan. 
 
In 1954, just before implementation of independence of Sudan from Great Britain, 
British academic constitutional experts drafted a constitution for the state. During that 
time, two conflicting issues over the form of a constitution that suited the nation state 
between a federal one or unitary constitution developed between the representatives of 
the Christian-Animist-South and the Islamic-Arab-North, which were represented by 
the Islamic sectarian parties, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). 
Politicians from the Christian-Animist-South urged the provision of the South a 
federal system to be codified to a permanent national constitution. In response, the 
political forces of the Islamic-Arab-North embraced this demand to be given after 
independence.
1107
   
   In August 1955, the „Southern Defence Corps‟(SDC) composed of the Christian-
Animist and stationed in Torit, South Sudan rejected participation in celebration of 
Sudan‟s independence from Great Britain and staged a mutiny against the Islamic 
North. The SDC killed the Muslim Arab soldiers and Muslim-Arab civilians in the 
town.
1108
 On 1 January 1956, The British endorsed independence and the Government 
of Sudan, under the DUP rejected the provision of the federation to the Christian-
Animist-South, but the inherited constitution from British that preserved religious and 
ethnic diversity was in operation.
1109
 In 1958, the democratically elected first national 
assembly composed of one hundred and seventy three Members of the Parliament 
(MPs) coming from the Umma, the DUP and the Federal Party (FP) a political 
organisation represented the Christian-Animist South started to discuss the issue of 
national identity. During the parliamentary debates about the constitutional system in 
 
 
1107Johnson, Douglas Hamilton (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan‟s Civil Wars, Oxford: James Currey, 
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the state, the forty MPs from the Christian-Animist-South urged the Islamic-North 
political parties in the parliament to legislate two equal religions and equal languages 
in the state. In their view, both Arabic and English should be taught in the South and 
Islam and Christianity should be legalised on equal status in national institutions of 
the country. The MPs maintained that the Christian-Animist population of the South 
should not be culturally oriented towards the Islamic Arab world, but that of Africa. 
They also requested the provision of federalism and maintenance of the existing 
Southern independent army. In reaction, the Islamic Arab political majority rejected 
these demands and urged the adoption of the Islamic constitution, where the criminal 
and civil laws are derived from Sharia and Arabic be an official language of the state.  
   In June 1958, the Muslim majority agreed to pass the Islamic bill in the parliament, 
but the forty Christian-Animist MPs walked away from the parliament. On the 
following day, the indigenous African-Muslim-politicians from Darfur, Nuba and 
Beja united with the Christian-Animist-South and demanded the necessity of 
decentralisation, instead of centralisation of Sudan system.
1110
 After five months of 
the contest over the issue of national identity, the Northern Muslim democratic leaders 
were dissatisfied over the resistance they faced from the MPs of the Christian-Animist 
South and their alternative was rumoured to be a handing over of power to an Arab 
Muslim military man to dictate the ideological terms of assimilation to the Islamic 




November 1958, the Commander-
in Chief of the army, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power and proclaimed himself 
as the President of the state. In May 1962, Abboud introduced a bill known as the 
„Missionary Societies Act‟, which defined regulations for the non-Muslim religious 
activities within the state. In February 1964 three hundred Christian missionaries were 
expelled from the territorial Sudan. Institutions of education in the South were entirely 
Arabised. Sunday as the day of worship for the Christians was substituted with Friday, 
the Muslims‟ worship day.
1112
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  In October 1964, popular uprising forced Abboud to resign. Sirr al-Khatim al-
Khaliffa became the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government and started 
contacts with political Christian Animist-activists from the South to resume political 
discussion on the issue of national identity. In March 1965, a conference known as the 
„Round Table Conference‟ was held in Khartoum and its agenda was to address the 
conflict of identity. Political figures from the Islamic North and Christian-Animist 
South attended the conference, but with different visions of constitutional formula. 
Political organisations from the Christian-Animist South were divided as the Sudan 
African National Union (SANU) rifted to two factions. One of them negotiated for the 
exceptional provision of federalism to the South, while the other demanded total 
independence from the Islamic North and the Southern Front, PF asserted the right of 
the Christian-Animist-South to self-determination. African observers proposed the 
formation of a „Twelve Men Committee‟ composed of equal number of 
representatives from the Christian-Animist-South and the Islamic-Arab-North. Their 
mandate was to draft a new constitution. The representatives of the conference 
proposed the system which might embrace all forms of religious faiths and negotiated 
them and finally endorsed the proposal which recommended the maintenance of 
religious diversity. Their recommendation, however, was not implemented as the 
transitional period ended and the multi party democratic system resumed power in 
April 1965 and in the subsequent democratic elections of April 1968. Throughout this 
democratic period, political debates focused on finding a constitutional system which 
addressed the issue of national identity. All attempts of finding alternatives could not 
be reached, because of the divisions between the Christian-Animist-South and the 
Islamic-Arab-North. The Northern Muslims and Arabs at the national legislature 
asserted un-changed position which asserted Sharia as a source of both civil and 
criminal legal codes and Arabic as an official language of the state. On the contrary, 
the Christian-Animist-people of the South again resisted such constitution and defined 










   On 25 May 1969, colonel Ja‟afer Muhammad Nimeiri an officer in the army seized 
power and settled the problem of national identity with the Christian-Animist-South in 
political negotiations held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1972. The „Addis Ababa 
Agreement‟ endorsed the system which respected the existing diversity of ethnic and 
religious pluralism within a unified territorial Sudan. The agreement gave regional 
self autonomy system to the Christian-Animist-South centralised in Juba as a capital 
of the unified provinces of Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in South 
Sudan.
1114
    
   In 1979, President Nimeiri introduced intensive measures to dismantle the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. First, he instructed the Attorney General, Hassan Abdullah Turabi 
to produce a bill in the parliament of one party system (SSU) to annex the rich oil 
territories from the South to the North.
1115
 Second, he decreed the re-division of the 
unified South composed of the above mentioned three provinces into disintegrated 
three regions. In this perspective, some Christian-Animist politicians of the Southern 
identity reacted and interpreted those measures as serious violations of chapter 1, 2: iii 
of the Addis Ababa Agreement and some of them decided to take up arms against 
Nimeiri. On 16 May 1983, some soldiers mainly from the Christian-Animist Dinka, 
Nuer and Shilluk ethnic groups widely known as Nilotics rebelled against the regime 
of Nimeiri and formed the SPLA and SPLM, a political wing.
1116
  
   In September 1983, Nimeiri unilaterally imposed Sharia and declared it as the only 
source of legal organs in Sudan.
1117
 In 1985, the Umma party, SCP with other 
different political organisations of the opposition, including the SPLM united under 
umbrella of NANS and held a meeting in London. After a long deliberation, the 
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NANS issued a charter that called for the restoration and adoption of the provisional 
constitution of 1956, which preserved religious diversity in the country.
1118
   
   In April 1985, popular uprising dismantled Nimeiri regime and General Suwar al-
Dhab filled the vacuum of power, however, he continued to maintain Sharia. On 10 
October the transitional government adopted the provisional constitution of 1956 and 
amended in 1964, which considered both Sharia and the customary laws as sources of 
legislature. The SPLM was dissatisfied with the maintenance of Sharia and urged 
Suwar al Dhab to restore secular laws. In April 1986, Suwar al Dhab returned power 
to the democratically elected government. Umma and DUP parties formed a coalition 
government, in which Sadiq al-Mahdi from the Umma became a Prime Minister and 
countered three major problems and dilemmas. First, he had an obligation to 
implement the charter, which his party signed with the NANS in London 1985. 
Second, he had ratified with the SPLM a charter, „Koka Dam Declaration‟ in March 
1986. Both charters invoked the abrogation of Sharia. Third, the DUP, which shared 
power with his party, rejected the Koka Dam Declaration.
1119
  
   In June 1989, the Umma, DUP, SCP, USAP and other political forces with the 
exception of the NIF acquiesced to the pressure of the SPLM to abrogate Sharia. 
These political parties started to „freeze‟ Sharia in the National Assembly, but the 
Islamists were unhappy on this initiative, but they were minority in the parliament. On 
29
 
June 1989 Brigadier Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir seized power from the 
democratically elected government and declared himself President of Sudan. Al-
Bashir called his military regime as the „Salvation Revolution‟. Under Al-Bashir, all 
the political parties were banned and Sharia was declared to be a sole guidance for all 
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